

ΑΝΑΛΕΚΤΑ ΒΛΑΤΑΔΩΝ
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GEORGE L. KUSTAS

STUDIES IN BYZANTINE RHETORIC

ΣΠΟΥΔΑΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ
ΜΕΣΑΙΩΝΙΚΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΦΙΛΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ
ΚΑΙ ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΝΗΣ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ



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ΕΚΔΙΔΟΜΕΝΑ ΥΠΟ
ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΟΥ Κ. ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥ

*To the Memory of
my Wife and my Father*

ANALECTA VLATADON

EDITED BY
PANAYOTIS C. CHRISTOU

17

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«Verily thou art a God that
hidest thyself»

Isaiah 45:15

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1. Listed as anonymous by SP-H. Psellus' name appears in Escor. Φ. III.1 and Y.I.9, in Monac. Gr. 98, and in Ambros. M. 84 sup. In all four manuscripts the work is part of a collection of Pselliana which seems beyond suspicion. I owe this information to Professor L. G. Westerink.

¹ *Ἐκ τῶν Λογίων*, pp. 213-216.

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1. Possibly spurious. See CHRIST - SCHMID - STÄHLIN, 435; C. WENDEL, *RE - PW* s.v. coll. 729-730.

PREFACE

Byzantine rhetoric is an outgrowth from trends within the Second Sophistic movement, to which in time were grafted Neoplatonic and Christian conceptions of the function of language. Modern editors of Byzantine texts often in their commentaries venture to describe the rhetorical habits of the authors they treat, in acknowledgement of the fact that the strong hand of rhetoric directs the great bulk of mediaeval Greek literature. However, no extended analysis has so far been made of the underlying principles of Byzantine rhetorical philosophy and their historical development.

This study is designed as a contribution to this end. It takes its stimulus from the conviction that Byzantium bestowed upon the art of rhetoric an authority to define its intellectual and spiritual vision which is without parallel in the history of literate societies. Rhetoric did not simply provide the machinery of literary endeavor; it was a key element of the Byzantine *Weltanschauung*. It gave formal structure through the logos to the fundamental characteristics and innermost aspirations of the Byzantine Christian mind. More than a habit of literature, it was an expression of life. Better still, it might be both at once, for it held out a special way of looking at words and how they work which rested ultimately on the claims of Christian ontology. Its fortunes, describing yet another instance of that effort toward synthesis which is the hallmark of the Byzantine achievement as a whole, can therefore best be understood in relation to the trends of Byzantine culture itself. Hence the book here presented is an excursion in the history of ideas and their interaction, rhetorical, philosophical, religious, and to some degree political and social. Such an approach should help us to apprehend the overwhelming fascination which rhetoric in Byzantium compelled both among those who wrote in accordance with its principles and those who read or hearkened to its charm.

My interest in the subject is of long standing. It first issued in a published study entitled, "The Literary Criticism of Photius: A Christian

Definition of Style," *Ελληνικά* 17 (1960), 132-169. It was renewed following an invitation to address a symposium on the history of rhetoric held at the University of California at Los Angeles in the spring of 1965. My contribution appears in the first issue of *Viator* (1970), 55 - 73, under the title, "The Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric." I have adopted some of the results of these two papers. However, my estimate of Hermogenes has in the light of subsequent investigation changed somewhat in his favor from that expressed in 1960. In 1967 I explored a related set of problems dealing with the rhetoric of late antiquity in a lecture delivered before the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies of the University of Toronto. In substantially revised form the address marks the second chapter of this study. For the book as a whole I have chosen a general title in the feeling that anything more specific would compromise the independence of the individual chapters. At the same time, a number of themes recurring throughout provide a natural, though loose, unity. The rationale is treated in Chapter I (p.12) as part of the analysis of the sources and the use to which they are put in the later chapters. I have quoted freely from the Greek texts, partly for reasons of exposition and analysis and partly by way of compensation for the scarcity of some of the works cited.

The basic source book for Byzantine rhetoric is the collection of rhetorical treatises and scholia edited by C. Walz in 9 volumes, Stuttgart, 1832-1836. As a result of subsequent scholarship, particularly by Hugo Rabe and his school, we now possess an improved text of some of these works, along with changes in dating and authorship. At the time of his death Rabe was working on a new edition of some of the remaining treatises. His considerable *Nachlaß*, now on file with the German Academy in East Berlin, will eventually no doubt be published. I venture, however, in the meantime to expect that the important changes and additions which will surely be forthcoming will not substantially affect the general propositions offered here.

Most of the writing was done at the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library in Washington, D.C. in 1969 while I was on leave from my university. Thanks to a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies the work was put into final form in the course of a stay at Princeton University in the spring of 1970. To both these institutions for permitting me the use of their facilities, and to their library staffs for many kindnesses, I here express my deep appreciation. My debt to Professor Harry Caplan of Cornell University and to my colleague, Professor Le-

endert G. Westerink, both of whom read early drafts of the manuscript, is large. I feel a special gratitude to Mr. Basil Laourdas for his comments on a portion of the work and his support in the production of the whole. His recent untimely death leaves a gap in the ranks of scholarship in modern Greece which will not easily be filled. I wish also to thank the authorities of the State University of New York at Buffalo for granting me the leave necessary to pursue my research and, finally, the Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies in Thessalonica which through its learned Director, Professor Panayotis Christou, and his associate, Dr. Evangelos Chrysos, has undertaken to publish the results. To my wife's role in these proceedings it is especially difficult to do justice. Her unquestioning confidence and unfailing encouragement, particularly when she was least aware that she was giving it, have not only inspired the work but in a larger sense have assured its very existence. *Requiescat in pace.*

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Buffalo, New York

George L. Kustas

CHAPTER ONE

HERMOGENES, APHTHONIUS, AND THE NEOPLATONISTS

In the second century of the Christian era the trends in the tradition of Greek rhetoric are essentially two. One is represented by the figure of Minucianus, the other by Hermogenes of Tarsus. Minucianus has a fine literary pedigree: he is related to Plutarch and to the sophist, Himerius. Athens is the center of his activity and influence. He is known to us as the author, *inter alia*, of a commentary on Demosthenes, of a book on stasis, i.e., the types of issue in court cases, and of a series of *progymnasmata*, those popular exercises or set compositions which illustrated the categories of rhetorical art laid down in the schools. If for no other reason than that he dealt with the same subjects,¹ Hermogenes clashed with him.² Traces of the conflict can be detected in the fragments and notices of Minucianus which have come down to us. Now it is Hermogenes, not Minucianus, who survived to become the basis of Byzantine rhetoric. The commentaries on his text start shortly after his death and continue apace throughout the whole of Byzantine history. After the end of the fifth century there is hardly any Byzantine intellectual who is not touched by him.³ His works, following the extensive scholarly

1. SYRIANUS, 2.2.3, mentions Hermogenes' commentary on Demosthenes, now lost: εἰς τὴν Δημοσθένειν γέγραφε ὑπομνήματα. Discussion in RABE, *Hermogenes*, p. xii; RADERMACHER, col. 877.4-9. On the *Progymnasmata* and *De Statibus* see p. 19. Minucianus was born probably under Trajan and was active during the reign of Antoninus Pius (138-161) and later. This makes him a generation younger than Hermogenes, whose birth date is put around 160. Hermogenes lived to a ripe old age, but his literary works were composed very early, starting in his teens. Full biographical details by W. STEGEMANN, *RE-PW* s.v. Minucianus (No. 1).

2. For the reconstruction of this episode in the history of rhetoric see O. SCHISSEL, «Die Familie des Minucianus,» *Klio* 21 (1927) 363-373. The fragments of Minucianus are collected and discussed by S. GLÖCKNER, *Quaestiones Rhetoricae. Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen* 8.2, Breslau 1901. See also RABE, *Prolog. Syll.*, p. xiii.

3. A special situation is the sixth-century school of Gaza. The activities of the

effort expended on him by the Neoplatonists, come to stand for rhetoric itself. By the late Middle Ages he has passed to the West, where he helps define the standards of Renaissance literature both on the continent and in England.¹ The formulae which he set forth continue still in force in some quarters of modern Greek education.² The host of Byzantine scholia on his text, many compiled by some of the most famous names in Byzantine intellectual history, such as John Geometres, Michael Psellus, John Tzetzes, Maximus Planudes, and George Gemistus Pletho³, not to mention the steady application of his principles in the various genres of mediaeval Greek literature of every age, bespeaks a remarkable influence practically without parallel in the history of education.

The victory of Hermogenes over Minucianus was not immediate. Throughout the third century the two authors appear to be equally in favor⁴. The best known member of the opposition is Porphyry, who

school were wide enough in scope to have their own momentum. Hermogenes, though probably known to its representatives, is not central to their views as he is in other circles of the Byzantine world. On the school see K. SEITZ, *Die Schule von Gaza. Eine literaturgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, Diss. Heidelberg 1892; G. DOWNEY, «The Christian Schools of Palestine: A Chapter in Literary History», *Harvard Library Bulletin* 12 (1958) 297-319; also pp. 59 ff., *infra*, for a fuller assessment.

1. See the important new book by Patterson on this subject (see Bibliography). Patterson's historical review and analysis of Hermogenes' rhetorical system as seen through the eyes of Renaissance translators of his work have opened a new field in English and Italian studies by showing the important role which the rhetorician played in the educational patterns and literary achievements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some of the historical parallels are striking: for example, it is the Neoplatonists who both in late antiquity and in the Renaissance find Hermogenes' principles compatible with their own philosophical views and as a result are particularly instrumental in spreading his teachings. See PATTERSON, 35 ff. and pp. 9 ff., 19 ff., *infra*.

2. This may be easily seen by perusing recent modern Greek books dealing with rhetoric, especially K. PAPANICOLAOU, *Ῥητορική Τέχνη*, Athens n.d., with a valuable bibliography, pp. 467-470, on post-Byzantine Greek rhetoric; also P. TREMPERAS, *Ὀμιλητική ἢ Ἱστορία καὶ Θεωρία τοῦ Κηρύγματος*, Athens 1950; K. KOURKOUΛAS, *Ἡ Θεωρία τοῦ Κηρύγματος κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τῆς Τουρκοκρατίας*, Athens 1957.

3. In addition to the frequent mention and use of Hermogenes throughout his works, and beside the *opusculum* in Spengel which belongs to him (see p. XIV), Psellus has left us two tracts, the first in verse, containing paraphrases of Hermogenes' principles: *Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς*, 3. 687-703 W, and *Σύνοψις τῶν Ῥητορικῶν ἰδεῶν*, 5. 601-605 W. TZETZES' verse account, *Ἐπιτομή Ῥητορικῆς*, is in 3.670-686 W; PLETHO'S *Σύντομή περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς Ῥητορικῆς* in 6.544-598 W. Geometres and Planudes are treated in *extenso* pp. 24 ff. and 21 ff.

4. W. STEGEMANN, *RE-PW*, s.v. Minucianus col. 1985.25 ff.; O. SCHISSEL, *RE-PW*, s.v. Sulpicius Victor, col. 873.26 ff.

composed a commentary on Minucianus, prompted probably in part by his being the student of Minucianus' great grandson and namesake.¹ By the fourth century the pendulum begins to swing in the direction of Hermogenes, as witness the attention which Iamblichus appears to devote to him.² By the fifth the issue is settled. The commentary by the Neoplatonist Syrianus is one of the most extensive to come down to us. Hermogenes' sphere of influence had been Rome, Antioch, and Alexandria. Syrianus is part of the fifth-century migration of scholars from Alexandria to Athens. His departure brought the battle to Minucianus' home ground, where Hermogenes finally emerged victorious. The works of his defeated opponents now generally survive in shattered fragments as comments upon the text of Hermogenes himself, alongside the remarks of his friends. No author can hope for a victory more complete or a homage more supine.

Neoplatonic interest in rhetoric is thus very strong and continues throughout the history of the movement. Though most of it circles round Hermogenes, we can detect other strands as well. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is less in evidence than perhaps one might expect, although Olympiodorus, the sixth-century Alexandrian scholar, quotes not infrequently from it in his commentary on Plato's *Gorgias* and mentions it twice in his commentary on *First Alcibiades*.³ The question whether to regard the *Rhe-*

1. *Εἰς τὴν Μινουκιανοῦ τέχνην*, which is probably a title, is mentioned by the *Suda*. On Porphyry's rhetorical works see R. BEUTLER, *RE-PW* s.v. Porphyry also wrote a *De Statibus*, mentioned by SYRIANUS 2.14.9.

2. RABE, *Prolog. Syll.*, p. xx. Iamblichus' involvement with Hermogenes is known from Syrianus, who in commenting upon Hermogenes, 215.8-10, quotes from Iamblichus' lost *Περὶ κρίσεως ἀρίστου λόγου*, 1.9.10-18. However, the quotation does not show the distinctive vocabulary of Hermogenes, so that it is unclear whether Iamblichus is reacting in his own language to his reading of Hermogenes or whether Syrianus or his source has independently adopted from him a quotation not originally related to Hermogenes. Scholars have chosen the first alternative, preferring to see in Syrianus' reference the proof of Iamblichus' direct relation with Hermogenes. See R. BEUTLER, s.v. Porphyry *RE-PW*, col. 300.8 ff.; CHRIST-SCHMID-STÄHLIN, 857, note 7 and 934, note 7; B. KEIL, «Pro Hermogene», *Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse*, 1907, 203; GLÖCKNER, op. cit., 76 ff. The century between Iamblichus († c. 236) and Syrianus († c. 450?), in any case, by steadily paying more and more attention to Hermogenes, ended by making the distinction, assuming it had existed, gratuitous.

3. *Olympiodori in Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria* ed. L. G. WESTERINK, Leipzig, Teubner, 1970. Professor Westerink has expressed to me the opinion that the way in which Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is cited by Olympiodorus suggests that the work was a stand-

toric and the *Poetics* as part of the *Organon*, a concern of Ammonius of Alexandria, is part of a general Neoplatonic interest in the classification of Aristotle's works.¹ In the third-century figure of Cassius Longinus we meet not only an outstanding critic exercising his talents on Homeric and other literary problems, but also a commentator on rhetoric who prefers to avail himself of habits and definitions drawn in part from Aristotle's *Categories*.² The *Anonymus Seguerianus*, Apsines, Cornutus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Menander, Theon, the numerous writers of works entitled *On Tropes* or *On Figures* edited in Spengel's third volume of the Greek rhetoricians, all exercise an independent influence, though it is noticeable that frequent references to them are also imbedded in the scholia on Hermogenes. In any case, the reasons why so many Neoplatonists concern themselves with rhetoric are basically two: the movement, as the successor to Plato, had catholic interests touching on many departments of ancient culture, including religion, literature, science, and philosophy. In addition, there were simply more opportunities for employment in rhetoric than in other fields. Damascius, for example, before assuming the headship of the school at Athens, had for a number of years been a teacher of rhetoric at Alexandria.³ It is likely that this kind of career was not unusual in Neoplatonic ranks.

It has been suggested that in the confrontation between Minucianus and Hermogenes the wrong man won: the philosophically trained, careful, objective champion of Aristotelian principles of rhetorical analysis succumbed before the absolutistic and arbitrary sophist.⁴ Yet it is the Neo-

ard item in the curriculum, so that the lack of commentaries from this period may well be due to chance or to later selection. In *Alc.*: ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἡμῶς ἐν Ῥητορικαῖς τέχναις ἐδίδασκε, 71.8 WESTERINK (71.7-14 ~ *Rhet.* 1359b19-23); ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν Ῥητορικαῖς τέχναις φησὶν, 11.14 (11.13-15 ~ *Rhet.* 1365a29). Other parallels: OLYMPIODORUS, In *Alc.* 100.13-15 ~ *Rhet.* 1358b20-27; PROCLUS, In *Alc.* 183.18 WESTERINK ~ *Rhet.* 1358b20-25; 294.21 ~ 1358b6-8, 20-29; 23.8 ~ 1404a12. See also the two twelfth-century commentaries on the *Rhetoric* edited by RABE, *CAG* 21.2, 1896, which present us with the interesting spectacle of Aristotle interpreted à la Hermogenes.

1. The question may have originally been posed by the Platonist Albinus, 2nd century A.D. See P. MORAUX, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Louvain 1951, 177-182.

2. On Longinus see K. AULITZKY, *RE-PW* s.v. CHRIST-SCHMID-STÄHLIN 934, note 6, calls attention to some passages which seem to reflect the terminology of Hermogenes.

3. PHOTIUS, *Bibliotheca* 126b41: προσθη διατριβῶν ῥητορικῶν ἐπὶ ἑτῇ θ'.

4. So SCHISSEL, *op. cit.*, 372; STEGEMANN, *RE-PW*, s.v. Minucianus, col.

platonists themselves who opted for Hermogenes. They did so not out of a preference for rhetoric over philosophy, but because the underlying principles of his system appeared more in keeping with their own speculations than the more exclusive discriminations of his opponent. Hermogenes survived because he had more to say to the emerging order of things, both pagan and Christian, and because he said it better. When we come to the question of originality, it is true that old terms and definitions abound in the corpus of his writings, but there seems considerable novelty in the system into which he fits them, especially in the case of the *De Ideis*, and there is certainly a seductive clarity of presentation.¹ His work, as I have pointed out elsewhere, has a studied simplicity about it, a quality which was to strike a very sympathetic Byzantine nerve and which he himself holds out as an ideal of style.² Tradition has preserved for us a number of notices to this effect. One records Hermogenes' charge that Minucianus was obscure;³ another tells us that Hermogenes and Aphthonius prevailed over other rhetorical writers because they were

1984.57 ff.; RADERMACHER, col. 370.58-61. The sophist suffers the usual mistreatment at the hands of modern scholars prejudiced in favor of the ancient classics. Two not atypical comments: G. GRUBE, *The Greek and Roman Critics*, Toronto 1964, 368: «There is hardly a spark of originality either in Hermogenes or in his commentators»; J.W.H. ATKINS, s.v. Hermogenes in *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford 1949: «With the philosophical features of rhetoric he was not concerned; he limited himself mainly to the elaborating of unending distinctions and over-subtle rules, which rendered rhetoric fixed and sterile.»

1. The claim is made by Hermogenes himself, who charges his predecessors with confusion: 216.17: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν, ὅστις πρὸς ἡμῶν ὅσα ἐμὲ γινώσκουσιν εἰς τήνδε τὴν ἡμέραν ἀκριβὲς τι περὶ τούτων πραγματευσάμενος φαίνεται, ὅσοι δὲ καὶ ἔψαντο, τεταραγμένως καὶ λίαν ἀπιστοῦντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν εἶπον εἰρήκασιν, ὥστε αὐτοῖς συγκεχυθῆναι τὰ πάντα. The charge is often repeated by his Byzantine scholiasts. See some passages collected by RABE, *Prol. Syll.*, 317. In 1930 J. Sykutris complained (in his review of Walsdorff in *Gnomon* 6 (1930) 527-539; reprinted in *Rhetorika. Schriften zur aristotelischen und hellenistischen Rhetorik*, ed. R. STARK, Hildesheim 1968, 438-450) that scholars were simply reproducing the old disparagement of Hermogenes and that no one had sat down to study the text in its entirety without prejudice. The complaint is still valid today, though Hagedorn's valuable monograph has made it possible to trace the background of some of the rhetorical concepts. He is not concerned with the system as a whole.

2. I.e., ἀφέλεια, one of the key virtues described in *De Ideis*, 322.4-329.24. The subject is discussed in my article, *The Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric*, in *Viator* 1(1970) 56ff.

3. ANON., *Prol. Syll.*, 60.15: ὁ Ἑρμογένης τούτου πολλῆς ἀσαφείας κατέγνω, αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ ἀκριβείας ἐξέθετο ὡς τοῦ Μινουκιανοῦ προκρίνεσθαι; cf. SOPATER, 5.14.24W; et al.

easier to understand and more useful;¹ and a third reproves Basilicus, also author of a *De Ideis* and possibly a younger contemporary, for lacking orderly arrangement in his work.² We may also note the complaint in the *De Inventione* that the subject had not advanced at all but was turning back on itself.³ These claims should be discounted as the usual ancient forms of apologia, but for all that they are not wide of the mark. We cannot enter here into the question of Hermogenes' sources, but in any over-all assessment we must keep in mind that we are dealing with a textbook and that originality in a textbook takes special forms.

Another reason for Hermogenes' success lies in the fact that his work is all-inclusive. As Psellus was later to point out, he is the only author to deal with the whole of rhetoric.⁴ Further, his observations are not limited to the courtroom. Being of wider application they could become, as indeed they did, a general school text for training in all manner of discourse. In addition, the matter-of-fact style, the careful definitions and distinctions, and the pedagogical tone must have appealed to the dialectical interests of the Neoplatonists at a time when they were themselves developing their philosophical commentaries along the same lines, and may

1. εὐληπτότερα καὶ πολυωφέλεστερα: DOXAPATRES, *Prol. Syll.*, 140.15-17; 317.13 ff.; ANON., *Prol. Syll.*, 79.9 ff.; et al.

2. εὐκρίνεια καὶ τάξις, SYRIANUS, 1.13.1. On Basilicus see BRZOSKA, *RE-PW* s.v. He is the teacher of Apsines, who calls him θεός, 217.6 Sp-H. Tzetzes says other authors used the title also: *Scholia in Hermogenem*, 126.5-8, ed. J. CRAMER, *Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis Bibliothecarum Oxoniensium*, vol. 4, Oxford 1837: πρὸ Ἑρμογένους ἔγραψαν καὶ ἄλλοι γὰρ ἰδέαι, αὐτὸς δὲ Διονύσιος σὺν ᾧ καὶ Βασιλίσκος (sic) καὶ Ζήνων δὲ καὶ Ζώσιμος ἀνὴρ Ἀσκαλωνίτης καὶ σὺν ἐκείνοις ἕτεροι ὧν περ ἐὼν τὰς κλήσεις. GLÖCKNER, op. cit., 56-58, considers Dionysius a contemporary of Minucianus and opponent of Hermogenes. The *Suda* lists also the second-century sophist, Hadrian (5 books) and Aelius Harpocration. Possibly Pseudo-Aristides (see Bibliography) also originally carried the title. See W. SCHMID, «Der sogenannte Aristidesrhetorik,» *Rheinisches Museum* 72 (1917) 123. On these figures see CHRIST-SCHMID-STÄHLIN, 927-929. JOHN SICELIOTES significantly refers to Hermogenes as not only a rhetor but also a philosopher because of his «methodical» ways: *Prol. Syll.*, 402.2-4: μηδὲ ῥήτωρ ἀπλῶς δὲ σαφὴς Ἑρμογένης, ἀλλὰ μεθοδικὸς ῥήτωρ, τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους πάντως φιλοσόφους ἐγκριτέον ἀληθεῖ κρίσει. So too the Renaissance scholar J. STURM, *In libros duos Hermogenis de Formis orationum seu dicendi generibus*, Strasbourg 1571, 12: Hermogenem fuisse non solum rhetorem sed etiam philosophum et Platonicum philosophum.

3. 126.13: περαιτέρω δὲ τούτων προβαίνουσιν τὴν ῥητορικὴν οὐχ εὐρήκαμεν, ἀνακυκλουμένην δὲ γε. On the authorship of this work see pp. 19-20.

4. *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* 208.1 Sp-H: καλὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ τοῦ Ταρσέως Ἑρμογένους ῥητορικῆ, πῶς γὰρ οὐ; συνεκτικωτάτη γὰρ ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν τῆς τέχνης μερῶν. On the assignment of this text to Psellus see p. XIV.

well have found a ready welcome in Christian exegetical circles insofar as they too were adopting similar techniques.

Modern scholarship in the field of rhetoric has concentrated to a large degree on its inner history and has sought to label a writer as Aristotelian, Theophrastan, or Stoic, depending on the purely rhetorical interests of the age in which he lived and the sources which he used. This is a useful and valid procedure, particularly in such a closed literary society as we know the ancient to have been. Less attention has been paid to the definition of the critic as a product of his age, using concepts and phrases which relate not only to rhetoric but to the broader cultural expressions of a period as well, and especially to its social and psychological patterns. As historians of culture we are more at home with the concept of the history of philosophy than we are with the history of rhetoric. Both philosophy and rhetoric, however, were part of the broad stream of cultural commitment and change and both should be treated not only within their own narrowly independent confines but as expressions responding to the impulses and inspiration of each successive age and author. Even the most arid of Byzantine scholia can be coaxed to yield their occasional flower once we regard them as living parts of the vital organism of intellectual history. It is from this point of view that the ensuing foray into the vast philological luxuriance of mediaeval Greek rhetoric takes a measure of its justification.

Hermogenes became popular at a time when the Neoplatonists sought not to continue the old conflict but to find an accommodation between philosophy and rhetoric.¹ One of the chief values of the Byzantine rhetorical scholia is the preservation of the texts from late antiquity which show us how this aim was realized; how, that is to say, philosophical analysis was applied to rhetorical questions and philosophical terminology used to define rhetorical issues. The reverse influence was also felt. The philosophical commentaries of the Neoplatonists invariably include as part of their assessment of Plato and Aristotle an analysis of the style of the two authors, and naturally use the yardsticks of contemporary rhetoric. We shall be concerned in this study largely with the *De Ideis* inasmuch as, of all the treatises in the corpus, it is particularly attuned to the rhetorical temper of the age. The others recall patterns of discus-

1. Valuable comments on the history of this relationship in late antiquity are provided by B. KEIL, op. cit., *passim*, and in his «Zwei Identificationen,» *Hermes* 42 (1907) 548-563.

sion already fully developed before Hermogenes. As so often in the history of thought the effectiveness of the *De Ideis* lies not in a revolt from current values and interests but in its success in capturing what is in the air and giving it effective voice.

Hermogenes, however, is related not only to pagan rhetoric. His rhetorical values are reflected also in the literary experience of Christianity. We shall see in Chapter Two how they might serve Christian theory and contribute to the development of the Christian genres. One cannot otherwise explain the adoption of his views as the base upon which subsequent Byzantine literary practice was built. In late antiquity the cultural forces laying claim to men's souls dip from common reservoirs of metaphysical and aesthetic belief. The sense of the mystical, the understanding of the relation between universal and particular, the fascination with the complex and the feeling for the sublime, color not only the metaphysical speculations of the philosophers but theories of art¹ and of language and literature as well. Hermogenes, the Neoplatonists, and the Christians work together because they are addressing themselves to the same problems, albeit from different vantage points. Chapters Three through Six will analyze these common threads insofar as they contribute to what emerges as a specifically Byzantine view of the function of logos. Much of this view can be organized around one of the key principles of Byzantine rhetorical theory, viz., that obscurity (*ἀσάφεια*) is a virtue of style.² The principle flies in the face of that hoary dictum first enunciated by Aristotle, which decreed just the opposite, that one of the chief merits of style is clarity.³ While maintaining Aristotle's requirement on one level, the Byzantines evolved patterns of literary theory and performance

1. The subject of the aesthetics of Byzantine art has a large bibliography. We shall touch on some parallels between art and literature *passim* as they affect the thread of argument, without attempting an analysis in depth of the background common to them at any particular period. Such a treatment would be particularly rewarding for the age of iconoclasm, when many of our texts show parallel lines of thinking about the two media. For a general understanding of the aesthetic principles of art consult P.A. MICHELIS, *An Aesthetic Approach to Byzantine Art*, London 1955, and G. MATHEW, *Byzantine Aesthetics*, London 1963.

2. DOXAPATRES, *In Aphth.*, quoting Geometres: 2.226.8 W: οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀσάφεια ἡδὴ καὶ κακία λόγου· τοῦναντίον μὲν οὖν πολλάκις καὶ ἀρετὴ; SICELIOTES, 6.199.30 W: ἐπαινουμένη ἀσάφεια; ANON., *In De Ideis*, 7.480.7; 951.28 W. See also Chapter Three, especially pp. 85-93; also p. 139.

3. *Rhetoric* Γ 2.1, 1404b2: ὁρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφὴ εἶναι; also *Poetics* 22.1, 1458a 18: λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφὴ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴ εἶναι.

which sought also to express their conception of the mystery of creation and man's place in it. Rhetoric was to contribute to the formulation of this ideal and at the same time adapt itself to it. Our larger purpose, then, is to explain, theoretically and historically, some of the main features and presuppositions of Byzantine literature.

Before proceeding it will be helpful to establish the structure of the *De Ideis* and to sketch the history of its use in Byzantium. The treatise lists seven *ιδέαι* or Forms of style along with their appropriate subdivisions:

1. σαφήνεια. Clarity.
 - a. καθαρότης. Purity.
 - b. εὐκρίνεια. Limpidity.
2. ἄξίωμα λόγου καὶ μέγεθος. Loftiness and Grandeur.
 - a. σεμνότης. Dignity.
 - b. τραχύτης. Ruggedness.
 - c. σφοδρότης. Intensity.
 - d. λαμπρότης. Brilliance.
 - e. ἀκμή. Climax.
 - f. περιβολὴ καὶ μεστότης. Amplitude and Ripeness.
3. ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κάλλος. Elegance and Beauty.
4. γοργότης. Conciseness.
5. ἦθος. Ethos.
 - a. ἀφέλεια. Simplicity.
 - b. γλυκύτης. Pleasantness.
 - c. δριμύτης καὶ ὀξύτης. Pungency and Sharpness.
 - d. ἐπισείκεια. Comeliness.
6. ἀλήθεια. Sincerity.
 - a. βαρύτης. Sternness.
7. δεινότης. Force.

Each of the subdivisions may also properly be called a Form. Each Form is described under eight Categories:

1. ἐννοία. Sentence.¹

1. I.e., *sententia*, the standard Latin rendering, as, e.g., in A. BONFINE's Latin translation, *Hermogenis Tarsensis Philosophi et Rhetoris acutissimi de Arte Rhetorica praecepta. Aphthonii item Sophistae Praeexercitamenta*, Lyons 1538. The term refers to the topic or subject-matter of discourse, that is, the content of thought. Ancient Latin rhetoricians use *sententia* for a variety of Greek terms, such as γνώμη, διάνοια, ἐνθύμημα, νόημα, and ὑπόθεσις. See J. ERNESTI, *Lexicon Technologiae Latinorum Rhetoricae*, Leipzig 1797, s.v. Despite the ambiguity in modern English, «Sentence» comes closest

2. μέθοδος. Mode.¹
3. λέξις. Diction.
4. σχήματα. Figures.
5. κόλα. Cola.
6. συνθήκη. Composition.²
7. ἀνάπαυσις. Cadence.³
8. ῥυθμός. Rhythm.

Reference to the above terms will in the future always be in capitals. The analysis of Amplitude and Dignity in Chapter Five will make clear in detail how the system works.

At first glance we seem to be presented with a very rigid structure. Actually, the effect is quite otherwise. We do not have to contend with twenty different types of Cadence, for example, each specially fitted to the seven Forms and their thirteen subdivisions. Rather, Hermogenes repeatedly remarks that the same type of Cadence may serve a number of Forms. The same holds true for the other Categories. Thus, Dignity shows types of Sentence and Modes special to itself and shares its preference for long vowels with other Forms; some of its Figures are the same as for Purity, others not; nor are some of its Rhythms exclusive to itself.

The literary achievement of a particular author is a unique pattern of these interlocking parts. In a paraphrase of Plato's *Timaeus*, where the observation is applied to the divine, Hermogenes gives us to understand that the essence of an author's style is "hard to grasp and, once grasped, hard to communicate to others".⁴ However, the Forms and

to expressing the variety of meaning that historically becomes compressed into what Hermogenes understands by ἔννοια.

1. μέθοδος is the disposition of the Sentence, that is to say, the way it is expressed or the principle of organizing the subject-matter. Allegorical techniques, for example, are «modes» for describing the divine, which is one of the main Sentences of Dignity: 242.22-246.23.

2. Hermogenes understands two things by συνθήκη: 1) relation of the last syllable of one word to the beginning of the next, e.g., hiatus, though purely rhythmical considerations are also involved; and 2) general sequence of long and short syllables. See BECKER, 11.

3. See SYRIANUS, 1.18.10: ἀνάπαυσις μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ κατάληξις τῶν κώλων. Cf. PLAUDES, 5.554.10 W. Résumés of Hermogenes' system in CHAIGNET, 462 ff., 532ff.; VOLKMAN, 555 ff.; PATTERSON, chap. II.

4. 216.16: χαλεπὸν δὲ οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ τὸ εὐρόντα εἰπεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι τι σαφὲς περὶ αὐτῶν; repeated almost *verbatim*, 217.9; cf. *Timaeus* 28c: εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν, quoted with variations as an instance of Dignity, 247.5. Cf. also ANON.,

the Categories permit us to sense at least the structure of a passage and the principles by which it is constructed and may be understood. The extensive gradations which result from the interplay of the Forms and their Categories may even proceed to the point where a passage may more properly be defined under a different heading from that assigned to the work as a whole, depending on the measure of the ingredients special to its composition. There is possible, that is to say, an almost limitless variety of permutations and combinations based on the interrelation of these components.¹ At the same time, a particular line of style may so predominate as to characterize the whole of an author, as for example Dignity for Plato and Pleasantness for Herodotus. In short, there is described to us in the *De Ideis* a flexible system which will take into account the ethos of an author as a whole as well as the individuality of a particular passage, defined systematically as variations drawn from specific common formulae.

Hermogenes presents this analysis by way of explaining the virtues of the style of Demosthenes. If we could describe the elements of this style, he says, we should have the basis for describing all discourse. He regards the Demosthenic logos as a unity of parts actively commingling with one another.² Discourse is for him, in other words, an organism, a living harmony of members. This is what he means by μῖξις, "mixture",

Prol. Syll., 390.12 (fifth century): δυσχερὲς τὴν μῖξιν τῶν ἰδεῶν εὐρεῖν καὶ εὐρόντα φράσαι.

1. For this type of rhetorical mentality cf. QUINTILIAN, 12.10.67-69: *nam et subtili plenius aliquid atque subtilius et vehementi remissius atque vehementius invenitur, ut illud lene aut ascendit ad fortiora aut ad tenuiora summittitur. Ac sic prope innumera-biles species reperiuntur, quae utique aliquo momento se differant; --- plures igitur etiam eloquentiae facies, sed stultissimum quaerere, ad quam se recturus sit orator, cum omnis species, quae modo recta est, habeat usum, atque id ipsum non sit oratoris, quod vulgo genus dicendi vocant. Utitur enim, ut res exiget, omnibus, nec pro causa modo, sed pro partibus causae.*

2. 217.12 ff.: τὰ γάρτοι τοῦ Δημοσθενικοῦ λόγου καθάπερ εἰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαὶ εἰ δι- νηθείμεν ἀκριβῶς αὐτὰ ἕκαστα ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν πόσα τέ ἐστι δεῖξαι καὶ ὅπως γίνεταί τις τε ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα μῖξις αὐτῶν καὶ τί δύνανται τόνδε ἢ τόνδε μιγνύμενα τὸν τρόπον, τάχα ἂν περὶ πάντων τῶν λόγων εἰρηκότες εἴημεν; 218.1 ff.: λέγω δὲ ὡς ἐν ταῦτα πάντα οἰοῖται συμπελεγμένα καὶ δι' ἄλλήλων ἤκοντα· τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ λόγος ὁ Δημοσθενικός. τούτων δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν αἱ μὲν ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰσι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς συνιστάμεναι, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσιν ὑφ' ἑαυτὰς τινὰς ἄλλας ἰδέας ὑποβεβηκυίας δι' ὧν δὴ γίνονται, αἱ δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις μέρει τινὶ ἢ μέρεσιν· ὁλως τε αἱ μὲν γένη εἰσὶν ἰδεῶν, αἱ δὲ ὥσπερ κατὰ διαφορὰν τινὰ κοινωνοῦσιν ἐτέραις ἰδέαις τοῖς ἄλλοις κεχωρισμένα παῖσιν, αἱ δὲ ὕπερ ἑφ' ἑαυτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄλλου προσδεό- μεναι; 215.10: τὰ μέρη καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶδος.

a cardinal principle in his thinking about style. He returns to the term frequently¹ and is especially eager to make his meaning clear on the occasion of his discussion of Amplitude, which, as we shall see, is regarded as a kind of conceptual unit achieved through stylistic means. One should not be surprised, we are told, to see Limpidity and Amplitude, though opposites, in evidence in the same passage. The Forms are not opposites in the sense of being unable to coexist, like hot and cold, life and death, day and night.² On the contrary, they have a *natural* capacity for coexistence.³ Discourse achieves its excellence as a result of such a happy mixture of opposites. Far from being incongruous, such contrasts are necessary to one another by way of tempering the excess of each.

The theory of opposites applies not only to this instance but to the structure of the *De Ideis* as a whole. The treatise arranges the virtues of style in two groups. On the one side are Clarity, Beauty, Ethos, and Sincerity together with their respective subdivisions; on the other, Grandeur, Conciseness, and Force. Many crossovers between the two groups are possible, so that such a division would require considerable modification if worked out in detail. Clearly, however, two general classes of style are held forth, which one might describe as the gentler and the rougher virtues, or the simpler versus the more complex.

Though Hermogenes pays proper respect to Clarity, putting it first in his list and reminding his readers that it is a basic principle of all discourse,⁴ he is more given to the complex patterns. The highest of the Forms is Force. Discussion of it is left till last, for it is defined as "the proper use of all the previous Forms and their opposites, together with what-

1. 217.15 ff.; 221.18 ff.; 224.15 ff.; 225.13 ff.; 279.26 ff.; 320.23 ff.; 380.15 ff.; et al. κρᾶσις is a synonym.

2. 279.17 ff.: οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐναντία τὰ τῶν λόγων εἶδη, καθάπερ ἄλλα τινά, ὥς μὴ δύνασθαι συνυπάρχειν, οἷον ὥσπερ τὸ θερμὸν τῷ ψυχρῷ, ἢ ὁ θάνατος τῇ ζωῇ ἢ ἡ νύξ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἢ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον πέφυκε δύνασθαι συνυπάρχειν τὰ ἐναντία ταῦτα καὶ τότε μᾶλλον θαυμαστός ὁ λόγος γίνεται, ὅταν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἰδεῶν εὖ κεκραμένος περαινῇται. See p. 148.

3. The conception of the natural harmony of the elements of discourse is a motif running through the *De Ideis*, and is revealed by the very frequent use of the term πέφυκε. Proper discourse is not merely a tolerated coexistence of discordant parts but a rhythmic harmony of all its members. Further, this harmony is a dynamic one: note δύνασθαι, 217.15; 279.21; and elsewhere. Cf. 218.13, 18; 279.21; 296.22; 321.3; 383.9; et al.

4. 226.8 ff.: σαφηνείας --- ἣν δὲ καὶ πρώτην ἐθέμεθα, διότι καὶ παντὶ λόγῳ τούτου δεῖ μάλιστα.

ever else makes up the body of discourse".¹ The best writer is one who, in this special sense, "mixes" the Forms. The model is of course Demosthenes. In choosing him Hermogenes is but in line with his contemporaries, for the orator had been the exemplar of Attic prose since the first century B.C. Indeed, the whole of the *De Ideis* is but a means of defining his literary genius. None of the ancients, we are told, achieved this blend of opposites so well, "at least after Homer".² Essentially, then, Hermogenes is joining the abstract analysis based on the principle of Forms to the tradition of Demosthenic criticism.³

The *De Ideis* has thus a split personality. There is virtue in a theory which gives stylistic variety within an author its due and seeks an explanation couched in psychological terms. One should emphasize the element of psychology because it is of a piece with contemporary rhetorical preoccupation with ethos and must surely be related to the sharpened sense of personality reflected both in Roman portrait art and in the developing Christian stress on the uniqueness of the individual soul before its Creator. However, when he proceeds to gauge stylistic value pre-eminently out of one model Hermogenes' purpose is compromised, for the attempt contrasts with the suggestion of stylistic freedom which lies

1. 368.23 ff.: ἡ δεινότης ἢ περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶ μὲν κατ' ἐμὴν γνώμην οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ χρησὶς ὁρθὴ πάντων τῶν τε προειρημένων εἰδῶν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐτι δι' ὧν ἑτέρων σώμα λόγου γίνεσθαι πέφυκε. On δεινότης in the Renaissance see the full treatment by PATTERSON, 66 ff., 177 ff.

2. 279.24 ff.: σχεδὸν οὐδεὶς οὕτω καλὸς οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων αὐτῇ κέχρηται ὥς ὁ ῥήτωρ, μετὰ γε "Ομηρον. See W. SCHMID, "Zur antiken Stillehre aus Anlass von Proklos' Chrestomathie," *Rheinisches Museum* 49 (1894) 158, who remarks that Isocrates could not be highly regarded in an age which insisted on realism and individual personality traits and on strong and immediate effects. The choice of model forms part of the history of the struggle between Asianism and Atticism. Some of the favored qualities will ultimately contribute to the make-up of the Christian sermon, as will appear in Chapter Two.

3. W. SCHMID thought Hermogenes was anticipated by the author of another rhetorical treatise of the period, the so-called Pseudo-Aristides, but changed his mind following Walsdorff's argument (p. 119, note 1) that the first book of Pseudo-Aristides uses Hermogenes as a model. See Schmid's review of Walsdorff in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* 191 (1929), with his acknowledgment, p. 240, note 3. The relation between Hermogenes and Pseudo-Aristides is in any case troublesome and we cannot enter into such questions here. Suffice it to say that later Greek writers knew the formula mainly through Hermogenes. See in general W. SCHMID, "Der sogenannte Aristidesrhetorik," *Rheinisches Museum* 72 (1917) 113-149 and 238-257. Reservations regarding Schmid's thesis by J. SYKUTIS, *Gnomon* 6 (1930) 527.

beneath the surface of his remarks. At the very least, the adoption of both principles raised the challenge of relating one to the other.

The strength of conviction which permeates the text, the directness of his approach, and the unsparing criticism of his rivals helped his early elevation into a kind of rhetorical gospel in an age which was looking for masters. The spirit of *ipse dixit* which guides the construction of the Biblical canon has its pagan counterparts: philosophy received the influence of Plotinus, when it did not go back to Plato himself, and rhetoric found its savior in Hermogenes. There is a difference, though: often he does not teach or even prescribe. His purpose may be to describe, but his tone is often one of dictation, and later generations were overawed. Classicists dislike him because he is no Aristotle and Byzantinists are unhappy with him because he dominates too much, down to the Muslim conquest and beyond. We have noted his boast that no one had treated the subject so carefully and clearly before. Though we withhold from him our critical superlatives, we cannot really test his claim to have set things right if we view him only as the end of one tradition or the beginning of another, rather than as a phenomenon of his time and place. The observations of Dionysius of Halicarnassus are more acute, but the principle which guides Hermogenes is, at least in theory, more fruitful than the "one man, one style" kind of discussion in Dionysius or even the dissection of masterpieces in Aristotle's *Poetics*. More important, the two contrasting bases on which the *De Ideis* is built peculiarly reflect the dual inheritance of Byzantium itself. The Christian stress on the individual urged the literary temperament in one direction; the demand for adherence to a classical ideal — the *μῦθος ἀρχαίων* — exerted a different kind of pull. The conflict and the various means for resolving it can regularly be seen in the tradition of analysis of Hermogenes' treatises by the later scholiasts.

This contrast has its own historical rationale, but it is at the same time in Hermogenes the manifestation of a deeper, more philosophical distinction. Essentially he is grappling with that most difficult of critical questions, to wit, what is meant by unity in a literary work. His Forms are structures which house the linguistic components represented by the Categories. The rich world of language contains an infinite variety of grammatical, metrical, phonological, and stylistic possibilities among which he proposes to discern significant and coherent, though not rigid, patterns and directions. His interest in meaningful ideal relationships no doubt owes a great deal to the Stoic vision of a harmony and purpose in

the physical universe.¹ In the world of the Stoics even disparate things fit together, like some of Hermogenes' opposites. Yet such accommodations were often the artificial product of the labor of Stoic minds from which the notion of paradox was never wholly absent. Hermogenes, one feels, proceeds from a purer instinct for harmony. He is developing for the world of the literary logos a scheme of interplay between universals and particulars which will have its counterpart in Neoplatonic² and Christian speculations about the divine logos. In the wildly fragmented and fluid world of late antiquity, which was witnessing on all sides the destruction of the old and the quest for new substrata of existence, rhetoric provided a surer footing than many other areas of intellectual life. Its external habits and most of its terminology continued within the shifting world order to supply readily identifiable measures of value. The frame into which Hermogenes fitted them could not help but intrigue the thinkers of an age struggling with similar philosophical and theological problems.

The corpus of Hermogenes which the Byzantines knew consists of five works: *Progymnasmata*, *De Inventione*, *De Statibus*, *De Ideis*, *De Methodo Vehementiae*.³ Of these the first two are spurious efforts to

1. On this much discussed subject consult K. REINHARDT's basic study, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, Munich 1926; also M. POHLLENZ, *Die Stoa*, Göttingen 1959. PLATO, *Laws* 889b-d, speaks of the relation of the arts to one another and to the universe.

2. In a fascinating repetition of history Hermogenes' adoption by the Neoplatonists, this time of the Renaissance, comes about partly because they saw in him a reflection of the notions of cosmic symmetry with which they were concerned on metaphysical grounds. See the striking array of texts collected by Patterson in the first chapter of her book (see note 1, p. 6, *supra*).

3. *Προγυμνάσματα, Περί Εὐρέσεως, Περί Στάσεων, Περί Ἰδεῶν, Περί Μεθόδου Δεινότητος*. Most of the work of sorting out the complexities of the manuscript tradition has been done by Hugo Rabe and his school. The fruit of their labors appears in the Teubner editions of Aphthonius, Hermogenes, John of Sardes, Nicolaus, and Syrianus (see Bibliography). The account in the following pages draws heavily on the analysis given in the *praefatio* to these various editions. To Rabe's work must be added the studies of the Polish scholar, G. KOWALSKI, and his students, who in the late 1930's and early 40's examined some of the manuscripts of Hermogenes and his scholiasts in detail in preparation for a new edition of the *De Statibus*, which appeared in 1947 (*Hermogenes. De Statibus* ed. G. KOWALSKI, Bratislava), and also studied the work of two other late antique rhetoricians, Nilus and George Monus. See G. KOWALSKI, *Commentarii Codicis Vaticanus Graeci 107 in Hermogenis περὶ στάσεων et περὶ εὐρέσεως cum scholiis minoribus in omnia praeter Praeexercitamenta opera*. *Acta Seminarii Philologici II Universitatis Ioanneo Casimirianae Leopoliensis*, Fasc. 5-7, Lvov 1939; Id., «Ad Georgii Moni in Hermogenis status commentarii capita scholiis P adiecta adnotationes criticae», *Eos* 40 (1939) fasc. 1, 49-69; Id., «De Commentarii in Hermogenis

which Hermogenes' name became attached by the fifth century.¹ They show a style quite different from that of the other three. The assignment to Hermogenes is an instance of the manner in which his name came to dominate rhetorical studies. In both cases the confusion seems prompted by the fact that he was known to be the author of works carrying the same title.² The corpus of the five treatises, with his name attached, was established by an unknown scholar of the late fifth/early sixth century.³ The extant fifth-century commentary of the Neoplatonist Syrianus reflects the situation obtaining before this date. He knows only the last three works. The loss of prior Neoplatonic exegesis makes it difficult to determine Syrianus' contribution. Clearly, however, he is not undertaking something previously unknown but is rather addressing a scholarly public well informed about Hermogenes.

His text regularly consists of snippets taken from his sources. His value to us is three-fold: 1) he mentions other Neoplatonic writers on rhetoric, such as Porphyry and Iamblichus, and quotes from their works; 2) he refers to many rhetorical writers beside Hermogenes who were known in Neoplatonic circles; and 3) the scholia of the middle Byzantine period are strongly influenced by him, often to the point of incorporating whole segments into their own text.

There is a break in the commentaries on Hermogenes following the activity of the Neoplatonists. That he continued as an established school author in the succeeding centuries cannot be doubted. The sermons of the eighth-century patriarch, Germanus, show the application of his principles⁴ and the thorough acquaintance with him evident in the *Biblio-*

status e tribus interpretibus confecti (Rh. Gr. IV WALZ) recensione in codice Par. Gr. 2923 (Pγ) obvia,» *Eos* 41 (1940-1946), fasc. 1, 46-80; M. PRÓCHNICKA, «De 'Anonymi in Hermogenis scriptum περί ῥητορικῆς commentarii recensione in codice Par. Gr. 2983 (Pg) conservata,» *Eos* 40 (1939), fasc. 1, 85-121; L. RYCHLEWSKA, «In Anonymum Hermogenis statuum interpretem (Rh. Gr. VII 397-442 W) cum Nilo (Par. Gr. Suppl. 670 ff. 36v-65r) collatum observationes criticae,» *Eos* 41 (1940-1946), fasc. 1, 173-184.

1. RABE, *Hermogenes*, pp. vi-xii. See also E. BÜRG, «Ist die dem Hermogenes zugeschriebene Schrift *Περὶ Μεθόδου Δεινότητος* echt?» in two parts: I, *Wiener Studien* 48 (1930) 187-197; II (continued) 49 (1931) 40-69. For a somewhat different estimate of the authenticity of these parts of the corpus see L. RADERMACHER, col. 869.5 ff.

2. See the list of cross references within the corpus in *Hermogenes*, p. 466.

3. *Prol. Syll.*, pp. xix-xxiii.

4. See the philological study by J. LIST, *Studien zur Homiletik. Germanos I. von Konstantinopel und seiner Zeit. Texte und Forschungen zur byzantinisch-neugriechischen Philologie*. No. 29, Athens 1939.

theca gives the impression that Photius is completely at home with him and expects that his readers are also.

The commentaries resume in the tenth century. We have used three major sets. The earliest extant are the Anonymus *In De Ideis* printed in the seventh volume of Walz's *Rhetores Graeci*, who assigns the earliest manuscript to the tenth century.¹ This extensive commentary is based on much older material, probably of the fifth or sixth century. In some of the manuscripts there is an additional set of comments which Walz calls *Scholia Minora* and prints at the bottom of each page. They introduce us to a special and important development in that they add or substitute examples from Christian literature, mainly Gregory of Nazianzus, by way of illustration. We see here the process by which Hermogenes can be affected by a Christian outlook and his observations applied to religious purpose.

The second major set of scholia is by John Siceliotes, eleventh century.² With the possible exception of Geometres, whose work we cannot judge in its entirety, Siceliotes is the ablest and most original of the commentators. Again, the principal effect is the Christianization of Hermogenes. Inasmuch as the scholia preserve a good amount of material which can be assigned to specific Neoplatonic authors, he is particularly useful in allowing us to see the interrelation of Neoplatonic and Christian thought and its application to rhetorical questions.

The third commentary, compiled by the thirteenth-century classical scholar, Maximus Planudes, is the most derivative and least satisfactory.³ A large portion consists of abbreviated segments of the Anonymus and of Syrianus, to which material from other sources is occasionally added. Planudes' text is in effect an *editio minor* of an older and fuller

1. 7.861-1087 W; see vol. 7, p. iii W; also pp. 86-87, *infra*.

2. 6.56-504 W. Siceliotes' dates are not known, but he seems to have been born around the turn of the century. This would make him an older contemporary of Psellus (born 1018). See RABE, *Prol. Syll.*, p. cxiii, and F. LENZ, *Aristidesstudien*, Berlin 1964, 114 (= *Hermes* 66 (1931) 53). LENZ has noticed that Siceliotes is also the author of certain scholia on Aristides in Paris. Gr. 2950. That Siceliotes was a teacher issues from his words, 6.448.14 W: οὐτε γράψομεν -- οὐτε διδάξομεν. Some autobiographical materials in 6.446-448 W. See pp. 196-197.

3. 5.437-561 W. See *Prol. Syll.*, pp. xlv, cix; *Nicolaus*, pp. xii ff.; *Aphthonius*, p. xi; *John of Sardes*, p. xv. The three texts, the Anonymus, Siceliotes, and Planudes, have much material in common, which it will be the task of a future editor to sort out. Walz's assignment of Siceliotes to the thirteenth century (6. pp. v ff. and 7. pp. iv ff. W) is in error. See POYNTON, 2.

tradition. By noting what he considered worth repeating we gain a view of thirteenth-century rhetorical interests. Herein lies his chief value. Planudes turns away from the Christian commentaries of the tenth and eleventh centuries and chooses instead the older tradition which has its roots in the "pure" Neoplatonic scholia unaffected by Christian comment.

The companion to Hermogenes in the rhetorical curriculum of Byzantine education is the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius. Aphthonius' version of these traditional fourteen types of prose composition¹ comes to dominate the field starting shortly after it was written. Little is known of the author. His general date is established by the fact that he was a student and confidant of Libanius, who addresses a letter to him dated 392.² The reasons for the success which his particular rendering enjoyed lie in the simplicity of his exposition and in his inclusion of examples to illustrate each of the types under discussion. There is nothing in the text to confirm the notice of the *Suda* that the book was written "for the techné of Hermogenes", but the association is not improbable since by the end of the fourth century Hermogenes was a magnet attracting all kinds of rhetorical writing. The partnership was at any rate entered into very early. At

1. The standard list is 1) μῦθος, Myth; 2) διήγημα, Narrative; 3) χρεῖα, Ethical Thought; 4) γνῶμη, Saying; 5) ἀνασκευή, Refutation; 6) κατασκευή, Confirmation; 7) κοινὸς τόπος, Amplification; 8) ἐγκώμιον, Encomium; 9) ψόγος, Censure; 10) σύγκρισις, Comparison; 11) ἡθοποιία, Characterization; 12) ἔκφρασις, Description; 13) θέσις, Inquiry; 14) εἰσφορὰ νόμου, Criticism of a law. Reference to these in the future will be in capitals. On the *progymnasmata* in general see the full article by W. STEGMANN, *RE-PW* s.v. Theon; G. REICHEL, *Quaestiones progymnasmaticae*, Diss. Leipzig 1915; H. MARROU, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, transl. G. LAMB, London 1956, 172 ff. English translation of the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius by R. NADEAU "The *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius in Translation," *Speech Monographs* 19 (1952) 264-285; of those in the corpus of Hermogenes by C.S. BALDWIN, *Mediaeval Rhetoric and Poetic*, New York 1928, 23-38. On the wide influence of Priscianus' Latin translation of the latter in Western letters see E. CURTIUS, *European Literature of the Latin Middle Ages*, transl. W. TRASK, New York 1953, 442-443. The *progymnasmata* were not limited to one's school years. They were composed by Byzantine intellectuals throughout their literary career. Numerous examples survive. See, e.g., the collection composed by NICEPHORUS BASILACES, 1421-525 W, as well as other examples in WALZ's first volume. The influence of the *progymnasmata* is hard to overestimate. Practically all the other genres of Byzantine literature are affected by them: homilies, letters, histories, and so on. Libanius' extensive contributions to the genre make up the whole of the eighth volume of the Teubner edition by R. FÖRSTER, Leipzig 1915.

2. Vol. 11, p. 189 FÖRSTER. See O. SEECK, *Die Briefe des Libanius*, Leipzig 1906, 79. On Aphthonius see J. BRZOSKA, *RE-PW* s.v. and RABE, *Aphthonius*, pp. xxii-xxv.

the time of the establishment of the corpus of Hermogenes Aphthonius was already the recognized leader in his field. The close relationship between the two authors may be seen in the fact that the two main classes of manuscripts containing Hermogenes have prefixed to them the work of Aphthonius.¹ The two authors, in other words, constituted the rhetorical cursus and continued to be so recognized throughout the life of Byzantium.² Hence it is natural that the same scholars will be concerned with both. John Doxapatres, to whom we shall come presently, not only composed scholia on Aphthonius, but commented as well on three works of Hermogenes,³ and John Siceliotos in his scholia on the *De Ideis* can speak of what he has learned in the *progymnasmata*.⁴

We shall use the three major commentaries on Aphthonius that have come down to us. The earliest is by a ninth-century author, John, bishop of Sardes.⁵ His work is our first witness for the confluence of Hermogenes and Aphthonius in the scholia. Not only does he frequently cite passages from Hermogenes, apparently on his own, both acknowledged and not, but he also adopts quotations from previous commentaries. He includes also a great deal of material from other handbooks. In the history of rhetoric the *progymnasmata* are an older phenomenon than Hermogenes' theory of Forms. As a result, the Aphthonius scholia as a whole permit a fuller assessment of the rhetorical tradition of late antiquity and of the Byzantine age inasmuch as they cite a wider range of Hellenistic and imperial texts than the more delimited tradition of comment on Hermogenes.⁶ John shows no evidence of anything later than the sixth century.

1. *Prol. Syll.*, p. xxi; *Aphthonius*, p. xiv.

2. ANON., *Prol. Syll.*, 168.18: τὰ δὲ τοῦ Ἀφθονίου Προγυμνάσματα ἀνομάσθησαν, ὡς πρὸς ἐκείνων τῶν γυμνασμάτων (i.e., of Hermogenes) τασσόμενα καὶ προμανθανόμενα; similarly, ANON., *In Aphth.*, 2.566.18 W.

3. *De Statibus, De Inventione, De Ideis*, all still in manuscript. See RABE, *Hermogenes*, pp. xix-xx.

4. 6.197.25 W: καὶ ἔλλα πολλά ὅσα ἐν τοῖς προγυμνάσμασι μεμαθήκαμεν.

5. Text: *Ioannes Sardianus. Commentarium in Aphthonium* ed. H. RABE, Leipzig 1928.

6. John of Sardes, for example, cites among others Theon, the Seguerianus, and Sopater. RABE, *John of Sardes*, pp. xx ff. On the first two see Bibliography and pp. 77-78. Sopater is the fourth (?) century author of a commentary on Hermogenes' *De Statibus* as well as of a set of *progymnasmata*, the latter fragmentarily preserved in John of Sardes and edited by Rabe at the end of his edition of Aphthonius. On this writer, who has traditionally been confused with others bearing the name, see S. GLÖCKNER, *RE-PW*, s.v.

The text is in fact drawn from a commentary or commentaries of that period and basically reflects the state of rhetorical knowledge within Neoplatonism or in circles affected by Neoplatonic thought. Despite his episcopal calling he makes no reference to anything Christian.¹ If the same person is the author of two extant hagiographical works,² it is somewhat unusual to find such a sharp separation between religious and secular interests. No doubt his sources, even if written by Christians, maintained the same separation. A parallel instance is the case of the Christian students of Olympiodorus, Elias and David, whose religion is rarely evident in formal terms in their pages.³

A second figure of importance within the Aphthonius tradition is John Geometres, second half of the tenth century, who is known to students of Byzantine literature as an outstanding author of religious hymns.⁴ Geometres is also a scholiast on Gregory of Nazianzus. There is as yet no edition of his rhetorical works, most of which do not survive in their own right but are incorporated in the commentaries of other authors.⁵ Thus, Doxapatres quotes very extensively from the lost commentary on Aphthonius and refers to him often in his scholia on the *De Inventione*.⁶ The excerpts show considerable originality. Geometres appears as one of the earliest commentators to include specifically Christian references. His Christian perspective allows him fresh definition for some of the old rhetorical clichés. It is significant that the Christianization of our commentaries involves pre-eminently the adoption of quotations from Gregory of Nazianzus. Geometres clearly plays a leading role in promoting this

1. RABE, *John of Sardes*, p. xviii.

2. "Ἀθλησις τῆς Ἀγίας Βαρβάρας καὶ Ἰουλιανῆς in Paris. Gr. 1458, fol. 46^r-48^v and *Μετάρρασις τοῦ Ἀγίου Μάρτυρος Νικηφόρου* in Paris. Gr. 1452, fol. 77^v. FELTEN, *Nicolaus*, p. xiv, note 3; RABE, *John of Sardes*, p. xx.

3. On these two authors see the full account in three studies by L. WESTERINK: *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, Amsterdam 1962, pp. xx-xxv; «Introduction to Elias on the Prior Analytics», *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, 14 (1961) 126-133; «Philosophy and Medicine in Late Antiquity», *Janus* 51 (1964) 172-174; also ÜBERWEG-PRAECHTER, 636 ff., 196* ff.; CHLGP, 483; and p. 108, *infra*. Rabe has noted a connection between John and David: *John of Sardes*, pp. xxi-xxiii, xxxii.

4. On Geometres see BECK, 553; KRUMBACHER, 736. Graeven's edition of the Seguerianus (see Bibliography) reports *passim* on Geometres' rhetorical interests and his relation to the other Byzantine scholia. See also BRZOSKA, *RE-PW* s.v. Anon. (No. 2).

5. An important first step has been recently taken by the edition with commentary of six progymnasmata: A.R. LITTLEWOOD, *The Progymnasmata of John Geometres*, Amsterdam 1972.

6. GRAEVEN I, p. xxi, note 2.

practice.¹ The same religious impulse which led him to compose his poetry and to study the works of Gregory may well have inspired an understanding of the function of rhetoric within a Christian society.

Our third commentator is John Doxapatres, active about the middle of the eleventh century.² He makes extensive use of John of Sardes

1. The question of the date of the introduction of Christian examples to illustrate Hermogenes and Aphthonius involves a number of termini. First, it must follow the Cappadocians, since quotations from them are the basis of much of such Christianization. A second terminus is the establishment of the Hermogenes/Aphthonius corpus in the late fifth or early sixth century. PHOTIUS in his *Bibliotheca* cites three lexica, about which he unfortunately says very little, which were apparently designed as aids to instruction in Hermogenes in the schools (codd. 146-148: λεξικὸν καθαρῶς ἰδέας, σεμνῆς ἰδέας, καὶ λόγου πολιτικοῦ). Their date is unknown. Possibly they should be assigned to the fifth/sixth century and regarded as part of the scholarly effort being expended on Hermogenes at the time. There is nothing, however, to suggest that they included Christian examples, and the fact that they appear in the *Bibliotheca* together with other non-Christian compendia may perhaps speak against the possibility. The citation of Christian examples in the classroom probably started early. On the other hand, the formal incorporation of such examples into the scholia which we have does not precede the tenth century. An impetus was no doubt provided by the model of Photius, who explains St. Paul à la Hermogenes and unconsciously chooses from among the roster of stylistic virtues those with Christian ethical value. See my «The Literary Criticism of Photius: A Christian Definition of Style», *Ελληνικά* 17 (1960) 140 ff., 154 ff. The beginning of the process of Christianization had to wait upon the feeling that the Cappadocians were Christian classics. One of the ways of gauging this is to note the date of the first scholia on their works. The earliest commentary on Gregory of Nazianzus can be traced as far back as the fifth century. See F. LEFHERZ, *Studien zur Gregor von Nazianz. Mythologie, Überlieferung, Scholiasten*, Diss. Bonn 1958, 113, and J. SADJAK, *Meletemata Patristica Scholiastarum et Commentatorum Gregorii Nazianzeni*, Cracow 1914, *passim*. Quotations must have begun to work themselves into Byzantine education at about this time. Documents, of course, fail us for the iconoclastic age, though it is tempting to suppose that the well-known adoption of citations from the Cappadocians by the theologians on both sides of the controversy has its counterpart within the rhetorical tradition as well. In any case, the Christian examples which exist alongside the references, taken from Hermogenes, to Demosthenes and Plato in the scholiasts of the middle Byzantine period such as Geometres, the author of the Scholia Minora, Siceliotes, and Doxapatres, are high points in a process which must have accelerated following the resolution of the iconoclastic controversy and the fusion of classical and Christian interests for which that resolution paved the way.

2. 2.81-564 W. The name indicates that he was a monk. In the spelling adopted here it must derive from the Doxology (Δόξα Πατρὶ, κτλ.), though «Doxopatres» is a possibility. See KRUMBACHER's note, 461-463. Rabe reports that the manuscripts he has examined give our spelling (*Rheinisches Museum* 63 (1908) 512, note 3). Doxa-

and Geometres. It has, however, been determined that he is not quoting from them directly but depends on an intermediate source which had conflated their works.¹ Like his predecessors, Doxapatres also uses Hermogenes. In John of Sardes, however, one can regularly see the point of juncture between the scholia on Hermogenes and those on Aphthonius. Doxapatres often moves beyond this stage and seems in his thinking to fuse the two traditions. Further, his text is cast in the form of *Homiliae*, a choice of title which is perhaps a reflection of the Christian bent evident throughout.²

In 1931 Hugo Rabe published a collection of thirty-four prolegomena to the various late antique and mediaeval scholia on Hermogenes and Aphthonius.³ These texts take up a series of questions such as the definition of rhetoric, why Plato attacked it, the meaning of the title of the *De Ideis* and of Hermogenes' other works, his purpose in writing them, as well as a number of other topics. Both the structure and the content of the prolegomena owe much to the techniques of instruction and commentary in use in Neoplatonic circles, particularly at Alexandria. Further, nowhere is the interpenetration of philosophical and rhetorical ideas more clearly in evidence than here. The prolegomena are replete with terms, definitions and quotations having their source or their parallel in our Neoplatonic philosophical commentaries. The full testimonia provided by Rabe's edition record these influences. Hence the prolegomena are an invaluable resource for tracing the diverse attitudes and theories regarding rhetoric across the centuries which concern us. As such they take their place alongside the scholia themselves as milestones in the evolution of Byzantine rhetoric.

Keeping in mind the texts reviewed in the preceding pages let us next examine the process by which a new, Christian rhetoric was created.

patres has traditionally been confused with John Siceliotes, who precedes him probably by several decades and to whom he often refers. The two authors are different in all respects, date, style, technique. See RABE, *Prolegomena*, pp. li-lii. BECK, 599, seems inclined not to identify our Doxapatres with the author of an extant tract on canon law. Other Aphthonius scholia discussed p. 86, *infra*.

1. RABE, *John of Sardes*, pp. xii, xxxii.

2. But cf. e.g. CASSIUS LONGINUS' *Philologoi 'Omuliai*.

3. *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, Leipzig. On the Hellenistic origin of parts of this corpus see L. RADERMACHER, «Timäus und die Überlieferung über die Ursprung der Rhetorik», *Rheinisches Museum* 52 (1897) 412 ff. and S. WILCOX, «Corax and the Prolegomena», *American Journal of Philology* 64 (1943) 1 ff.

CHAPTER TWO

TRENDS IN GREEK CHRISTIAN RHETORIC A.D. 200-550

A number of rhetorical and philosophical texts have preserved a notice to the effect that the Stoics regarded rhetoric as the *ἐπιστήμη τοῦ εὖ λέγειν*, "the science of speaking well," and that they meant by this "speaking the truth" (τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν).¹ The definition represents a shift from the Aristotelian stress on clarity (σαφήνεια), and diverges also from that branch of tradition in the analysis of language which laid emphasis on embellishment. Truth and clarity can be mutually reinforcing. The Stoics share with Aristotle the conviction that rhetoric has a philosophical base. Indeed, philosophy—we shall come to say theology—is the context in which both clarity and truth were in late antiquity to find ultimate justification within the emerging Christian order.² At the same time that Christian theory, as we shall see, was developing the principle that obscurity was a mystical means of expressing divine truth, the opposite trend, based on more traditional rhetorical patterns, continued to make itself felt, though now under religious auspices. Moreover, the Stoic statement provided the theoretical support for the transformation of the function of oratory, for the Christian preacher now dealt with

1. ANON., *Prolegomena*, 192.7: «ἐπιστήμη τοῦ εὖ λέγειν», οἱ Στωικοὶ τὸ δὲ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν; ANON., *Prolegomena*, 232.13: ἀληθευτική ἐστὶ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἀληθῶς λέγειν; ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, *In Topica*, CAG 2.2 ed. WALLIES, p. 1.11; DIOGENES LAERTIUS, 7.42. QUINTILIAN, 2.15.34-35, says the definition *scientia recte dicendi* was derived by Chrysippus from Cleanthes and is the same as *scientia bene dicendi*. See p. 120. For the Stoic interest in ἀλήθεια see some remarks in K. BARWICK, «Probleme der stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik», *Abhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Philologisch-Historische Klasse* 49.3 (1957) 7; B. KEIL, «Zwei Identificationen», *Hermes* 42 (1907) 549 ff., 560-563. Cf. also PLATO, *Apology*, 18a: ῥήτορος ἀρετὴ τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

2. So it is that Libanius can describe rhetoric, which he regards as part of virtue, as religion's greatest gift: *Orat.* 18. 157 FÖRSTER: τί μείζον εἶποι τις ἂν τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ θεῶν δῶρον τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς λόγους. See *Libanius' Autobiography (Oration I)* ed. A.F. NORMAN with Introduction, Translation and Notes, Oxford 1965, pp. xx-xxx.

truth, and not, as in secular rhetoric, with what was probable or feasible (εἰκότα).

In one of his *Letters* Isidore of Pelusium, fifth century, lists as the four virtues of style truth, conciseness, clarity, and propriety, along with their respective vices, and asks for a proper mixture of the four if one is to attain a successful style.¹ It is remarkable to see truth and falsehood listed as rhetorical yardsticks. Essentially, Isidore is supplying a Christian counterpart to the relation between philosophy and rhetoric being worked out in Neoplatonic circles. As we shall see, the strong interest throughout late antiquity in both logic and rhetoric leads to a search for the ἀληθινὴ ῥητορικὴ, the ideal which Plato had held forth in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*.² This "true rhetoric" Isidore now interprets as a synthesis

1. Book 5, Letter 145, PG 78, 1412 A: λόγου ἀρεταὶ μὲν ἀλήθεια, συντομία, σαφήνεια, εὐκαιρία· κακίαι δὲ ψεῦδος, μακρογορία, ἀσάφεια, τὰ ἔξω τοῦ καιροῦ φέρεσθαι. τί γὰρ ὄφελος εἰ ἀληθὴς μὲν εἴη, μὴ σύντομος δέ, ἀλλ' ἐνοχλεῖ τοὺς ἀκούοντας; ἢ σύντομος μὲν, μὴ καιρῶς δέ· εἰ δὲ πάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς, τότε δραστήριος ἔσται καὶ γοργὸς καὶ ἐμφυχός, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τοὺς ἀκούοντας χειρούμενος, τῇ δὲ συντομίᾳ καταγωνιζόμενος, τῇ μὲν σαφηνείᾳ καθαπτόμενος, τῇ δὲ εὐκαιρίᾳ στεφανούμενος. The language reflects Hermogenes and Aphthonius, both of whom Isidore would know, though the dependence need not be immediate. Cf. APHTHONIUS virtues of Narrative, 3.8: σαφήνεια, συντομία, πιθανότης; also NICOLAUS, 14.4. The substitution of εὐκαιρία for πιθανότης may result from the importance which late antiquity applies to the notion of τὸ πρέπον. See p. 41.

2. *Gorgias* 517a: ἀληθινὴ ῥητορικὴ; cf. *Phaedrus* 261a: ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχᾶ γωγία τις διὰ λόγων. Scriptural support appears in *John* 17:17: ὁ λόγος ὁ σὸς ἀλήθειά ἐστι (said to Jesus); cf. also 8:43 ff. On the ἀληθὴς λόγος in philosophy and rhetoric in late antiquity see B. KEIL, *ibid.* The discussion of the true rhetoric is frequent in the prolegomena: ANON., *Prolog. Syll.*, 242.24 ff.; (MARCELLINUS), 282.1 ff.; TROILUS, 57.2 ff.; SICELIOTES, 395.21 ff. The adjectives vary: ἀληθεύουσα, ἀληθευτική, ἀληθής, ἀληθινή. See further p. 120. On the important role which Hermogenes' Form ἀλήθεια plays in the religious literature of the Renaissance see PATTERSON, 64 ff., 126 ff., 145 ff.

Knowledge of the *Phaedrus* in the rhetorical scholia is secondhand, derived generally from the quotations in Hermogenes, who often cites Plato's works with approval in illustration of the Forms. There is hardly any concern with the substance of the dialogue except to explain away Plato's attacks on rhetoric (albeit always with respect for ὁ θεὸς Πλάτων· DOXAPATRES, 2.620.5 W; PLANODES, 5.487.9 W; et al.; even ironically by SICELIOTES, *Prolog. Syll.*, 397.10). Common themes are the charge in 260e (also *Gorgias* 462c) that rhetoric is an ἐμπειρία or a τριβή, not a τέχνη (see ANON., *Prolog. Syll.*, 320.16, with RABÉ's testimonia), and the image in 264c likening the logos to a living being (for a list see note 2, p. 154). One of the commonest quotations is 246e, ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς, ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἄρμα, cited by grammarians and rhetoricians as an example of τὸ σεμνόν and of allegorical phraseology (*De Inventione*, 200.19; DEMETRIUS, 56; GREG. COR., 7.1213.9 W; ANON., 8.652.12 W; et al.). References to the *Phaedrus* in Hermogenes appear particularly in his chapters on Dig-

of style and content into a higher Christian unity. Truth is not hereby reduced to a measure of style; rather, style itself is raised into partnership with it. The synthesis represents the idealization of the function of logos in terms of rhetoric. It is the equivalent to the idealization of man in the image of God within Christian theology. Such a development was assisted by the adoption in the early Empire of a theory of Forms for the purpose of explaining the operation of literature. By defining stylistic behavior in terms of Platonic ideals the theory recast the whole understanding of rhetorical process and paved the way for supplying not only ethical and moral but metaphysical substance to literary creation.

In stressing truth as the object of rhetoric the Stoics in effect supplied an ideological foundation for the claim of Christian literature to expound the true religion in language clear and simple, intelligible to all. The early Christians found themselves the recipients of a vast and complex body of rhetorical and literary prescription which had over the centuries evolved answers to the problem of what constitutes good Greek and what were or should be the vehicles for its expression. Hence in order to determine the Christian contribution we must examine the selection and adaptation which Christians made not only of the types of literature available to them but also of the stylistic precepts recommended in the handbooks which they used. Our attention will focus principally on three main genres of the new religion, the epistle, the homily, and the dialogue¹ as they issue from pagan sources, and on the support which they found in

nity, Beauty, and Pleasantness, as might perhaps be expected from the content of the dialogue.

The other Platonic dialogues most commonly cited in the scholia are the *Timaeus* and the *Gorgias*. The first, through its metaphysical theme, supplies Hermogenes with examples of Dignity and, reinforced by Proclus' commentary, served the later tradition as a kind of model of the «religious» style. Quotations from the *Gorgias* are random, but a common theme is the disparagement of rhetoric in 463b as πολιτικῆς μορίου εἶδωλον. For references consult index to *Prolog. Syll.* Doxapates' defense of Plato is curious: *Prolog. Syll.*, 120.19: Plato criticized rhetoric because he loved it beyond all else. He was of course concerned that philosophy was being abandoned in its favor. His comments are simply a case of giving weight to an inferior argument—which is after all a function of rhetoric!

1. A. QUACQUARELLI, *Rhetorica e Liturgia Antenicensa*, Rome 1960, devotes his fourth chapter, entitled, «Sermo, Omilia, Panegirico ed Epistola», to the history and interrelation of these forms with special emphasis on the literature of the Latin West. The book as a whole offers an interesting account not only of the stylistic developments but also of the use of gesture in the Christian service. On the relation between genres and rhetorical ideals see the penetrating comments in BECK, *Kallilogia, passim*.

rhetorical theory, particularly as seen in the pages of Hermogenes.

The *De Ideis* acquires added significance when set beside Christian attitudes toward life and letters developing at the time of its composition. One of the most persistent questions in the rhetorical prolegomena seeks to understand why Hermogenes chose the term *ιδέα* instead of the standard *χαρακτήρ* for his title. Doxapatres notes that *ιδέα* is more general in its application. It can serve Christians as well as pagans, whereas *χαρακτήρ*, both conceptually and historically, is too closely related to specific authors. Dignity, he points out, one of the *ιδέαι*, can apply equally well to Thucydides as to Chrysostom.¹ His remarks are witness to a recurring concern in the scholia, that is, the desire to accommodate both the ancient tradition and the new reality of the Christian order.

Of particular interest are the comments of a sixth-century critic, possibly Phoebammon,² who sketches the relationship between ancient models and contemporary practice. It is quite possible, we are told, to emulate an ancient author and at the same time preserve one's own identity. A person of "plain" disposition, for example, properly trained in the plain style (*ισχνός*), may express the vitality of his own nature while imitating the style of Lysias. By the cultivation through formal training of his natural bent, an author brings himself in line with the ancient standard without abjuring his own talent.³ The premium which a text such

1. *Prol. Syll.*, 428.13 ff., especially 424.1 ff., 425.6, and 424.15: ἡ γὰρ καθόλου φέρε εἰπεῖν σεμνότης περιέχει τὴν Θουκυδίδου εἰ τῶχοι σεμνότης καὶ τὴν Χρυσόστομικὴν καὶ ἄλλας οὐκ ὀλίγας. Basically similar comments by SICELIOTES, *Prol. Syll.*, 404.19-407.14; cf. also ANON., *Prol. Syll.*, 390.4-15; et al. On the history of *ιδέα* versus *χαρακτήρ* see W. SCHMID, «Zur antiken Stillehre aus Anlass von Proklos' Chrestomathie,» *Rheinisches Museum* 49 (1894) 131-161, especially 152 ff., and my «The Literary Criticism of Photius: A Christian Definition of Style,» *Ἑλληνικά* 17 (1960) 135 ff.; also G. HENDRICKSON, «The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style,» *American Journal of Philology* 26 (1905) 248-290; F. QUADLBAUER, «Die genera dicendi bei Plinius d. J.,» *Wiener Studien* 71 (1958) 55-111. Interesting comparisons between the rhetorical *χαρακτήρ* and the fine arts in CHAIGNET, 508-531.

2. On the question of authorship Rabe hesitates, *Prol. Syll.*, pp. cvi-cix. On this important figure in late antique rhetoric see the full article by W. STEGEMANN, s.o. Phoebammon in RE-PW. PHOEBAMMON'S *Περὶ μμήσεως* is one of the few surviving later treatments of the subject which had been central to Plato's and Aristotle's discussion of the arts. Cf. also SICELIOTES, *Prol. Syll.*, 410.11 ff. Rhetoric had now turned to other questions. See p. 148 and A. BRINKMANN, «Phoebammon περὶ μμήσεως,» *Rheinisches Museum* 61 (1906) 117-134. On *μμήσεως* of antiquity as a Byzantine literary standard see the article by HUNGER, *passim*.

3. *Prol. Syll.*, 382.1 ff.: δυνατόν γὰρ κατὰ ταῦτόν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν φύσιν φυλάττειν καὶ

as this places on individuality and the explicit connection which it draws between character and style are inspired in part, we must not forget, by a reading of Hermogenes and can also be fruitfully regarded in the light of evolving Christian patterns of emphasis on the personal.

A related line of argument on the question of *χαρακτήρ* versus *ιδέα* conceives of *χαρακτήρ* as specifying an individual author as a psychological unit, impossible of definition as a whole and of indissoluble complexity, but capable of expression through the unique manipulation at any given point of the various *ιδέαι* supplied by rhetorical prescription. The remarks come from Siceliotēs, who is taking his cue from Phoebammon. Siceliotēs connects *χαρακτήρ* with *ἥθος* and *ιδέα* with the virtue of the soul (*ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς*). Just as a human face can be described in terms of its distinctive features, e.g., aquiline, grey-eyed, white-skinned, so the Forms are outwardly recognizable through their Categories (Sentence, Diction, and the rest) and comprise and shape the logos in the same way as the virtues do the soul.¹ We see here an essentially moral line of thought in the sense that moral terminology is used to describe distinctions of style. Christian composition of whatever kind might thus ultimately be justified not only on its intrinsic merits but also through its use of a classicizing rhetorical tradition which in some of its language appeared to have common moral concerns.

According to Siceliotēs, not only are the Forms colorations of style; their absence makes the logos formless and ugly (*ἀνείδεος* and *ἀκαλλῆς*).² So too Hermogenes describes Beauty and Ethos as Forms which give

ζηλωσαι τύπον ἀρχαῖον· ὁ γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἰσχνὸν ἐπιτηδεύς ἔχων κἀν τούτῳ δεόντως ἐγγυμνασθεῖς ἅμα καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν φύσιν ἑρρωμένην φυλάττει καὶ τὸν Λυσιακὸν χαρακτήρα, κἀπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὡς ὁμοίως, ἔνθα ἂν ἕκαστος ἐπιρρεπεστέραν ἴδοι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, περὶ τοῦτο μάλιστα γυμναζόμενος καὶ εἰς ἀρχαῖον πάντως κατενεχθήσεται τύπον καὶ τῆς οἰκίας οὐκ ἐκπεσεῖται δεξιότητος.

1. *Prol. Syll.*, 407.2 ff.: οὐκοῦν αἱ ἰδέαι - ἣ τε σαφὴνεια καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ - ταῖς ἀρεταῖς εἰκνύονται ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ συνεστηκυῖαι ὥσπερ τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἰδιωμάτων ἦτοι γρῦπότητος, γλαυκότητος, λευκότητος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκάστης αὐτῶν ἰδιωμάτων, οὕτω καὶ αὗται λέξεις, ἐννοίας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰκότως (ἄρα) περὶ ἀρετῶν λόγου καὶ ἰδιότητος προθέμενος εἰπεῖν Περὶ ἰδεῶν ἐπέγραψε τὸ βιβλίον, αἱ γινωσκόμεναι καὶ συνιστάσι τοὺς λόγους καὶ εἰδοποιούσιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἀρεταὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. On such comparisons see A. DESMOULIEZ, «La signification esthétique des comparaisons entre le style et le corps humain dans la rhétorique antique,» *Revue des études latines* 33 (1955) 59-60.

2. *Prol. Syll.*, 406.24: αἱ (sc. ψυχαὶ) τοῦτο (i.e., ἰδέαι) μὴ ἔχουσαι καὶ ἀνείδεοι καὶ ἀκαλλεῖς.

color to the body of discourse just as complexion does to the human body."¹ With this observation Siceliotes has in effect supplied an aesthetic dimension. His views are not original to the eleventh century in which he lives. As with our other middle-Byzantine scholia he incorporates older Neoplatonic ideas. The parallel sentiments which in this instance may be found in Proclus and Olympiodorus² attest the vital influence which the Platonizing direction of late antiquity could exercise on the subsequent development of a Byzantine theory of literature, a direction which found reinforcement in Hermogenes' own rhetorical conceptions.

Texts such as Phoebammon and Siceliotes allow us to reconstruct the framework within which much of Byzantine literature comes to be written, a literature that could be gauged and admired in terms of how well it subscribed to a distinctive synthesis of moral and aesthetic purpose, and that enjoyed the added sanction of being rooted in ancient modes. We must be careful to note that it is indeed a fusion and not merely a combination that Hermogenes has in mind. The Forms, by blending, impinging, and shading off into one another, orchestrate a transcendent unity of stylistic value which turns away from the elitist judgments of

1. 296.17 ff.: κάλλος - - εὐάρμοστον καὶ σύμμετρον μετὰ τινος ἐμφαινομένης δι' ὅλου τοῦ λόγου ποιότητος ἥθους μῖξ πρεπούσης τῇ ιδέᾳ καθάπερ ἐν σώματι χρῶμα; also 297.1 ff.; 320.25 ff.: ἥθος - - τὸ δι' ὅλου τοῦ λόγου ἀναγκαίως ἔχον ἐμφαίνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν σώματι χρῶμα. On these passages in another connection see pp. 153-54, 162-63.

2. OLYMPIODORUS, *In Phaed.* 40.19-20 NORWIN: οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν ὡς ἀνείδω καὶ ἀκαλλεῖ; *In Gorg.* 5.1; 12.10 WESTERINK; PROCLUS, *In Alc.* 326.9-13 WESTERINK: ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐν σώμασι κάλλος οὐκ ἄλλως ὑφέστηκεν ἢ ὅταν τὸ εἶδος ἐπικρατῇ τῆς ὕλης· ἀκαλλὴς γὰρ αὕτη καὶ αἰσχροῦ, καὶ ὅταν κρατηθῇ τὸ εἶδος ὑπ' αὐτῆς, αἰσχους ἀναπύμπλαται καὶ ἀμορφίας καὶ οἷον ἀνείδων γίνεται τῇ ὑποκειμένη φύσει συνεξομοιούμενον. I owe these references to Professor Westerink. Cf. also *In Alc.* 48.12: ἐν εἶδει γὰρ τὸ καλόν, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ἀνείδω καὶ τῷ αἰσchrῷ συμμιγές; 318.1: ἡ ὕλη καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἀκαλλὴς οὖσα διότι καὶ ἀνείδους; 320.8 ff.; 206.10: ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ ἡ σύμμετρία μετὰ τοῦ κάλλους πάντως ὑφέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀσυμμετρία καὶ ἡ ἀναρμοστία μετὰ τῆς αἰσχροσύνης; 210.7: διότι γὰρ εἶδους ἐπέχει τάξιν ὁ λόγος ἐν τῇ συμπάσῃ ψυχῇ, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ κακία τοῦ λόγου τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν αἰσχος ὥσπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ κάλλος; cf. 325.12: τὸ δὲ τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλόν ἐστι. The ideals of truth, beauty, and proportion (ἀλήθεια, κάλλος, σύμμετρία), the three monads of *Philebus* 64a7-65a5, are discussed by Proclus. See *Lectures on the Philebus*, Sects. 233-249 WESTERINK and p. xxi of his introduction to the text. Proclus is known to have written a commentary on the *Philebus*. See R. BEUTLER, *RE-PW* s.v., coll. 195-196. Further, large sections of his *In Alc.* discuss the καλόν/αἰσchrόν-σύμμετρον. See Sects. 3; 205; 225; 325; 339; et al. As a prime dialogue in the philosophical curriculum (see p. 59) the *First Alcibiades* contributed significantly to the formation of the rhetorical ideals of late antiquity.

older rhetoric in favor of a more catholic appreciation of the habits of discourse. There is no moral or aesthetic hierarchy in his system, no distinction between high and low styles. The Form Simplicity carries no more or less weight in the structure of the logos than Dignity, and only rarely is Hermogenes inclined to relate his observations to specific genres, as his predecessors were wont to do. This levelling, coupled with the call for a mixture of elements within a given narrative, bestows a kind of universalist dimension on any one literary product while at the same time respecting its singular claim within the gamut of literary experience. Furthermore, the Platonizing impulse of Hermogenes' rhetorical message, by projecting literary value into the ideal, not only exalts the act of literature itself but places it in the realm of the distant¹, hence perhaps hidden and obscure. In this way it contributes to the mysticism of the Fathers and the whole later Byzantine view.

Partly because it is in the nature of the ideal to be somehow beyond us, late antique rhetoric came to stress the more extrinsic aspects of literary form. By way of compensation, however, it left free at the same time an inner core to be identified with personality. If the wellspring of literature lay within the privacy of the human soul, it was not easily subject to classification and limitation but could be as varied and as singular as the human psyche itself. Yet it still required definition. Here the old rhetorical concept of ἥθος came into play, which in various guises enjoys wide popularity in late antiquity and in Byzantium. Hence the association of χαρακτήρ with ἥθος in Siceliotes. Hence too the vogue, extremely common throughout Byzantine literary history, of composing ἡθοποιαί, the progymnasma devoted to individual character studies. It is in this light also that we must view the whole discussion of χαρακτήρ in Phoebammon, Siceliotes, and Doxapatres. The term had previously been limited to the traditional three levels of style, the grand, the middle, and the simple. These scholiasts now wish that its application be widened so as to refer to the standard, non-technical meaning of "character", for they conclude that the possibilities are infinite and hard to grasp and they prefer to work through the Forms rather than through any facile categorization of individual character.²

1. Cf. ARISTOTLE's remark, *Rhet.* I' 2.3, 1404b11, that men admire what is remote: θαυμασταὶ γὰρ ἀπόντων εἰσίν.

2. ANON. (eleventh century), *Procl. Syll.*, 393.4-12: Διὰ τί Περὶ ἰδεῶν, οὐ <Περὶ> χαρακτήρων εἶπεν; ὅτι οἱ χαρακτῆρες καὶ ἐπὶ ἐμφύχων καὶ ἐπὶ ἀψύχων [καὶ] ἀκατάληπτοι εἰσιν. αἱ δὲ ἰδέαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν προσώποις ἰδεῶν μεταφορικῶς παρελήφθησαν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰς

Put another way, the two poles now are made to meet and reinforce one another: the Forms achieve a distinctively human reality and in turn ennoble it. Such an attitude, relying on the innate flexibility of Hermogenes' analysis, provided a full theoretical base for literary endeavor. We can as a result better appreciate the extensive Byzantine interest in the subjective, the clearest instance of which lies perhaps in the rich tradition of epistolography. The letter, by supplying an outlet for the personal, which it presented with the proper accoutrements of literary grace, met the demands of both *χαρακτήρ* and *ιδέα*. In remaining so often external, however, the moral-aesthetic component was applied not so much as a cosmetic to adorn but as a mask which stifled and concealed. Yet masks may have also the positive function of giving outward form to inner emotion; they can be immediate and real rather than false and distant. The challenge was at least there and often supplied the framework within which the creative impulse could express itself.

To the Christian cleric or layman of late antiquity exposed in his school training to a text such as Hermogenes, two elements in the Form-structure especially must have rung true in their identity with the claims and features of Christian literature and the definition of the Christian person. Eduard Norden singled out *ἀφέλεια* (simplicity) and *σεμνότης* (dignity) as marking the definition of the style of the Biblical text and of Patristic literature generally.¹ Now the example of *ἀφέλεια* given in Pseudo-Aristides, the rhetorical text roughly contemporary and in some ways intimately connected with Hermogenes, is the non-oratorical prose used by historians and philosophers, especially Socrates.² Fur-

δνομασίας ἐκ τῆς ἐκάστου ιδέας γνωρίζομεν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὁψεως ἐπιστάμεθα οἷον ἀνδρας, γυναῖκας, παῖδας, οὕτως οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἐκ τῶν ιδεῶν γνωρίζοντες ἀδρούς καὶ ἰσχνούς καὶ ἀνθηρούς τοὺς λόγους ἐκάλεσαν, ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μορφῶν τὰ δνόματα θέμενοι; similarly, (PHOEBAMMON), *Prol. Syll.*, 376.12 ff.; SICELIOTES, *Prol. Syll.*, 398.2 ff., 405.13 ff.; DOXAPATRES, *Prol. Syll.*, 423.13 ff. This special combination of *χαρακτήρ* and *ιδέα* is reminiscent of the emphasis on both insight and control which has been recognized as the dual basis for literary creation propounded by Pseudo-Longinus, *On the Sublime*, a text which shows a number of similarities of approach to what we find in Hermogenes. See e.g. J. BRODY, *Boileau and Longinus*, Geneva 1958, 142. S. MONK, *The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in XVIII-Century England*, New York 1935, 82, speaks of «equality of mind plus experience».

1. See the impressive list of passages cited in his *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, vol. 2, Leipzig 1898, 512 ff. On ἡθοποιία see p. 45, *infra*.

2. 73.13 ff.; 76.19 ff.; 80.19 ff.; 87.25 ff.; 92.21 ff.; 98.23 ff.; 102.18 ff.; et al. For the connection of *ἀφέλεια* with the private, conversational style see 72.13: ἀφε-

ther, it is a kind of prose closely associated with the personality of its author, who must have an ἀπλὴ ψυχὴ καὶ γενναία, "a simple and noble soul."¹ Xenophon's historical and philosophical tracts had long been a model for this kind of thinking. Schmid has argued cogently that Hermogenes continued to regard Xenophon as an example of *ἀφέλεια*, but took an important step further and assigned the quality to Plato as well.² Plato's is the full, even poetic kind of prose. By tying it so closely to *ἀφέλεια*, Hermogenes in effect gave a handle to generations of Christian writers who, though embarrassed by the simple style of the New Testament, could escape their dilemma by emulating the classical Platonic model, which now shared a common definition with the language of the Gospel. Simplicity and Dignity are opposites in Hermogenes' scheme,³ but in Plato they were seen to be mutually supporting. The same cooperation could now help define and justify Biblical and Patristic style. The Christian had now at his disposal not only Scriptural authority but also the sanction of pagan learning, the link between the two provided by a common vocabulary of criticism.

σεμνότης figures steadily and importantly in Christian thinking about style. Chrysostom selects as his ideal classical authors pre-eminently those with a stately or dignified style.⁴ Photius' letter to the Bulgarian prince, Boris-Michael, in which Photius advises him of his duties as

λῆ ὡς ἐν ιδιωτικῇ καὶ ὁμιλητικῇ ὄντα. On Hermogenes and Pseudo-Aristides see note 3, p. 17. LUCIAN, *Πῶς δεῖ ιστορίαν συγγράφειν* 44 IACOBITZ, calls for a style for historiography in many respects similar to that recommended by the two rhetoricians. The style should fall midway. It should be such as the many might understand and the cultured might praise. The first aim should be the clear and lucid presentation of events. Like many of his contemporaries, Lucian asks not for ordinary speech but for a simplicity which has in it a due measure of classical references and ornaments: τῇ φωνῇ εἰς σκοπὸς ὁ πρῶτος, σαφῶς δηλῶσαι καὶ φανότατα ἐμφανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα, μήτε ἀπορρήτοις καὶ ἔξω πάτου δνόμασι μήτε τοῖς ἀγοραίοις τούτοις καὶ καπηλικοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς συνεῖναι, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευμένους ἐπαινέσαι· καὶ μὴν καὶ σχήμασι κεκοσμηθῶ ἀνεπαχθέσι καὶ τὸ ἀνεπιτήδευτον μάλιστα ἔχουσιν. See AVENARIUS, 55 ff.

1. 84.4. See SCHMID, «Der sogenannte Aristidesrhetorik», *Rheinisches Museum* 72 (1917) 245. RUSSELL, p. xxii and xxvi, note 7, interprets 'Longinus' as asking for ψυχικὸν μέγεθος before one can achieve μεγάλοι λόγοι. On ἀπλότης see the recent study by J. AMSTUTZ, *Ἀπλότης. Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Studie zum jüdisch-christlichen Griechisch*, Bonn 1968.

2. Op. cit., 249.

3. 242.19: σεμνότητος, ἥ τάχα ἐν ἐναντίον εἶη ἀφέλεια.

4. *De Sacerdotio* IV, PG 48, 669: τὸν Δημοσθένους ὄγκον καὶ τὴν Θουκυδίδου σεμνότητα καὶ τὸ Πλάτωνος ὄψος.

a Christian ruler, charmingly recommends that his dress (περιβολή) be dignified and that his style of writing likewise combine Dignity and Amplitude (περιβολή) in pious harmony.¹ In the sixth century the Phoebammon text pays particular attention to Dignity among Hermogenes' Forms. However, it ascribes it to Demosthenes and Antiphon.² Sice-liotes, who borrows the passage, thinks rather of SS. Basil and John Chrysostom and the "theological" style as a whole.³ We should not take "theological" in the narrow sense. It means Christian writing in general, as exemplified by these particular writers, and especially Gregory of Nazianzus, whose appellation ὁ θεολόγος seems to be in point here. The author of the Scholia Minora points out that there are now available a number of quotations, such as the beginning of the Fourth Gospel and passages from the Hexaëmeron, that can take the place of the pagan examples.⁴ A simple tactic of adaptation is illustrated also by Psellus. As the main Sentence of Dignity Hermogenes recommends discussion concerning the gods or divine matters. In his outline Psellus changes

1. PG 102, 665D: περιβολή ἐσθῆτος κόσμιον ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ σεμνόν; 668A: σύμμετρον σὺν εὐταξίᾳ σεμνόν τε καὶ ἀξιάγαστον καὶ μεστὸν ὄγκου καὶ σὺν εὐλαβείᾳ ποθεῖν ὁρᾶσθαι παρασκευάζει. Photius describes Themistius' style as σαφὴς καὶ ἀπέρिटτος (on the relation between περιβολή and περισσολογία see pp. 139ff.) and says he manages to combine σεμνότης with the πολιτικὸς λόγος: cod. 74, 52a6 ff. Cf. on Herodian, cod. 99, 85b41: οὔτε δὲ περιττολογίαις ἐστὶ σεμνυνόμενος. Philoponus, whose doctrines Photius dislikes, is σαφὴς but not σεμνός (cod. 75, 52a31), while the orator Aeschines is praised for combining the two qualities (cod. 264, 490a37). The notices on the Attic orators in the *Bibliotheca* have, however, their own tradition, which depends ultimately on the judgments of Hellenistic rhetoric. See A. VONACH, *Die Berichte des Photios über die fünf älteren attischen Redner. Commentationes Aenipontanae V*, Innsbruck 1910.

2. *Prol. Syll.*, 384.28 ff.: καθ' ὃν γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς φιλοσόφους λόγον τὸ εἶδος περιέχει τὰ ἄτομα, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἡ σεμνότης τὴν Δημοσθενεὶν [sc. ἰδέαν] καὶ τὴν Ἀντιφαντεῖαν εἰ τύχοι καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς. It is noticeable that the rhetorical standard appears in a context concerned with the relation of ἄτομον to εἶδος and this in turn to γένος, the same yardsticks which affect the definition of Amplitude. See p. 134. RABE compares Porphyry's *Isagoge*, CAG 4.1 ed. BussE, pp. 5.15; 7.27: περιέχεται οὖν τὸ μὲν ἄτομον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἶδους, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους.

3. *Prol. Syll.*, 405.8 ff.: ὡς γὰρ τὸ εἶδος περιέχει τὰ ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἄτομα --- οὕτω καὶ αὖται, τουτέστι σεμνότης καὶ λαμπρότης καὶ αἱ λοιπαί, τὴν Βασιλευκὴν τυχὸν ἰδέαν ἢ τὴν θεολογικὴν ἢ Χρυσόστομικὴν. The passage is imitated by DOXAPATRES, *Prol. Syll.*, 425.5, who also remarks, 424.14: ἡ γὰρ καθόλου φέρε εἰπεῖν σεμνότης περιέχει τὴν Θεουκιδίδου εἰ τύχοι σεμνότητα καὶ τὴν Χρυσόστομικὴν καὶ ἄλλας οὐκ ὀλίγας. See p. 123.

4. 7.956 note W.

"gods" to "God."¹ In this way Hermogenes easily becomes a Christian.

Dignity has other Christian echoes as well. Chrysostom's preference for those classical authors writing in the grand style occurs in a context which assesses the stylistic virtues of St. Paul, the Scriptural author upon whose text he wrote the detailed commentary which is the basis of all later Byzantine exegesis of the Epistles.² Chrysostom regards St. Paul as the supreme stylist because he addresses himself to all humanity and transcends the distinction between the high style of a Demosthenes or Thucydides and the ἀπλότης or ἀφέλεια of the common man³ interested less in rhetorical embellishment than in spiritual redemption. This same association of ἀφέλεια with ἰδιωτισμός we find in the pagan philosopher of the second century, Sextus Empiricus.⁴ In effect Chrysostom has transformed a pagan motif so that ἀφέλεια and ἰδιωτισμός become of themselves sublime (σεμνά), while sublimity is itself in turn justified by its new relevance in the elevation of the humble and lowly to the bosom of God.

The rhetorical basis from which Christianity could proceed to this association lay in the importance which ἀφέλεια commanded as a stylistic value in the early imperial period. The whole of the second book of Pseudo-Aristides is devoted to it and it is in addition one of Hermogenes' Forms. We need not examine the recommendations of these two authors in detail. Suffice it to say that ἀφέλεια has to do with the simpler patterns of language. Hermogenes says its Sentences avoid anything profound or involved. He compares it to the way we speak to the uneducated or to

1. 5.602.1 W: ἡ σεμνότης ἐννοίας ἔχει τὰς περὶ θεοῦ ὡς περὶ θεοῦ. HUNGER, 35, calls attention to *Christus Patiens* 1131: πολλά τ' ἀέλπτως πολλάκις κραίνει θεός ~ EURIPIDES *Med.* 1416: πολλά τ' ἀέλπτως κραίνουσι θεοί.

2. Text: PG 60-63. See K. STAAB, *Die Pauluskatenen*, Rome 1926, *passim*, especially 263 ff.

3. ἰδιώτης, *II Cor.* 11:6. This is also the burden of the analysis of the Pauline λόγος in Photius. See B. WYSS, «Photios über den Stil des Paulus», *Museum Helveticum* 21 (1952) 236-251.

4. *Πρὸς ἑήτορας* Mutschmann/Mau III, 99.27: εὖνοιαν δὲ ἐμποιεῖ οὐχ ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀλλ' ὁ ἀφελὴς καὶ τὸν ἰδιωτικὸν ὑποφαίνων τύπον; 100.4: ἀφελούς καὶ ἰδιώτου. This association helps explain ἀφέλεια as the style *par excellence* of the Greek novel, in which ἡθοποιᾶ in the sense of description of the adventures and feelings of the characters plays a key role. See E. RONDÉ, *Der griechische Roman*³, Leipzig 1914, 551. On the subject of the exalted and the low styles in ancient criticism see F. WEHRLI (see Bibliography).

children, pointing out that it contains elements of the poetic, uses the rhythms of ordinary speech, and shares common ground with Purity and Pleasantness.¹

Psychologically, a pride in ἀφέλεια lies behind the frequent protestations that Christian concern is with truth, not stylistic beauty. St. Basil writes to his pagan friend, Libanius:

"But for us, admirable sir, we associate with Moses and Elias and such blessed men, who communicate their thoughts to us in a barbaric tongue, and it is what we learn from them that we give utterance to—in substance true, though in style unlearned, as indeed these present words show. For even if we did learn something from you, time has caused us to forget it."²

And Synesius exclaims,

"God does not care for exalted style; the spirit of God spurns finery in writing."³

As we have seen, for Hermogenes Plato is not only ἀφελής; he is a prime example of the σεμνὸς χαρακτήρ.⁴ ἀφέλεια and σεμνότης have thus been referred to the same author. Further, ἀφέλεια and σεμνότης are essentially the same set of values as Pseudo-Aristides' ἀπλοῦς and γυναιῶς. In the one case we are in the realm of ethics, in the other of style. The word of God has both simplicity and grandeur; so should the individual Christian. Similarly, Christian speech is not only ἀφελής; it can also uplift, i.e., is σεμνός, as Isidore of Pelusium tells us:

"The language of the divine wisdom is ordinary but its content is as high as the sky; of pagan wisdom the style is brilliant but its burden lowly. If one could have the substance of the one and the style of the other, one would be judged most wise, for beauty of speech can be an instrument of the supramundane wisdom."⁵

1. 322.4-329.24.

2. Letter 339, PG 32, 1084: ἡμεῖς μὲν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, Μωσεὶ καὶ Ἡλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς οὕτω μακαρίοις ἀνδράσι σύνεσμεν, ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φωνῆς διαλεγόμενοις ἡμῖν τὰ ἑαυτῶν, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐκείνων φεγγόμεθα, νοῦν μὲν ἀληθῆ, λέξιν δὲ ἀμαθῆ, εἰ γὰρ τι καὶ ἤμεν παρ' ὑμῶν διδαχθέντες, ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου ἐπελαθόμεθα. R.J. DEFERRARI'S Loeb translation.

3. Hom. 1, PG 66, 1561B: οὐδὲν μέλει τῷ θεῷ θεοφορήτου λέξεως. πνεῦμα θεῖον ὑπερορᾷ μικρολογίαν συγγραφικὴν.

4. Note the frequent references to Plato in the section on Dignity, 242.21 - 254.21.

5. Book V, Letter 281, PG 78, 1500D: τῆς θείας σοφίας ἡ μὲν λέξις πεζή, ἡ ἔννοια

Thus, the same qualities which are being held up as stylistic models by the purely pagan and strictly philological or rhetorical tradition form the concern of those who during the same centuries are building not only the theoretical base of Christian literature but the structure of Christian ethics. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the same terminology should be in use in both disciplines. We have rather to ask what special connotations such vocabulary has during this period and what is the principle of selection. The parallels should not be pressed too far. We are dealing not so much with cross influences as with common associative patterns of thinking about character and about style. σεμνότης and ἀφέλεια may play a central role in the definition of a Christian, but in Hermogenes they are but two of a larger set of concepts contributing to an over-all definition of style. Both Christian and pagan interest in late antiquity is focusing attention on the relation of the soul to the terrestrial and ethereal cosmos. The resources of rhetoric could be brought to bear on such a problem. The paraenetic elements in Plato impress Neoplatonist and Christian alike, each dedicated in his own way to the development of dogma, for which such techniques would be eminently useful, while the figure of Socrates, proto-Christian as he was proto-Stoic and proto-Cynic, simple yet splendid in his humble grandeur, reinforced the appeal in both camps.

The definition of Plato's style is a concern not only of the rhetorical theorists but of the philosophers as well. Here an additional factor comes into play. Proclus calls attention to the "prophetic" or "enigmatic" (αἰνιγματώδες) in Plato in seeking to define the special vigor (πάθος) of the dialogues. This element he defines as an aspect of σεμνότης, which like Hermogenes he considers to be a subdivision of μέγεθος.¹ When he

δὲ οὐρανομήκης τῆς δὲ ἐξωθεν λαμπρὰ μὲν ἡ φράσις, χαμαιπετής δὲ ἡ πρᾶξις. εἰ δὲ τις δυνήσθῃ τῆς μὲν ἔχειν τὴν ἔννοιαν, τῆς δὲ τὴν φράσιν, σοφώτατος ἂν δικαίως κριθεῖ. δύναται γὰρ ὄργανον εἶναι τῆς ὑπερκοσμίου σοφίας ἡ εὐγλωττία. The passages from Basil, Synesius, and Isidore are cited by NORDEN, op. cit., 513 ff.

1. In rem publ. 2.7.23 KROLL. PROCLUS also speaks of the Socratic τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας as mixed (2.8.8): it uses 1) the ἀποφαντικός τρόπος, by which he means authoritative statements without proof, as for example in prophecy, because this is most suited (πρέπει) θεῶν λόγοις, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐνθουσιάζουσιν καὶ τοῖς χρησμοδοῖς, and 2) the εἰκονικός = expressing the metaphysical in terms of the mathematical or the physical, for οὐκ εἶναι δὲ ψυχαῖς καὶ τοῖς κοσμικοῖς πᾶσιν τὸ εἰκονικόν. A full exposition of the Socratic four τρόποι διδασκαλίας (ἀποφαντικός, διαλεκτικός, συμβολικός, εἰκονικός) appears in PROCLUS, *Theol. Plat.*, 1.4 SAFFREY - WESTERINK See also pp. 175ff. The τρόποι appear also in various grammatical and rhetorical prolegomena and, in

further remarks on the basic relationship between poetry and myth in Plato¹ he is putting his finger on a feature of the dialogues which was to serve Christian homiletic needs as well. For in addition to the tendency of the homily to follow the more external prescriptions of style, it could now as regards subject matter substitute Christian narrative for pagan myth and Scriptural quotation for poetic allusion. The preacher, inspired and inspiring, could now lay claim, as had Christ himself, to delivering his simple message before the initiates of the new mystery.

While on one level the adoption of the yardsticks of Platonic criticism aggravated the Christian problem of insisting at once on the universality and the exclusiveness of the Christian message, on another level the very contrast invited a solution which with appropriate changes could meet the challenges posed by the new genres. The old distinction in rhetoric between the high and the low styles² had been based largely on grammatical and linguistic considerations. Although late antiquity preserved much of the vocabulary of this discussion, it widened the reference, making it part of a more profound antithesis based on metaphysical or theological factors as well which drew from an appreciation of both Scriptural and Platonic purpose.

In other words, in the course of adopting pagan modes Christianity

altered form, in the introduction to some medical texts. See the list in WESTERINK, *Anon.*, p. xl, note 132, and his notes in *Damascius. Lectures on the Philebus Wrongly Attributed to Olympiodorus*, Amsterdam 1959, Sects. 52-56. Some references: *Procl. Syll.*, 78.17-79.7; 237.11-16; *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam. Grammatici Graeci* I, iii ed. A. HILGARD, Leipzig 1901, 161.20-24; 352.33-34; ELIAS, *In Porphy. Isag.*, CAG 18.1 ed. A. BUSSE, 39.26-31; DAVID, *In Porphy. Isag.*, CAG 18.2 ed. A. BUSSE, 93.25-94.6.

1. *In rem publ.* 2.111.6: τοῖς μυθικοῖς πλάσμασι μάλιστα δεῖ ποιητικῆς χάριτος. Note the similarity between the ideals of prose and poetry in later antiquity as defined by QUINTILIAN, 10.1.27, who is following a Theophrastan tradition: «Poets give us inspiration as regards the matter, sublimity of language, the power to excite every kind of emotion and the appropriate treatment of character» (H.E. BUTLER's Loeb translation): *nam ab his in rebus spiritus et in verbis sublimitas et in adfectibus motus omnis et in personis decor petitur*. On the classical theory regarding poetry see A. SPERDUTI, «The Divine Nature of Poetry in Antiquity», *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 81 (1951) 209-240; H. NORTH, «The Use of Poetry in the Training of the Ancient Orator», *Traditio* 8 (1952) 1-33.

2. PROCLUS, *In rem publ.* 2.8.4, is using standard terminology in calling the Platonic style ἀδρός, «grand», which he cites as one of the traditional three types. His thinking throughout the passage is, however, dualistic. On the history of these stylistic divisions in antiquity see the bibliography in CAPLAN, 252, note c.

took upon itself a whole new definition of literature. It presumed to try to bring into a new union, under a single religious aegis, many of the contrasting achievements in ancient letters, such as prose and poetry, myth and symbol, philosophy and rhetoric, and it made the attempt under the felt compulsion to see literature as an instrument of an overriding divine scheme within which the individual writer in expressing his genius at the same time unfolded God's plan. Hence the frequent use in contemporary criticism of the notion of fittingness or propriety, derived from ancient rhetoric.¹ One detects not merely a concern for adjusting style to content,

1. Terms such as πρέπον, οἰκεῖον, and πρόσφορον are frequent touchstones of Neoplatonic thought and have also been received into the later discussions of the rhetorical ἰδέα. See WALSDORFF, 101 ff. and pp. 97, 144, 153, 172, *infra*.

τὸ πρέπον has its origin in the classical period in Gorgias' conception of καῖρός (fr. 6; see DIONYS. HAL., *De Comp.*, 45.6 ff.) and reflects the Greek sense of decorum in human relations and in the natural order already evident in Homer. Its practical application appears in Lysias' ἡθοποία, that is, the technique of adjusting style to the characteristics of the defendant on whose behalf an orator writes his speeches. The development of ἡθοποία as a specific type of literature is owed to Theophrastus. Cf. PLATO, *Phaedrus* 271a; *Gorgias* 513b. W. SÜSS, 187 ff., 216 ff.; G. KENNEDY, 92; J. STROUX, *De Theophrasti Virtutibus Dicendi*, Diss. Leipzig 1912, 78; and, in general, H. M. HAGEN (see Bibliography). In Aristotle's hands τὸ πρέπον becomes a central virtue of style, along with clarity, and henceforth plays a steady and important role in the history of rhetoric as well as philosophy. Cf. *Rhet.* 1408a10 ff.: τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἡ λέξις ἐὰν ᾗ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἠθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον; 1408a25 ff.: καὶ ἠθικὴ δὲ αὐτὴ ἡ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις, ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἀρμόττουσα ἐκάστῳ γένει καὶ ἔξει. Latin discussion: CICERO, *Orator* 70 ff., 123.

In the course of its career the concept assumes a Protean variety of forms. Appropriateness to time and circumstance and to the person either addressed or doing the addressing, orally or in written form, is perhaps the most traditional and obvious approach, but the concept figures especially importantly in Stoic ethics, particularly in Panaetius' definition of the harmonious personality. See M. VAN STRAATEN, *Panaetius*, Amsterdam 1966, 160-163; R. PHILIPPSON, «Das Sittlichschöne bei Panaitios», *Philologus* 85 (1930) 357-413. H. NORTH regards it as the «chief rhetorical expression of sophrosyne»: *Sophrosyne. Self Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature*, Ithaca, New York 1966, 148. Its wider associations are cultivated by the Stoic sense of the interrelation of the parts and members of the universe, which may have helped supply the notion of the unity of literary experience adumbrated by Hermogenes as a pattern of inter-effective parts, and also clearly influenced the Neoplatonists, imbued as they were with the feeling of the sublimation of all things into the One. Not the least of its functions in late antiquity is that it provided an ideal of order and decency in a world often displaying the opposite conditions. The adaptations which the Christians make of it will be considered *passim*. Basic treatment: M. POHLENZ, *Τὸ πρέπον. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des griechischen Geistes*.

but a subtle desire that literature be direct and immediate, that it serve God's will within a new cosmic order, that it use ornament to good purpose and allow no interference with its "natural" function.¹

Such concerns will affect both the pagans and the Christians of the age, but they have of course a special religious relevance in terms of the subsequent fortunes of Greek letters. The consummate beauty of much of church poetry and the successful appeal of many a Byzantine sermon mark just such a noble synthesis as theory required. It is a synthesis which we often find difficulty in feeling, for the modern age, whose values in criticism are heavily secular, is poorly equipped to judge a literature based on a special set of religious premises. To be sure, the achievement is not universal. The failure, however, is one of practice, not theory, and is owed in part to the continuing force of an older, outmoded rhetoric,

Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse, 1933, 53-92; see also D'ALTON, 116 ff. POHLENZ, 72 ff. points out that it is fundamentally a phenomenon of the moral impulse of Greek thought. For a useful general appreciation of such conceptions as balance, rhythm, and structure in the Greek Fathers and their individual systems of explaining the cosmos see F. McCLOY, «The Sense of Artistic Form in the Mentality of the Greek Fathers,» *Studia Patristica*, vol. 9 (= *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, vol. 94), Berlin 1966, 69-74.

In the form of *καίρος* the *πρέπον* is an important principle of style very frequently treated by 'Longinus'. Cf. 106.24; 122.21; 153.15; 154.9; 170.23; 172.21; et al. See J. BORDY, *Boileau and Longinus*, Geneva 1958, 41 ff. R. McKEON, «Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity,» *Modern Philology* 34 (1936) 33, observes that in some of the works of imperial rhetoric «the problem of literature turns on propriety and the need to find distinguished thoughts and distinguished expressions and to clothe thoughts in appropriate words» and that writers like Demetrius limit the term *μιμησις* «to the imitation of poets by poets and of things by words.» The development points to a relation between *τὸ πρέπον* and the concept of Dignity which is evident in Hermogenes' scheme. H. CAPLAN, «Classical Rhetoric and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching,» *Classical Philology* 28 (1933) 86, speaking of the West, finds that «the richest legacy bequeathed to mediaeval rhetoric from the ancient period was the principle of the inventional use of the *topos* or commonplace, the artistic finding of the right argument communicable to the right audience in the right circumstances». While the West put emphasis on *εὑρεσις* (*inventio*) over *λέξις*, in the Byzantine tradition the reverse holds true. Cf. also PLUTARCH's perceptive distinction, *De audiend. poet.* 18D: οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν τι μῆεῖσθαι καὶ καλῶς. καλῶς γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πρεπόντως καὶ οἰκείως, οἰκεῖα δὲ καὶ πρέποντα τοῖς ἀσχοροῖς τὰ ἀσχροτά. Byzantine *καλλιλογία* envisions them both as one.

1. Cf. PROCLUS, *In Parmen.* 492 STALLBAUM: τοῖς περὶ θεῶν πραγμάτων λόγοις προσήκει τὸ ἀπέρριπτον καὶ ἀτοφὺς καὶ ἀκαλλώπιστον.

which we often ourselves apply in judging mediaeval works and which did not alone have the resources to bridge the gap between the low and the exalted styles, because it was rhetoric itself which had made the distinction.

The nature of the extensive Stoic legacy to the rhetoric of late antiquity added to the problem. The kind of truth the Stoics had in mind was moral and inward. As such it pointed to a reality which could not be fully expressed but only approached through the rigorous effort of the mind. This meant in effect that the truth became not single but multiple, depending on the individual who pursued it. For the Stoics the result was, as Croll points out,¹ «a highly imaginative portrayal of their relation with truth; and even those who professed to strive for clearness, and in fact did so, could not resist the temptation to convey the ardor of their souls in brevities, suppressions, and contortions of style which are in fact inconsistent with a primary devotion to the virtue of perspicuity.» Furthermore, the Stoic felt the world to be an alien abode. Thus, finding it difficult to relate his inner quest to its outward show, literature served him either to express his private truths or to record the very partiality of his relation to the universe. The simpler and more public discipline of Christian dogma overthrew the Stoic pluralism, though it also fell heir to many of its rhetorical habits. Yet it is not so much in the manipulation of the minutiae of rhetoric as in the open design of the new genres as a whole, guided by theological principle, that we can appreciate Christian developments.

We shall, for example, look in vain for a discussion of what constitutes a good homily or sermon, that literary creation which we in a later age recognize as one of the most original and successful productions of the Christian genius. The reasons for the absence lie in the complexity of its origin and in the variety of elements of which it is composed. In *De Officiis* Cicero had complained:

«There are rules for oratory laid down by rhetoricians; there are none for conversation (*sermo*); and yet I do not know why there should not be. But where there are students to learn, teachers are found; there are none, however, who make conversation a subject of study, whereas pupils throng about the rhetoricians everywhere. And yet the same rules that we have for words and sentences in rhetoric will apply also to conversation.»²

1. P. 86.

2. 1.132: *contentionis praecepta rhetorum sunt, nulla sermonis, quamquam haud*

If we class the style of such plain speech under the heading of ἀφέλεια, we are brought into the circle of thought we have been discussing. Latin *sermo* in reference to Christian preaching would suggest that the sermon is ordinary speech between simple people. Of course, the word originally had no philosophical or theological significance. Greek ὁμιλία, beside its connotations of simple speech, has wider associations. ὁμιλία is the word Xenophon uses to describe the Socratic circle. Their activity is διαλέγεσθαι. The same two terms are used by Porphyry in speaking of the students of Plotinus.¹ Thus ὁμιλία includes the element of fraternity as well as, in the strict sense, *conversatio*. We are drawn back to Plato. A homily is thus a kind of dialogue between a speaker and his audience. This set of ideas, in both Latin and Greek, becomes so strong as to predominate over the other line of tradition which sees the homily not in relation to dialogue but to oration. Here too Christianity could find support in contemporary rhetoric, for the authors whom Hermogenes and others propose as particularly worthy of imitation are Plato and Demosthenes, the representatives *par excellence* of the two genres.

There is a major exception to the rule regarding the general absence of rhetorical theory in Christian texts. The letter is the earliest of the literary forms of the new religion to make its appearance. The popularity of letter-writing throughout the whole of the Greek middle ages is attested by the extensive collections of letters surviving to us from practically every major Greek author. Here we can see the dual inheritance of Christian literature in still another form, for the letter-writer could point to the sanction of the New Testament itself while at the same time he conti-

scio an possint haec quoque esse. Sed discentium studiis inveniuntur magistri, huic autem qui studeant, sunt nulli, rhetorum turba referta omnia; quamquam quae verborum sententiarumque praecepta sunt, eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt (W. MILLER's Loeb translation). Cicero is presumably following Panaetius of Rhodes. See WALSDORFF, 111. The ultimate source is Peripatetic. See ARISTOTLE, *Rhet.* I 12.1, 1413b2 ff. Cf. *Ad Herenn.* 3.13.23, and CAPLAN, 196, note b. Elsewhere (*Orator* 64) CICERO says philosophical discourse should be called *sermo* rather than *oratio* because it is pure, without ferocity or shrewdness: *mollis est enim oratio philosophorum et umbratilis nec sententiis nec verbis instructa popularibus nec vincita numeris sed soluta liberius; nihil iratum habet, nihil invidum, nihil atrox, nihil miserabile, nihil astutum; casta verecunda virgo incorrupta quodam modo. itaque sermo potius quam oratio dicitur.*

1. XENOPHON, *Memor.* A.II. 6, 12, 15, 18; et al. PORPHYRY, *Vita Plot.* 8.11 HENRY/SCHWYZER: διαλεγόμενος πρὸς τινα - - - καὶ συνείρων τὰς ὁμιλίας; also 18.6: ὁμιλοῦντι δὲ ἐρικίνηαι ἐν τοῖς συνουσίαις.

nued the tradition represented by the letter-writers of the Second Sophistic such as Libanius and others.¹

Such epistolographical theory as survives to us from late antiquity tends not to be independent but is included as *addenda*, so to speak, to more general literary or rhetorical comment. Our sources show that a tradition of thought regarding the letter did, however, exist. Theon, the earliest extant author to describe the system of progymnasmata taught in the schools, classes the letter among the forms of ἡθοποιία.² As we have noticed, this particular kind of composition involved the fictional re-creation of the thoughts and feelings of a historical or mythological figure at a critical point in his career, as for example, Achilles before rejoining the fight. It called, in other words, for entering into the conditions peculiar to a situation and to the psychology of the character in question.

Theon's definition is revealing also from another point of view. The letter is one of three sub-headings of ἡθοποιία. The other two are panegyric and protreptic. Essentially this brings the letter into close association with the homily, of which panegyric and protreptic are two key ingredients: on the one hand the hymn to the Deity, on the other the appeal to the faithful to attend the ways of righteousness. Aristotle had

1. Byzantine interest may be most conveniently noted by consulting Beck's index (see Bibliography). Both pagan and Christian epistolography, the latter as witnessed in part on Egyptian papyri, have received increasing attention in recent years. We are as a result in a better position to mark the many commonplaces shared by the two traditions and to discern more clearly the relation between them. The bibliography on the letter is very extensive. The fullest account of the history of ancient epistolography is by J. SYKUTIS, *RE - PW, Supplementband V*, s.v. For the reception of the letter into Christian literature see K. THRAEDE, «Untersuchungen zum Ursprung und zur Geschichte der christlichen Poesie. II,» *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum* 5 (1962) 125-157, especially 148: «Der Brief ist die einzige Gattung die vom alten Christentum nicht nur in praxi und teilweise sondern per definitionem und als ganze übernommen und - offenbar gerade deswegen - besonders stark mit Hilfe umgedeuteter Bibelstellen erbaulich umgeformt worden ist.» See also H. KOSKENNIEMI, *Studien zur Ideologie und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n.C.*, Helsinki 1956; G. KARLSSON, *Idéologie et cérémoniel dans l' épistolographie byzantine*, Uppsala 1959. On Chrysostom's exegesis of St. Paul see p. 37, *supra*.

2. I.e., προσωποποιία: *Progymnasmata* 115.20 ff. Sp-H: ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ γένος τῆς γυμνασίας πίπτει καὶ τὸ τῶν πανηγυρικῶν λόγων εἶδος καὶ τὸ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐπιστολικῶν. Theon's date is probably late first/early second century A.D.

classed eulogy and invective as parts of epideictic.¹ Theon is in line with this tradition when he calls ῥητορικὰ indicative (ἐπιδεικτική) of ῥῆθι and πάθῃ.² The Christian homilist has the same object in view but changes the addressee: eulogy to God and to the pious, invective against the devil and the sinner.

The common ground between letter and homily is seen also in their shared associations with the dialogue, itself regarded in rhetorical theory as the expression *par excellence* of τὸ ῥηρικόν.³ In the fullest account of the theory of letter-writing extant from antiquity Demetrius quotes Artemon, the reputed editor of Aristotle's letters, as follows:

"We should write dialogues and letters in the same way for the letter is as it were one half of the dialogue."⁴

Again, a tract on epistolography generally assigned to the fifth century calls the letter "a kind of ὁμιλία in writing of one absent person with another, fulfilling some utilitarian function."⁵ Such observations apply

1. *Rhet.* 1358b12-13: ἐπιδεικτικὸς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπαινος, τὸ δὲ ψόγος.

2. 117.20 Sp-H: τοῦτο τὸ γύμνασμα μάλιστα ῥῥῳ καὶ παθῶν ἐπιδεικτικόν ἐστι. In the process the elimination of pagan poetical practice from the Greek literary scene was accelerated, for it was in poetry that πάθος traditionally had found vital expression. One result was the freer development of Christian hymnology, drawing not only from classical but from Oriental sources. Within the classical tradition itself πάθος comes to be regarded as one of the stylistic ingredients of letter-writing. SYKUTRIS, «Probleme der byzantinischen Epistolographie», *Actes du IIIe congrès international d'études byzantines*, Athens 1932, 303, goes so far as to say that epistolography is really poetry and should be so evaluated. He suggests that the proper interpretation of Byzantine literature depends on the relation between the conventional and the subjective, wherein subjective worth lies not in avoiding convention so much as in applying it (p. 309).

3. Note the close connection between dialogue and ῥῥος in HERMOGENES, *De Meth. Vehem.* 455.1: διαλόγου πλοκή ῥῥοι καὶ λόγοι. An anonymous Neoplatonist describes the dialogue as a kind of κόσμος: «In the same way as a dialogue has different personages each speaking in character, so does the universe comprise existences of various nature expressing themselves in various ways»: WESTERINK, *Anon.*, 15.2.

4. Sect. 223: Ἀρτέμων μὲν οὖν ὁ τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους ἀναγράφας ἐπιστολάς φησιν ὅτι δεῖ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ διάλογόν τε γράφειν καὶ ἐπιστολάς: εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τοῦ διαλόγου. Further on the close relation between letter and dialogue in THRAEDE, *op. cit.*, 147, note 100; and, with special reference to Seneca and Horatian satire, R. HIRZEL, *Der Dialog*, vol. 2, Leipzig 1895, 25 ff., 32 ff. On the dialogue in Patristic literature see M. HOFFMANN, *Der Dialog bei den christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten vier Jahrhunderten*. Texte und Untersuchungen No. 96, Berlin, 1966, and, most recently, B. R. VOSS, *Der Dialog in der frühchristlichen Literatur*, Munich 1970.

5. Ἐπιστολιμαῖοι Χαρακτῆρες ed. V. WEICHERT, Leipzig 1910, 14: ἐπιστολὴ μὲν

to the Christian form as well, for it is precisely in epistolography that little distinction is made between the two traditions. This particular conceit appears already in St. Paul, who in addressing the Corinthians speaks of himself as absent in body but present in spirit,¹ and the tenacity of the sentiment is such that in the eleventh century Psellus can call the letter an εἶδωλον (image) of the absent person.² We may recall too that St. Paul's *Epistles* are not merely written messages, but were meant to be read aloud to the congregation. Hence they spoke to it with the exhortative power of the homily. *I Thessalonians* 5:27 says, "I charge you by the Lord that His epistle be read unto all the holy brethren,"³ and we may note that our handbooks of Christian literature can list many sermons produced in letter form.⁴

At the same time there are differences in the reception of letter and homily. The sermon was a new instrument, molded by absorbing many elements drawn from the rich variety of ancient literature. Though the letter is one of the major influences in the development of the sermon, its own history shows it to be the product of a more wholesale assimilation from earlier models. We may usefully distinguish the formal aspect of the *Epistles* of St. Paul, which they owe to their Hellenistic forebears, from the *Epistles* viewed as simple instruments of communication.⁵ The ancient letter had served the cause of philosophy—witness Plato's *Epis-*

οὖν ἐστὶν ὁμιλία τις ἐγγράμματος ἀπόντος πρὸς ἀπόντα καὶ χρειώδη σκοπὸν ἐκπληροῦσα. On the vexed question of authorship (Libanius? a student of his named Proclus, otherwise unknown?) see WEICHERT, p. xxv; differently, SYKUTRIS, *RE-PW*, Supplementband V, s.v. Epistolographie, col. 191. Cf. JOSEPH RHACENDYTES, fourteenth century, 3.559.4 W: ἀπαγγελία γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁμιλία φίλου πρὸς φίλον ἢ ἐπιστολή.

1. *I Cor.* 5:3: εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ ἀπείμι, ἀλλὰ τῷ πνεύματι σὺν ὑμῖν εἰμι. Further parallels in THRAEDE, *op. cit.*, 141 ff.

2. The passage deserves quotation in full for its use of vocabulary tying together the various strands of thought under discussion: Epistle 11, *Μεσ. Βιβλ.* V, Paris 1876, 242 SATHAS: ἀληθὴς μὲν γὰρ ὁ λόγος ὅτι σοφίζεται τις τὴν τοῦ ἀπόντος ὕψιν, φαντασιούμενος αὐτὴν καὶ τυπούμενος· οὐ μὴν ἀρκεῖ πρὸς εὐφροσύνης λόγον ἢ φαντασία, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐμφύχου προσώπου εἶδωλόν ἐστι τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον· -- παρόντες μὲν διὰ τῆς κατὰ πρόσωπον ὁμιλίας, ἀπόντες δὲ δι' ἐπιστολῶν ὁμιλήσομεν· -- μάλιστα γὰρ τὸν φίλον ἀπεικονίζεται καὶ τὸν χαρακτῆρα δεικνύει τῆς ἐκείνου ψυχῆς· -- ὁ μὲν ἀπλοῦς λόγος κατὰ τὸ ἐπιτυχὸν ἀπαγγέλλεται καὶ οὐ μάλ' ἀσαφηνίζει τὸν λέγοντα· ὁ δ' ἐπιστολιμαῖος τὴν ἐνδιάθετον μορφήν ἀποτυπύεται τοῦ γράφοντος, etc. ἐνδιάθετος and ἐμφύχος are Hermogenes' terms for describing Sincerity, 352.16.

3. ἐνορκίζω ὑμᾶς τὸν Κύριον ἀναγνωσθῆναι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς.

4. See the list and remarks in NORDEN, *op. cit.*, 538, note 2.

5. THRAEDE, *op. cit.*, 148.

les—and was decked out with a host of rhetorical paraphernalia. Hence it could now be enlisted in the service of theology and, insofar as it was, may be said to have satisfied the demand for σεμνότης. ἀφέλεια, on the other hand, was served by St. Paul's letters in their second capacity and nurtured a more direct emotional appeal in terms recognizable from daily experience. This same dual source of strength carries over into the sermon with its celebration of both the majesty and the philanthropy of the Christian message.¹

Greek literature shows a remarkable continuity of stylistic theory regarding the letter. Dēmētrios asks that it be "plain in style" (ισχνός); like the dialogue, "it should abound", he says,

"in glimpses of character. It may be said that everyone reveals his own soul in his letters. In every other form of composition it is possible to discern the writer's character but in none so clearly as in the epistolary. The length of a letter, no less than its style, must be kept within due bounds. Those that are too long---are not letters but treatises with the heading 'My dear so-and-so'. ---There should be a certain degree of freedom in the structure of a letter. ---We must also remember that there are epistolary topics as well as an epistolary style. ---A letter is designed to be the heart's good wishes in brief. It is the exposition of a simple subject in simple terms. Ornament, however, it may have in the shape of friendly bits of kindly advice, mixed with a few good proverbs. This last is the only philosophy admissible in it, the proverb being the wisdom of a people, the wisdom of the world. But the man who utters sententious maxims and exhortations seems to be no longer talking familiarly in a letter but to be speaking *ex cathedra*. --- We may remark that from the point of view of expression the letter should be a compound of two styles, the graceful and the plain."²

1. A similar association appears in the history of the Byzantine letter. ΣΥΚΥΤΗΣ, «Probleme», 206, calls attention to two forms: 1) the rhetorical letter of the late Empire, and 2) the Christian letter (St. Paul), and points out that in the succeeding centuries the two sometimes combine, as in the case of the Cappadocian letter-writers, and sometimes, as in late Byzantium, move apart.

2. Sect. 227 ff.: πλεῖστον δὲ ἐχέτω τὸ ἡθικὸν ἢ ἐπιστολὴ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ διάλογος· σχεδὸν γὰρ εἰκόνα ἑκαστος τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς γράφει τὴν ἐπιστολήν. καὶ ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἐξ ἄλλου λόγου παντὸς ἰδεῖν τὸ ἥθος τοῦ γράφοντος, ἐξ οὐδενὸς δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἐπιστολῆς. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος συνεστάθω τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ λέξις. αἱ δὲ ἄγαν μακροὶ---οὐ---ἐπιστολαὶ

Under the Second Sophistic the letter becomes the vehicle for the discussion of its own style. Philostratus finds the letters of Herodes Atticus commendable for their delineation of character but notes that their author fails in the matter of style by being on occasion excessively Attic and sometimes too common in his speech. The letter, says Philostratus, should strike a mean. The beauty of its form lies in its formlessness. It should not be too long unless there is good reason by way of including all the necessary points.

"An honest clarity is the touchstone for all language, especially of the letter. Whether we are granting favors or asking them, agreeing or attacking or are in love, we shall more easily persuade if our expression is clear, and we shall express ourselves clearly and without meanness if we describe ordinary things in a novel way and novel things in an ordinary way."¹

γένοιτο ἂν, ἀλλὰ συγγράμματα, τὸ χαίρειν ἔχοντα προσγεγραμμένον. -- καὶ τῇ συντάξει λελύσθω μᾶλλον. -- εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ, ὅτι οὐχ ἑρμηνεῖα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πράγματά τινα ἐπιστολικά ἐστιν. --- φιλοφρόνησις γὰρ τις βούλεται εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστολῇ σύντομος, καὶ περὶ ἁπλοῦ πράγματος ἐκθεσις καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ἁπλοῦς. κάλλος μέντοι αὐτῆς αἰ τε φιλικαὶ φιλοφρονήσεις καὶ πυκναὶ παροιμίαι ἐνοῦσαι· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον ἐνέστω αὐτῇ σοφόν, διότι δημοτικὸν τί ἐστὶν ἢ παροιμία καὶ κοινόν, ὃ δὲ γνωμολογῶν καὶ προτρεπόμενος οὐ δι' ἐπιστολῆς ἐτι λαλοῦντι ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ μηχανῆς (Rhys Roberts comments: «The reference is to the god who spoke words of warning or rebuke from a lofty stage-machine, on which a solemn λόγος προτρεπτικός was felt to be more appropriate than a homely ὁμιλία. A letter must not be a *sermon*, except in the Horatian sense of a 'talk'. Nor must it be a lecture.» The Christian sermon is of course all of these). καθόλου δὲ μεμίσχθω ἢ ἐπιστολῇ κατὰ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν ἐν δυοῖν χαρακτέροις τούτοις, τοῦ τε χαρίεντος καὶ τοῦ ἱσχνοῦ. G.M.A. GRUBE's translation.

1. Letter 1, 257-258 KAYSER. The full text runs as follows: τὸν ἐπιστολικὸν χαρακτήρα τοῦ λόγου μετὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἀριστὰ μοι δοκοῦσι διεσκέφθαι φιλοσόφων μὲν ὁ Τυανεύς καὶ Δίων, στρατηγῶν δὲ Βρούτος ἢ ὁ τῷ Βρούτῳ ἐς τὸ ἐπιστέλλειν ἐχρήτο, βασιλέων δὲ ὁ Θεσπέσιος Μάρκος, ἐν οἷς ἐπέστελλεν αὐτός· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ κεκριμένῳ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὸ ἐδραῖον τοῦ ἥθους ἐντετύπωτο τοῖς γράμμασιν· ῥητόρων δ' ἀρίστα μὲν Ἡρώδης ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐπέστελλεν, ὑπεραττικῶν δὲ καὶ ὑπερλαλῶν ἐκπίπτει πολλαχοῦ τοῦ πρέποντος ἐπιστολῇ χαρακτήρος. δεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τὴν ἰδέαν ἀττικωτέραν μὲν ἐκνηθιείας ἐκνηθιστέραν δὲ ἀττικίσεως, καὶ ξυγκείσθαι μὲν πολιτικῶς, τοῦ δὲ ἀβροῦ μὴ ἀπαθεῖν. ἐχέτω δὲ τὸ εὐσχημον ἐν τῷ μὴ ἐσχηματίζεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ σχηματιοῦμεν, φιλοτιμεῖσθαι δόξομεν, φιλοτιμία δὲ ἐν ἐπιστολῇ μειρακιώδες. κύκλον δὲ ἀποτορνεύειν ἐν μὲν ταῖς βραχυτέραις τῶν ἐπιστολῶν συγχωρῶ, ἵνα τούτῳ γοῦν ἢ βραχυλογία ὠραῖζται ἐς ἄλλην ἡχῶ πᾶσα στενὴ οὖσα· τῶν δὲ ἐς μῆκος προηγμένων ἐπιστολῶν ἐξαιρεῖν χρὴ κύκλους· ἀγωνιστικώτερον γὰρ ἢ κατ' ἐπιστολήν τοῦτο, πλὴν εἰ μὴ πῶς ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν ἐπεσταλμένων ἢ συλλαβεῖν δεοὶ τὰ προσηρημένα ἢ συγκλείσαι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι νόημα. σαφήνεια δ' ἀγαθὴ μὲν ἡγεμὼν ἅπαντος λόγου, μάλιστα δὲ ἐπιστολῆς· καὶ γὰρ διδόντες καὶ δεόμενοι καὶ συγχωροῦντες καὶ μὴν καὶ

The comments are very much in the Aristotelian tradition of criticism, which Philostratus shares with Demetrius. At the same time Philostratus is suggesting wider uses for the letter when he says it can be long if it must, when he catalogues the possibilities of its content, and when he speaks of its style in terms that apply not to the letter alone but to all discourse.

The first discussion regarding the letter to meet us in a Christian author appears in Gregory of Nazianzus. Nicobulus, his niece's husband, had asked Gregory to define the principles of epistolography. The close connection with the pagan ideal is readily apparent:

"Of those who write letters, since this is what you ask, some write at too great a length, and others err on the side of deficiency; and both miss the mean, like archers shooting at a mark and sending some shafts short of it and others beyond it; for the missing is the same though on opposite sides. Now the measure of letters is their usefulness; and we must neither write at very great length when there is little to say, nor very briefly when there is a great deal.---This is my opinion as to brevity; as to perspicuity it is clear that one should avoid the oratorical form as much as possible and lean rather to the chatty; and, to speak concisely, that is the best and most beautiful letter which can convince either an unlearned or an educated reader; the one, as being within the reach of the many; the other, as above the many; and it should be intelligible in itself. It is equally disagreeable to think out a riddle and to have to interpret a letter.

The third point about a letter is grace: and this we shall safeguard if we do not write in any way that is dry and unpleasing or unadorned and badly arranged and untrimmed, as they call it; as for instance a style destitute of maxims and proverbs and pithy sayings, or even jokes and enigmas, by which language is sweetened. Yet we must not seem to abuse these things by an excessive employment of them.---Figures of speech we shall admit, but few and modest. Antitheses and balanced clauses and nicely divided sentences we shall leave to the sophists, or if we do sometimes admit them, we shall do so rather in play than in earnest.

καθαπτόμενοι καὶ ἀπολογούμενοι καὶ ἐρῶντες ῥῶον πείσομεν, ἣν σαφῶς ἐρμηνεύσωμεν· σαφῶς δὲ ἐρμηνεύσωμεν καὶ ἕξω εὐτελείας, ἣν τῶν νοηθέντων τὰ μὲν κοινὰ καὶ κοινῶς φράσωμεν, τὰ δὲ καὶ κοινὰ κοινῶς. See note 4, p. 109.

My final remark shall be one which I heard a clever man make about the eagle, that when the birds were electing a king, and came with various adornment, the most beautiful point about him was that he did not think himself beautiful. This point is to be especially attended to in letter-writing, to be without adventitious ornament and as natural as possible.

So much about letters I send you by a letter; but perhaps you had better not apply it to myself, who am busied about more important matters. The rest you will work out for yourself, as you are quick at learning, and those who are clever in these matters will teach you." ¹

"Those who are clever in these matters" are of course the sophists, and Gregory's "more important matters" no doubt have to do with his Christian mission. The document is a marvellous *tour de force* in that its technique is an example of precisely that which it advocates. The fable regarding the eagle, the image drawn from archery, the simple elegance of the language, the familiar conceit of criticizing the sophists, the loose-

1. Letter 51, PG 37, 105: τῶν γραφόντων ἐπιστολάς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦτο αἰτεῖς, οἱ μὲν μακρότερα γράφουσιν ἢ περ εἰκός, οἱ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐνδεέστερα, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω τοῦ μετρίου διαμαρτάνουσι, ὥσπερ τῶν σκοπῶν οἱ τοξεύοντες, ἂν τε εἴσω πέμπωσιν, ἂν τε ὑπερπέμπωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτυγχάνειν ἴσον, κἂν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων γίνηται. ἔστι δὲ μέτρον ἐπιστολῶν ἡ χρεια, καὶ οὐτε μακρότερα γραπτέον, οὐ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ πράγματα, οὐτε μικρολογητέον, ἐνθα πολλά. --- περὶ μὲν δὴ συντομίας ταῦτα γινώσκω· περὶ δὲ σαφηνείας ἐκεῖνο γινώριμον, ὅτι χρὴ φεύγοντα τὸ λογοειδέες, ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ λαλικὸν ἀποκλίνειν, καὶ ἴν' εἴπω συντόμως, αὕτη τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἀρίστη καὶ κάλλιστα ἔχουσα, ἡ ἂν καὶ τὸν ἰδιώτην πείθῃ, καὶ τὸν πεπαιδευμένον, τὸν μὲν ὡς κατὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς οὔσα, τὸν δὲ ὡς ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλοὺς, καὶ ἡ αὐτόθεν γινώριμος. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀκαιρον καὶ γρήφον νοεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπιστολὴν ἐρμηνεύεσθαι. τρίτον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἡ χάρις· ταύτην δὲ φυλάξομεν, εἰ μήτε παντάπασιν ξηρὰ καὶ ἀχάριτα γράφοιμεν ἢ καὶ ἀκαλλώπιστα, ἀκόσμητά τε καὶ ἀκόρητα, ὃ δὴ λέγεται, οἶον δὴ γνωμῶν καὶ παροιμιῶν καὶ ἀποφθεγμάτων ἐκτός, ἔτι δὲ σκωμμάτων καὶ αἰνιγμάτων, οἷς ὁ λόγος καταγλυκαίνεται, μήτε λίαν τοῦτοις φαινόμεθα καταχρώμενοι· --- τροπὰς δὲ παραδειξόμεθα μὲν, ὀλίγας δέ, καὶ ταύτας οὐκ ἀναισχύντους. ἀντίθετα καὶ πάρισα καὶ ἰσόκωλα σοφισταῖς ἀπορρίψομεν· εἰ δὲ που καὶ παραλάβοιμεν, ὡς καταπαίζοντες μᾶλλον τοῦτο ποιήσομεν ἢ σπουδάζοντες. πέρας τοῦ λόγου, ὅπερ τῶν κομψῶν τινος ἤκουσα περὶ τοῦ ἀετοῦ λέγοντος, ἦνικα ἐκρίνοντο περὶ βασιλείας οἱ ὄρνιθες καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλως ἤκον ἑαυτοὺς κοσμήσαντες, ὅτι ἐκεῖνου κάλλιστον ἦν τὸ μὴ οἰεσθαι καλὸν εἶναι. τοῦτο κἂν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς μάλιστα τηρητέον, τὸ ἀκαλλώπιστον καὶ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. τοσαῦτά σοι περὶ ἐπιστολῶν ὡς δι' ἐπιστολῆς παρ' ἡμῶν, καὶ ταῦτα ἴσως οὐ πρὸς ἡμῶν, οἷς τὰ μεῖζω σπουδάζεται. τᾶλλα δὲ αὐτός τε φιλοπονήσεις εὐμαθὴς ὢν καὶ οἱ περὶ ταῦτα κομψοὶ διδάξουσιν. Translation by C.G. BROWNE and J.E. SWALLOW in *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Second Series*, vol. 7 edd. P. SCHAFF and H. WACE, New York 1894, p. 476.

ness of the grammar, the frankness of tone: all contribute to creating the kind of style which Gregory prescribes for a letter, that it be terse, clear, and gracious.

The habit of commenting upon the proper style for the genre is continued in the fifth century by Isidore of Pelusium. "The style of letter-writing", he says,

"should be neither so completely unembellished nor decked out in luxuriance and daintiness, for in the one case it is vulgar, in the other extravagant. Ornament in moderation with a view to both utility and beauty is best."¹

The remarks of Philostratus, Gregory, and Isidore, at the same time that they echo earlier ideals of epistolography, seem actually to go beyond. Their comments might apply to other kinds of writing as well. We meet this enlargement once more in the ninth century. In the large number of letter collections which Photius reviews, both pagan and Christian, the list of qualities admired might be said to constitute over-all ideals of Greek writing style as evolved and set forth in the handbooks.² Just as the homily assimilated to itself many formerly distinct types of literature, so the Greek letter comes to bear the burden of a much greater number of literary needs. The acme of this trend is reached in the late Byzantine tradition which catalogues one hundred and thirteen different kinds of letter.³

The proliferation of epistolography in later Greek literature reflects in part the effect of Christianization, for the criteria under which letters were composed were in line with the inherent dualism of the literary standard of late antiquity. Like the homily, the letter aimed at both simplicity and dignity, the combination which, resting on Biblical support, enjoyed the added sanction of rhetorical theory. Further, the developing exegetical literature of the new religion is guided by impulses similar to those which affect the widening province of the letter in its new Christian

1. Book 5, Letter 133, PG 78, 1404: ὁ ἐπιστολιμαῖος χαρακτήρ μήτε παντάπασιν ἀκόσμητος ἔστω μήτε μὴν εἰς θρόψιν κεκοσμημένος ἢ τρυφήν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐτελές, τὸ δὲ ἀπειρόκαλον· τὸ δὲ μετρίως κεκοσμηθῆναι καὶ πρὸς χρεῖαν καὶ πρὸς κάλλος ἀρκεῖ.

2. See B. LAOURDAS, «Παρατηρήσεις ἐπὶ τοῦ χαρακτῆρος τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τοῦ Φωτίου,» *Ἐπετηρὶς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* 21 (1951) 74-109. Depending on the author, a letter may show ἡδονή, ἰσχύς, πυκνότης, χάρις; in style it may be ἀπλοῦς, ἀφελής, βραχύς, ἡδύς, ἡθικός, κομψός, λαμπρός, πιθανός.

3. *Ἐπιστολιμαῖοι Χαρακτῆρες*, 34 ff. WEICHERT.

setting. One is struck by the great amount of exegesis cast in a form which emphasizes the personal relation between author and audience. A theologian will respond to student or friend puzzling over a problem of Holy Writ. Similarly, apologetic tracts are often replies to individual pagan opponents. Exegesis is by definition simplifying and the ideals of clarity and truth are enlisted now in support of the elucidation and confirmation of the Christian message.

The versatility of the letter and the range of interests and values to which it gave voice cannot fail to impress. The wondrous variety of its technique; its historical value as a document for the reconstruction of political, ecclesiastical, social, and cultural history in terms of its basic denominator, the persons engaged in it; the richness of its imagery; the subtlety of its tones: all attest the high success with which it realized the high goals set for it. The letter sought and attained throughout its long course the definition of τὸ ἡθικόν, the manifestation of character caught at a moment in time, and in so doing met the call of the late antique and Byzantine age for ethical statement. Its emphasis on psychological factors and its manipulation of hardened literary forms into new yet conservative syntheses are key features in the process by which the new cultural discipline of Christianity sought to fill the place vacated by the destruction of the old.

Yet the Greek letter paid a price for its devotion to ἦθος. Despite its charm, it sometimes gives the impression of being merely an educational exercise; sometimes, also, it smacks too much of literature and not enough of life. Its main concerns were indeed legitimate: it gave itself over to the values and norms of life, such as form the interests of the educational program of every age. These concerns illustrate the close link between the literary genres and the stylistic training by which they were nourished. Still, the very connection might stifle more spontaneous literary growth. We have, however, in the final analysis to assess its achievement on its own terms. The letter devoted itself to character, certainly, but at a distance, objectified or, one might say, externalized. Interest comes to center not on the expression of character but on its definition, or rather, the definition of a characteristic moment in the fortunes of the persons involved.¹ Person and event, as it were, become

1. A similar attitude informs the development of the Christian epigram. See A. D. KOMINES, «Βυζαντινὸν ἱερὸν ἐπίγραμμα καὶ οἱ ἐπιγραμματικοί,» *Ἀθηνᾶ. Σειρὰ διατριβῶν καὶ μελετημάτων*, 3, Athens 1966.

one, and it is useful to note that somewhat the same attitude informs the objective, synthesizing treatment of language in Hermogenes.

It is, however, not only personal character that is in question here. Christianity brought with it a new conception, the idea of universal history actualized in the central fact of the Incarnation of Christ. The supreme event of his Passion compelled a re-evaluation of human affairs in terms of relation to it. Auerbach remarks, "The here and now is no longer a mere link in an earthly chain of events; it is simultaneously something which has always been and which will be fulfilled in the future; and strictly, in the eyes of God, it is something eternal, something omni-temporal, something already consummated in the realm of fragmentary earthly event."¹ As has often been recognized, pagan philosophies of history with their quest for causal connections in the life of mankind give way before a view which sees the events of history already justified in the vastness of time between Creation and the Last Judgment. God and His world *are*: this is the point of departure from which the Christian proceeded to understand the pattern of existence. In the process the *raison d'être* of literature is itself transformed. It can no longer be the expression of new truths produced by man's creative insight. The Creation has already taken place and marked its climax in Christ. What is required now is the characterization (ἡθοποιία) of the given cosmos. If epistolography is one manifestation of the new order, an even more vital development makes itself felt in the literature of the Church. The divine character of the universe will be extolled in limitless variations, all reporting man's attempt to come to grips with its infinitude and all realizing it, at least for their fragmented moment of time. The fertile rhetoric of the Byzantine Aca-thistos Hymn or the poetry of Romanus the Melode, for example, bespeaks the pious intensity (πάθος)² with which the author seeks after ever

1. E. AUERBACH, *Mimesis. The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, transl. W.R. TRASK, Princeton 1953, 74. See also his index s.o. figural interpretation. I acknowledge here a general debt to this influential study. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Thal.* 7, PG 90, 284A, calls attention to the confusion of tenses in the Bible: ἔθος ἐστὶ τῇ Γραφῇ τοὺς χρόνους μεταλλάσσειν καὶ εἰς ἀλλήλους μεταλαμβάνειν· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὡς παρωχρότα καὶ τὸν παρωχρότα ὡς μέλλοντα καὶ τὸν ἐνεστώτα εἰς τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐκφωνεῖν.

2. In the tradition of criticism ἔθος and πάθος, following Aristotle's lead, *Rhet.* 1388b31 ff., are regularly discussed together. πάθος is the expression of deeper emotion, ἔθος its more steady, urbane, and external display. Our period changes the basis of discussion so that emphasis is put almost exclusively on ἔθος, ἡθοποιία, and related concepts. πάθος continues to be treated—Hermogenes speaks of it often—

new epithets and new modes of description for keeping ever before him the high majesty of his holy theme.

The same emotions are evoked by the church service. The Byzantine liturgy gave the Christian the opportunity of participating in a surpassingly moving experience not merely as part of a congregation but as a member of a chorus in a drama unfolding before his eyes, a participant who through hymn and response voiced the depth of his religious emotion. Here surely πάθος, the subjective yet disciplined feeling of the heart in the presence of God, reigns supreme, though we recover it with difficulty across the span of time.¹

To be sure, poetry has no exclusive claim on πάθος. We need to look deeper. πάθος returns to Greek literature in late antiquity through a conception of the living power of the logos with which words are now invested and the function of which they aim to serve. No doubt the popular Second Sophistic habits of public recital of one's literary productions contributed to a sense of the emotional vitality of the spoken word reinforced by intonation and gesture. It is, however, the very way words are looked upon that changes.² In a society which paid increasing attention to qualities of allegiance, in which one was either pagan or Christian,

but in a framework in which ἔθος predominates. Thus, the progymnasmata recognize three types of ἡθοποιία, one ἡθική, another παθητική, and a third μικτή: [HERMOG.] 21.10; APHTON., 35.2; NICOLAUS, 64.14. This restriction surely imposed rules upon the freedom of passionate utterance, but it also supplied that utterance with the advantages of rhetorical control. A contemporary attempt at interaction along these lines appears in the non-Christian prose literature of the novel. In Apuleius' description of rapture before the mysteries of Isis, for example, which is cast in the first person, definition and expression are meant to coalesce. Cf. *Metamorph.* 11.3 ff., 8 ff., 27 ff. On the religious implications of the novel in Greek see R. MERKELBACH, *Roman und Mysterium*, Munich 1962. For πάθος in 'Longinus' see next note. Some useful comments on the late antique definitions of ἔθος - πάθος by J. F. LOCKWOOD, 'Ἡθική λέξις and Dinarchus,' *Classical Quarterly* 23 (1929) 180-185; full discussion in VOIT, 131-152.

1. In 'Longinus' this appears as a combination of ὕψος (generally parallel to Hermogenes' σεμνότης) and πάθος: 127.6; 144.27; 154.10; et al. See H. LACKENBACHER, 'Die Behandlung des πάθος in περὶ ὕψους,' *Wiener Studien* 33 (1911) 213-223.

2. J. Rabinowitz sees similar forces at work in the Old Testament, pointing out that the very notion of words is different. They do not merely communicate but have a dynamic power as God's will: 'Towards A Valid Theory of Biblical Hebrew Literature,' in *The Classical Tradition. Literary Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan* ed. L. WALLACH, Ithaca, New York 1966, 315-328. Christian thought seems to have reached a similar position both through the adoption of the Old Testament and through developments in late classical rhetorical and philosophical theory.

Roman or barbarian, Greek or Latin, the feeling of commitment to one's chosen or inherited form of reality colors indiscriminately all expressions of life. In such a setting a sense of the natural force of language and the immediacy of its symbols with their objects helps identify and reserve man's place in the scheme of a living and variable universe. Supported by the Christian doctrine of the Logos become living and suffering flesh, the essence of literature undergoes a profound transformation. In passing from the pagan to the Christian age we pass from theories of rhetoric to a universal theory of logos in the definition of which rhetoric will play a key role. God's creation of a singularly vibrant cosmos of harmonizing parts not only helps compel a reconciliation between philosophy and rhetoric but seeks also in its own way to unite *ἦθος* and *πάθος*, the two sides of the human spirit. Propriety (*τὸ πρέπον*) shifts its emphasis away from the call for the discovery of the most effective relation between words and circumstance, looking toward some oratorical end.¹ The homogeneity of the Christian cosmos assumes this relationship from the start. Propriety lies now in the recognition of the unique validity of every legitimate linguistic resource, decked out in fitting rhetorical dress, for conveying in its multiplicity the grand meaning of creation. The adaptation is not a forced one. It takes place through a core of common interest in the pagan as well as Christian thought of the time. Mediaeval theorists, far from discarding older habits, continue to prescribe the pagan formulae, but the function of these is now subtly enlarged and enhanced. Ultimately, the eurythmic dynamism of literature, regarded as in its own right expressive of a higher mystic symphony of existence, will impress and excite the mind of Byzantium.

The new Christian philosophy of history required that a way be found to represent the supra-temporal valence of events. It is here that the various tropical and figural tactics carefully elaborated by ancient rhetoric come into their own. Allegory, emphasis, figure, metaphor, metonymy, symbol, trope: all such conceptions and habits of language now contribute in their distinctive ways to the assessment of the human as part of the scheme of superhuman value in accordance with the terms of Christian history. The personages and events of the Old Testament through the technique of typology are manipulated so as to prefigure the life of Christ and his kingdom. In such an atmosphere there lurks the danger that the present, while acquiring significance, loses reality. In

1. See p. 41.

principle, however, the reality of events—and literature is just such an event—lies precisely in their significance. The Byzantine view recognized a point of juncture in the vertical plane of existence which it designated, as we shall see in a later chapter, by the rhetorical term "emphasis". Indeed, rhetoric helped to reinforce this sense of the ambivalence of life, and the large number of surviving works on figures and tropes attests the vitality of Byzantine feeling for all periods.¹

In addition, two of the key Forms in Hermogenes' list, Dignity and Amplitude, are permeated by the same instinct.² They may well owe their popularity to this very fact, for in following Hermogenes' prescriptions for achieving Dignity the Byzantines were well aware that divinity is expressible only through metaphor. Further, in Hermogenes' scheme the chief Sentence of Amplitude calls for reference to the part as well as the whole and to species as well as genus, categories which both Cicero and Quintilian discuss under the heading of metaphor.³ Thus Dignity and Amplitude cater to the Byzantine desire to see the world whole, to characterize though rhetoric the sublime oecumene of which they recognized themselves a part. It is not for nothing that in rhetorical theory the synonym for *ἡθοποιία* is *μίμησις*.⁴ The identification will attain its fullest meaning in the life of Byzantium and its citizens as themselves representative of the reality of the cosmos. That the sentiment has a profound moral base appears also in another way. One of the standard types of allegorical interpretation is *τροπολογία*. This Origen defines as having to do with *ψυχή*, that is, the "spiritual" interpretation of Scripture.⁵

Besides the letter special interest attaches to still another literary form which in becoming Christianized attempts to give utterance to the

1. See pp. 160-162.

2. On Dignity see p. 129; on Amplitude, p. 134. The equivalent of this combination in 'Longinus' is *ὑψος - αὐξήσις*, wherein *ὑψος* is a kind of vertical amplification (*διάγραμμα*) and *αὐξήσις* one of number: 127.9 ff.: *κεῖται τὸ μὲν ὑψος ἐν διάγραμμι, ἡ δ' αὐξήσις καὶ ἐν πλήθει. διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν καὶ νοήματι ἐνὶ πολλάκις, ἡ δὲ πάντως μετὰ ποσότητος καὶ περιουσίας τινὸς ὀρίσεται.* On *αὐξήσις* see pp. 76, 135, 141, 159.

3. QUINTILIAN, 8.6.13; CICERO, *De Oratore* 3.168. So too 'Longinus' says that *ὑψος, πάθος*, and *τρόπος* produce a kind of *μέγεθος*: 127.6-8. See p. 141.

4. QUINTILIAN, 9.2.58: *imitatio morum alienorum, quae ἡθοποιία vel, ut alii malunt, μίμησις dicitur.*

5. See LAMPE, s.v. *τροπολογία* and *ψυχικός*. ORIGEN, *De Principiis*, Book 4.11, PG 11, 364B. See H. CAPLAN, "The Four Senses of Scriptural Interpretation," *Speculum* 4 (1929) 285.

feeling of the beholder in the contemplation of beauty. The *ἐκφρασις*—the root meaning of “revelation” suggests its purpose—has sources deep in the Hellenistic age. Fundamentally it is a description of people, places, or things, though in its later history it becomes limited primarily to architecture and other works of art. It is also one of the progymnasmata and, interestingly enough, requires two of the stylistic virtues sometimes applied to the letter, *σαφήνεια* and *ἐνάργεια*.¹ As with so many of the literary formulae of late antiquity it becomes affected by the interest in the personal. The *ἐκφράσεις* of the fourth-century Callistratus show him to have been among the first, so far as we can determine, to subordinate the description of the object to the praise of the artist himself.² The sixth-century proceeded even further. Procopius’ account of the cathedral of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople includes a description of the effect of the structure on the viewer.³ A related attempt to express the feeling of the beholder may be seen in the epigrams, particularly by Agathias, from the same period.⁴ The opportunity which the *ἐκφρασις* offered for evoking the inner experience of the beholder before the sacred objects of his religion made it a popular literary form in Byzantium. It is received early into the homily, and whole sermons are in form actually *ἐκφράσεις* of a new church or an especially beautiful set of icons or mosaics.⁵ If we recall that the homily is part of the liturgical drama, we can appreciate the contribution which the *ἐκφρασις* made to the beauty of the divine service and its effect on the emotions of those participating in it. Nor can we doubt that the ground for expressing this mystical feeling was prepared

1. [HERMOG.] *Progymnasmata* 23.9. Cf. also the recommendation by ‘Longinus’ of the use of *φαντασία* or *εἰδωλοποιία* (*ἡθοποιία*) because they supply vividness (*ἐνάργεια*): 131.8 ff.

2. See the articles on «Ekphrasis» by G. DOWNEY in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* and A. HOHLWEG in *Reallexikon für byzantinischen Kunst*; also J. PALM, *Bemerkungen zur Ekphrase in der griechischen Literatur*, Hum. Vetenskaps-Samf. in Uppsala, Årsbok 1965-1966, 108-211. Callistratus’ text is regularly printed together with Philostratus’ *Imagines*.

3. *De Aed.* 1.1 ff.

4. See Book 9 of the *Palatine Anthology*, *passim*.

5. See, for example, the tenth and seventeenth homilies of Photius, the one on the church of the Theotokos in Constantinople, the other on an image of the Virgin in Hagia Sophia (ed. B. LAOURDAS, *Φωτίου Ὁμιλία*, Thessalonica, 1959); also a description of a mosaic in the monastery of Kauleas, and of a church of S. Zaoutzes by Leo the Wise (ed. ΑΚΑΚΙΟΣ, *Λέοντος τοῦ Σοφοῦ Πανηγυρικοὶ (sic) Λόγοι*, Athens 1868, 245-46; 275).

in part by Neoplatonic notions of the ecstasy of the soul in its ascent to the contemplation of the cosmos. The Platonic dialogue which Iamblichus put first in his curriculum of instruction and to which the philosophers of the day gave much of their attention is the *First Alcibiades*, the themes of which, as Proclus informs us,¹ are self-knowledge and the nature of man.

Studies of late antiquity have a way of leading one back again and again to Plato and his successors, for philosophy and religion are never far apart in the Platonic scheme. Synesius’ letter to Hypatia ranks philosophers and ecclesiastics together in their attacks upon him for using too much rhetoric in his works.² The schools of philosophy and the Church could indeed find much on which to agree as against rhetoric, but they had also to come to terms with it for their own needs. The phrase “Neoplatonic sophist” might be a useful designation for those in the pagan philosophical tradition who, whether out of vocational need or personal inclination, involved themselves more in rhetoric than in philosophy.

The power of the rhetorical tradition moves into the sixth century with undiminished force. Neoplatonism yields to Christianity, its school in Athens closed by imperial decree, but the rhetorical and philosophical interests it had done so much to foster continue. Neoplatonic sophists are no more. Their place will be taken by Christian sophists, of the sort that had been active at Gaza in the late fifth and early sixth centuries. The center reflects some of the cultural currents we have been examining. A few remarks concerning the activities of some of its scholars may be in order by way of rounding out our survey of late antique rhetoric.

Aeneas, a slightly younger contemporary of Procopius of Gaza, has left us a number of letters as well as a fictitious dialogue entitled *Theophrastus* which deals with the immortality of the soul and resurrection. It draws on both pagan and Christian sources, in the one instance Neoplatonism, in the other largely Gregory of Nyssa. The title carries a revealing textual difficulty: one branch of the manuscript tradition refers to Aeneas as a σοφιστής, while another calls him a “Platonic Christian” (Πλατωνικός χριστιανός).³ He himself would probably have found it difficult to

1. In *I Alcib.* 11.11 WESTERINK. See W. O’NEILL, *Proclus: Alcibiades I. A Translation and Commentary*, The Hague 1965, p. vii, and R. ASMUS, *Der Alkibiades-Kommentar des Iamblichos als Hauptquelle für Kaiser Julian. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philologisch-Historische Klasse* 8 (1917), No. 3, especially introductory pages.

2. Letter 153, PG 66, 1553-1557.

3. Text: *Enea di Gaza. Teofrasto* ed. M.E. COLONNA, Naples 1958.

choose, so interwoven are the two strands in his time. His letters, cast in a compressed and difficult style, give a decided impression of stiltedness. He often refers to them as λόγοι,¹ so that the sharp distinction which Gregory of Nazianzus had made between λόγος and ἐπιστολή is here lost.² By his labored style he has also sacrificed the principle that a letter should strike a middle ground between too much Atticism and too little. The judgment which Siceliotes was later to pass on his fellow Gazaeans, Procopius, could easily apply to Aeneas as well:

"He uses tropes and epithets unduly and excessively in his λόγοι and he is too Attic also in his letters; hence in the former he is unclear, though pleasant, and in the latter cold and without charm."³

Procopius wrote Homeric paraphrases which, except for fragments, do not survive. Although some doubts have been voiced, the general opinion holds that the same man is the author of the extant commentaries on the Old Testament.⁴ So at least the Byzantines assumed. When Photius remarks that his style "is of a very high order even though somewhat too refined for the needs of exegesis"⁵, we can only agree. The reservation well illustrates the problem inherent in being a Christian sophist.

Beside his Biblical commentaries Procopius has left us other works. One of his most successful genres is the ἐκφρασις: his description of a clock in the market place at Gaza is justly famous.⁶ These works form part of a tradition of extremely clever, well-polished pieces. With certain

1. Consult the index to the recent edition by L. M. POSITANO, *Enea di Gaza. Epistole*², Naples 1961.

2. See p. 50.

3. 6.94.11-15 W: ἀκαίρως μὲν καὶ κατακόρως χρώμενος ταῖς τροπαῖς καὶ ἐπιθέτοις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὑπεραττικίζων δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς (note that the distinction between λόγος and ἐπιστολή is here maintained). τοιγαροῦν ἐν τοῖς μὲν ὡς ἐπίπαν ἀσαφὴς ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ γλυκύς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὑπόφυκρος καὶ ἀηδής.

4. Procopius' works are unfortunately in scattered editions. For a list consult W. ALY in *RE-PW*, to which add L. WESTERINK, «Ein unbekannter Brief des Prokopios von Gaza», *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 60 (1967) 1-2, and A. GARZYA and R. J. LOENERTZ, «Un nuovo codice delle epistole di Procopio di Gaza», *Le Parole e le Idee* 9 (1967) 71-72.

5. *Bibliotheca*, cod. 206, 164a39-41: ἡ φράσις δὲ αὐτῶ ἐς τὸ ἄριστον ἤσκηται, εἰ καὶ τῆς ἐξηγητικῆς διατυπώσεως ἔχει τι καὶ κομψότερον.

6. Ed. H. DIELS, with commentary: «Über die von Prokop beschriebene Kunst- uhr von Gaza», *Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Philologisch-Historische Klasse* 7 (1917).

linguistic allowances they could stand as the products of a much earlier age. The authors whom Procopius and other members of the school cite as models are in the standard late antique list: pre-eminently Plato and Demosthenes, on occasion Isocrates, Aeschines, and Aristides. Noticeable too is the special place which Choricus, another Gazaeans, reserves for Thucydides, whom he calls "the fount of rhetoric."¹ In both Procopius and Choricus Platonic adulation is so strong that they will use words for which Plato is the only source.² Yet a fourteenth-century author cites Procopius and Choricus as examples of "the humble and pure style."³ The reference may be to such matters as rhythm and sentence structure, simple by later Byzantine standards, but may also reflect approval of the kinds of literature popular among the Gazaeans, such as the dialogue and the letter. Perhaps one should also think of the humble folk, such as shepherds and merchants, who form the subject of many of Procopius' ἡθοποιαί. In sum, the school of Gaza seems given to a more conservative rhetorical tradition. The popularity of its representatives in later centuries helped preserve for Byzantium many of the patterns of the Second Sophistic outside the influence of Hermogenes.

The early sixth century fixes once for all the essence of Byzantium in art, in secular and ecclesiastical politics, in the habits of literature, and in rhetorical theory as well. It is the period, we may recall, when the corpus of Hermogenes, together with a rich tradition of commentary and the addition of Aphthonius, is firmly set. The other areas of the life of the period have been accorded a close scrutiny. Rhetoric needs to be drawn more into the discussion. The relations between church and state at the time are often treated under the name of Caesaropapism. Whatever the shortcomings of the term, it may not be amiss to describe the condition of literature as also affected by a kind of cultural Caesaropapism wherein the free development of Christian writing has to coexist with the now firmly fixed jurisdiction of the Second Sophistic to provide it with superintendence and control. The evolving patterns of dogma and ecclesiastical administration had to establish a *modus vivendi* with the abso-

1. πηγή ῥητορικῆς: «Anecdota Choriciana Nova», ed. R. FÖRSTER, *Philologus* 54 (1895), 119.24.

2. K. SEITZ, *Die Schule von Gaza*, Diss. Heidelberg 1892, 39, supplies a list.

3. τῆς ταπεινωτέρας λέξεως ἔχουν τῆς καθαρᾶς παραδείγματα: JOSEPH RHACENDYTES, 3.526.17 W, cited by SEITZ, op. cit., 48; cf. also 521.16; 571.19; 572.28; 573.3. This is also the thrust of Photius' review of Choricus, cod. 160, though Photius also complains that he sometimes uses tropes and poetic language to excess.

lutistic Roman political authority. Similarly, the habits of Christian literature will flourish now within the latitude of the prescriptions of rhetoric, itself adjusted to accommodate new Christian impulses. The subsequent history of Greek letters as of Byzantine politics is one of the conscious or unconscious, ever-shifting interrelation of the two forces.

The patriarch Photius has left us extensive critical comments on John Chrysostom, whose works and life he greatly admired. The sermons especially impress him and he tells us he hesitates whether to call them *ὁμιλῖαι* or *λόγοι*.¹ The Christian in him impels toward *ὁμιλῖαι* and he stresses the personal relation of the pastor to his flock and the simple eloquence of the words. The cultured Byzantine, on the other hand, inclines toward *λόγοι* and calls attention to their artistry of composition. The confusion is fundamental and can be noted in the often indiscriminate use of the two terms in present-day Greek.

Essentially late antiquity took the phrase *vir bonus dicendi peritus* and sought to bring its two components, the ethical and rhetorical, into more fruitful and meaningful interaction by explaining each through the other as parts of a new unity inspired by the introduction of Christian moral and metaphysical values. The challenge is part of the legacy of humanity. We have examined it within the context of Christianity and classical culture, but its source lies deeper still. For man as a social being, rooted in history, it is the conflict of freedom versus authority; for him as a spiritual creature it is in some of its parts the relation of beauty to truth, and its solution waits upon personal and historical circumstance in every age.

1. See codd. 172-174.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONCEPT OF OBSCURITY IN GREEK LITERATURE

When Aristotle cited clarity as the chief merit of style¹ he set in motion a train of discussion which runs through the whole of ancient and mediaeval Greek literature. His interest also led him to consider its opposite.² He addresses himself to the problem of obscurity in two of his works, the *Rhetoric* and the *Topica*. The *Rhetoric* treats obscurity from the point of view of style and its underlying principles. The analysis forms a companion piece, as it were, to the *Topica*, which approaches the problem from the point of view of logic, that is to say, the proper definition of terms as elements of discourse. The treatment in the two works is built along the same lines. In addition to common terms of reference both give attention to the more external manifestations of obscurity and then pass on to consider the nature of metaphor. Thus the twin categories of style and logic imply a recognition of their common ground in the nature of language itself. This distinction, or rather relation, is retained in the following centuries. The close formal contact between the two modes of analysis

1. *Rhet.* Γ 2.1, 1404b1: ὁρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφὴ εἶναι. It is later, Γ 2.6, 1414a24, defined as a mean between garrulity and conciseness (ἀδολεσχεία - συντομία).

2. The comparison of the style of Euripides and Aeschylus in ARISTOPHANES' *Frogs* shows that the issue had already been raised in fifth century circles, probably by the Sophists. Euripides attacks Aeschylus for being «obscure in setting forth his plots» (1122: ἀσαφὴς γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῇ φράσει τῶν πραγμάτων) and, in general, for his pretentious and difficult language. Aeschylus' answer is that lofty thoughts require lofty words: 1058-1061: ἀνάγκη μεγάλων γνῶμῶν καὶ διανοιῶν ἴσα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τίκτειν./καὶ ἄλλως εἰκὸς τοὺς ἡμιθέους τοῖς ῥήμασι μείζονσι χρῆσθαι./καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἡμιτέοις ἡμῶν χρῶνται πολὺ σεμνοτέροισιν. Aeschylus' is the first expression of a view basic to all «aristocratic» criticism, ancient and modern. Counter to it is the Euripidean principle of a «plain» style, appropriate to plain people and events. See discussion in FUHRMANN, 60. On the general subject of ancient criticism see, most recently, R. HARRIOTT, *Poetry and Criticism Before Plato*, London 1969, especially Chapter 7, «The Beginnings of Criticism», 130-161, with bibliography.

continues in force and is very much in evidence in the Neoplatonic and Byzantine commentaries on Hermogenes.

Thus, Aristotle's account in the *Rhetoric* is not a simple celebration of the virtues of clarity. He tells us that clarity results from words used

"in their natural sense; all others elevate style and make it ornate, --- for departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified; --- our language must therefore have a 'foreign' air, for men admire what is remote."

He points out that we all use metaphor and demands that it be appropriate, for

"It is metaphor above all else that gives clarity, pleasure, and a foreign air."

Later, in analyzing the excessive use of poetic language in works of prose, he declares,

"Obscurity results from verbosity; for when words are piled upon one who already knows, clarity is destroyed by a cloud of verbiage."¹

In the *Topica* obscurity is similarly the result of excess. Terms should not have more than one meaning, nor should they be repeated. Obscurity results in both cases.² In line with the *Rhetoric* he admits that

1. *Rhet.* Γ 2.2, 1404b5-12: τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφὴ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τᾶλλα ὀνόματα --- τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέρην --- διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον. θαυμάσται γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσιν; Γ 2.6, 1404b34: πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται; Γ 3.3, 1406a33: τὸ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν· ὅταν γὰρ γινώσκοντι ἐπεμβάλλῃ διαλύει τὸ σαφὲς τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖν. J. FREESE's Loeb translation, with slight variations. Cf. DEMETRIUS, 190: τὴν δὲ λέξιν πᾶσαν χρὴ κυρίαν καὶ συνήθη· μικρότερον γὰρ τὸ συνηθέστερον πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνηδες καὶ μετενηγμένον μεγαλοπρεπές. See p. 69, note 3.

FUHRMANN, 50, points out that *obscurus* in Latin is connected not only with *nox*, *umbra*, etc., but also with *lux* (cf. LIVY, 24.21.7: *obscura luce*), so that it could signify not only absolute darkness but also a kind of phantom aura. He also distinguishes usefully between two types of obscurity, one arising from oracular language, the other from riddles, and sees the first as emotional and inspired, the second as rational and formalized.

2. E 2, 130a2: τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον ἀσαφὲς ποιεῖ τὸ ῥηθῆναι; E 2, 130a32: ταρατταί γὰρ τὸν ἀκούοντα πλεοναχίς λεχθέν· ἀσαφὲς οὖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδολεσχεῖν δοκοῦσιν. The whole of the fifth book of the *Topica* is given over to the types of unintelligibility which result from improper definition. The object is the attainment of truth, τἀληθές, a recurrent theme throughout. The *Rhetoric*, on the

"metaphor makes its meaning to some extent clear because of the likeness involved, for those who use metaphors do so always in view of some likeness."¹

The *Topica* is, however, interested in the strict and singular correctness of terms. Because metaphor presupposes plurality, just as verbosity and repetition do, its inherent dualism leads him also to assert that "all metaphor is obscure", and to add that "all unusual phrases are obscure."² Both possibilities are true. Metaphor both conceals and reveals. In the *Topica* Aristotle is more impressed with the gulf between words and what they stand for; in the *Rhetoric* with their capacity for helping us experience reality. The Christian mystic could later offer his own solution and maintain that God is never more distant than when He is closest to us. In the developed Byzantine view which we shall consider in the following chapters language does not simply react to the obscurity of the world, seeking to resolve it through metaphor, but itself exemplifies it. Language at once bypasses metaphor in order to express the mystery of the cosmos and is also the ultimate metaphor in seeing God in and through man and His works.

The departure from the ordinary which Aristotle broaches in the *Rhetoric* is in the direction of dignity. Though he does not establish an immediate connection between dignity and the obscure, he thinks of dignity as constituting a different style from that associated with the naturalness of proper nouns and verbs. Thus, when in a later century Hermogenes can prescribe the discussion of things divine as one of the first elements of a dignified style and so open the way to the Christians to describe their God in this manner, the trends of thought which they follow reflect a perception to which Aristotle is in his own context giving voice.

Before this stage is reached, however, there is a steady history of analysis of the problem of obscurity in our ancient texts. A considerable impetus toward the formulation of the post-Aristotelian discussion must have been supplied during the fourth century not only in the Peripatos

other hand, is more interested in persuasion, τὸ πιθανόν. Cf. also *De Soph. Elench.*, chapter 32, which treats the relation between truth and purity (ἐλληνισμός).

1. Z 2, 140a8: ἡ μὲν μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ πως γνώριμον τὸ σημαινόμενον διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα. W.D. Ross' translation.

2. Z 2, 139b34: πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον; Z 2, 140a5: πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰλωθός.

but in the Isocratean school as well, with its even more practical turn of mind. The establishment of the canons of the classical authors in the Hellenistic period must also have contributed. To write in the style of Lysias meant first of all to know the elements of that style in detail. We are privileged to see only the later stages of this process, as it appears in the Greek and Roman rhetorical writers of the first century B.C. and beyond, when most of the stylistic labels and terms of reference are already fast established. Philodemus, first century B.C., gives the Epicurean view. His comments presuppose a knowledgeable audience who may not have known the doctrine in detail but surely knew what he was talking about.

Philodemus posits two kinds of obscurity, one intentional (i.e., obfuscation), the other not. Obscurity is produced intentionally when a person, having nothing to say, deliberately obfuscates so as to appear to be saying something useful. An author will use poetical and tropical expressions, archaisms, and solecisms toward this end since they would not be understood by the majority. The true σοφός, however, will have none of these vices.¹ Here Philodemus introduces us to a common motif: obscurity is a device for keeping out the crowd and showing oneself distinctive and exclusive. Unintentional obscurity, on the other hand, arises basically from ignorance, either of the subject matter or of the rules for writing good Greek. We are warned against solecisms and barbarisms, and the section concludes by recommending a style which uses with propriety words in common use.²

The issue is also discussed by the critic, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, first century B.C. Dionysius singles out Thucydides as the chief repre-

1. 156.15-158.24 SUDHAUS: ἀσάφεια τις μὲν ἐπιτηδευματικῶς γίνεται, τις δ' ἀνεπιτηδεύτως· ἐπιτηδευματικῶς μὲν ὅταν μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν τις εἰδῶς καὶ λέγων ἐπικρύπτῃ τοῦτο διὰ τῆς ἀσάφειας, ἵνα δόξῃ τι χρήσιμον γράφειν καὶ λέγειν --- ἀνάγκη πολλὰ μὴδ' εἰς σύνεσιν ὅλως ἔρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι --- μόνος ὁ νοούμενος ἰδίως σοφὸς εἰλικρινῶς καὶ ἀμεταπτώτως καθαρὸς ἔστι τῶν τοιούτων κακιῶν, κτλ. Cf. *Rhet.* Γ 5.4, 1407a33: ὅταν μὴθὲν μὲν ἔχῃσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δέ τι λέγειν. Photius makes this same charge against Eunomius, whom he accuses of manipulating Hermogenes' Amplitude and Force to this end: *Bibliotheca*, cod. 138, 98a5-11.

2. 158.8-161.12: ἄνευ δ' ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἀσάφεια γίνεται παρὰ τὸ μὴ κρατεῖν τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ μὴ διελημμένως --- καὶ κοινῶς τε παρὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι --- καὶ γὰρ σολοικισμοὶ ποιοὶ καὶ βαρβαρισμοὶ πολλὴν ἀσάφειαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀποτελοῦσι --- τῶν φράσεων ταῖς καθωμιλημέναις χρῆσθαι μετὰ τοῦ πρέποντος καὶ μήτ' ἀκύρως μήτε καθολικῶς μήτε κοινῶς ἀλλὰ ῥητῶς ἐκφέρειν. The Aristotelian background of these sentiments will be readily apparent.

sentative of the obscure style of writing. Though he regards the trait as a fault, one cannot at the same time escape the feeling that he welcomes the challenge which Thucydides' language throws out. His attitude suggests that the survival, even the popularity, of some classical authors such as Thucydides or Pindar depended in part on their difficulty and obscurity, qualities which invited both comment and imitation in the schools and literary circles of a later age.

Dionysius complains that Thucydides' novel system of chronology detracts from the clarity of his style. The habit of division into summers and winters compels the historian to interrupt the narrative of an episode which extends beyond a year and to resume it only after he has treated other unrelated events of the same year. As a result, Thucydides is difficult to follow, hence obscure.¹ Very characteristic is Thucydides' penchant for compressing as much as he can into the smallest number of words. This too is a kind of acceleration or brevity which takes away from the charm of speech and generates obscurity. Thucydides' archaic, poetic and unusual language, his hyperbata, solecisms and asyndeta, and his inversion of the natural order of narrative introduce a further obscurity into his words which affects their beauty and has found no imitator. By contrast, Demosthenes, though he adopts some elements of the Thucydidean style which he finds useful, is not obscure nor in need of explanation.²

1. The discussion of the Thucydidean system involves the larger question of the arrangement of historical materials into a coherent whole. Herodotus achieves his end by *not* jumping to a second topic before finishing with the first. Thucydides' unity is temporal, Herodotus', together with that of Hellenistic historiography in general, is topical (e.g., Book II on Egypt). Lucian's tract *How to Write History* airs the virtues of both procedures. See AVENARIUS, 119 ff. The question of the means of arriving at a sense of unity in narrative also lies behind Hermogenes' recommendations for Amplitude. See pp. 147ff. It may be of interest to note that for the proper ordering of the elements of discourse for this purpose rhetorical theory uses the term *οἰκονομία* (LUCIAN, 51; DIONYS., *De Thuc.* 335. 16; definition in PSEUDO-ARISTIDES, 103.3 ff.; see VOLKMANN, 363), a word later fraught with theological and political meaning in Byzantine thought.

2. *De Thuc.* 363.8 ff.; 365.14 ff.; 377.8 ff.; 379.15 ff.; 412.8 ff.; 414.12 ff.; 418.1 ff.; *De Thuc. Idiom.* 424.20 ff.

The *locus classicus* in Latin discussions of clarity is QUINTILIAN, 8.2.22: *nobis prima sit virtus perspicuitas, propria verba, rectus ordo: non in longum dilata conclusio: nihil neque desit neque superfluat: ita sermo et doctis probabilis et planus imperitis erit.* The passage forms part of an extensive analysis in Books 8 and 9 of clarity and obscurity, which is built along essentially Aristotelian lines. The distinction between

Demetrius is a writer of Peripatetic bent. Though no one section of his *On Style*¹ is given to a discussion of obscurity, there are occasional references to it scattered throughout and many of his remarks touch on it indirectly.

The work discusses four types of style, the elevated, the elegant, the plain, and the forcible.² These are treated under the headings of subject matter, diction, and composition.³

In composition the elevated style is characterized by paeonic rhythms, long cola, rounded periods, a liberal use of connectives, repetition

clarity of style and clarity in the presentation of facts (*perspicuitas rerum*) is reminiscent of the contrasting treatment in the *Rhetoric* and the *Topica*. Yet, although obscurity might be generally deplored, it had its attractions, at least in the eyes of some. QUINTILIAN, 8.2.18, says many spent an infinity of toil acquiring it and records Livy's mention (not in our text of Livy but apparently part of a letter Livy addressed to his son which is mentioned QUINT., 2.5.20 and 10.1.39) of a teacher who directed his pupils «to make all they said obscure, using the Greek word σκότισον ('darken it'). It was this same habit which gave rise to the famous words of praise, 'So much the better; even I could not understand you': *in hoc malum a quibusdam etiam laboratur; neque id novum vitium est, cum iam apud Titum Livium inveniam fuisse praeceptorem aliquem, qui discipulos obscurare quae dicerent iuberet, Graeco verbo utens σκότισον. Unde illa scilicet egregia laudatio: Tanto melior; ne ego quidem intellexi.* H.E. BUTLER's Loeb translation.

The style of Demosthenes provided for Dionysius, as well as for the host of writers on rhetoric for whom Demosthenes was a standard, a measure of support for the promotion of obscurity. ROBERTS (*Dionysius of Halicarnassus On Literary Composition, Being the Greek Text of the De Compositione Verborum* ed. with Introduction, Notes, Glossary and Appendices W. RHYS ROBERTS, London 1910, 38) remarks, «No careful student of a highly wrought speech like the *Crown* of Demosthenes can have failed to be arrested, here and there, by some slight ambiguity which, so far as he can judge, might have been removed by an equally slight change in the word-order; and he gains much in the appreciation of Demosthenes if he is thus led to consider what are the subtle laws of rhythm and melody to which an absolutely unimpeachable lucidity has (in however small a degree) given way.» ROBERTS, 335-341, also discusses the role which lack of punctuation and word-division played in creating obscurity in Greek generally and how the inflection of the ἀναγνώστης could be used in dispelling it.

1. The date of the *Περί Ῥητορικῆς* is one of the most difficult questions in the field of ancient rhetoric. Opinions range from the third century B.C. to the first A.D. For a recent review of the bibliography and some of the arguments see McCALL, 137-138.

2. 36: μεγαλοπρεπής, γλαφυρός, ισχνός, δεινός.

3. πράγματα, λέξεις, σύνθεσις.

of words (anadiplosis), and long vowels.¹ Elevation in subject matter results from the choice of a great subject, as, for example, famous battles or "when heaven or earth is the theme."² Diction should be "grandiose, elaborate, and out of the ordinary", for "usual and current words, though clear, are unimpressive and liable to be held cheap."³ Compound words, a touch of poetic diction, metaphor and allegory when used moderately and appropriately, are recommended.⁴ Further,

"Any darkly-hinting expression is more terror-striking, and its import is variously conjectured by different hearers. On the other hand, things that are clear and plain are apt to be despised. --- Hence the Mysteries are revealed in an allegorical form in order to inspire such shuddering and awe as are associated with darkness and night. Allegory also is not unlike darkness and night."⁵

In certain cases conciseness and, especially, aposiopesis produce elevation "since some things seem to be more significant when not expressed but only hinted at."⁶

The treatment of the plain style gives Demetrius the opportunity to discourse on the nature of clarity. Since many of its features are the opposite of the elevated style, for Demetrius, as for Aristotle, elevation and obscurity are obviously related. Compound words, long cola, concurrences of long vowels, oblique cases, and unusual figures should be avoided in

1. 38; 39; 44; 45: σύμπασα γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη μεγαλοπρέπεια (he is speaking of Thucydides) ἐκ τῆς περιαγωγῆς γέγονεν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μόγις ἀναπαύσαι αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν ἀκούοντα; 46; 47; 53; 66; 72. By paeonic rhythms he understands—○○○ and ○○○—Cf. *Rhet.* Γ 8, 1409a2 ff. Anadiplosis (66): δράκοντες δὲ που ἦσαν ἐν τῷ Καυκάσῳ μέγεθος, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ πλῆθος (HERODOTUS, 1.203).

2. 75: διαπρεπὴς πεζομαχία ἢ ναυμαχία, ἢ περὶ οὐρανοῦ ἢ περὶ γῆς λόγος; 76. Cf. HERMOGENES on the Sentences of Dignity, 242.22 ff. and pp. 129 ff., *infra*; also 'LONGINUS,' Sect. 35. ROBERTS' translation, with slight variations.

3. 77: περιττὴν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένην καὶ ἀσυνήθη μᾶλλον—ἢ κυρία καὶ συνήθης σαφὴς μὲν, λειτὴ δὲ καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητος. Cf. also 190 (quoted p. 64, note 1).

4. 78-90; 91-93; 112. For τὸ πρέπον in Aristotle see *Rhet.* Γ 2.9, 1405a10 ff.

5. 100-101: πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπονοούμενον φοβερώτερον καὶ ἄλλος εἰκάζει ἄλλο τι· ὁ δὲ σαφὲς καὶ φανερόν καταφρονεῖσθαι εἰκός--- διὸ καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἐν ἀλληγορίαις λέγεται πρὸς ἐκπληξιν καὶ φόβον, ὥσπερ ἐν σκοτὶ καὶ νυκτί. ἔοικε γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἀλληγορία τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῇ νυκτί. Cf. also 151: «Some veiled meanings have a kind of piquancy about them»: ἔχουσι δὲ τι στωμύλον καὶ ἀλληγορία τινές; and 254. See pp. 164, 167.

6. 103: ἡ συντομία δὲ πῇ μὲν μεγαλοπρεπὴς καὶ μάλιστα ἡ ἀποσιώπησις· ἕνα γὰρ μὴ ῥηθέντα μείζονα φαίνεται καὶ ὑπονοηθέντα. Aposiopesis is a form of emphasis in *Rhet. ad Herenn.* 4.53; hence contributes to the obscure. See p. 195.

the interests of clarity.¹ Techniques of repetition are a help.² Amplifications should be kept within bounds.³ In general, clarity requires current words and words "bound together", as against wholly disjointed or unconnected writing.⁴ Our object, says Demetrius, is to convince and "the power of convincing depends on two things, clearness and naturalness."⁵

Last to be treated is the forcible style. Historically speaking, it is also the last to be introduced into rhetorical theory and marks the recognition of an added power attaching to language beyond that assumed within the older three levels.⁶ Hence it adopts some of the existing categories but regards them from another point of view. We are told that it uses the same kind of diction as the elevated style but with particular emphasis on conciseness.⁷ Indeed, conciseness runs through the whole section in various guises almost as a synonym. Thus, brevity is encouraged in the form of short phrases (κόμματα) rather than cola,⁸ and periods must

1. 191; 198; 204; 207; 208. On the effect of the use of other than the nominative case see pp. 132, 139. The avoidance of unusual figures is based on the belief that «all eccentricity is unfamiliar and extraordinary»: φευγέτω δὴ καὶ τὰ σημειώδη σχήματα. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ παράσημον ἀσύνηθες καὶ οὐκ ἰδιωτικόν (208).

2. 196. Conciseness (συντομία, 197) Demetrius regards as having in it more of charm than of clarity.

3. περιπαγογαί, 202 (~ περιβολή). «It is with sentences as with roads. Some roads have many resting-places and many signposts --- but a dreary road with never a signpost seems hard to track, however short it may be»: ὥσπερ ἂν αἱ πολλὰ σημεῖα ἔχουσαι ὁδοὶ καὶ πολλὰς ἀναπαύλας --- ἡ δὲ ἀσημειώτος καὶ μονοειδής, καὶ μικρὰ ἤ, ἄδηλος δοκεῖ.

4. 192: πρῶτα μὲν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις, ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς συνδεδεμένοις. τὸ δὲ ἀσύνδετον καὶ διαλελυμένον ὅλον ἀσαφές πᾶν. His example is Heracleitus, whose obscurity he claims is due to a looseness of structure. See p. 80. This admonition should be distinguished from his warning against excessive nicety, which he finds trivial. See 53 (in connection with the elevated style): μικροπρεπὲς ἢ ἀκριβεία; also 59. Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Eth. Nicom.* Δ 4, 1122b8: ἡ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. So also 247, under the forcible style, where exact parallelisms are said to weigh down the narrative: τὰ δὲ ἀντίθετα καὶ παρόμοια ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις φευκτέον· ὄγκον γὰρ ποιοῦσιν, οὐ δεινότησα, πολλὰ τοῦ δὲ καὶ ψυχρότητα.

5. 221: τὸ πιθανὸν δὲ ἐν δυοῖν, ἐν τε τῷ σαφεῖ καὶ συνήθει.

6. The forcible style Demetrius calls the one presently in vogue and his special goal: καταφεύγειν μάλιστα ἐπὶ τὴν νῦν κατέχουσαν δεινότητα (245). On δεινότης see VOIT's book listed in the Bibliography. FUHRMANN, 65, points out that the forcible style is equivalent to DIONYSIUS' αὐστηρὰ ἁρμονία (*De Comp. Verb.*, Sect. 22).

7. 272: λέξεις δὲ λαμβανέσθω πᾶσα ὅση καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ χαρακτηριστῇ, πλὴν οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος.

8. 241: κόμματα ἀντὶ κώλων.

have a definite point at the end.¹ In keeping with these suggestions Demetrius recommends the use of metaphor, allegory, innuendo (ἐμφασίς), hyperbole, and other symbolic forms, all of which fall under the rubric of artificial speech (πλάσματα).² They are all essentially a kind of shorthand producing their effect through an economy of language.³ A related habit is the "covert allusion,"⁴ which employs a variety of contrived means for concealing one's real intent, whether out of fear, cleverness, or a desire for irony. The utility of this technique in the context of Roman or Byzantine autocracy appears from Demetrius' remark that "great and powerful populaces no less than despots usually require these ceremonious forms of language."⁵ In short,

"Conciseness is so favorable to this style that a sudden lapse into silence is often yet more feasible --- and, strange as it may seem, obscurity often produces force, since what is distantly hinted is more forcible, while what is plainly stated is held cheap."⁶

Behind Demetrius' observations regarding the forcible and the concise lies an interest in the more vigorous and spontaneous forms of language. It is this which basically distinguishes the forcible from the elegant style.⁷ Throughout he emphasizes such notions as vehemence, picturesqueness, and an epigrammatic adventuresomeness of the imagi-

1. 244: τὰς γε μὴν περιόδους ἐσφίχθαι μάλα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ τέλος. Cf. 251: «An uninterrupted series of periods --- is favorable to force. Its crowded succession will create the impression of line recited after line»: πρέπει δὲ τῇ δεινότητι καὶ τῶν περιόδων ἡ πυκνότης --- συνεχῶς γὰρ τιθεμένη μέτρῳ εἰκασθήσεται λεγομένῳ ἐφεξῆς.

2. 298.

3. Cf. 243: τὰ σύμβολα ἔχει δεινότητας, ὅτι ἐμπερὶ ταῖς βραχυλογίαις; also 272; 282. DEMETRIUS, 286, finds something poetical in allegory, hyperbole, and innuendo. The observations are made in connection with the style of Demades, a fourth-century orator.

4. 287-295. The phrase is Roberts' and best expresses Demetrius' meaning. I have, however, elsewhere preferred the translation, «figured topics», when reference is made to these as forms of composition, i.e., a genre, rather than, as here, to a more isolated psychological point. The covert allusion is related to ἐμφασίς (287). For fuller discussion see pp. 82, 188 ff.

5. 294: οἱ δὲ ἥμιοι οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ ἰσχυροὶ δέονται τοιοῦτου εἵδους τῶν λόγων, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι.

6. 253-254: οὕτω δ' ἡ συντομία τῷ χαρακτῆρι χρήσιμον, ὥστε καὶ ἀποσιωπήσαι πολλὰ τοῦ δεινότερον --- καὶ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς σχεδὸν [ἀν] καὶ ἡ ἀσάφεια πολλὰ τοῦ δεινότερος ἐστὶ. δεινότερον γὰρ τὸ ὑπονοούμενον, τὸ δ' ἐξαπλωθὲν καταφρονεῖται. Aposiopesis is also described in 264 as producing force. See p. 69, note 6.

7. On the elegant style in Demetrius see FUHRMANN's remarks, 63-64.

native faculty which avoids the smooth and polished in favor of an abrupt tension in language.¹

In sum, Demetrius shows a keen awareness of the function and importance of obscurity as a force in literary composition. This awareness extends not only to psychological values but is also reinforced by a knowledge of the grammatical possibilities for translating them into an effective style.

'Longinus' also shows a consciousness of the role of obscurity in literature, although the term itself is nowhere in evidence. His influence on the Byzantine tradition is comparatively small;² yet his views well express a good measure of the Byzantine feeling regarding obscurity. If Demetrius reflects the Aristotelian position, 'Longinus', by stressing man's mystic reach for the divine, represents more the Platonic outlook.

'Longinus' observes that man's λόγος, his capacity for using words, has been given to him by nature. Literature as the formal expression of this capacity is a natural function, and this, according to Longinian doctrine, involves a quest for something more than human,³ for nature has

"from the first breathed into our hearts an unconquerable passion for whatever is great and more divine than ourselves."⁴

This observation is only one of many in the treatise which connect the passionate instinct—here ἔρωσ, elsewhere very frequently πάθος—

1. 244; 246-247; 250; 258; 265-271; 275-277; 281; 297; 299-301. The recommendations do not preclude elaboration, for he recognizes that «a discreet use of elaborate language produces not only dignity but vigor of style»: τὸ δὲ ἐξαίρεσθαι πως λαμβανόμενον οὐ μέγεθος ποιεῖ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ δεινότητα (277).

2. See the testimonia, pp. 86-92, in the Teubner edition, *Dionysii vel Longini De Sublimitate Libellus* ed. O. JAHN, 1867, 4th ed. J. VAHLEN, 1910, with additions by H.-D. BLUME, Stuttgart 1967. Psellus knows him. See A. MAYER, «Psellos' Rede über den rhetorischen Charakter des Gregorios von Nazianz», *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 20 (1911) 60 ff.

3. 163.8: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔργων [sc. θαυμάζεται] τὸ μέγεθος, φύσει δὲ λογικὸν δ' ἀνθρώπος --- ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ λόγου [sc. ζητεῖται] τὸ ὑπεράϊρον τὰ ἀνθρώπινα; cf. 166.19: λόγων ἀνθρώποις ἐμφύτων.

4. 161.14: εὐθὺς ἀμαχὸν ἔρωτα ἐνέφυσεν ἡμῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παντὸς ἀεὶ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς δαιμονιωτέρου. W. H. FYFE's Loeb translation, with minor variations, is used throughout this section. Cf. 161. 10: ἡ φύσις οὐ ταπεινὸν ἡμᾶς ζῶον οὐδ' ἀγενὲς ἔκρινε, τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἀλλ' ὡς μεγάλην τινα πανήγυριν εἰς τὸν βίον καὶ εἰς τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον ἐπάγουσα, θεατὰς τινὰς τῶν ὄλων αὐτῆς ἐσομένους καὶ φιλοτιματάτους ἀγωνιστάς.

to sublimity. The process of literary creation is one of a fuller realization on the part of man of his true essence. The awe that man feels is not for something different but for a greater degree of a quality he shares with God. What is sublime and moving is at the same time nearest our hearts.¹ In the comparative δαιμονιωτέρου 'Longinus' asserts man's divine claim. Elsewhere, sublimity is described as "the true ring of a noble mind;" it lifts men of genius "near the mighty mind of God."² From the point of view of the reader a truly sublime passage must leave "behind in his mind more food for thought than the mere words at first suggest."³ That is to say, its full purport is curiously obscured on one level and revealed on another. The process can reach the point where "even without being spoken the bare idea often of itself wins admiration for its inherent genius."⁴ Thus, for 'Longinus' silence itself can be an expression of sublimity. Withal, it becomes also the expression of the divine, resident both in God and in the spirituality of man. Pythagoras with his appreciation of the religious function of silence and the host of Byzantine theologians inspired by a similar vision would have endorsed the sentiment.⁵

The devices of language will contribute to sublimity. The large emphasis which 'Longinus' places on figures (σχήματα) is based on a sensitive feeling of the interrelation between the principles and the materials of literary performance.⁶

1. 139.12: τῶν λόγων τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ὕψη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐγγυτέρω κείμενα.

2. 116.25: ὕψος μεγαλοφροσύνης ἀπήχημα. 162.16: τὸ δ' ὕψος ἐγγὺς αἴρει μεγαλοφροσύνης θεοῦ. Such men (i.e., μεγαλοφρεῖς) are «more than human»: οἱ τηλικούτοι πάντες εἰσὶν ἐπάνω τοῦ θνητοῦ (162.11).

3. 114.11: ἐγκαταλείπη τῇ διανοῇ πλεῖον τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ ἀναθεωρούμενον. This passage might be regarded as the special Longinian contribution to the rhetorical concept of emphasis, in which more is implied than said. See Chapter Six.

The feeling for τὸ πρέπον is widespread in the treatise, appearing perhaps most tellingly in the assertion, «Nothing makes the style so great as genuine emotion in the right place»: οὐδὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ γενναῖον πάθος, ἐνθα χρὴ, μεγαλήγορον ἐστὶ (116.15); cf. 118.18; 152.8; 154.9; 173.11.

4. 117.1: ὅθεν καὶ φωνῆς δῖχα θαυμάζεται ποτε ψιλὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἢ ἔννοια δι' αὐτὸ τὸ μεγαλόφρον. On the Christian implications of silence see p. 169, *infra*.

5. See pp. 107, 169.

6. FUHRMANN, 66-69, notices in 'Longinus' a congruence of φύσις and τέχνη under the impulse of πάθος, wherein the various rhetorical devices undergo a complete «Funktionalisierung» in the service of the sublime. The reader is referred to his very perceptive analysis of the notion of obscurity in this author. Cf. 143.11: τότε γὰρ ἡ τέχνη τέλειος ἦν ἢ ἂν φύσις εἶναι δοκῇ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἐπιτυχής, ὅταν λαμβάνουσιν περιέχῃ τὴν τέχνην.

"Figures are somehow natural allies of the sublime and draw in turn marvellous reinforcement from the alliance."¹

The same critical judgment is later applied to tropes (τρόποι), especially metaphor. Clearly, tropes and figures serve a common function. "Tropical writing," he observes,

"has a natural grandeur and metaphors make for sublimity."²

Further, the observation that "a figure is always most effective when it conceals the very fact of its being a figure," is later applied also to hyperbole, one of the tropes.³ The strange power of the symbolic habits of language works its effect in terms of concealment and revelation in the service of the sublime.

Figures and tropes are thus means by which we relate to something larger than ourselves. They offer us the opportunity of seeing ourselves *sub specie aeternitatis*. For this reason 'Longinus' devotes special attention to σύνθεσις, the composition or arrangement of words. Composition is

"a kind of melody in words—words which are part of man's nature and reach not his ears only but his very soul—;—by the blending of its own manifold tones it brings into the hearts of the bystanders the speaker's actual emotion so that all who hear him share in it, and by piling phrase on phrase builds up one majestic whole; by these means it casts a spell on us and always turns our thoughts towards what is majestic and dignified and sublime."

Further, after an analysis of the metrical effect of a passage from Demosthenes, he remarks,

"Nothing is of greater service in giving grandeur to such passages than the composition of the various members. It is the

1. 138.8: φύσις πως συμμαχεῖ τε τῷ ὕψει τὰ σχήματα καὶ πάλιν ἀντισυμμαχεῖται θαυμαστῶς ὅπ' αὐτοῦ. 'LONGINUS' claims this insight as his own discovery, 138.6, but it appears to be also the burden of the section on σχήματα σεμνά in HERMOGENES, 250.16-251.13, and is more likely a feature of contemporary rhetorical thought.

2. 155.22: μεγάλαι τε φύσιν εἰσὶν αἱ τροπικαί, καὶ ὡς ὑψηλοποιὸν αἱ μεταφοραί.

3. 138.19: τότε ἄριστον δοκεῖ τὸ σχῆμα, ὅταν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαλανθάνῃ, ὅτι σχῆμά ἐστι; cf. 164.19: μήποτ' οὖν ἄρισται τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων προείπομεν, αἱ αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαλανθάνουσαι, ὅτι εἰσὶν ὑπερβολαί, and note also 154.9: τὰ εὐκαιρα τῶν μεταφορῶν, ὅπερ ἔφην καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων. Figures are treated in Sects. 16-29; tropes in the general section on φράσεις, 30-38. Cf. the recommendation of Gregory of Nazianzus that a letter should be like an eagle: «The most beautiful point about him was that he did not think himself beautiful» (quoted p. 51, *supra*).

same with the human body. None of the members has any value by itself apart from the others, yet one with another they all constitute a perfect organism. Similarly, if these effects of grandeur are separated, the sublimity is scattered with them to the winds; but if they are united into a single system and embraced moreover by the bonds of rhythm, then by being merely rounded into a period they gain a living voice. In such periods, one might say, the grandeur comes from a multitude of contributors."¹

In short, composition, together with metaphor and figures, provides access to the magnificence and fulness of the divine. Its tactics are not merely means by which we come to grips with the universal order but also the proof of its complexity. If the kind of writing style here suggested has a handle on obscurity, it yet proceeds from a noble attempt to simulate universality insofar as man is capable of it.

A different though related kind of obscurity issues from the effort to make style reflect the unpredictability of life. 'Longinus' lays great stress on the more spontaneous and rougher forms of expression as against those which give the effect of smoothness. His preference results directly from the importance which he assigns to πάθος. "Emotion", he declares at one point, "resents being hampered by connecting particles and other irrelevant insertions."² Hyperbaton is "the truest form of vehement emotion," for its inversion of the logical order of events in favor of innumerable variations, repetitions, and asyndeta is a truer imitation of nature and of life itself.³ Hence Demosthenes' "very order is disordered and equally his disorder implies a certain element of order."⁴

1. 166.19: ἁρμονίαν τινὰ οὖσαν λόγων ἀνθρώποις ἐμφύτων καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, οὐχὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς μόνης ἐφαπτομένων--- ἅμα τῇ μίξει καὶ πολυμορφίᾳ τῶν ἑαυτῆς φθόγγων τὸ παρεστὼς τῷ λέγοντι πάθος εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πέλας παρειαγούσαν καὶ εἰς μετουσίαν αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἀκούοντας δαί καθιστάσας, τῇ τε τῶν λέξεων ἐποικοδομήσει τὰ μεγέθη συναρμόζουσας, δι' αὐτῶν τούτων κηλεῖν τε ὁμοῦ καὶ πρὸς ὅγκον τε καὶ ἀξίωμα καὶ ὕψος καὶ πᾶν δ' ἐν αὐτῇ περιλαμβάνει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκάστοτε συνδιατιθέναι;--- ἐν δὲ τοῖς μάλιστα μεγέθοι ποιεῖ τὰ λεγόμενα, καθάπερ τὰ σώματα ἢ τῶν μελῶν ἐπισύνθεσις, ὧν μὲν οὐδὲν τμηθὲν ἀφ' ἐτέρου καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἀξιόλογον ἔχει, πάντα δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐκπληροῦ τέλειον σύστημα οὕτως τὰ μεγάλα, σκεδασθέντα μὲν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ἅλλος' ἄλλῃ ἅμα ἑαυτοῖς συνδιαφορεῖ καὶ τὸ ὕψος, σωματοποιούμενα δὲ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ καὶ ἐτι δεσμῷ τῆς ἁρμονίας περικλειόμενα, αὐτῷ τῷ κύκλῳ φωνήεντα γίνεται καὶ σχεδὸν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις ἑρπύς ἐστι πλήθους τὰ μεγέθη. The discussion of composition runs Sects. 39-42.

2. 142.16: τὸ πάθος ὑπὸ τῶν συνδέσμων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προσθηκῶν ἀγανακτεῖ. Cf. 125.13; 128.3; 133.10; 169.13; et al.

3. 142.22: χαρακτηρ ἐναγωνίου πάθους ἀληθέστατος, and cf. Sect. 22 as a whole.

4. 142.5: οὕτως αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τάξις ἀτακτον καὶ ἡ ἀταξία ποῖαν περιλαμβάνει τάξιν.

Historically, the kind of rough yet full style here described shows affinities with the δεινότης of Demetrius¹ and contributes as well to Hermogenes' περιβολή. 'Longinus' envisions one of its main features, the hyperbaton, as springing from one point to another with various interpolations, then wheeling again to its original position, all the while carrying the reader along until the final resolution. The description is reminiscent of Siceliotes' characterization of περιβολή as a form of discourse which wheels about to keep pace with events themselves and leaps from one to the other.² Clearly, περιβολή came to absorb some of the qualities of the old (not Hermogenes') δεινότης. At the same time, the element of expansiveness in περιβολή shows a connection with Demetrius' μεγαλοπρέπεια. Thus περιβολή is the heir both of μεγαλοπρέπεια and of δεινότης, and not only in some of its stylistic devices but also in underlying principle. The same pair forms the base of what 'Longinus' understands by ὕψος,³ and it is ὕψος which gives way ultimately before the more popular term, σεμνότης, its equivalent in Hermogenes. This set of relationships helps explain the intimate connection that περιβολή and σεμνότης are later to maintain in Byzantine rhetoric. A number of largely independent, though related, lines of rhetorical thought are being pursued in the early imperial age, most of them traceable to Hellenistic ancestry. Eventually they converge and form a dominant structure of opinion for which Hermogenes becomes the key spokesman. One

FUHRMANN, 69, regards these habits as the sort that Dionysius would have characterized as obscurity, but thinks the term is avoided in 'Longinus' because they are absorbed into the ideal of «pathetische Erhabenheit.»

1. FUHRMANN, loc. cit.

2. 143.2: ἐκάστοτε παραπίπτοντες ἄλλα προθέμενοι πολλάκις ἐπ' ἄλλα μεταπηδῶσι, μέσα τινὰ παρεμβαλόντες ἀλόγως, εἴτ' αὖθις ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἀνακυκλοῦντες καὶ πάντῃ πρὸς τῆς ἀγωνίας--- τῆδε κάκεισε ἀγχιστρόφως ἀντισπῶμενοι τὰς λέξεις τὰς νοήσεις τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰρμού παντοίως πρὸς μυρίας τροπὰς ἐναλλάττουσι τάξιν, κτλ. Cf. SICELIOTES, 6.206.30 W: μὴ κατ' εὐθεΐαν ὁ λόγος κινεῖται, ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ πάντα τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλ' ὧδε κάκεισε χορεύει πρὸς τὰ πράγματα μεταβαλλόμενος καὶ παραβαλλόμενος καὶ ἀπὸ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο μεταπηδῶν--- καὶ ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἴσος ἐστὶ θηρίῳ--- καμπὰς καὶ διακυκλήσεις καὶ περικοπὰς καὶ ἐπιτάσεις--- οὐκ ἔχοντι. See p. 152. Similar language is used by 'Longinus' in speaking of αὐξήσις, one of the sources of περιβολή. See HAGEDORN, 47, who compares the notion of extraneous accretions in 'Longinus' (ἐξωθέν ποθεν ἐπεισκυκλῶν, 144.17) with Hermogenes' description of περιβολή, 278.14: ὅταν ἐξωθέν τι προσλαμβάνῃς. On αὐξήσις see pp. 57, 135, 140, 159.

3. So FUHRMANN, 66, who distinguishes two conceptions of the high style in 'Longinus', the one μέγεθος, the other properly ὕψος, and notes their similarity with Demetrius' μεγαλοπρέπεια and δεινότης.

of the chief elements in the structure is the definition of literary obscurity.

We have so far considered the attitude of the major critics. Their treatment of the stylistic devices which serve the cause of obscurity is on the whole selective, illustrative, and analytical. On the other hand, in the rhetorical handbooks which survive it is fuller and more prescriptive in tone and purpose. One of these is an anonymous work known as the Seguerianus, which seems based to a considerable degree on material belonging to the century before Hermogenes.¹ It became a very popular tract in the Byzantine period starting from the third century, when it appears to have assumed most of its present form. One section takes up narration (διήγησις),² to which are assigned three virtues, clarity, conciseness, and persuasiveness.³ The discussion of the first includes an extensive treatment of obscurity on the principle that the desideratum of clarity is automatically achieved once we know and avoid the techniques of its opposite. Though such an approach seems at first glance too negative, it has the distinct virtue of avoiding a common pitfall. Rhetorical values commonly express ideals, which as such cannot be fully translated into the required stylistic and grammatical formulae. The Seguerianus both here and elsewhere (for example, in the immediately preceding section on conciseness) is following a common practice in listing ways in which writers generally fall short of their purpose. The result is a useful handbook which turns away from generalities and speaks in easily understood, pragmatic terms.

Obscurity, we are told, occurs either in the subject matter or in the style.⁴ It takes many forms. In the first category there are a number of possibilities: 1) when the subject is not common knowledge, as, for example, dialectic and geometry; 2) when we confuse the order of events and resort to tedious repetition; 3) when we omit necessary points; and 4) when we introduce extraneous material. In the second category we pro-

1. Text and Commentary by GRAEVEN (see Bibliography); also ed. pp. 352-398 Sp-H, used here. There is general agreement that Graeven's assignment of the text to Cornutus is wrong (see CHRIST-SCHMID-STÄRLIN, 928); however, vexed questions about its date and forms of transmission remain. On its Byzantine influence see some remarks by BRZOSKA, s.v. ANONYMI (No. 2), *RE-PW*, col. 2328; FELTEN, *Nicolaus*, pp. xxxi-xxxii.

2. 361.12-377.16.

3. 365.7: σαφήνεια, συντομία, πιθανότης. QUINTILIAN, 4.2.31-32, refers the trinity to Isocrates. See VOLKMANN, 153; CAPLAN, 25, note g. Cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 66.9-11: σαφῶς, συντόμως, πιστῶς.

4. 367.12: ἥ γὰρ ἐν λέξεσιν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον ἀσαφές ἢ ἐν πράγμασιν.

duce obscurity when we use tropical language and unintelligible, obsolete, or ambiguous terms, and when we resort not to a simple and natural form of composition but to long periods and allegorical expressions. Word formations and "articulation" ¹ also create obscurity. So too will the use of digressions, for they break up the order of narrative and may even cause the omission of necessary items. Finally, we learn that all these devices prove useful when our purpose is to lead the judge astray. In such cases we should concentrate not on the diction but on confounding the order of events. ² The remark recalls Quintilian's reference to the use of obscurity in court cases as a means of preparing the judge to receive instruction. ³ It is, however, noticeable that the Seguerianus repeats the advice some lines later not with reference to the courtroom but as a general proposition, thus seeming to accept obscurity as a valid habit of discourse. ⁴ We may suppose that rhetoric recognized it as a positive force making for a given end. The analysis of its components was in part in-

1. διάρθρωσις, 368.12, e.g., 'Αλέξανδρος ὁ Πάρις, 'Αλέξανδρος ὁ Φιλίππου. The recommendations in this section, 367.8-368.17, are not particularly new. Most may be found in the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and many appear also in the *Rhet. ad Alex.*, 66.4 ff. The Seguerianus, however, provides the most formal and complete statement, fuller than that of other handbooks, and the one best known to the Byzantines. See p. 86, note 2 *infra*.

2. 368.13: ποιήσεις δὲ ἀσάφειαν καὶ ἐὰν τὰς ἀκολουθίας διαλύσῃς ἀλόγοις διηγήμασι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερβαίνῃς, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τάξιν τιθῇς. οὕτως δὲ αὐτὰ τις ποιήσει τὸν δικαστὴν ἀπατήσαι βουλόμενος τῇ ἀνακολουθίᾳ.

3. 4.1.40-41. Cf. CICERO, *De Invent.* 1.20. Quintilian gives the Greek term as δυσπαρακολούθητον, 'hard to follow,' which he translates by *obscurum* and which is clearly equivalent to the Seguerianus' ἀνακολουθία (368.17). A related tactic is mentioned in the scholia on THEON, 1.260.5 W, which are influenced indirectly by the Seguerianus. See RABE, *John of Sardes*, p. xiv; FELTEN, *Nicolaus*, p. xiv, note 1. We use clarity, says the scholiast, when we speak in our own defense and obscurity when we attack. He quotes *De Corona* 111, where Demosthenes, unable to counter the laws Aeschines cites against him, takes refuge in obscurity: 'As for Aeschines' topsy-turvy miscellany of arguments about the statutes transcribed for comparison, I vow to Hermes I do not believe you understand the greater part of them and I am sure they were quite unintelligible to me.' C.A. and J.H. VINCE's Loeb translation.

4. 377.10: ὅπου δ' ἀνατετραμμένην σε δεῖ, φησί, ποιεῖν τὴν διήγησιν καὶ ἀσαφῆ, μὴ τῇ λέξει τὴν ἀσάφειαν ἐργάζου ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν λέξιν ὥς ἐνι μάλιστα ἀπλὴν ἵνα καὶ εὐμαθείας δέξῃς ἐνθὺς τῷ ἀκροατῇ, τὴν δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν κίνει. The author is apparently quoting from Alexander, son of Numenius, a rhetorician of the time of Hadrian. Cf. 'Longinus' on hyperbaton, p. 75, *supra*, and the Seguerianus' quotation from Harpocration (1st/2nd cent. A.D.), 370.17: διηγήματος ἀρεταὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς εὐπρεπεστάτοις σαφήνεια, ἐν δὲ τοῖς σαθοῦς ἀσάφεια προβεβλημένη.

spired by court tactics, a development perhaps no more than to be expected, given the origin of rhetorical theory in a judicial setting in the fifth century B.C.

Theon, the author of our earliest set of progymnasmata, gives an extensive treatment of clarity and obscurity. ¹ His text parallels the Seguerianus, often to the point of identical phraseology. ² Once again we are dealing with narration. However, the remarks no longer form part of a general discussion but are subsumed under one of the progymnasmata, that of διήγημα. ³ It is under this same heading that the various Byzantine scholia on Aphthonius also discuss obscurity. Indeed, the scholia incorporate also the tradition represented by the Seguerianus. Thus the knowledge which Byzantine students had regarding obscure writing reached them not abstractly but as an integral part of training in the progymnasmata, to which every schoolboy was exposed. ⁴

Theon shows the same division into πράγματα and λέξεις. ⁵ As to the first, we should avoid technical subjects such as dialectic and geometry. We should try to describe no more than one thing at a time. Thucydides' annalistic method of recording events by summers and winters is faulty, for it compels him to compress too many items under one heading, then drop them only to resume the account among the events of the following year. We must also avoid repetitions and immoderate digressions. Theopompus' account of the reign of Philip of Macedon shows some of these characteristics: he runs together too many stories, he omits to mention many points, and he tends toward oblique and secretive references.

1. 78.14-93.4 Sp-H. On date see p. 45, note 2.

2. The degree to which Theon and other writers of handbooks on progymnasmata are eclipsed by Aphthonius may be gleaned from the fact that the scholia on Theon mentioned p. 78, note 3, *supra* (1.257-262 W), are actually a compilation drawn largely from the scholia of John of Sardes on Aphthonius. See *Prolog. Syll.*, p. xxxvii.

3. The heading and subsequent discussion in the Seguerianus concern διήγησις. In Theon the heading is διήγημα, the discussion, of διήγησις. The entry in the three other main writers of progymnasmata, [Hermogenes], Nicolaus, and Aphthonius, is διήγημα. The change seems to occur as this particular progymnasma took on distinct form as a literary entity. All the writers are aware of the difference between the two terms. [Hermogenes] compares ποίησις - ποίημα. To him διήγησις is the wider term: the *Iliad* is a διήγησις, the making of the shield of Achilles a διήγημα (4.9 ff.). Aphthonius makes the same distinction, 2.16 ff. Nicolaus says this is the common view but also gives other opinions, e.g., διήγησις deals with fact and διήγημα with fiction, 11.16 ff.

4. See p. 190.

5. 80.7 ff.

In the matter of λέξις, we must avoid poetic, onomatopoeic, tropical, archaic, local, and ambiguous terms. We must not use words which in pronunciation can be divided so as to give a different meaning. Confusion regarding the antecedent also makes for obscurity. Heraclitus sometimes had recourse to this tactic, either deliberately or out of ignorance.¹ In general, hyperbaton should be avoided, though it has its uses; also long parenthetical remarks. Omission of key words tends to obscurity, as does also the stringing together of a number of words in the same case.

Theon's interest in the more grammatical side of obscurity admits us into an ancient classroom, as it were, and allows us to see the actual techniques of instruction. At the same time, the mention of Heraclitus introduces an added element. The proverbial obscurity of Heraclitus is based in the ancient sources on two factors. The philosopher is obscure because of his subject matter, which is abstruse, and also because of his style. Theon is essentially reproducing the judgment of Aristotle, who tells us that it is difficult to punctuate Heraclitus' writings since it is unclear whether a word belongs to the clause which precedes or to the one which follows.² Similarly, Demetrius informs us,

"Writing which is wholly disjointed and unconnected is entirely lacking in clearness. It is impossible to discern the beginning of each member owing to the looseness of the structure. This is illustrated by the writings of Heraclitus, the obscurity of which is due mainly to their loose structure."³

Tradition, however, also records Heraclitus' reasons for so writing. His book *On Nature*, Diogenes Laertius reports,

1. 82.16: παρὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν τὰ Ἡρακλείτου τοῦ φιλοσόφου βιβλία σκοτεινὰ γέγονε κατακόρως αὐτῇ χρησαμένου ἢ ἐξεπίτηδες ἢ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν.

2. *Rhet.* Γ 5.6, 1407b14: τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίζαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόκειται τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον. To the third-century B.C. satirist, Timon of Phleius, Heraclitus is a «riddler» (αἰνικτής), *Diog. Laert.*, 9.6. Cf. also *De Mundo* 396b20, our earliest reference to the σκοτεινὸς Ἡράκλειτος, which describes Heraclitus' theory of the harmonization of opposites in the formation of the world. A similar interest in the mixture of contrasting impulses within the human soul leads *Plutarch, De Tranq. Anim.* 15, p. 474 B *Wyttenbach*, to quote *Empedocles*. The fragment (122 *Diels*) seems part of a list of good and bad *daimones*, among whom are included *Νημερτής τ' ἑρέεσσα μελάγκουρός τ' Ἀσάφεια*.

3. 192: τὸ δὲ ἀσύνδετον καὶ διαλελυμένον ὄλον ἀσαφὲς πᾶν· ἄδηλος γὰρ ἡ ἐκάστου κώλου ἀρχὴ διὰ τὴν λύσιν, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα σκοτεινὰ ποιεῖ τὸ πλεῖστον ἢ λύσεις.

"is divided into three discourses, one on the universe, another on politics, and a third on theology. This book he deposited in the temple of Artemis and, according to some, he deliberately made it the more obscure in order that none but adepts should approach it, and lest familiarity breed contempt."¹

With Heraclitus, that is to say, obscurity acquires a religious justification. It was a key which only initiates might possess.

In sum, it is evident that the early imperial age had at its disposal extensive criteria by which to gauge the clarity of discourse. The criteria are not only lexical and grammatical but insist as well on a kind of natural coherence in the development of the pattern of narrative. There is at the same time a recognition that obscurity is not merely a negation of an ideal but can serve a purpose of its own. As far as Theon is concerned the purpose is still largely judicial, though Heraclitus had opened up other possibilities. In addition, there existed a body of critical opinion, as in the case of Demetrius and 'Longinus', according to which obscurity is not merely a deviation from an Attic norm but could be a resource for the satisfaction of specific literary demands.

Let us turn to Hermogenes. As we have seen, clarity for Hermogenes is not only the Aristotelian ideal applying to all style, but has a more limited function as one of the Forms in his system. Its subdivisions are Purity and Limpidity, and its opposite is obscurity.² In turn, the opposite of Purity is Amplitude.³ Hermogenes spends little time on Clarity, choosing instead to give detailed suggestions under its subdivisions. We need not examine these in detail. In general, Purity requires simple sentences, topics of common understanding which avoid anything profound or involved, a style which turns away from tropical expressions, and a preference for the nominative case because of its directness. The *Cola* must be kept uncomplicated. In *Composition* we should avoid hiatus. *Cadence* and *Rhythm* should be those of popular speech, largely iambic and trochaic.⁴

1. 9.5-6: διήρηται εἰς τρεῖς λόγους, εἷς τε τὸν περὶ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ θεολογικόν. ἀνέθηκε δ' αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερὸν, ὥς μὲν τινες ἐπιτηδεύσας ἀσαφέστερον γράψαι, ὅπως οἱ δυνάμενοι (μόνοι) προσίοιεν αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ δημόδους εὐκαταφρόνητον ᾗ. R. D. HICK's Loeb translation.

2. See pp. 132, 138ff. 226.10: τῆς σαφηνείας, ἥπερ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ δῆπουθεν ἡ ἀσάφεια, ἢ ὑποβέβηκε τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ εὐκρινές. Obscurity, though not a Form, is surely helped toward that status by being included among them.

3. 227.25; 231.21; 232.7; 289.2; 294.14; 295.17 - 296.3.

4. 227.1 - 234.3.

Limpidity is described as a kind of helpmeet to Purity. It employs various devices to make sure that items are treated in their proper order, it uses short questions such as "Why do I mention these things?" to break up the narrative and clarify its intent, and it employs techniques of repetition in order to avoid confusion. Its Cola, Composition, and Rhythm are the same as those for Purity.¹

The style described under these headings, we are informed, is largely that of Isocrates. Demosthenes, Hermogenes' hero, works with many of the opposite techniques, especially those of Amplitude.² Thus there is in the text an implicit recognition of higher stylistic value to be found in the more complex patterns of discourse. These might be considered obscure at least in the special sense of being the opposite of Clarity in Hermogenes' scheme.

The section on Limpidity concludes by pointing out that its opposite is confusion. This is a vice of style, occurring when we use Amplitude and Ripeness without Limpidity:

"Obscurity by itself would not be a vice of style since emphases--- and figured topics do not speak clearly; for all that, we cannot say that their success depends on a vice or that they are a vice of style.--- Clarity requires the sure support of Grandeur and a kind of weightiness and magnificence, for close to the excessive use of Clarity is the mean or lowly, which is the opposite of Grandeur."³

This is why, Hermogenes continues, Demosthenes, while recognizing that his speeches should be clear throughout, intermixed elements making for Grandeur and Amplitude, since Clarity carried the danger of making the style too humble.⁴

1. 235.1 - 241.9. 235.2: ἡ δὲ εὐκρίνεια ἔχει μὲν τινα καὶ φύσει σαφηνείας ἐργαστικά, τὸ γὰρ μὲν πλεῖστον σχεδὸν ἐπικουρὸς ἐστὶ τῆς καθαρότητος πρὸς ὅπερ ἐκείνη ποιεῖν βούλεται.

2. Some of the Modes, for example, are a feature of Isocratean style. 237.23: πολλὰ παρὰ τῷ Ἰσοκράτει· οὐ μὴν δεινὸν γὰρ τύπου ταῦτα οὐδὲ Δημοσθενικοῦ. Amplitude as a characteristic feature of Demosthenes, 221.7-9; 278.5-7. See p. 129.

3. 240.21-241.15: ἐναντίον δὲ εὐκρίνειας σύγχυσις, ἣ δὴ γίνεται, ὅταν χωρὶς τῶν ποιούντων εὐκρίνειαν περιβάλλῃ τις καὶ μεστὸν ποιῇ τὸν λόγον, ἥπερ καὶ κακία ἐστὶ λόγου. οὐ γὰρ ἦ γε ἀπλῶς ἀσάφεια κακία ἂν εἴη λόγου, ἐπεὶ αἱ γὰρ ἐμφάσεις--- καὶ τὰ ἐσχηματισμένα τῶν ζητημάτων οὐ σαφῶς λέγει τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐ κατὰ κακίαν φήσομεν προάγεσθαι δῆπου οὐδὲ εἶναι τοῦ λόγου κακίαν. On «figured topics» see pp. 71, 188 ff.

4. 241.7-21: δεῖ γὰρ τῷ σαφεῖ μεγέθους τινὸς καὶ ὄγκου· παράκειται γὰρ τῷ σφόδρα

Hermogenes qualifies the acceptance of clarity as a major principle of discourse in two ways. He would temper excessive attachment to it by adopting opposite values, which he actually prefers as more illustrative of the genius of Demosthenes. Secondly, he recognizes two kinds of rhetorical composition, emphasis and figured topics, that also have the opposite intent and effect. He does not go so far as to characterize their habits as virtuous—this was to be left for later generations—but it is easy to see how his remarks could form the basis for such a development. Finally, his failure to elaborate his meaning makes it evident that he is not introducing novel proposals but is talking of matters already known to the rhetorical circles of his day.

Obscurity was a topic of discussion in other quarters as well. Galen tells us that he wrote a treatise entitled *Concerning Clarity and Obscurity*.¹ Though lost, we may infer, given his literary interests, that it formed part of the extensive ancient dialogue on the relative merits of Asianic versus Attic style. In the Christian realm recognition of the question of obscurity appears chiefly in connection with the development of exegetical works and their attempt to elucidate Holy Writ. Here the obscurity of a Biblical passage is often explained away through techniques of allegorical or typological interpretation.² The Alexandrian Neoplatonists also take up the question and, enlarging on an older tradition, see in Aristotle's writings the deliberate use of obscurity for a given end.³ Just as Christian exegetes advanced the awareness of obscurity as an

σαφεῖ τὸ εὐτελὲς καὶ ταπεινόν, ὃ δὴ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τῷ μεγέθει.--- ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ τῷ σαφεῖ μέγεθος τε προσεῖναι πάντως καὶ ὄγκον τινα καὶ ἀξίωμα· παράκειται γὰρ τῷ σφόδρα σαφεῖ τὸ εὐτελὲς, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τῷ μεγέθει. ὅπερ οἶμαι καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐπιγνοῦς διὰ μὲν τὸ πάντως δεῖν σαφῆ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἶναι λόγον διόλου κέρχεται τοῖς ποιούσι τὴν σαφήνειαν, διὰ δὲ τὸ κινδυνεύειν ἐνεκα ταύτης ἐκπίπτειν αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸ εὐζωνότερον κατέμειξεν αὐτῇ τὰ ποιούντα τὸ μέγεθος καὶ διαφερόντως πεπλεόνακε τῇ περιβολῇ.

1. *Περὶ σαφηνείας καὶ ἀσαφείας*, p. 124.16, vol. II, *Scripta Minora* edd. MARQUARDT et al.

2. Particularly in the Alexandrian school. This is of course a large subject in its own right, into which we cannot enter here. Noticeable are such discussions as ORIGEN, Fr. *In Proverb.*, PG 13, 21C ff. and Fr. *In Cantic. Cantic.*, PG 13, 36A; et al.; CHRYSOSTOM's two homilies (PG 56, 163-192), Ἀπόδειξις τοῦ χρησίμως τὰς περὶ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἐθνῶν καὶ τῆς ἐκπαίδεως Ἰουδαίων προφητείας ἀσαφεῖς εἶναι; and PHOTIUS' analyses, *Τὶ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀσάφεια τῆς Γραφῆς* (*Amplochia* 152 and 153, PG 101, 816-820) and *Διὰ τί ἡ προφητεία τοῖς τῆς ἀσαφείας τρόποις συνεσκήσται* (*Amplochia* 204, PG 101, 948B).

3. See Chapter Four.

element of their religious texts, so the Neoplatonists helped give it mystical sanction within pagan philosophy.

At the same time that Greek literature found in obscurity a means for expressing some of its deep felt religious values, on another level it continued to regard it as a vice of discourse. We have noted the list of four virtues of style, truth, conciseness, clarity, and propriety, given by Isidore of Pelusium, and his demand that they be successfully mixed, which he couples with a specific warning against their opposites.¹ Yet in another passage which reviews various kinds of writing in his day he tells us that some people think it shameful not to express themselves clearly, while others regard obscurity as a source of strength in their works. He seems to be referring to distinct genres or writing styles, since the remarks which follow list various kinds of authors, such as those who use a wealth of examples or others who are good at expressing pity or anger.²

Obscurity, having transcended its judicial limitations long since, could now be justified on a number of grounds, rooted more widely in religious and social attitudes. We meet an especially remarkable coalescence of these trends in the defense of Arethas, tenth century bishop of Caesarea, entitled *To Those Who Have Accused Us of Obscurity, in Which We Discuss also the Forms of Style Which We Use*.³ Perhaps, Arethas tells his correspondent, my accusers do not know what obscurity is or when and on what occasions it should be employed. I am willing to make corrections if my accusers are learned men skilled in matters of style. But if they belong to a group which has not spent the time and effort I have in these matters, I shall ignore them. They cite the language of the Fathers of the Church. I would agree it is simple, intelligible to all, and

1. See p. 28.

2. Letter 217, PG 78, 1461A: τῶν συγγραφέων οἱ μὲν αἰσχροὺς ἡγοῦνται μὴ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν, οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀσαφείᾳ τίθενται τὴν ἰσχύ· καὶ οἱ μὲν τιμῶσι τὸ μέτριον, οἱ δὲ ἕξω φέρονται τῶν καιρῶν· οἱ μὲν τῶν ἡκριβωμένων ὥτων στοχάζονται, τοῖς δὲ ἀρκεῖ τὰ μειράκια σεῖσαι· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμείνονες εἰς προοιμίου χρεῖαν, οἱ δὲ ἐν παραδείγμασι εἰσι πλούσιοι· οἱ μὲν οἰκτον ἐμβαλεῖν δεινοί, οἱ δὲ θυμόν· τῶν μὲν τὸ βραδύ λυπηρόν, τῶν δὲ τὸ ταχὺ τερπνόν· οἱ μὲν ὕπνον ἐμποιοῦσι, μᾶ κατὰ χρώμενοι ιδέα, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀφαιροῦσι ταῖς μεταβολαῖς. χρητοῖν τὸν βασανίσαι συγγράμματα δεινόν, πάσης καὶ χάριτος καὶ ἀπεχθείας ὄντα κρεῖττονα, ἐκάστου συγγραφῆως καὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν εἰδέναι καὶ τῇ μὲν ψηφίσασθαι τῇ δὲ μέμψασθαι.

3. Πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ἀσάφειαν ἡμᾶς ἐπισκόπωντας, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τίς ἡ ιδέα οὗ μέτεμεν λόγον. Text: pp. 186-191, *Arethae Scripta Minora* I, ed. L. WESTERINK, Leipzig, Teubner 1968. The passage is too long to quote. I give a short résumé in this paragraph.

looks to the improvement of men's souls. But even the Fathers—take, for example, Gregory of Nazianzus—can be shown to use various involved modes of style. These lend dignity to their words. My own style follows the requirements of rhetoric as laid down by Hermogenes. It is a proper mixture of the various ingredients of good discourse. We must not be like Megabyzes the Persian, who, upon visiting Zeuxis' studio, expressed a preference for the paintings done in brighter colors, though they were less successful, to those of darker hue, though these were much better executed. The students who were present mocked his ignorance. Only initiates can judge such matters properly. It is, in short, says Arethas, the ignorance of my accusers which is at fault, not I.

Arethas' tract is written in a kind of high style. His involuted language, the quotations from a wide range of classical and later authors, his invective, his use of a defense which rests on Patristic support, his feeling of exclusiveness, and his adoption of themes drawn from his Neoplatonic reading, constitute a collection of elements which in the round is not rare in Byzantine literature. Indeed, the work is almost a genre-piece. In the eleventh century Psellus, writing to a friend, describes his own exceptional capacity for combining philosophy and rhetoric as a rare achievement not meant for the common crowd. The ingredients of his composition are practically the same as in the case of Arethas.¹

We have, then, in the course of Byzantine history a very conscious and steady tradition of opinion and practice regarding obscurity. The habit was not intermittently imported into the mediaeval mind, resurrected from classical cupboards as the occasion demanded, but is integral to the very thought-world of Byzantium. Through being a regular element in the scheme of Byzantine rhetorical education it forms part of the apparatus of learning in all periods. Hence if we seek to reconstruct rhetorical theory on the subject it is not only to Hermogenes and Aphthonius that we must turn. We must also consider how their commentators understood their prescriptions and translated them to contemporary purpose. In the analyses of the scholiasts we shall find that more direct perception which not only affected literary production but also reached out beyond the confines of rhetoric to inform the Byzantine mentality itself.

We have seen that the commentary of John of Sardes on Aphtho-

1. Letter 174, pp. 441-443, *Meo. Bibl.*, vol. 5, ed. C. SATHAS, Paris 1876. See pp. 103, 117, 155.

nus is our first major extant witness to the alliance of Hermogenes and Aphthonius, which manifests itself not only in the incorporation of the text of the two authors within the same manuscripts but also in the penetration of the scholia on the one author into those on the other. We have also noted that John's commentary is largely a reproduction of materials from older Neoplatonic sources.¹ The immediate interest of the Neoplatonists in the problem of obscurity derives from their wish to explain Aristotle's occasionally difficult style. Their awareness of the actual grammatical and linguistic elements making for obscurity, however, comes to them from elsewhere. The observations of John of Sardes on the subject issue *verbatim* from the Seguerianus² and need not be repeated here. They are inserted into the text as part of the comment on Aphthonius' mention of clarity as one of the virtues of Narrative. Hence it is an easy conclusion that the Seguerianus supplied some of the techniques for measuring obscurity both to the Neoplatonists and to later ages, and did so through the medium of training in the progymnasmata. It is John of Sardes who initiates the discussion in the middle Byzantine period.

Another set of scholia on Aphthonius permits a closer look into educational practice.³ Some of the section on Narrative⁴ is cast in the form of a catechism. Questions are put and answered. To the question how many are the vices of Narrative, the answer is four: 1) obscurity, 2) verbosity, 3) unpersuasiveness, and 4) impurity of words.⁵ Most of the section is taken up with the first two. ἑλληνισμός is defined as the avoidance of barbarisms and solecisms. The difficulty of achieving both conciseness and clarity is noted. An author should prefer to err on the side of length, making sure that all the necessary points are included, rather than out

1. See pp. 23-24.

2. 20.7-21.11 = Seg. 367.8-368.17, except that John omits the one-line (368.12) mention of διαφθωσις (see note 1, p. 78, *supra*).

3. The scholia are found in a shorter (2.1-68 W) and a longer (2.565-684 W) version. Perhaps they are by the same author as the one who composed the anonymous commentary on Hermogenes in Walz's volume 7. See p. 21. At any rate, the two works appear in the same manuscripts, the earliest of which Walz assigns to the tenth century. See p. v, vol. 2 W and note 3, p. 87, *infra*.

4. 2.578.1-585.2 W.

5. 2.582.12 W: πόσαι κακίαι διηγήματος; τέσσαρες, ἀσάφεια, μακρηγορία, ἀπίθανον, καὶ ὁ μὴ τῶν λέξεων ἑλληνισμός. These are simply the negative equivalents of Aphthonius' list, 3.3: σαφήνεια, συντομία, πιθανότης, καὶ ὁ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑλληνισμός. See pp. 77, 94.

of a desire for conciseness run the risk of being obscure. One should strike a middle ground in these matters. The nominative is more conducive to clarity than the oblique cases. We are directed to Hermogenes to learn more about clarity, and a preference is expressed for a division of the style of Narrative into three elements (clarity, conciseness, and persuasiveness) rather than, with the addition of pleasure and magnificence, into five¹. At the same time an alternative view is recorded that persuasiveness applies to Narrative alone, the other four being common to all forms of discourse.

The scholia show evidence of more than one source. Some of the observations on clarity, for example, are repeated a few lines further on to no purpose. The catechetical structure, though by no means excluded as a possibility for the middle Byzantine period, may better be assigned to the fifth or sixth century, when, as we know, many of our rhetorical commentaries were composed and when the question-and-answer technique was in full use in both rhetorical and philosophical instruction. Many examples survive in the prolegomena to the various rhetorical scholia. An echo of this origin as far as our present text is concerned appears in the list of the six περιστατικά or "circumstances" making up the body of a narrative. To this list our scholiast tells us that some added a seventh member, ὅλη, by abstraction from the fifth, which is τρόπος.² The Anonymus *In De Ideis*, which as we have indicated may be by the same author, reports that the third-century Neoplatonist, Porphyry, recognized seven περιστατικά.³ There is, however, no reason to suppose a direct dependence. We must think rather of the later Neoplatonic milieu, when a number of earlier currents flow into the commentaries on Hermogenes and Aphthonius. Indeed, we have a fifth-century author, of considerable popularity in later Byzantine times, who we know was educated in Neoplatonic circles and whose writings display just such a confluence. Nico-

1. ἡδονή and μεγαλοπρέπεια, 2.583.2 W. See note 3, p. 94.

2. 2.579.19 W (~2.13.24 W): εἰσι δὲ οἱ τὴν ὅλην ἔβδομον στοιχεῖον προσέθηκαν; also 580.11; 582.9. The six are πρόσωπον, πρᾶγμα, χρόνος, τόπος, τρόπος, αἰτία. They are constantly being cited in rhetorical texts. On the origin of the list and the additions and variations see VOLKMANN, 36-37; 442 ff. On the περιστατικά in relation to Hermogenes' Dignity and Amplitude see p. 135. Other references: DEMETRIUS, 217; DIONYS., *De Lys.* 14.19 ff.; *Rhet. ad. Herenn.* 4.68; QUINTILIAN, 9.2.40; in the scholia: 1.122.18, 128.27; 2.212.21, 582.6; 4.10.27, 150.25, 164.11, 288.18; 6.48.21, 444.11, 448.22, 449.29, 455.5 W; et al.

3. See note 3, p. 86, *supra*. 7.921.2 W: ὁ φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν στέσεων τέχνῃ περιστατικά φησιν ἑπτὰ, κτλ. (the list follows).

laus, author of an extant set of progymnasmata, occasionally depends on Porphyry for his rhetorical views and notes the matter of the seventh περιστατικόν.¹ Nicolaus has been shown to reflect the tradition of the Seguerianus. Further, he is independent of Aphthonius, whose textbook must have been written perhaps only a few years before.² Nicolaus' dependence on Neoplatonic sources is not unique but rather reflects the common rhetorical habit of his day. A similar dependence may reasonably be claimed for the earliest commentaries on Aphthonius, now lost, from which our middle Byzantine scholiast presumably drew.

The tenth-century Anonymus *In De Ideis* gives us further reflections on obscurity, prompted by Hermogenes' observation that emphases and figured topics cannot be considered vices. Confusion, the scholiast notes, often arises when the inexperience of the author does not allow him to convey his meaning effectively to his readers. However, when an author says one thing while intending another and the reader grasps his true intent, the obscurity is appropriate and commendable.³ We must not be surprised that the opposite of Purity, which according to Hermogenes is Amplitude,⁴ is not a vice, whereas the opposite of Limpidity is precisely the fault that we call confusion. When Amplitude gets into difficulty, Limpidity provides a kind of relief; it itself has no helpmeet⁵, and when it suffers a reverse the result is confusion. The scholiast is throughout very much aware of obscurity as an element of style useful for a specific purpose and has moved to a position where he can speak of it not simply as not a vice but as an achievement of technique. He does not go so far as to regard it as a general virtue—it is still, to be precise, a virtue only of emphasis and the figured topics—but his remarks come close to such a view and, indeed, may suggest a psychological acceptance of it.⁶

The eleventh-century Doxapatres likewise takes his cue regarding

1. 13.19. See FELTEN, *Nicolaus*, pp. xxxi-xxxii.

2. FELTEN, op. cit., p. xxx.

3. χρηστή, 7.951.16 W. Cf. 'LONGINUS', 114.11, and p. 71, *supra*.

4. 226.20.

5. 7.951.31 W (=PLANUDES, 5.480.12 W): ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔσχεν ἐπικουροῦσαν τὴν εὐκρίνειαν. Cf. HERMOGENES, 235.3, where εὐκρίνεια is ἐπικουρος τῆς καθαρότητος.

6. 7.950.13 W: τοῦτο τέχνης καὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχηματισμένοις ἀσαφές, οὐ κακία λόγου; 951.7: τέχνης καὶ ἀρετῆς τῷ ἐσχηματισμένῳ τὸ ἀσαφές, οὐ κακία λόγου; 951.28: φεύγειν οὖν δεῖ τὴν σύγχυσιν, ἡ γὰρ ἀσάφεια οὐ κακία λόγου (said in regard to figured topics); cf. PLANUDES, 5.480.7 W: τὸ οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις [sc. ἐσχηματισμένοις ζητήμασι] πᾶσιν ἀσαφές τέχνης καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐ κακίας· κακία δὲ γίνονται ἂν, δταν ἐξ ἀπειρίας τοῦ λέγοντος ἡ ἀσάφεια συμβαίνει.

obscurity from Aphthonius' mention of clarity as one of the virtues of Narrative. Since clarity is a virtue, its opposite is a vice.¹ Hermogenes, we are reminded, does not discuss the virtues of Narrative as such but gives only some figures (σχήματα) suited to this particular progymnasma.² An extended passage is quoted from [Hermogenes'] *Progymnasmata*.³ As with John of Sardes the discussion of clarity which follows departs from Aphthonius to follow Hermogenes. Like Hermogenes, Doxapatres asks that the Sentences of Purity be clear and familiar. However, he adds two phrases which extend the original meaning and give us an intimation of his outlook. Hermogenes' σαφεῖς becomes σαφεῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς and to γνώριμος is added πάντη.⁴ Doxapatres expounds on the definition at length, asking that discourse be intelligible not only to the educated but to the multitude. His stress is on themes of interest to the daily life of the mass. One need not, he advises, speak only of God, virtue, and the soul. Coming from a monk, the recommendation is unusual. Yet it seems at the same time impelled by a pious regard for the common man and tells us something about Doxapatres himself. We have to do with a particularly sensitive schoolmaster who, conscious of the possibility of serving a wider public, wishes to accommodate the received body of rhetorical knowledge to his pedagogical purpose and make it more palatable to his pupils.

Doxapatres continues his discussion of Purity in accordance with Hermogenes' Categories. When he reaches Diction, though still in basic agreement with his master, he again moves somewhat beyond Hermogenes' intent. Hermogenes recommends that we avoid λέξεις τετραμμένη, a phrase probably not meant to be especially precise in meaning. Doxapatres takes it to refer specifically to metaphorical expressions.⁵ His interpretation is in keeping with his matter-of-fact rhetorical predilections.

So much, he says, for Hermogenes' definition of clarity. However, the older commentators on Aphthonius, he goes on, chose to speak of

1. His discussion is extensive, covering twenty-seven pages in WALZ's edition, 2.215-241.

2. 2.215.20, 216.3 W.

3. 4.21-5.14=2.216.4-22 W.

4. HERMOG., 227.3; DOXAPATRES, 2.217.6 W.

5. HERMOG., 229.9; DOXAPATRES, 2.217.27 W: τροπικὰς--- ἃς δὲ καὶ μεταφορικὰς οἱ γραμματικοὶ καλοῦσι.

obscurity. He has in mind John of Sardes. The discussion which follows¹ is identical with John's quotation from the Seguerianus which we have already treated.² Next we are given Geometres' account, which we are told is very similar. The next few pages are preponderantly from Geometres. Given Doxapatres' popularity in the succeeding centuries we can claim for Geometres a considerable influence on later Byzantine rhetoric, to an extent which has not hitherto been recognized.

Geometres' definition is quoted, *σαφήνεια παντός ἡγεμὸν ἀγαθοῦ λόγου*,³ and his comment noted that clarity is achieved by avoiding obscurity. To the old division *πράγματα - ὀνόματα*⁴ is added a third member, *σχήματα ἀσαφείας*. Thus obscurity has now reached the point where it can be included as in itself an independent third aspect of discourse.

By *σχήματα* Geometres does not understand figures in general but is referring to Hermogenes' Category.⁵ This is apparent from his observation that obscurity effects itself in Cola and Composition as well. His remarks may imply that the more common areas in which obscurity was thought to operate were Sentence, Mode, and Diction. Basically, he is attempting to include and define the more grammatical side of obscurity, which had been received through the Seguerianus tradition, under Hermogenes' headings. His analysis shows the power which the rhetorician exercised upon him. The result is to give obscurity through the medium of Hermogenes a valence extending across all areas of rhetorical behavior.

Doxapatres gives us Geometres' list of the habits contributing to obscurity. It is in general reminiscent of Theon, though longer and more systematically put. We must not 1) like Thucydides, narrate too many things at once, for this taxes the memory; 2) confuse the chronology or natural order of events; 3) use long digressions, though they are in special cases desirable for the relief they can supply to the monotony of straight historical narrative; 4) use "parenthetical" expressions (*μεταξύλογια*): they are a form of Amplitude pushed to excess; 5) use long or numerous hyperbata; 6) be garrulous: prolixity is related to obscurity; 7) indulge in particularly abstruse forms of allegory, for they become

1. 2.219.4-220.6 W.

2. See p. 86, note 2.

3. 2.220.7 W.

4. 2.220.10 W; later in the text (224.2) *λέξεις* is substituted.

5. Perhaps he also has in mind Hermogenes' «figured topics», *τὰ ἐοχηματισμένα τῶν ζητημάτων*, 241.2.

enigmatic and secretive; and 8) make use of technical vocabulary.

In the matter of diction¹ Geometres gives the same warnings as Theon: we should avoid the *ποιητικά*, *πεποιημένα*, *τροπικά*, *ἀρχαῖα*, *ξένα*, and *ὀνόματα*. He simply adds *γλωσσηματικά*² and gives a short statement of what he means by each category, together with examples. He would turn away from the harsher poetical and metaphorical expressions.³ Punctuation is important in eliminating obscurity as are also pronunciation and word division.⁴ Also, one must make sure that the antecedent is clear.

Despite protestations to the contrary, it is largely these same tactics to which later Byzantine writers will succumb in their conscious or unconscious allegiance to obscurity. We must, however, be careful not to impose a full-grown theory upon Geometres himself. His text is rather witness to a process and the list he recites is given of course as a warning, not a recommendation.

Doxapatres continues quoting from him. It is Geometres who is responsible for the remarkable statement that "not every instance of obscurity is a vice; on the contrary, it is often even a virtue."⁵ Hermogenes had of course suggested that obscurity need not in itself be a fault of style, but his remark was cast in the form of a condition (*ἐν*) and referred to specific kinds of composition.⁶ With Geometres the intent is general and his feeling is positive. A similar statement is made by Siceliotus in the next century: "Not every form of obscurity is blameworthy." In this and in Siceliotus' reference to the "approved obscurity," (*ἐπαινουμένη ἀσάφεια*),⁷ which he now goes so far as to call an *ἰδέα*, we see the shift in favor

1. 2.223.3 W.

2. 2.223.5 W, equated a few lines later (22) with *ξένων*.

3. 2.223.7 W: *εἰσὶ δὲ ποιητικά-- καὶ τὰ τραχύτερα καὶ σκληρότερα*. Cf. HERMOGENES, 410.3, on Thucydides: *κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐπὶ τὸ τραχύτερον μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ σκληρότερον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσαφέστερον*.

4. 2.224.22 W. The example, *οὐ κενταύροις* versus *οὐκ ἐν ταύροις*, is in THEON, 82.5. In the form of *σχεδογραφία* this school exercise experiences a new vogue about this time. See F. FUCHS, *Die Höheren Schulen von Konstantinopel im Mittelalter*. *Byzantinisches Archiv*. Heft 8, Leipzig 1926, 45-46; additional bibliography in J. PAPADEMETRIOU, «Τὰ Σχέδη τοῦ Μυῶς: New Sources and Text», *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature* 58 (1969) 210, note 1.

5. 2.226.8 W: *οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀσάφεια ἤδη καὶ κοκία λόγων· τούτων τινος μὲν οὖν πολλὰ καὶ ἀρετή*.

6. 240.24 ff.

7. 6.203.4 W: *ταῦτα διήλθον ἐν τῷ σαφηνείας λόγῳ ὥς ἂν γινώσκοντες ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα μεμ-*

of the more subtle and involuted craftsmanship of later Byzantine literature. For the moment obscurity is harnessed to a Christian vision: both Geometres and Siceliotes look to Hermogenes through Christian eyes. With the aggrandizement of the secular at the expense of the Christian element among many of the Byzantine intellectuals of later centuries, obscurity, stripped of its religious support, often degenerated into a *mysterium* of its own.

For Siceliotes Hermogenes' ideal style, Force, is attained if one's Sentences are not only dignified and elaborate but obscurely expressed.¹ Now Sentence in Hermogenes is the very stuff of discourse, the first of the Categories through which the Forms operate, and the substance upon which the others, such as Rhythm and Diction, build. Furthermore, Force, Siceliotes has previously remarked, involves reference to such factors as time, place and person in the narration of events.² He is reminded of the description of God in Gregory of Nazianzus. In giving Gregory's statement, "God always was and is and will be,"³ he plays on the double meaning of *ἐννοια* in Hermogenes' sense of Sentence and in Gregory's of our "understanding" of the Deity. Here, in other words, is the highest Force. The rhetorical, human yardsticks help us to see how God exceeds them. The obscurity of God lies in His being beyond our understanding and beyond limit. Thus obscurity contributes to Force. Further, the Sentence for which the use of the *περιστατικά* is especially prescribed in Hermogenes' system is that of Amplitude. We are advised not to express things "neat" but with their accompanying circumstances.⁴ Amplitude requires context and since the ultimate context is the Godhead, there

πη. This is presumably the meaning, though the statement is quoted without antecedent, having apparently been carelessly included at this point. 6.199.30 W: οἱ γριφοὶ σοφοὶ ὄντες τῆς αὐτῆς ιδέας τῆς ἀσαφείας εἰσι τῆς ἐπαινουμένης καὶ τῶν ἐμφάσεων, οὐ μὴν τῆς χειρίστης οἶον, κτλ. See pp. 12, 193.

1. 6.457.22 W: εἰ δὲ πρὸς τῷ εἶναι σεμνὸν καὶ περινενοημένον καὶ ἀσαφῶς φρασθῆναι, δεινότητος ιδέα πάντως κριθήσεται. For the application of these sentiments to the fourteenth-century literary quarrel between Nicephorus Chumnus and Theodore Metochites see ŠEVČENKO, 55.

2. 6.455.5 W; cf. also 444. 11; 448.22; 449.29; and note 4, *infra*.

3. *Orat.* 38, PG 36, 317B: θεὸς μὲν ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται—ἀόριστον, πᾶσαν ὑπερεκπύπτον ἐννοιαν καὶ χρόνου καὶ φύσεως. Much of Gregory's homily is given to such mystical description of the Godhead.

4. 281.3: ὅταν (sc. τις) μὴ ψιλὰ λέγῃ τὰ πράγματα, μὴδὲ καθ' ἑαυτὰ, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τῶν παρακολουθοῦντων οἷον τόπου, χρόνου, αἰτίας, τρόπου, προσώπου, καὶ ἔτι γνώμης, κτλ.

issues an essential relation among ἀσάφεια, δεινότης and περιβολή.¹ This pattern of ideas forms a remarkable instance of rhetoric in the service of theology. We are observing an attempt at the spiritualization and sanctification of the written and spoken word, done in terms of traditional rhetorical theory.

When Geometres tells us that obscurity is a virtue he promises to describe "a little later"² the occasions when and the way it should be used. Either Doxapatres forgot to quote him or Geometres himself neglected to return to the subject, for our text does not resume the discussion. One is curious to know whether Geometres intended to provide specific suggestions regarding the matter. In any case, he tells us that for the moment he recommends figured topics and emphases. Also, he approves of the view that obscurity, through the medium of irony and innuendo, is useful in challenging superiors and intimates. Finally, he adds, clarity and obscurity depend not on the disposition of the listener but on the nature of the logos itself. We cannot classify as obscure what exceeds the capacity of an audience to understand but what through ignorance or dimness of wit of the author himself is deficient in technique.³

At this point Doxapatres leaves Geometres to take up the view of "commentators on Aphthonius," that clarity is simply the avoidance of obscurity.⁴ Not so, he objects. The two are not direct opposites. Clarity is after all only one of Hermogenes' Forms. Hermogenes' system works in such a way that it is possible to give more weight to any one of the Forms. Obscurity does not automatically issue once we downgrade Clarity. Doxapatres has in other words reduced Aristotle's overriding principle to Hermogenes' more limited definition. It is not difficult to see why. He can now separate off the concept of obscurity and give it an existence all its own, a necessary step in the Byzantine process by which obscurity becomes a touchstone of rhetoric.

1. Metochites' quarrel with Chumnus turns on these same three concepts, but with a difference. The concerns of the two contenders are philosophical and purely literary. They represent the secularization of an ideal which is three centuries older and which arises originally in response to a religious quest. On the connection between ἀσάφεια and δεινότης cf. DEMETRIUS, 254: καὶ ἡ ἀσάφεια πολλὰ τοῦ δεινότητος ἐστὶ δεινότερον γὰρ τὸ ὑπονοούμενον, τὸ δ' ἐξαπλωθὲν καταφρονεῖται. See p. 71. What has happened is that the principle, for religious reasons, has been dovetailed into Hermogenes' structure.

2. 2.226.11 W.

3. 2.226.17 W.

4. 2.226.26 W.

The remainder of Doxapatres' comments on Narrative is devoted to the other three elements of style which, in addition to clarity, Aphthonius says are suited to it: conciseness, persuasiveness, and purity of words (ὁ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑλληνισμός). Under the first of these he advises, once more following Geometres, that we avoid digressions and not talk of many things at once, for such habits produce obscurity and garrulity.¹ Tautology stands opposite to both conciseness and clarity,² for the listener is confused into thinking that different topics are being discussed when in fact they are not.

Among the writers of textbooks on progymnasmata, only Aphthonius lists a fourth element of Narrative. ἑλληνισμός was for Aristotle the foundation of good style.³ John of Sardes pays hardly any attention to it, giving only a short definition, and Doxapatres reports that "most commentators"—his usual phrase—have not touched the subject. He himself assigns a certain amount of importance to it.⁴ Basically he agrees with John that ἑλληνισμός consists in the use of standard grammatical forms and vocabulary. Barbarisms and solecisms are to be avoided. He then asks himself why it should merit special attention since it has so much in common with clarity. His suggestion is that students come to Hermogenes after reading poetry, where many irregularities occur. One should warn the student specifically to look out for them. The section concludes by giving Geometres' view that careful attention paid to ἑλληνισμός⁵ will be a distinct aid not only to the other three elements of Narrative but also in the application of Hermogenes' Forms.⁶

1. 2.229.14 W.

2. 2.230.10 W: ἡ ταυτολογία αὕτη δὲ οὐ συντομία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ σαφηνεία πολλάκις ἐναντιοῦται. The source of these observations is the Seguerianus, 365.21 ff.

3. ἀρχὴ λέξεως, *Rhet.* Γ 5.1, 1407a19. APHTHONIUS, 3.3. THEON has only the standard three, 79.20; also DIONYSIUS, *Demosih.* 205.13; et al. NICOLAUS, 14.4, gives συντομία, σαφηνεία, πιθανότης, ἡδονή, μεγαλοπρέπεια (the last two supplied by Aristotle's contemporary Theodectes. QUINTILIAN, 4.2.63). Felten brackets the sixth, [ὁ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑλληνισμός]. See pp. 86-87, 128, 142.

4. 2.240.6-241.13 W. JOHN OF SARDES, 30.7.

5. Doxapatres knows the division, ἀττικόν - ἑλληνικόν - κοινόν, in which ἑλληνικόν traditionally occupied the middle ground. On the whole, the term is eliminated early, i.e., in late antiquity. Byzantium satisfied herself with the simpler contrast, ἀττικόν - κοινόν, perhaps in part because of the implicit reference to paganism in ἑλληνισμός, but also because Atticism was the standard of the Second Sophistic, to which she fell heir. On the later history of these terms see G. BÖHLIG, *Untersuchungen zum rhetorischen Sprachgebrauch der Byzantiner*, Berlin 1956, 3 ff.

6. 2.241.1 W.

The review in the preceding pages of the rhetorical scholia has shown that obscurity becomes established as a definite literary standard in the tenth and eleventh centuries by men such as Geometres and Siceliotes, who are moved by religious inspiration. The conception continues to affect Byzantine writing as well as rhetorical theory in the succeeding period. A sharpened awareness of its features and its possibilities is evident even among late Byzantine scholars. Their interests lie more with pagan than with Christian learning, but their interpretation of Hermogenes is similarly marked by the exaggerated definition of his prescriptions which characterizes their more pious predecessors. So it is with Chumnus and Metochites in the fourteenth century; so too with Pletho, who reports four virtues of style, clarity, conciseness, persuasiveness, and grandeur. He is of course excluding, he says, "figured topics and imitative forms of composition, written by authors deliberately obscure or verbose, for in these cases the vice of discourse becomes a virtue."¹ To be sure, Pletho is echoing Hermogenes, but his categorical statement shows that he too has moved somewhat beyond him and regards obscurity as a classification of style and a virtue with definite rules.

In sum, three lines of approach are evident in the Greek tradition regarding obscurity. The first maintains the necessity for the clear exposition of one's thoughts and records the grammatical habits which contribute to or detract from its attainment. The second recognizes the existence of special types of discourse, whether specific genres such as figured topics or various tropical techniques such as emphasis, metaphor, or allegory, which admit the positive value of obscurity designed for and contributing to a given purpose. It is not, however, a sufficient explanation to say that in the first instance we are dealing simply with form and in the second with content, or to grant that the tropical forms must themselves be "clearly" presented according to careful linguistic rules. There is on one level an irreconcilable conflict between Geometres' warning to avoid excessive numbers of words because they make for obscurity and his feeling that obscurity is a virtue, both expressed within a few lines of one another.² In the one the grammarian speaks; in the other

1. *Συντομή περί τινων μερῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς*, 6.587.4-9 W: ἐρμηνείας ἦτοι φράσεως λόγου τέσσαρες ἀρεταί, ἄνευ λέγω τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων καὶ αἰνιγματωδῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν κατὰ μίμησιν γεγραμμένων, ἀσαφογράφων τινῶν ἢ μακρογόρων· ἐν τοῖς γὰρ ἀρετῇ γίγνεται ἢ τοῦ λόγου κακία. By λόγοι κατὰ μίμησιν γεγραμμένοι he appears to have in mind types of emphasis. See p. 198.

2. For the existence of the two traditions already in the sixth century see pp. 112-114.

the theologian. The immediate explanation is simply that our rhetorical scholia are regularly stitched together from more than one source and that the joints are often painfully visible, with no attempt on the part of the author to produce a smooth and unified fabric of thought. Yet this is not to deny the scholiast his private vision, which emerges on another level, above the traditional requirements of composition, and colors his over-all view of the function of discourse. Style can be manipulated to serve the function of content; indeed, it may reflect that function and in its way contribute to it. Herein lies the third line of approach, the most original and rewarding, and the distinctive Byzantine contribution. Borrowing selectively from the rhetorical tradition to which she fell heir, Byzantium enlarges and enriches its meaning through the leaven of her own theological and mystical purpose so as to guide the expression of some of the unique features of her life and thought. We shall be concerned in the next chapter with some of the trends in the historical process by which this transformation took place.

Before doing so, however, it may be fitting to conclude our discussion with a few remarks regarding the role which the issue of clarity versus obscurity played in another period of European literature. Croll discusses the Stoic contribution to a cult of "significant darkness" in antiquity for which the prose of Tacitus is the prime example and which, apart from Stoicism, is also enshrined in such authors as Persius and Tertullian. The seventeenth century was host to an anti-Ciceronian movement in style which likewise showed a distinct Stoic image and which expressed itself in the celebration of Tacitus as the *prince des ténèbres* and saw his style imitated by such literary lights as John Donne, Bacon, and Montaigne.¹ The Dutch scholar, Justus Lipsius, famous for his edition of Tacitus, may have been helped in his choice of subject by one of the outstanding French humanists of the day, Marc-Antoine Muret, who in one of his orations hints at the opinion that obscurity is a virtue of style.² Elsewhere, Muret has this to say:

"For although a bare and clear style gives pleasure, still in

1. Pp. 86-87. On the Stoicism of the Renaissance see CROLL's bibliography, 74, note 36.

2. CROLL, 150. The date of the first of Lipsius' editions of Tacitus is 1574; the date of Muret's oration, 1572-73. Lipsius visited Muret in 1568. On these figures consult J. E. SANDYS, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, vol. 2, Cambridge 1908, s.p.

certain kinds of writing obscurity wins praise sometimes. By diverting discourse from common and vulgar modes of expression, it wins a dignity and majesty even out of strangeness and grips the reader's attention. It acts as a veil, to exclude the view of the vulgar. Those who enter the dark crypt of a temple feel a kind of awful solemnity sweep in upon their souls."¹

Obscurity has also a political dimension. The keenest awareness of it in Byzantium occurs between the ninth and eleventh centuries, the time of her greatest military expansion and political prosperity, the period when her ecumenical vision is most fully formed. In English history Croll observes, "Bacon's greatest service to English prose was that he naturalized a style in which ingenious obscurity and acute significance are the appropriate garb of the mysteries of empire."² There is a curious connection between obscurity and the imperial idea, between, that is to say, the somber and the grand.³

1. Quoted by CROLL, 153, who also points to Muret's statement that the Greeks recognized obscurity as one of the virtues of Thucydides and who sees in Muret's remarks the theoretical base of some of the prose of Pascal. One of many equivalents in the realm of art are the dark canvases of El Greco. See p. 98, note 3, *infra*.

2. P. 135.

3. Appropriateness (Latin *decorum*, Greek *πρέπον*) also comes into play here. Appropriateness and conciseness (*συνομιλία*, specified as a virtue of style by the second-century B.C. Stoic, Diogenes of Babylon (see D'ALTON, 163), as against Aristotle, who considered it an excess, *Rhet.* I 12.6, 1414a26) are two fundamental Stoic principles of style. See note 1, p. 41, *supra*. In their tendency to apply *τὸ πρέπον* too widely so as to reflect a whole gamut of human interrelationships and interacting cosmic processes the Stoics supported a complexity coinciding with their view of a harmonious world order. This line of thought is in keeping with the Stoic contribution to the political theory of the Roman *imperium*, by which Roman hegemony over the *orbis terrarum* could be justified as an instrument and terrestrial expression of the divine pattern. Further, by adopting techniques of epigrammatic brevity in order to express appropriateness they gave voice to the neat tensions which in their estimation characterized the vital force of the world. Yet at the same time obscurity was provided with a second base of support. See D'ALTON, 115 ff. CROLL, 86, makes a good case for the proposition that the Stoics «cultivate clearness not for its own merits but as a wise corrective to the other qualities of Stoic prose, brevity and appropriateness, which they love better.» The younger Seneca's call for a «natural» style is a good manifestation of this over-all Stoic tendency. See F.I. MERCHANT, «Seneca the Philosopher and his Theory of Style,» *American Journal of Philology* 26 (1905) 44-59; C.N. SMILEY, *Latinitas and Ἑλληνισμός. The Influence of the Stoic Theory of Style as Shown in the Writings of Dionysius, Quintilian, Pliny the Younger, Tacitus, Fronto, Aulus Gellius, and Sextus Empiricus. Bulletin of*

The dominant influence in English literary criticism in the eighteenth century was 'Longinus', following the reawakening of interest in the text as a result of Boileau's French translation in 1674.¹ One could find in 'Longinus' support for both clarity and obscurity. Boileau, in reaction to the preciousness of mid-seventeenth century writing, believed in clarity as a cardinal virtue and insisted on simplicity of style in the service of the sublime, which he thus tended to divorce from rhetoric.² At the other pole stands Edmund Burke, who can say, "A clear idea is another name for a little idea."³ For Burke it is the terrible aspects of nature that show the greatness of the Creator and the inscrutability of His ways. Monk notices that sublimity for Burke consists of seven things: obscurity, power (i.e., fear before superior force), privation (darkness, silence), vastness (height, depth, length), infinity, difficulty, and magnificence.⁴ The key

the University of Wisconsin No. 148. *Philology and Literature Series*, vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 205-272, Madison 1906. See pp. 153, 172.

1. *Traité du sublime ou du merveilleux dans le discours traduit du grec de Longin*, Paris. For the limited English knowledge of the treatise before Boileau see S.H. MONK, *The Sublime. A Study of Critical Theories in XVIII-Century England*, New York 1935 and, in general, A. ROSENBERG, *Longinus in England bis zur Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin 1917; T.R. HENN, *Longinus and English Criticism*, Cambridge 1934; J. BRODY, *Boileau and Longinus*, Geneva 1958; RUSSELL, xlii ff.; BORINSKI, 178 ff.

2. MONK, op. cit., 32; BRODY, op. cit., 88 ff.; RUSSELL, xlii. A steady theme, starting with Boileau, is the noble simplicity of the quotation from *Genesis* (1:3 and 9: «Let there be light and there was light--- let there be earth and there was earth») given in 'LONGINUS', 119.14-15.

3. *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*, London, first edition 1757, second edition 1759, Sect. 2.4. Burke's view is based in part on the Longinian sentiment that «by some natural instinct we admire, surely not the small streams, clear and useful as they are, but the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, and far above all, the sea»: φυσικῶς πως ἀγόμενα μὲν Δι' οὐ τὰ μικρὰ βεῖθερα θαυμάζομεν, εἰ καὶ διαυγῆ καὶ χρήσιμα, ἀλλὰ τὸν Νεῖλον καὶ Ἰστρον ἢ Πῆγον πολὺ δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸν Ὀκεανόν, 161.22. HENN, op. cit., 119 ff., calls attention to Burke's eulogy of John Milton on this basis. On Burke see also MONK, op. cit., 84-100, and on Romantic literary ideals in general consult M. H. ABRAMS, *The Mirror and the Lamp. Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*, Oxford 1953.

4. Op. cit., 93. We need not belabor the obvious connection of these items with the elements in Hermogenes' Dignity and Amplitude. What has, however, received very little notice in discussions of 'Longinus' in England is the fact that some of the ideas in the treatise were already inculcated among English men of letters through their schooling, for Hermogenes formed a part of the curriculum from the sixteenth century on. See M.L. CLARKE, *Classical Education in Britain 1500-1900*, Cambridge 1959, 31-32, 61; also PATTERSON's book (see Bibliography).

For the relation between literature and the other arts in the matter of obscurity,

as far as Burke is concerned is emotion, and one can see a connecting thread linking him with the subjective theory of aesthetics propounded by Immanuel Kant and the standards that later affect Wordsworth, Scott, Byron, and Keats. In the course of the century 'Longinus' proved useful to both Ancients and Moderns, though he ended it by becoming the patron saint of the unclassical and romantic. There is an element of Apollo in Boileau's vision as there is of Dionysus in Burke's. In reality, of course, mankind responds to both.

Obscurity has enjoyed an appeal in all ages for it answers to something fundamental in the psychic make-up of man. It is identified and used by philosophers and critics alike, by schoolmasters and churchmen, by writers and thinkers of every stamp, its definition remarkably consistent, varying only in respect to the cultural particulars of an age. It is a feature of the poetry and scholarship of Hellenistic Alexandria, it underlies some of the ancient quarrel between Asianists and Atticists, it is a vital factor in the literature of religion, wherever found, and in the mid-twentieth century, as any reader can attest, it continues to offer its fascination and to take its toll.

Our theme, however, is Byzantium. If the inherited rhetorical knowledge supplied her with the tactics and technique for her literary endeavors an even surer foundation lay in her own religious vision. In the literature of the Church Byzantine thought found room for both clarity and obscurity, striving for a relation between them which identified her with God's historical plan and gave expression to her deepest spiritual instincts. It is a literature that, whatever its form, shows the profound knowledge of Scripture which informed the religious life of the Byzantine subject. The patterns of imagery by which poets hymned and exegetes interpreted the events of the Bible were part of his cultural inheritance. The connection between the Old and the New Testament was a cornerstone in the understanding of Scripture, resting on the principle that the Bible was a unity and that every part of it spoke of Christ.¹ This view of the centrality of the figure of Jesus found illustration as well on the walls of Byzantine churches, which exhibited side by side the Old Testament ver-

including the development of such features as *chiaroscuro*, as well as the conception of the obscure in Western mediaeval and in German and other literatures the important study by BORINSKI (see Bibliography) should be consulted *passim*, especially vol. 1, 42,99, and vol. 2, 54 ff.

1. See G. W. H. LAMPE, «The Reasonableness of Typology,» in *Essays on Typology. Studies in Biblical Theology. No. 22*, London 1957, 9-14.

sion and its fulfillment in the New. The events of the Hebrew Scriptures were real and immediate to the beholder, yet at the same time veiled fore-shadowings of the clear and revealed light of the New Testament story. Together the two accounts formed a single witness of the message of the Gospel. Thus the New Testament and the new Christian age which it introduced were, as an indispensable part of their definition, patently reflected in and reinforced by the obscurity of Old Testament prefiguration. Here, then, the two conceptions are twinned and find high justification within Byzantium's religious heritage.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE COMMENTATORS ON ARISTOTLE'S *CATEGORIES* AND ON PORPHYRY'S *ISAGOGE*

Among the works edited in the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* are a number of analyses of the *Categories*, Aristotle's basic treatise on formal logic, as well as commentaries on Porphyry's introduction to philosophy, the *Isagoge*, which is concerned with basic philosophical principles. Those which concern us belong to the fifth/sixth century and are the product of the Alexandrian school of Neoplatonism. The authors are Ammonius, son of Hermias; his students, John Philoponus and Olympiodorus; and Olympiodorus' students, Elias and David. To this list we may add Simplicius, who attended Ammonius' lectures before emigrating to Athens.¹ We are dealing with a common tradition of exegesis.² The standard arrangement is several pages of prolegomena, in which the author lays out his purpose and defines his terms, followed by extensive scholia on individual passages. The commentators consistently make the claim that they are clearing up obscurities in the text. Hence the term ἀσάφεια appears often in their pages. Our interest, however, lies not here but in their analysis of what they regard as Aristotle's deliberate use of obscurity as a quality of style designed with a specific end in view. We have therefore to examine in some detail what they say.

1. The initial reference to these authors will give the volume and fascicle of the *CAG*. Later references limit themselves to the page and line number of the edition. On the authors consult *RE-PW*; ÜBERWEG - PRAECHTER; *CHLGP*; WESTERINK, *Anon.*, pp. xi-lii; R. VANCOURT, *Les derniers commentateurs alexandrins d'Aristote. L'école d'Olympiodore. Etienne d'Alexandrie. Mémoires et travaux des facultés catholiques de Lille*, Lille 1941.

2. The immediate source is a lost work, called *Συναγωγή*, by Proclus, the fifth-century Athenian Neoplatonist. Reference to it is made by ELIAS, *In Cat.*, *CAG* 18.1 ed. A. BUSSE, 1900, 107.24-26.

Ammonius.

Ammonius proposes in his Introduction to the *Categories* to deal with ten questions having to do with Aristotle's works. Question VI considers the qualifications of the ideal student; Question VII seeks to define Aristotle's style; VIII asks why Aristotle deliberately cultivated obscurity; and Question X concerns the ideal teacher.¹

The students must be of good moral character and pure of soul for, as Plato said, it is not right that the impure should lay hands on what is pure.² He must know his material well, be an intelligent man, and always aim for the truth.³

Aristotle's style is superior. His more technical works present complex and involved thoughts in an easy style, while those meant for a wider public are cast in the form of a dialogue. These are more decorative and make an attempt to adjust the style to the speakers. Here the philosopher does not shy away from metaphorical expression or more elaborate phraseology.⁴ Aristotle's *Letters*,⁵ on the other hand, are successful examples of the epistolary style, brief, clear, and free from complex turns of expression.

If we ask why he fastened on obscure methods in some of his works we shall say that just as in temples priests use curtains or screens so that the mass of the uninitiated may not come into contact with what is forbidden, so Aristotle uses obscurity as a kind of cover for his philosophy.

1. In *Cat.*, CAG 4.4 ed. A. BUSSE, 1895, 1.8-12: ἔστιν πῶς δεῖ παρασκευάσασθαι τὸν ἀκροασόμενον φιλοσόφων λόγων, ἔβδομον τί τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀπαγγελίας, ὧς δὲ διὰ τί φαίνεται ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀσάφειαν ἐπιτηδεύσας---δέκατον ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἐξηγούμενον αὐτά. On Ammonius see VANCOURT, op. cit., 3-5.

2. 6.23: πεπαιδευμένον τὰ ἥθη εἶναι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κεκαθαυμένον· μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαρῷ ἐφάπτεσθαι οὐχὶ θεμιτὸν ὁ Πλάτων εἶπεν (Phaedo 67b: μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαρῷ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ).

The Greek terms throughout our texts are ἀκροατής and ἐξηγητής. In view of the fact that we are, except in the case of Simplicius (see WESTERINK, *Anon.*, p. xxvi), dealing with classroom productions, they refer to teacher and student.

3. 8.12 ff.

4. 6.25 ff.

5. A collection apparently first compiled in the first century B. C. The ancient notices are collected and discussed in the Paris Firmin Didot edition of Aristotle's works, vol. 4, 1857, 324-331. ÜBERWER-PRAECHTER, 101*. See P. MORAUX, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Louvain, 1951, 133-144, who regards much of the collection as genuine.

In this way serious students may invigorate their soul, while the lazy and frivolous will be repelled by the obscurity.¹

Simplicius.

Simplicius assigns himself the same task as Ammonius, with small variations. The order of the questions changes: VI concerns the nature of Aristotle's writings, by which he means both style and content; VII the reasons for obscurity; and VIII and IX the qualities which the teacher and student must possess.² His comments are fuller than his predecessor's. He admires the terseness and vigor of the Aristotelian analytical style and he demands that the teacher know his author thoroughly, be objective, and accept nothing uncritically. The student must be a good

1. 7.7-14: ὧς δὲ διὰ τί ποτε τοιαύτην ἀσάφην διδασκαλίαν ἡγάπησεν ὁ φιλόσοφος καὶ λέγομεν ὅτι καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς κέχρηται παραπετάσμασι τισὶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ πάντας ἤδη καὶ τοὺς βεβήλους ἐντυγχάνειν τοῖς ὧν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄξιοι τυχεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης προκαλύμματα τῆς αὐτοῦ φιλοσοφίας κέχρηται τῇ ἀσάφει, ἵνα οἱ μὲν σπουδαῖοι δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔτι μᾶλλον τὰς ἐαυτῶν συντείνωσι ψυχάς, οἱ δὲ κατεββαθυμένοι τε καὶ χαῦνοι τοῖς τοιούτοις προσβύοντες λόγοις ὑπὸ τῆς ἀσάφειας διώκωνται.

The image of the παραπέτασμα (or καταπέτασμα or προκαλύμμα) is exceedingly common. The *locus classicus* is PLATO, *Protagoras* 316d ff., where the sophist speaks of the use of poetry, music, religious rites, and even gymnastics, as screens employed in order to avoid the popular disapproval incurred by those who practice sophistry outright. Clement of Alexandria, the fifth book of whose *Stromateis* discusses religious obscurity as seen in Egyptian, Hebraic, Pythagorean, and other practices, notes, 5.4.3: τῆς ἐπικρύψεως τὸν τρόπον θεῖον ὄντα---ἐν τῷ ἄδύτῳ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποκείμενον---Ἑβραῖοι διὰ τοῦ παραπετάματος ἠνίξαντο; also sect. 24; et al. Cf. *I Cor.* 2:7, 10; SALLUSTIUS, ch. 3; in Christian mysticism, GREG. NYSS., *C. Eunom.* 1.19 JAEGER (PG 45,253B); Ps.-DIONYS., Ep. 9, PG 3, 1108AB; also OLYMPIODORUS, *In Gorg.* 239.15 WESTERINK. Psellus knows the tradition well, through his Neoplatonic sources: Letter 174, *Mes. Bibl.*, vol. 5, 441 SATHAS; τὸ φιλόσοφον χρῆμα ἢ ἐχέμυθον πάντη καὶ μυστηριώδες ἢ καὶ συμβολικὸν καὶ ὑπὸ φαύλοις παραπετάσμασι τε καὶ σχήμασι τὰ τῆς σοφίας κρύπτον ἀπόρητα. διὰ ταῦτα τοῖς ἀρχαίοις φιλοσόφοις θεολογοῦσι, πατέρες καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ νοῖ τριαδικαί τε ἱυγες καὶ τελετάρχαι καὶ νοσηγοὶ τῷ λόγῳ παρέλαμβάνοντο. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἄρα παρηγόμησεν ἐς τὴν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων ἀφέντος προύστησά τοι τὴν ἀσάφειαν; Letter 188, p. 479: Ὁμηρὸς ποιητὴς ὧν καὶ ὑπὸ παραπετάσματι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων φιλοσοφῶν; Letters 172 and 207, pp. 442, 511; *Encom. Ital.*, *Scripta Minora* ed. E. KURTZ, vol. 1, Milan 1936, 50.16: τελεστικῶς ὑπὸ παραπετάσματι τὰ ἀρήρητα κρύπτοντες; *In Inscript. Psalm.*, 391.68-72, where the opposite of σαφῶς is κρυφίως καὶ συγκεκαλυμμένως. For the Homeric background to the concealment of the divine we may recall the poet's habit of enveloping his deities in a mist from which they issue for their appearance before mankind. See pp. 85, 117, 155.

2. In *Cat.*, CAG 8 ed. C. KALBFLEISCH, 1907, 3.20 ff. On Simplicius see K. PRAECHTER in *RE-PW*.

man, serious of purpose. He must devote much time and effort to understanding the text, and he must not fall victim to contentiousness or garrulity, as many Aristotelian scholars are wont to do.

Aristotle's use of language is admirable. He can often express in a few syllables what others need many sentences to say. When clarity especially is called for, he more than meets the challenge. This is particularly evident in the *Letters*, where the combination of clarity and grace which the epistolary style requires raises him above his peers.

Aristotle did not employ myths or symbolic language, as others before him, but preferred obscurity to other forms of "curtain." The ancients believed that even makers of shields should not broadcast their skill but should describe it in myths and symbols. For similar reasons the inner sancta of temples are concealed from view by the use of curtains. Aristotle may not have liked the indefiniteness of myths or the allusiveness of symbolic speech (though there may be other reasons) and chose obscurity because it gave more play to the intellect.¹ He at any rate achieved his purpose of keeping the indolent and indifferent at a distance.

Further discussion of Aristotle's obscurity appears in Simplicius' Introduction to the *Physics*. Here we find again the standard observation that the more technical works (of which the *Physics* is one) were purposely written in obscure language in order to discourage the casual reader.² Simplicius then quotes from an exchange of letters between Aristotle and Alexander the Great. Alexander had protested the publication of such works. His objection was that, now that the education he had received from his teacher was public knowledge, there was nothing to distinguish him from anyone else. Aristotle's reply is that he has both published them and not, since they would in any case be intelligible only to those who had attended his lectures.³

1. 6.30 ff.: οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μύθοις οὐδὲ συμβολικοῖς αἰνίγμασιν, ὥς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τινες, Ἀριστοτέλης ἐχρήσατο, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ παντὸς ἄλλου παραπετάσματος τὴν ἀσάφειαν προετίμησεν. --- ἴσως μὲν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον τῶν μύθων καὶ τῶν συμβόλων ὑπὸ νοίαν παραιτησάμενος (ῥαδίως γὰρ ἄλλος ἄλλως ἐκδέχεται δύναται τὰ τοιαῦτα), ἴσως δὲ καὶ γυμναστικωτέραν εἰς ἀγγέλιον ὑπολαμβάνων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀσάφειαν.

2. *CAG* 9 ed. H. DIELS, 1892, 8.19.

3. 8.26 ff.: ἔγραψάς μοι περὶ τῶν ἀκροατικῶν λόγων, οἷός μοι δεῖν αὐτοὺς φυλάττειν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις. ἴσθι οὖν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκδεδομένους καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένους. συνετοὶ γὰρ εἰσι μόνοις τοῖς ἡμῶν ἀκούσασιν.

John Philoponus.

Philoponus, the Christian Neoplatonist and student of Ammonius, gives us a somewhat expanded though basically similar version regarding the same Questions. However, he adopts a more independent vocabulary and his remarks show him to be more interested in moral questions, an impulse that we may perhaps ascribe to his Christian convictions. Question VI in his scheme has to do with style; Question VII with obscurity; VIII with the student; and IX with the teacher.¹

The student must be a just man, intelligent, serious of purpose, modest and humble. The teacher must be impartial and must first explicate the text before giving his own opinions.

Aristotle's style is precise; he avoids embellishment and is concerned only with the facts. He is often compressed and obscure,² his purpose being to turn away the frivolous from the start and to make the rest more earnest in the pursuit of his philosophy. He used obscurity, that is to say, as a curtain with which he cloaked the solemnity of his subject matter.

Olympiodorus.

Ammonius' other student, Olympiodorus, is more in line with his teacher. His remarks, however, are fuller, though the order of the Questions again varies. VI deals with the ideal student; VII with the ideal teacher; VIII with the matter of obscurity; and IX with Aristotle's style.³

The student must be prudent, keen of wit, with gracious affections and purity of soul. We are then given three Platonic quotations, plus a

1. In *Cat.*, *CAG* 13.1 ed. A. BUSSE, 1898, 1.12 ff. On Philoponus see the full article by W. KROLL in *RE-PW* s.v. Ioannes (No. 21).

2. 6.17 ff.: ἀκριβὲς κατὰ τὴν φράσιν (ἐκφεύγει γὰρ αἰὲν ὁ φιλόσοφος τὰς ῥητορικὰς κομψείας) --- συνεσφιγμένον καὶ ἀσαφῶς πεφρασμένον. Philoponus is giving an explanation of Aristotle's obscurity not in terms of subject matter but in terms of style: it is owed to compression.

A passage in his commentary on the *De Anima* (*CAG* 15 ed. M. HAYDUCK, 1897, 376.29 ff.) may be an echo from Hermogenes: οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ποιητικοῖς λόγοις θεωρεῖται τὸ μέτρον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς. οἱ γοῦν περὶ ἰδέας λόγου γεγραφότες παραδεδόκασι ποῖοι καὶ πόσας παραλαμβάνοντες πρὸς τὸ ῥητορικὸν κῶλον εὖ τοῦτο ἀπεργάζονται. Philoponus would certainly know the rhetorician, though the term ἰδέα λόγου may be of general application.

3. *Prol.*, *CAG* 12.1 ed. A. BUSSE, 1903, 1.20 ff. On Olympiodorus see WESTERINK, *Anon.*, pp. xiii-xx; R. BEUTLER in *RE-PW*; VANCOURT, op. cit., 1-7 and *passim*.

line from Hippocrates, all of which urge the pursuit of truth above all else.¹ The student must apply his efforts in accordance with Plato's tripartite division of the soul, letting intellect guide his spirit and appetites, and must practice the four cardinal virtues.² The teacher must be able to explain the truth in clear terms, distinguish it from falsehood, and remain impartial at all times.

Aristotle did not use one style alone. He talked about many things and adjusted his style accordingly. In his *Letters* he is brief and compact, familiar and at the same time distinctive, as befits a letter-writer. A letter is after all a conversation with an absent party. Since we use a simple style when addressing one another face to face, a letter must do the same. However, the writing must also have a certain polish so as not to lapse into vulgarity.³

In his historical works (e.g., *Historia Animalium*) Aristotle is clear, expository, and articulate. In his dialogues he avails himself of various embellishments. His technical treatises (e.g., *Ethics*, *Topics*, *Metaphysics*) are concise and clear in their definitions. They avoid poetical language and display a natural rhythm which has made them an ideal of later generations. In his "exoteric" works,⁴ on the other hand, he employs a decorative style.

Obscurity is not natural to Aristotle; he used it for a purpose. He wished to put students to the test, challenging the serious and discouraging the lazy. Indeed, Plato for similar reasons recommended trial of the young before they entered upon the study of philosophy. He said we

1. *Phaedo* 67b (quoted note 2, p. 102) and 91c: Σωκράτους μὲν ὀλίγον φροντιστέον, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ; *I Alcib.* 114e: εἰ μὴ σὺ σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ἀκούσης, μηδενὶ ἄλλω λέγοντι πιστεύσης; *Aphor.* 2.10: τὰ μὴ καθαρὰ τῶν σωμάτων ὁκόσῳ ἂν θρέψης μᾶλλον βλάψει.

2. 10.12 ff.

3. The theory of epistolography here outlined is the standard for late antiquity and for the Byzantine age. For the parallels, pagan and Christian, see pp. 44ff. Olympiodorus shows that these same values passed into Neoplatonism as well, affecting the analysis of Aristotle's *Letters*: 11.7-13: ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πυκνὸς ἐστὶ καὶ σύντομος, κοινὸς τε ἅμα καὶ ἴδιος· τοιοῦτον γὰρ δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστέλλοντα· κοινὸν μὲν, διότι ἡ ἐπιστολὴ ἐντευξὶς ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀπόντας, καὶ ὥσπερ (πρὸς) τοὺς παρόντας ταῖς ἐντευξέσιν κοινῶς διαλεγόμεθα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐντευξέας τῶν ἀπόντων, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰς ἐπιστολάς, κοινὴν ποιείσθαι τὴν ἐντευξίν. ἴδιον δὲ χρὴ πάλιν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστέλλοντα ἵνα μὴ λάθωμεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς ἔννοιαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἐμπίπτοντες.

4. Presumably popular treatises not in dialogue form, since at 7.7 *διαλογικά* and *ἐξωτερικά* are equated. For the classification of Aristotle's writings in these texts see WESTERINK, *Anon.*, p. xxvi.

should first make them drunk so that they might declare what lay hidden in their souls.¹ Pythagoras did likewise: he asked his disciples by day the dreams they had seen during the night, wishing to divine the movement of their souls.² Plato's technique is better: we can falsely add to or subtract from the experience of our dreams, but when we are drunk and not in control of ourselves we tell fearlessly what is in our hearts. Poets veil their thoughts in myths since they do not wish to make divine matters clear to all. Surely Cronus did not literally swallow his children or Zeus become a swan. If we punish men for actions such as Cronus', why do we refer these same actions to the gods? The minds of children are impressionable. Hence we are indebted to the poets, for no one could believe their wilder stories as they stand.³ Priests use curtains for the same purpose, to keep the mysteries from being clear and known to all. An Orphic poet says, "I sing to those who know. Close the doors to the profane."⁴ This is why Apollo too spoke ambiguously (λοξῶς) in his oracle and is called Loxias. In short, what ambiguity is to Apollo, curtains to priests, dreams to Pythagoras, and drunkenness to Plato, obscurity is to Aristotle.

1. This is not in Plato, though the inspiration for the sentiment derives from the claim of the drunken Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, 212e, to speak the truth. Cf. 217d: οἶνος ἄνευ τε παίδων καὶ μετὰ παίδων ἦν ἀληθής, which may be a conflation of two proverbs, one that there is truth in wine, the other in children.

2. This reference should be added to the very numerous ancient and mediaeval notices regarding Pythagoras' mystical habits. Of particular interest are the tradition that Pythagoras enjoined five years of silence upon his disciples before admitting them as full-fledged members of his community, and the habit in Pythagorean circles of speaking obscurely and symbolically. A list of texts is given by CASEL, 51ff. and E. ZELLER, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. 1.17, Leipzig 1923, 400, note 2. See also BIELER, 99ff. and note the Neoplatonic refinement, ΠΟΡΦΥΡΥ, *De abstin.* 2. 34, that the highest God must be honored in silence and only the lesser, the ἑργονοιοὶ or νοητοὶ θεοί, with hymns. See pp. 73, 169 *infra*.

3. 12.4 ff.: διὸ καὶ δέος ἐστὶ μὴ ποτε αἱ τῶν νέων ψυχὰι ἀπαλώταται οὔσαι παραδέξονται ὡς ἀληθῆ. δυσμετακινήτως γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ νέοι πρὸς ταῦτα. ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς τερατωδεστέροις τῶν ποιητῶν χάριν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἵνα διὰ τῆς υπερβαλλούσης ἀπιστίας μηδεὶς τοῖς λεγομένοις πιστεύσειεν. The Laurentian MS. of Ammonius repeats this notice (*In Cat.*, 7.14).

4. 12.11 (fr. 334 KERN): αἰδῶ συνειπεῖν, θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε βεβήλοις (CAG misprints βεβλήλοις). Cf. PINDAR, *O.* 2.85: φωνάεντα ξυνειπεῖν; BACCHYL. 3.85; HORACE, *Odes* 3.1.1-2; et al. The textual tradition of this commonly quoted line varies between βεβήλοι (e.g., LUCIAN, *De Sacr.* 14) and βεβήλοις. See note 1, p. 169, and cf. *Matth.* 13:11-13: ὅτι ὑμῖν δέδοται γινῶναι τὰ μυστήρια τῆς βασιλείας, ἐκεῖνας δὲ οὐ δέδοται. --- διὰ τοῦτο ἐν παραβολαῖς αὐτοῖς λαλῶ, ὅτι βλέποντες οὐ βλέπουσιν καὶ ἀκούοντες οὐκ ἀκούουσιν οὐδὲ συνίουσιν. See also pp. 150-151, 170.

Elias.

Olympiodorus' Christian disciple, Elias,¹ gives us the fullest and most systematic treatment of all the commentators who address themselves to the question of obscurity. In his *Prolegomena to Philosophy* he takes up the meaning of the term φιλοσοφία. His remarks form part of a tradition of comment which appears also in Ammonius' prooemium to Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Both authors rely on Pythagorean sources for their explanation. Elias' statement, however, takes on an even more mystical and religious turn. Pythagoras, we are told, limited the appellation of philosopher to those who know the immaterial world. The divine is clear to them though obscure to us because we are unpracticed in its ways, like bats exposed to the sunlight.²

In Elias' Introduction to the *Categories*, Question VI discusses the ideal student, VII the ideal teacher, VIII Aristotle's style, and IX his obscurity.³ Elias includes additional quotations from Plato and Aris-

1. Full biographical materials in WESTERINK, *Anon.*, pp. xv-xxiii; also his «Elias on the *Prior Analytics*,» *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, 14 (1961) 128; and «Philosophy and Medicine in Antiquity,» *Janus* 51 (1964), 172; VANCOURT, op. cit., 5-6, 12-13.

2. Text of the *Prol. Philos.* in CAG 18.1 ed. A. BUSSE, 1900, 1-34. 24.4-7 (~ AMMONIUS, CAG 4.3, ed. A. BUSSE, 1894, 9.7 ff.): συνέστειλε τὸ τῆς σοφίας ὄνομα ἐπὶ μόνους τοὺς τὰ εὖλα εἰδότες, τοῦτ' ἔστι τοὺς φιλοσόφους· σαφὴ γὰρ καὶ φανὰ τὰ θεῖα αὐτοῖς, εἰ καὶ ἡμῖν ἀσαφὴ διὰ τὴν ἡμῶν ἀνεπιτηδεύτητα, ὥς καὶ τοῖς νυκτερίσιν ὁ ἥλιος. The bat image comes from ARISTOTLE, *Metaphys.* a 1, 993b9-11. WESTERINK, *Anon.*, p. xliii, cites a number of parallels: OLYMPIOD., *In Gorg.* 156.20 WESTERINK; PHILOPON., *In De Anim.* CAG 15 ed. M. HAYDUCK, 1897, 23.34; 271.5; ASCLEP., *In Metaphys.* CAG 6.2 ed. M. HAYDUCK, 1888, 4.32-35; 114.4-7, 31-33; 117.26-28; ELIAS, *Prol. Philos.* 15.28-30; DAVID, *Prol. Philos.* CAG 18.2 ed. A. BUSSE, 1904, 46.20-21; WESTERINK, *Anon.*, 1.8. It appears also in ARETHAS, *Scripta Minora*, 188.13 WESTERINK. C. MITCHAM, «A Non-Aristotelian Simile in *Metaphysics* 2.1,» *Classical Philology* 65 (1970) 44-46, argues that the passage in the *Metaphysics* is spurious because it does not correspond to Aristotle's epistemology. Extensive discussion by W. HAASE, «Ein vermeintliche Aristoteles-Fragment bei Johannes Philoponos,» in *Synusia. Festgabe für W. Schadewaldt* edd. H. FLASHAR and K. GAISER, Pfullingen 1965, 323-354. See also note 2, p. 118.

3. 105.17 ff. Thus no one commentator gives the Questions in the same order. The variations may be arranged schematically as follows:

	AMMONIUS	SIMPLICIUS	PHILOPONUS	OLYMPIODORUS	ELIAS
Style	7	6	6	9	8
Obscurity	8	7	7	8	9
Ideal student	6	9	8	6	6
Ideal teacher	10	8	9	7	7

The variations are to be explained by assuming a continuing process of expansion,

totle along with other new material. However, even when he follows his predecessors there is little textual identity and he presents his points in a fresh and novel way.

The student must be like a well-ordered microcosm. The three Platonic divisions of his soul must be superintended by their respective cardinal virtues: wisdom over intellect, courage over the spirited element, and temperance over appetite. Justice will preside over all in a kind of harmony.¹ The student should prefer truth above all else and he must cultivate it with precision. Otherwise, the uncritical acceptance of a person's character or his words may, when they fall short of our expectations, cause us to disdain men and discussion alike.² The source of understanding is in ourselves. Elias' remarks suggest the Christian preacher seeking to understand the human soul and instruct us about it. He brings a moral commitment to his task and his juxtaposition of character and intellect underlines his sense of the unity of human behavior.

The teacher must be a scholar. In his first capacity he will clarify difficult points; in his second, distinguish truth from falsehood. He must be impartial, unlike Iamblichus, who out of devotion to Plato tried to argue that Aristotle did not really oppose Plato's theory of Ideas. He must know his subject well and seek to explain Aristotle through Aristotle.

Aristotle's style varies according to the subject matter but is always ideally suited to it.³ His *Letters* show a style which is compact, familiar, and at the same time uncommon. This is as it should be, for the epistolary style is similar to that of common speech without at the same time being vulgar. This is why Hermogenes advises us to describe ordinary things in a novel way and novel things in an ordinary way.⁴ Aristotle

abridgement, and rearrangement of lecture notes on the part of both student and professor.

1. 121.22 ff.

2. μισολογία and μισανθρωπία, 122.6; cf. *Phaedo* 89d: γίνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία.

Elias is given throughout to a great many quotations [in support of his views. In this section (Question VI, 121.20-122.24) Plato and Aristotle are frequently cited: *I Alcib.* 114e (quoted note 1, p. 106); *Eth. Nicom.* A 4, 1096a16 (quoted also a few lines later, 122.34, in variant form): φίλος μὲν ὁ ἀνὴρ, φίλη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς· ἀμφοῖν δὲ φίλον ὄντων αἰρετέον μᾶλλον τὸ ἀληθές; also *Rep.* 441c; *Phaedo* 98c and 91c (quoted note 1, p. 106); *Topica* A 11, 105a4.

3. 123.17.

4. The phrase is in PHILOSTRATUS, 2.258.7 KAYSER (quoted note 1, p. 49). It is not in Hermogenes, though *De Meth. Vehem.* 445.18 ff. shows a parallel sentiment.

is also occasionally pungent in his *Letters*. In his historical works he is precise and distinct, as befits this kind of writing. The works meant for a wider public have the virtue of clarity together with much literary charm. The specialized treatises, on the other hand, show an obscurity about them owing in part to his use of ordinary words in a new and technical meaning. There is also another reason. He will sometimes refrain from giving an immediate solution to a problem and will rather add a second or third problem and solve the first by reference to the last. Habitually, too, he will add quotations from authors such as Heracleitus and Empedocles by way of concluding a proof which he has already established.

There are three reasons why Aristotle, whose natural style is clear, used obscurity: 1) for concealment, 2) for scrutiny, and 3) for mental exercise.¹ Elias treats each of these *in extenso*. As to the first, obscurity serves the same function for Aristotle as myths do for poets and curtains for priests. Elias then quotes two Orphic passages, two lines from Callimachus, and a passage from Plato's *Second Letter*.² All have to do with keeping the mysteries hidden from the profane.

The second reason involves the distinction between those fit for philosophy and those not. Aristotle's purpose is to make students understand that philosophy requires diligent application. As Plato says in the *Epinomis*,³ the road is not easy. Notice how eagles determine which are their true offspring. The young are made to face the sun. Those that can do so without blinking are welcomed into the nest; the rest are cast out.⁴ The Celts use the river Rhine to the same end. They put their infants on shields which they then release into the water. Those who survive the current they consider their own; those who perish are not.⁵ The Pytha-

1. 124.32: κρύψεως χάριν ἢ δοκιμασίας ἢ γυμνασίας.

2. The first of the Orphic passages is Olympiodorus' quotation (see note 4, p. 107). The second does not appear in the modern collections of the fragments: 125.3: κακοφραδέων δὲ βεβήλων / οὐατα λαχνηέντα περισκεπέτωσαν ἀράχνη. CALLIMACHUS, *Hymn to Ceres* 3.4: τὸν κάλαθον κατιόντα χαμαὶ δέρισκεθε γυναῖκες, / μὴδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τέγους μὴδ' ὑψόθεν αἰγιάσσησθε. The editor brackets the four lines which follow (125.10-14); they contain a reference to Aristotle's letter to Alexander (see note 3, p. 104) and mention a Pythagorean who met with shipwreck for writing a book purporting to reveal some secrets of the sect. Cf. PLATO, *Second Letter* 312d: ἴσ' εἰ ἡ δέλτος τι πάθη ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάσῃ ὁ ἀναγνούς μὴ γινῶ. See note 3, p. 117.

3. 992a.

4. Originally in ARISTOTLE'S *Historia Animalium* I 34, 620a2 ff.; later, AELIAN, *Nat. Anim.* 2.26; 9.3; PLINY, *Nat. Hist.* 10.3.30; LUCAN, *Bell. Civil.* 9.902-905; et al.

5. Originally in the *Politics* II 17, 1336a18. It subsequently appears in a host

goreans used to ask their novices to declare the content of their dreams. They then chose as disciples those whom they thought suitable. The rest they dismissed with all their belongings. Thereupon they erected a cenotaph and always spoke of them as though dead. Plato had a better method: we can embroider our dreams in the telling, but drunkards do not lie. The obscurity of Apollo's oracles also put men to the test. Croesus, for instance, mistook them; Themistocles did not. We are then given some Delphic sayings by way of example. Of course, Elias points out, such methods contribute also to the third purpose, mental improvement. The section concludes with a short summary of the previous discussion.¹

Elias treats the question of obscurity also as part of his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*. He distinguishes three kinds, which he says Porphyry overcame. One is dark and below the surface, like the writings of Heracleitus. A second results from an excessively diffuse style, as with Galen and Proclus. The third comes from just the opposite, a compressed style, as in the case of Aristotle and Hippocrates.²

of pagan and Christian authors: *Palat. Anth.* 9.25; JULIAN, *Orat.* 3 (2), p. 156.24 and (spurious) Letter 191, p. 247.11 BIDEZ; CLAUDIAN, *In Rufin.* 5.112; NONNUS, *Dionys.* 23.94; 46.54; LIBANIUS, *Orat.* 12.48; GREG. NAZ., *Carm.* 2.2 poem 4, 1.142 (PG 37, 1516); GEORGE PISIDES 1.41 (p. 86 PERTUSI); THEOPHYL. SIMOC., *Epist.* 10, p. 36 BOISSONADE; THEODORE HYRTACENUS, Letters 25 and 37 DE LA PORTE DU THEIL; et al. I thank Professor Ernst Badian for uncovering some of these references.

1. 126.18 ff.

2. 41.30: τρεῖς γὰρ τρόποι εἰσὶν ἀσαφείας, δι' οὓς ἀποκινούσιν οἱ νέοι τοῖς βιβλίοις ἐντυγχάνειν· ἡ γὰρ διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν καὶ ὑποβρύχιον τῶν νοημάτων, ὡς τὰ Ἑρακλείτεια (διὸ καὶ τις τὰ Ἑρακλείτου ἐφη βαθέος δεῖσθαι κολυμβητοῦ), ἡ διὰ τὸ ἐξηπλωμένον τῆς φράσεως ὡς χαλινού δεῖσθαι, ὡς τὰ Γαλήνεια καὶ τὰ Πρόκλεια, ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀπεστενωμένον τῆς φράσεως, ὡς τὰ Ἀριστοτελικά καὶ τὰ Ἱπποκράτεια. An identical note on Heracleitus appears in DOXAPATRES, 2.226.3-5 W. This is also the standard criticism of Galen. Cf. SICELIOTES, 6.197.10 W. The scholiasts on Hermogenes occasionally draw in medical analogies, citing Galen and Hippocrates. Cf., in a medical context, SICELIOTES, 6.92.3 W: ὁ παχὺς τὸ ἥθος ὁμοίους καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀπογεννᾷ καὶ ὁ χαλεπὸς χαρπέντας, and his remark, 6.236.22 W, that HIPPOCRATES' *Aphorisms* are a good example of συντομία; also ANON., *In De Ideis*, 7.894.24 and note, 1085 W. Stylistic judgments on Proclus do not figure in the commentaries. ELIAS notes, 107.5-7, that Aristotle liked συντομία and σύνοψις, becoming in reality a Pythagorean and transforming the silence of Pythagoras into βραχυλογία.

The medical writer, Stephanus of Athens, whose lectures follow some of the same patterns of thought as the school of Olympiodorus, and who may be identical with the philosopher, Stephanus of Alexandria, author *inter alia* of a commentary on the *De Anima* (CAG 15, ed. M. HAYDUCK, 1897, 446-607, s.v. Philoponus) is also aware of Hippocrates' ἀσάφεια, which he describes along similar lines. See *Apol-*

In sum, Elias' views on obscurity show him elaborating distinctions which we find only hinted at by his predecessors, adding to their examples, and quoting freely from ancient authors, including Hermogenes. His quotations do not always agree *verbatim* with our received text. He may be quoting from memory or using sources unknown to us. The two possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and we may perhaps think of materials available to him not only through his teacher, Olympiodorus, but from fellow-students and other commentators. He has, at any rate, used his sources to good purpose. He comes forth as a good illustration of the type of Christian scholar whom we see also in the school at Gaza: not a polemicist or apologist for the Faith but one who, from a Christian background, devotes much of his career to pagan learning.

Further, his two analyses, the one in connection with Porphyry, the other with Aristotle, show that he is the recipient of the two-pronged tradition regarding obscurity that we have outlined in the previous chapter, the first the more purely grammatical or stylistic, echoing the strictures of the handbooks, the second the more abstract, based on a scholarly and religious intent. In the one obscurity is avoided, in the other cultivated. Elias makes no attempt to relate the one to the other, though his reference, when speaking of Porphyry, to Heracleitus and to Aristotle himself, suggests common ground. It is left to David, Olympiodorus' other Christian pupil, to try to view them from one vantage point. In any case, Elias allows us to see within a single author already within the Neo-

Ionii Citiensis, Stephani, Palladii, Theophili, Meletii, Damascii, Ioannis, Aliorum Scholia in Hippocratem et Galenum ed. F.R. DIETZ, Königsberg, vol. 1, 1834, 56-57, 67. On Stephanus and the close connection between philosophy and medicine at the time see WESTERINK, *Anon.*, p. xxv, note 94, and his «Philosophy and Medicine in Late Antiquity», *Janus* 51 (1964) 171, 174-175; VANCOURT, *op. cit.*, 26 ff.; H. USENER, *De Stephano Alexandrino*, Bonn 1879.

A Christian writer of the seventh century, whose lectures on Porphyry's *Isagoge* continue the Alexandrian tradition of Olympiodorus, Elias, and David, adds a remark about the obscurity of «theological writing»: *Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David). Lectures on Porphyry's Isagoge* ed. L. WESTERINK, Amsterdam 1967, 18.26 ff.: γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀσάφεια γενικῶς μὲν κατὰ δύο τρόπους, ἐκ τῆς λέξεως καὶ ἐκ τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ἐκ τῆς λέξεως διχῶς, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν μὲν γίνεται ἀσάφεια ὅταν πλατεῖς καὶ ἀπέραντοι ὑπάρχωσιν οἱ λόγοι· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀσαφεῖ εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα συγγράμματα, ὥσπερ τῶν Γαληνοῦ, καὶ (γὰρ) οὗτος ὀλίγα διὰ πολλῶν συνέγραψεν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πρόκλος. κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποιόν, ὡς ὅταν τις ξένους καὶ περισκελεῖσι χρῆσται βήμασι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἔγραψεν, ὅστις διὰ τοῦτο σκοτεινὸς ἐπεκλήθη, ἐπειδὴ ξένους τισίν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐχρήσατο βήμασιν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς διανοίας γίνεται ἀσάφεια, ὅταν ὑψηλοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι καὶ δυσβάτοις κεχρηται τις, ὥσπερ εἰσὶν οἱ θεολογικοὶ λόγοι.

platonian tradition the kernel which later issues in the actual juxtaposition which we find in the Byzantine scholia on Hermogenes and Aphthonius.

David.

David is the last of the Alexandrian scholars to treat the question of obscurity. The observations appear in his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*. In praising the clarity of the work David avails himself of the opportunity to talk about the opposite condition. His remarks once again vary considerably from those of his predecessors, although the general structure and some of the examples are retained.

Obscurity is a matter of both form and content. Heracleitus exemplifies the latter. The first divides in two: 1) prolixity, 2) quality of expression.¹ Galen, for instance, expresses his thoughts well (i.e., is εὐφραδής) but at too great length. Aristogenes,² on the other hand, fails to give us necessary descriptions or explanations. However, let us look at the masters themselves. Aristotle's thoughts are simple, his phrasing difficult; Plato is the reverse.³ As far as Homer is concerned, if you limit yourself to his simple style you will not appreciate the depths of his thought, except through allegory. This is why Plato refused to recommend Homer to the young: he was afraid they might be seduced by the style into thinking that Homer's thought was the same.⁴ As in the case of the eagles, obscurity is a means of identifying what is genuine. The more a truly devoted

1. CAG 18.2 ed. A. BUSSE, 1904, 105.10 ff.: ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν θεωρημάτων.--- ἀπὸ λέξεως γίνεται διττῶς ἡ ἀσάφεια· ἡ γὰρ διὰ τὸ μῆκος τῆς φράσεως--- ἡ διὰ τὴν ποιότητα τῆς λέξεως. DAVID, 105.11, like Elias (see previous note) speaks of the need of a «deep diver» to fathom Heracleitus. On David see WESTERINK, *Anon.*, pp. xxiii-xxiv and his *Janus* article (see previous note), 173-174; VANCOURT, *op. cit.*, 5-6, 13-15. David's remarks follow generally the Seguerianus, which, however, speaks of πράγματα and λέξεις. The substitution of θεωρημα may perhaps derive from a Neoplatonic classification which, along with the Christian notion of θεωρία as the contemplation of the divine, gives a mystical value to the content of speech, that is, the πρᾶγμα of the rhetoricians, and helps transform expression into a mystical experience. Cf. PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS' phrase, μυστικὰ θεάματα, «hidden objects of contemplation», *De Myst. Theol.* 1, PG 3, 997B. See CHLGP, 469. Θεωρία refers also to the exposition of a text, as, e.g., in OLYMPIODORUS, *In Meteor.* CAG 12.2 ed. W. STUVE, 1900, 18.30.

2. A medical writer of the third century B.C. See the notice in the *Suda* and R. WELLMANN in *RE-PW* s.v.

3. 105.19 ff.

4. Cf. *Rep.* 598d ff.

student encounters obscurity the more he endeavors to overcome it so that he might be acclaimed supreme in learning through his mastery of what is strange and difficult. Pythagoras used the tactic of asking his disciples to recite the content of their dreams, in the belief that our nocturnal phantasies recollect the activities of the day. Plato not only employed obscurity of thought but used to make his students drunk on the theory that wine soothes the soul and disinclines it from falsehood. Plato's method is manifestly superior, although symposia are not really suitable for the cultivation of philosophy. On the other hand, wine disposes us to tell the truth, whereas the recital of dreams is subject to forgetfulness and fancy.

The authors whose views we have reported in the preceding pages reflect a strong and coherent tradition of comment. It remains to consider its sources and its relations with later Byzantine thought. Already in the third century Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Peripatetic source of much of later Neoplatonism, in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* speaks of Aristotle's deliberate obscurity. He uses the same phrase as the texts we have examined: ἐπετήδευσε ἀσάφειαν.¹ The casualness with which he introduces it and his failure to explain what he means suggest that it was a formula common to Aristotelian exegesis, antedating Alexander himself.

Of further interest are the comments of the fourth century philosopher, Themistius, one of the later Peripatetics.² Themistius wrote a number of commentaries on the works of Aristotle, many of which are

1. *CAG* 1 ed. M. HAYDUCK, 1891, 673.36. Alexander touches on the question of obscurity also in connection with Aristotle's treatment of it in the *Topica*, Z1, 139b 12 ff. Improper definition, says Alexander (*CAG* 2.2 *In Topica* ed. M. WALLIES, 1891, 427.4), takes two forms, ἀσάφεια and περιττολογία (~ Aristotle's περίεργον, *Topica* Z 1, 139b17, i.e., using longer expressions than necessary). Cf. also *Topica* E 2, 130a2: τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον ἀσάφες ποιεῖ τὸ ῥηθέν; and E 2, 130a33. Alexander's discussion of the *Topica* then goes on to describe obscurity as produced ἥτοι δι' ὁμωνυμίαν ἢ ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ ἢ ἐν τῷ ὀρίστῳ ἢ διὰ μεταφοράν ἢ διὰ κατάχρησιν (on this last see QUINTILIAN, 8.6.34, who calls it «the practice of adopting the nearest available term to describe something for which no actual term exists, as in the line (*Aeneid* 2.15) *equum divina Palladis arte aedificant*»; that is to say, *aedificant* properly has to do with making a house, not a horse). On the extensive knowledge of the *Topica* in Byzantium see M. WALLIES, *Die griechischen Ausleger der aristotelischen Topik*, Ostern 1891, *passim*.

2. On the question of his philosophical allegiance see W. STEGEMANN, *RE-PW* s.v., coll. 1647-1649.

extant. In his *Twenty-Sixth Address*, which discusses the kind of style philosophers should use,¹ he calls attention to the distinction that Aristotle makes between the kind of words useful in speaking before the common public and those which supply philosophical discourse.² The sick and the hearty, he asserts, are never served the same diet.³ The first kind of language is for those outside the pale (θυραῖοι), the other for those within. The keys for opening or closing the doors are clarity and obscurity. The one kind is more popular; its words are filled with light and achieve their effect with the aid of a pleasant and graceful style. The others are mystical. Aristotle made this distinction, Themistius says, so that the profane might at the same time understand them and not. Hence the philosophical type of discourse is "fenced round" even more than the palace at Ecbatana.⁴ Aristotle also gave us the means of distinguishing the true from the metaphorical.⁵ It is the same with words as it is with men: some men are good and appear so, others appear to be but are not; similarly, some λόγοι appear and are true, others dissemble and deceive.⁶ Hence their fascination (γοητεία), which Aristotle made it

1. Ὑπὲρ τοῦ λέγειν ἢ πῶς τῷ φιλοσόφῳ λεκτέον DINDORF.

2. 385.18 DINDORF.

3. The writer must use a style which will allow him to be understood by the ἀσθενεῖς and ἄπειροι. It is instructive that Themistius has the same example, drawn from the medical quarter, as his Christian contemporary, Chrysostom. See p. 151.

4. 386.2: πλείοσι πεφραγμένοι εἰσι περιβόλοις ἢ τὰ ἐν Ἐκβατάνοις βασιλείᾳ. There is a pun here on περίβολος, «enclosure,» and περιβολή in the rhetorical sense of the full and complex style, the extreme of which makes for obscurity.

5. The general reference is to the *Topica*, Book Z, which treats the question in detail. Themistius views obscurity in relation both to style and to logic, thus in effect combining the *Rhetoric* and the *Topica*. See pp. 63ff.

6. The distinction is reminiscent of Hermogenes' division of the δεινὸς λόγος, 372.24: ὁ μὲν καὶ ἔστι καὶ εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἔστι μὲν, οὐ μὴν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν, δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι. If we add the play on περίβολος, Themistius' language may be inspired by Hermogenes. Hence this may be among the earliest instances of his influence.

The comparison here between λόγος and ἄνθρωπος shows the strong ethical interpretation which Themistius assigns to literature. Cf. also 408.20: οἱ λόγοι δὲ εἰσι καρπὸς ψυχῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ ἐν ταύταις ζητητέον τοὺς τε ἀμείνους καὶ τοὺς χείρους αὐτῶν. Stoic discussions of the subject appear in contexts which treat the relation between φύσις and τέχνη. For an analysis of the Stoic contribution see W. STEGEMANN, *RE-PW* s.v. Phoibammon, col. 331. Cf. also ALEXANDER, *Περὶ Σχημάτων* 11.20-13.20; 'LONGINUS', 163.10 ff.; et al. The connection is related to the rhetorical stress on Ethos as one of the touchstones of criticism. For a Christian equivalent see GREG. NAZ., *Orat.* 25, *In Laudem Heronis Phil.*, PG 35, 1197A, where philosophy relates to moral excellence and is seen as a means whereby man as a

possible for us through the techniques of logic to understand.

Themistius' comments provide useful information regarding Aristotelian studies in his day.¹ Together with Alexander he allows us to establish the Peripatetic origin of the remarks in the Neoplatonic authors regarding Aristotle's obscurity. As with Alexander, Themistius does not give the impression of expounding something new. Rather, the compression and allusiveness of his style suggest that he is reviewing older attitudes. We may recall that the nature of obscurity had been explored in the rhetorical schools by at least the first century B.C., if not earlier. A *terminus post quem* is provided by Andronicus of Rhodes, head of the Peripatos about the year 70 B.C., who inaugurates a new era in Aristotelian studies.² He is apparently the first of the commentators on the *Categories*, a work to which he gave especial attention in the belief that the logical works were the proper starting point of Aristotelian exegesis.³ Whether he is directly responsible for introducing the question of obscurity cannot be determined. The discussion, however, was certainly advanced by the sharp distinction drawn between Aristotle's esoteric and exoteric works. If, on the other hand, we search for sources closer to our fifth and sixth-century Alexandrian commentators, it is probably to Porphyry, Iamblichus⁴ and Proclus that we must look, without at the same time neglecting the steady exchange between philosophy and rhetoric throughout some of the later history of the Peripatos and the Porch and some of Neoplatonism.⁵

«logical» (λογικός) creature approaches the divine Logos: ἡ γὰρ φιλοσοφητέον ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος ἢ τιμητέον φιλοσοφίαν εἴπερ μὴ μέλλωμεν παντελῶς ἔξω τοῦ καλοῦ πίπτειν. μηδὲ ἀλογίαν κατακριθῆσθαι λογικοὶ γεγονότες καὶ διὰ λόγου πρὸς Λόγον ἀπεύδοντες. See note 1, p. 121.

1. Themistius is not particularly well known among the Byzantine rhetorical scholiasts, though an anonymous author praises his panegyrics (*Περὶ τῶν τεσσάρων μερῶν τοῦ τελείου λόγου*, 3.572.28 W (fourteenth century?) and Joseph the Philosopher (Rhacendytes), fourteenth century, recommends his «mixed» style, 3.521.11; 526.22 W. Gregory of Corinth, in defining παράφρασις as a passing from the obscure to the more clear, cites Themistius' Aristotelian commentaries, which τὰ συνισταμένα ἀναπτύσσει, 7.1294.2-6 W.

2. On Andronicus see H. DÖRRIE in *Der Kleine Pauly* s.v.; *CHLGP*, 119.

3. ELIAS, *In Cat.* 117.20; 118.20 ff.

4. Simplicius recommends that we study the commentaries on these two authors in particular as the most significant in the list: *In Cat.* 2.28; 3.14.

5. For some discussions of the relation between philosophy and rhetoric see AMMONIUS, *In Cat.* 8.4-22; ELIAS, *Prol. Philos.* 21.6-24; DAVID, *Prol. Philos.* 40.33-41.10. The relationship does not, however, preclude important differences

The tradition regarding Aristotle's obscurity is not limited to late antiquity. The issues raised in the Neoplatonic works, the examples cited, and the general outlook with which they view their subject have a long echo in Byzantine thought. Arethas' defense against the identical charge shows him using a number of motifs in common with his Neoplatonic sources, while Psellus can later cite with pride Aristotle's obscurity in defense of his own.¹ The large number of manuscripts of the Aristotelian commentaries which survive are an indication that the issue had considerable currency within educated circles.² Platonic criticism is also affected. In the fifteenth century Bessarion devotes a chapter in his *In Calumniatorem Platonis* to an explanation of why Plato chose to write "enigmatically or not at all about matters divine."³ Many of Bessarion's examples appear already in our Neoplatonic Alexandrian texts.

There is a further theme in the commentators which is of interest to us. In discussing the *Metaphysics* the sixth-century commentator Asclepius describes the content of the work as σοφία, by which he means "the first philosophy" (πρώτη φιλοσοφία), which deals with matters divine. He then produces a pun: σοφία - *σάφεια, the latter an artificial term for which there is no sanction in Greek save within our particular set of texts. According to Asclepius things divine are clear and manifest and a work discussing the first principles is perforce an exercise of clarification. σοφία is the end of the process as far as human beings are concerned.⁴ A similar statement appears in two of Philoponus' commentaries, one on the *Posterior Analytics*, the other on Nicomachus of Gerasa, and is found also

among the various branches of Neoplatonism. In Alexandria, for example, rhetoric was an integral part of the curriculum, whereas in Athens it may not have been taught at all as an independent discipline.

1. On Arethas see pp. 84-85, and also the testimonia in WESTERINK's edition. On PSELLUS, Letter 174, *Μεσ. Βιβλ.*, vol. 5, 442 SATHAS: 'Αριστοτέλης --- προῦστη-σατο τὴν ἀσάφειαν. See pp. 103, 155.

2. One should also note the commentaries on the *Categories* by Photius in the ninth, Arethas in the tenth, and Psellus in the eleventh century. PHOTIUS, *Amphilochia* Nos. 137-147, PG 101, 759A-812A; Arethas, unpublished, in Cod. Urbinas 35; PSELLUS, *Compendium quinque vocum et decem praedicamentorum philosophiae* ed. J. FOUSCANUS, Paris 1541.

3. Book 1, chapter 2 MOHLER: Διὰ τί Πλάτων περὶ τῶν θεῶν πραγμάτων ἤτοι οὐδὲν ἢ αἰνιγματωδῶς τυγχάνει συγγεγραφώς. Bessarion gives examples from PLATO's *Second* (quoted note 2, p. 110) and *Seventh Epistles*, IAMBlichus' *Vita Pythag.*, et al. See MOHLER's testimonia.

4. In *Metaphys.* 3.27-34.

in a Latin version in Boethius' commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*.¹ In addition, David shows a variation on the theme.² σοφία is especially applicable to the divine, he notes. It is a kind of *σαοφία, which is to say, it preserves (σώζει) the light. David answers those who raise the objection why the divine, if it is defined as clear, is unclear to us. The reason is that just as the sun appears dark to bats because of their own deficiency, so things divine, which are naturally clear and sincere, are obscure to us because the eye of our soul is befogged by our intemperate acts. The Christian David has added a moral element to the discussion by tracing obscurity to a weakness in the human condition.

The equation in these texts may be regarded as an attempt to combine content (σοφία) with form (*σάφεια) into a higher unity, to dissolve, in other words, the distinction between the how and the what. The depth of a philosopher's wisdom gives him a special purchase on the obscurity of the divine, so that his σοφία may become an ultimate clarity. If the philosophic λόγος in the course of defining itself requires the λόγος of the rhetorician (*σάφεια), to which it gives metaphysical access, the reverse process is also at work. The rhetorician through the exercise of his art makes possible the contemplation of a higher reality. Philosophy and rhetoric combine. This sense of a unity of function was supported by the close association which the two disciplines enjoyed in the Byzantine edu-

1. CAG 13.3, *In Poster. Analyt.* ed. M. WALLIES, 1905, 332.8-12: σοφία κληθεῖσα οἷον σαφία (note the variant spelling) τις οὐσα διὰ τὸ δι' αὐτῆς τὰ θεῖα σαφῆ ἡμῖν γίνεσθαι. τὰ γὰρ θεῖα, ὡς αὐτὸς φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, φανότατά τε εἰσι καὶ σαφέστατα. NICOMACHUS OF GERASA, *In Nicom. Arithm. Isag.*, p. 1 HOCHÉ; BOETHIUS, *In Porphyry. Isag.*, p. 7.12 BRANDT; quoted by H. SAFFREY, *Le Problème Philosophique d'Aristote et la théorie platonicienne des idées nombres*, Leiden 1955, 9. Saffrey finds the origin of the theme in Ammonius and thence in Aristotle's lost treatise, *Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας*. Full discussion in HAASE (article cited note 2, p. 108, *supra*).

2. *Procl. Philos.* 46.13-25: τὸ τῆς σοφίας ὄνομα κυρίως ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν ὤφειλε λέγεσθαι --- σοφία λέγεται οἷον σαφία τις οὐσα, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τὸ φῶς σώζουσα --- εἰ ἄρα τὰ θεῖα κατὰ τὴν φύσιν σαφῆ εἰσι, πῶς ἡμῖν ἀσαφῆ εἰσι; καὶ ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὥσπερ ὁ ἥλιος φύσει φωτεινὸς ὢν ταῖς νυκτερίσι δοκεῖ ἀμυδρότερος (on this image see note 2, p. 108) διὰ τὸ ἀνεπιτήδειον τοῦ ὀργάνου, --- τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ θεῖα κατὰ τὴν φύσιν σαφῆ καὶ εὐληκρινῆ ὄντα ἡμῖν ἀσαφῆ εἰσι διὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα ὑπὸ τῆς σωματικῆς ἀχλὺς ἡγῶν διὰ τῶν ἡδυπαθειῶν ἐπισκοπιζέσθαι.

The same collocation σοφία - *σάφεια has worked its way into Christian exegesis. THEOPHYLACT, eleventh/twelfth century archbishop of Bulgaria, explains *I Cor 12:8* (αὐτῷ τὸ ἓν ἐστιν τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς σοφίας, τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς γνώσεως) as follows: PG 124, 713A: ἡ γὰρ σοφία διδάσκει, σάφειά τις οὐσα ὡς καὶ διασαφύουσα τὰ κρυπτά.

cational program. The intelligentsia are commonly adept at both. Moreover, the idealization of rhetorical habit through Hermogenes' Forms assisted this cooperation, for his ἰδέα is a function of the pragmatic human art of discourse defined at the same time in terms of its transcendence.

Such a collocation as σοφία - *σάφεια is but one of many attempts to find and justify, within the special terms of the age and in special contexts, an overriding harmony among the resources of life. For Iamblichus everything must "harmonize" with everything else, with ultimate reference to the One, while in Proclus, particularly in his commentary on the *Timaeus*, metaphysical, ethical, physical, and purely dialectical concerns are freely transposed.¹ We might easily add rhetorical concerns to this list.

If it was to do full Byzantine service, however, the pagan equation had first to be translated into Christian terms. A theme recurring often in the Alexandrian commentators but with important echoes also in Christian exegesis and forming in addition a frequent topic of discussion in the rhetorical tradition among the scholiasts on Hermogenes and Aphthonius, concerns the definition of the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος.² It is the λόγος which exists in the soul, whence man must start in order to reach the truth of God.³ The cultivation of the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος is described in the

1. See R. BEUTLER, *RE-PW* s.v. Proklos, col. 192.

2. The distinction made is between ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς, i.e., λόγος as thought versus λόγος as utterance. It is Stoic in origin. See VOLKMANN, 12. Some rhetorical sources: TROPHONIUS, *Procl. Syll.*, 7.20; ANON., *Procl. Syll.*, 184.1; 188.7; 232.4; SOPATER, 5.1.12 W; DOXAPATRES, *In Aphth.* 2.116.7 W; ANON., *In De Stat.* 7.1.14 W; et al.; among the Neoplatonic commentators: PORPHYRY, *In Cat.* 64.26 BUSSE; *De Abstin.* 187.21 NAUCK; AMMONIUS, *In Cat.* 57.23; *In De Interpr.* 22.14; 256.31; 272.14 BUSSE; PHILOPONUS, *In Cat.* 90.3; *In De Anim.* 556.10 HAYDUCK; OLYMPIODORUS, *In Cat.* 87.8; SIMPLICIUS, *In Cat.* 29.14; *In De Anim.* 260.2 HAYDUCK; ELIAS, *In Cat.* 95.29; 183.22; 191.14; DAVID, *Procl. Philos.* 11.28; *In Porphyry. Isag.* 210.23; 211.22; STEPHANUS, *In De Interpr.* 63.18; 64.15 BUSSE; et al.

The contrast has an important extension in Christology. ἐνδιάθετος describes the unity between the Father and the Logos; προφορικὸς the Logos as the expression of the infinite Father. Consult LAMPE s.v. λόγος, II.B.2, for numerous texts. Noticeable also is the definition of the ὁρθὸς λόγος in Hierocles, the fifth-century Platonist who had an important influence on Christian teaching: λόγος ὁρθὸς πείθεσθαι καὶ θεῶν ταυτῶν ἐστὶ (453a3 MULLACH). It is φύσει ἐνὸν καὶ ἐγγεγραμμένον in the soul of man (438b10). Hierocles conceives of it as uniting human and divine. See K. PRAECHTER, *RE-PW* s.v.

3. A turning inward is in keeping with the trend of the age. Cf. fr. 33, *Damascii*

scholiasts as dependent on the understanding of the principles of syllogistic thought and on the recognition in terms of formal logic of the distinction between true and false statements. To this distinction Themistius and the commentators on the *Topica* and the *Categories* devote considerable attention. Some of this discussion appears also in the rhetorical scholia alongside the Platonic differentiation of a false from a true rhetoric, an ἀληθὴς λόγος which for the Christians will rest on the revelation of religious truth.¹

These received materials, which the sharper cultural divisions of late antiquity kept relatively separate, are in the course of time shaped into a new composition. If we look at the age of iconoclasm we shall see in preparation a distinctively Byzantine conception of discourse, based not on secular ideals but on a religious revaluation of the function of logos. Both sides in the controversy insisted on the authority of the written tradition, that is, the pronouncements of the Church, in support of their respective positions. The sayings of the Fathers acquire a special aura in the structure of argument as partners with the words of Scripture. Further, let us recall that the iconoclasts often replaced Christian art with classical motifs and that, starting at least with the eighth century, manuscripts of the works of Greek literature, both classical and Christian, are regularly collected and transcribed. These developments must have set off the two traditions in high relief and invited the feeling that Christian literature was somehow different not only in its themes and its style, but was by its very nature invested with a religious power denied its pagan counterpart.

The process of developing a theology of pictorial images was attended by a sharpened feeling for the symbolic function of discourse as well.²

Vitae Isidori Reliquiae ed. C. ZINTZEN, Hildesheim 1967 (= *Suda* 4.324.22 ADLER): πρὸς τὰ εἶσω (said of Sarapion, Isidore's student); PLOTINUS, *Enn.* 1.6.8.4: συνεπέσσω εἰς τὰ εἶσω; AUGUSTINE, *De Vera Relig.*, PG 34, 154: noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas; quoted by ZINTZEN.

It is instructive that ἐνδιάθετος is a synonym for the ἀληθινὸς λόγος, one of Hermogenes' Forms (352.15 ff.), which is also defined as ἔμψυχος. It consists of sincere, heartfelt utterance.

1. On the ἀληθινὴ ῥητορικὴ in Plato and the Stoics see note 1, p. 27 and note 2, p. 28.

2. The juxtaposition is very frequent in the texts and is well known to all students of iconoclasm, though it has so far received no systematic treatment. Some texts: GERMANUS, *Epistle* 1, PG 98, 152C: διὰ γραμμάτων καὶ διὰ χρωμάτων γραφαὶ καὶ ἱστορίαι; *Epistle* 2, 160B; *Epistle* 4, 172D, 184A; St. JOHN DAM., *Orat. 1 De*

The habits of language—and in a Byzantine context this could only mean rhetoric¹—could be better understood in relation to the habits of art. The Byzantine was constantly impressed with the metaphor of existence,

Imag., PG 94, 1265C: ἐν εἰκόνας καὶ λόγου τὸ ἔργον--- οἱ μὲν τῷ λόγῳ κοσμοῦντες οἱ δὲ τοῖς πίναξιν ἐγγραμμίζοντες; 1293C: εἰκόνας βιβλίου τῶν ἀγραμμάτων; *Orat.* 3 *De Imag.*, 1333D; NICEPHORUS, *Ep. ad Leon. Papam*, PG 100, 192A; *Antirrhet.* 3, 380C: ἐν βιβλοῖς καὶ ἐν πίναξιν ἀνιστορήσαντες; THEOD. STUD., *Epistle* 36, PG 99, 1032 ff.; PHOTIUS, *Amphil.* 205, PG 101, 948C; *Hom.* 17, 170.15-171.27 LAURDAS; et al. In addition, terms such as γραφή, περιγραφή, and ἱστορία do double duty in Greek by referring to both writing and painting. See pp. 182ff. Cf. St. BASIL, *Epistle* 9.1, PG 32, 268C: εἰκόνες ὄντως τῶν ψυχῶν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι. For the background cf. PLATO, *Cratylus* 430e, where γράμμα = εἰκὼν; ISOCRATES, *Evag.* 73: εἰκόνας--- τὰς τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὅς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις; *Antid.* 7: λόγος ὥσπερ εἰκὼν τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας. See H. WILLMS, *Eikón. Ein begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Platonismus*, Münster 1935; E. PANOFSKY, *Idea. A Concept in Art Theory*, transl. J. J. S. PEAKE, Columbia, South Carolina, 1968; and, as regards Western epistemology, M. L. COLISH, *The Mirror of Language. A Study in the Mediaeval Theory of Knowledge*, New Haven 1968.

1. It is noticeable that Greek has no word for literature in the modern sense of creative production. Terms such as μουσική, ποίησις, and λόγοι belong to special contexts, from which they are sometimes pressed for larger service. The term ῥητορικὴ underwent the same expansion as prose overwhelmed poetry in late antiquity, but it too never fully abandoned its concern with the process rather than the product or the fact of writing. The modern Greek word for literature, λογοτεχνία, is obviously artificial and shows the retention of the ancient notion of a τέχνη. The earliest instance of its use is apparently Nicetas Eugenianus, twelfth century, where it seems to refer, however, to writing in general (*Epist.*, vol. 2, p. 8 BOISSONADE). A significant passage in Doxapatres discusses the rhetorical logos. Rhetoric is a λογοικὴ τέχνη. Nature (φύσις) provides us with matter (ὕλη), while logos provides us with τέχνη. Logos is an all-pervasive good occurring throughout our life and puts itself under the control of τέχνη. The two types of logos, the ἐνδιάθετος and the προφορικός, just as in the case of ὕλη, submit to the rhetorical τέχνη and are shaped into beautiful form by it. Just as the creator of the universe in the process of arranging, giving form to and embellishing matter through logos may be called an ἀριστοτέχνης, so the logos which embellishes the logos itself is a τέχνη. *Prolog. Syll.*, 89.13-90.8: ἡ ῥητορικὴ λογοικὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη--- τὴν μὲν ὕλην ἡ φύσις, τὴν δὲ τέχνην ὁ λόγος δίδωσι--- οὕτω πάντα διεξεληθὼν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τέχνην ἄγει. ὑπόκειται γοῦν, φασι (Doxapatres is throughout quoting unspecified other arguments regarding the origin of rhetoric) τῇ ῥητορικῇ ὁ μὲν λόγος καθάπερ ὕλη ὃ τε προφορικός καὶ ὁ ἐνδιάθετος, κοσμεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ τεχνικός. εἰ γοῦν πᾶσα ὕλη κοσμουμένη λόγῳ κοσμεῖται καὶ διατάσσεται, ὁ δὲ λόγος τέχνη, καθὼ καὶ τὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργὸν ἀριστοτέχνην φασι λόγῳ τὴν ὕλην κοσμήσαντα καὶ τάξαντα καὶ εἰδοποιήσαντα, πῶς οὐκ καὶ τὸν δίκην ὕλης τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν κοσμοῦντα λόγον τέχνην εἶναι νομίσωμεν; In his edition, 2.90.6, Walz emends λόγον τέχνην to read λογοτέχνην, thus providing a neat balance with ἀριστοτέχνην, but the reading has no manuscript support. What is at any rate clear in the text is the close association of λόγος with ῥητορικὴ τέχνη. See note 6, p. 115.

an existence to which the Incarnation supplied metaphysical design. Already the early Fathers had adopted the collocation λόγος - Λόγος in relating to Christ the human faculty of reason.¹ St. John of Damascus visualizes the relationship in terms of his concept of εἰκών. According to John we are εἰκόνες of the Trinity in that our νοῦς corresponds to the Father, our λόγος to the Son as Λόγος and our spirit to the Holy Spirit. λόγος in the context is not the literary or rhetorical art, but has to do with thought in contrast to the abstract intelligence of νοῦς. Yet it is a practical reason issuing in words, and John can say a few sentences later, referring not to the product of pen and ink but to what is presented on the page, that what is inscribed in books is a reflected image of the λόγος.² His formulation is in keeping with the parallel which the iconodules drew

1. For a partial list of passages see G. BARTELINK, «Jeux de mots autour de λόγος, de ses composés et dérivés chez les auteurs chrétiens,» *Mélanges offerts à Mademoiselle Christine Mohrmann*, Utrecht 1963, 23-37.

2. *Orat. 3 De Imag.*, PG 94, 1340CD: τρίτος τρόπος εἰκόνος ὁ κατὰ μίμησιν ὑπὸ Θεοῦ γενόμενος, τούτεστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· πῶς γὰρ ὁ κτιστὸς τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως ἔσται τῷ ἀκτίστῳ ἀλλὰ κατὰ μίμησιν; ὥσπερ γὰρ νοῦς ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ Λόγος ὁ Υἱὸς καὶ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον, εἰς Θεός, οὕτω καὶ νοῦς καὶ λόγος καὶ πνεῦμα εἰς ἄνθρωπος (commenting on *Genesis* 1:26: ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν); 1341D: εἰκονίζει γὰρ τὸ γράμμα τὸν λόγον, ὥς ὁ Θεὸς τὸν νόμον ταῖς πλαξὶν ἐνεκόλαψε (~ 1244B, 1344A); cf. also 1247C.

Origen's general contribution to such schemes of thought is very large. LOSSKY, 16, remarks that «above all since Origen there has been the desire to identify the presence of the Divine Logos in the writings of the two Testaments with the Incarnation of the Word by which the Scriptures were 'accomplished'». In the *Contra Celsum*, 6.9, Celsus quotes from a passage in PLATO's *Seventh Letter*, 342a ff., regarding the ἀληθὴς λόγος, which runs as follows: «Every existing object has three things which are the necessary means by which knowledge of that object is acquired; and the knowledge itself is a fourth thing; and as a fifth one must postulate the object itself which is cognizable and true. First of these comes the name; secondly the definition; thirdly the image; fourthly the knowledge»: (R.G. BURK's Loeb translation) ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστω, δι' ὃν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνάγκη παραγίγνεσθαι, [τρία] τέταρτον δ' αὐτῇ—πέμπτον δ' αὐτὸ τιθέναι δεῖ ὁ δὴ γνωστὸν τε καὶ ἀληθὺς ἔστιν ὄν—ἐν μὲν ὄνομα, δεύτερον δὲ λόγος, τὸ δὲ τρίτον εἰδωλόν, τέταρτον δὲ ἐπιστήμη (cf. *Laws* 895d; *Parmen.* 142a; *Rep.* 490b). L. ROBERTS in an unpublished dissertation entitled «Philosophical Method in Origen's *Contra Celsum*» (State University of New York at Buffalo, 1971) points out, p. 176, that Origen «relates all the knowledge aspects to the divine Logos. The name, Origen says, corresponds to John's voice crying in the wilderness'. The word corresponds to Jesus; the image, to the Christ within each individual; 'and a person with ability might consider also whether Christ—corresponds to the fourth which is knowledge'» (cf. *Contra Celsum* 6.79; *Comment. in Joann.* 6.6; *Comment. in Cantic. Cantic.* 3.76).

between the image of Christ and the Bible, the truth of its statement existing *per se* both within and above any individual rendering of its text.¹ Moreover, the central Christological problem carried with it the subsidiary issue of the saints. Just as the one discussion, aside from the necessary theological distinctions, moves along parallel lines with the other,² so the words of the saints acquire an authority as historical extensions, so to speak, of Holy Writ, secondary but vitally related to it. And if the production of the artist is true—for on this reckoning there can be no false icon of Christ except in secular or aesthetic terms—similarly the writings of the holy men of the Church are true εἰκόνες in the realm of words as Christ's image is in the realm of art.

Thoughts about language are offered by the iconodules as simple reinforcements to their main arguments and are not worked out to the full. The main business of the age was, after all, pictures, not words. It remained for the post-iconoclastic period to identify the conception more closely with the rhetorical function. We see the theory in full flower in the eleventh century in the glorification of Basil, John Chrysostom, and Gregory of Nazianzus, the three Hierarchs of the Church, as the paragons of a true rhetoric, based not on style alone but also on theological content.³ These new wise men become not merely the philosophical and theo-

1. NICEPHORUS, *Apol.*, PG 100, 748B ff.; PHOTIUS, *Amphil.* 205, PG 101, 948C ff. Cf. THEOD. STUD., *Antirrhet.* 1, PG 99, 340D ff.; *Antirrhet.* 2, 376A ff.; et al.

2. JOHN DAM., *Orat. 1 De Imag.*, PG 94, 1249B; 1252B; 1264A: ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ Χριστοῦ Χριστὸς καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ Ἁγίου Ἁγίος; *Orat. 2 De Imag.* 1301A; 1352A; *Orat. 3 De Imag.*, 1348C; 1352D; NICEPHORUS, *Antirrhet.* 2, PG 100, 341C; *Apol.* 560C; THEOD. STUD., *Antirrhet.* 1, PG 99, 348D; 351; *Septem Capit.* 485; et al. See L.H. GRONDIJS, «Images de saints d'après la théologie byzantine du VIII^e siècle,» *Actes du VI^e congrès international d'études byzantines*, Paris 1948, vol. 2, Paris 1951, 145-170.

3. SICELIOTES, *Prol. Syll.*, 395.10 ff., celebrates the stylistic virtues of Basil, Gregory, and Chrysostom even above those of Demosthenes: τοιοῦτο. Βασίλειος καὶ Γρηγόριος καὶ ὁ χρυσοῦς ἡμῶν ὡκεανὸς καὶ γλυκὺς καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ ὀρμήματα τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου, οἷς εὐφραίνονται αἱ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκκλησίαι, κατακλύζονται δὲ ψυχαὶ τε καὶ φύσεις πονηραὶ καὶ παράνομοι ἀγχεμάχοις βέθοις καὶ τοῖς ἐκ μέλανος, μετατίθεται δὲ σύμπασα γῆ καὶ μετάρηται πρὸς εὐκοσμίαν τε καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν. Later, 405.10 ff., Basil's, Chrysostom's and the «theological» style are grouped together as the prime examples of Dignity and Brilliance: τούτεστι σεμνότης καὶ λαμπρότης καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ [sc. ιδεαί], τὴν Βασιλικὴν τυχὸν ιδεὴν ἢ τὴν θεολογικὴν ἢ Χρυσοστομικὴν. The second is that of Γρηγόριος ὁ Θεολόγος. See p. 36, *supra*. Geometres' ῥητορικὴ ἔστι λόγος περὶ τὸν λόγον is pregnant with meaning but unfortunately quoted without context by Doxapatres,

logical models of Byzantium, the keepers of her heritage of Christian learning; they are the rhetorical models as well. If philosophy and rhetoric, as antiquity had sometimes wished, are one, the Christian now said that in a larger sense theology and rhetoric are one. The three figures are saints and saintly is all they say and do. Rhetoric is now a sacred art, part of the sacred cosmos of man. It is a sacrament—Doxapatres and Siceliotes actually call it a μυστήριον¹—and we, skilled in its ways, are its celebrants, for the act of formal expression in words is a religious act, charged with divinity and embracing at once the logos of man in the Logos of God.

A similar interpretation of the role of these figures is given by a contemporary of Siceliotes, the scholar John Mauropus, professor at the university in Constantinople. His remarks appear in an address delivered on the occasion of the celebration of the Feast of the Three Hierarchs. Because His Gospel was threatened by the many heresies abroad in the world, he says, the Lord sent the three saints to restore and proclaim its true interpretation. This they accomplished through the charm of their words, their human logos, assisted by the grace of the divine Logos. In these figures the two levels join; natural and supernatural come together in their rhetorical art, an art of wisdom withal, for they are wise men. Through them is restored the true harmony of word and spirit.²

Prol. Syll., 107.6 (also in ANON., *Prol. Syll.*, 349.4), and we cannot know its intent (Christian Logos? philosophical logos?).

1. DOXAPATRES, *Prol. Syll.*, 80.12-16: ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἡχοῦσιν ἄρτι μέγα μυστήριον καὶ τῆς ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιπνοίας καὶ μεγαλονοίας ἐμφορηθῆναι θέλουσιν οὐκ ὀλίγον μὲν τὸ θάμβος οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκπληξιν ἀγεννῇ τῶν θαυμασίων αὐτῆς ἀπτομένοις προθύρων ἐνεῖναι εἰκός; SICELIOTES, *Prol. Syll.*, 89.12-14: ἀναγκαῖα τὰ τῆς πανδήμου ῥητορικῆς ὄργια καὶ μυστήρια καὶ τῶν ἀδύτων μεθόδων τοῖς ἐξαγίστοις αἱ τελεταί. The Areopagite according to PHOTIUS, *Amphil.* 109, PG 101, 697D, is ὁ ῥήτωρ μὲν τοὺς λόγους, φιλόσοφος δὲ τὰ νοήματα, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς γλώσσης τὴν ἄνωθεν ἀποστάζων χάριν καὶ τῆς θείας ἡμῖν σοφίας ἀναβλύζων τὴν ἄβυσσον. Elsewhere, *Amphil.* 205, PG 101, 949A, Photius puts on the same footing images and «other mysteries,» such as the words of the Bible: ἐπ' ἱσῆς γὰρ ἔστι τὰ εἰρημένα περὶ τῶν σεπτῶν εἰκόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μυστηρίων ἡμῶν. ποίους γὰρ λόγους Εὐαγγελίου θεοπνεύστους, κτλ. BECK, *Kallilogia*, 100, speaks of the rhetorical function as a θυσία λογική, the Byzantine term for the Eucharist. γραφικὴ μυσταγωγία is MAXIMUS term, *Amb. Lib.* 2.10, PG 91, 1160A, for Scriptural exegesis. See R. BORNERT, «Explication de la liturgie et interprétation de l'Écriture chez Maxime le Confesseur,» in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 10, Part I ed. F.L. CROSS, Berlin 1970 (= *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, vol. 107), 323-327.

2. *Johannis Euchaitarum metropolitae quae in codice vaticano graeco 676 supersunt* edd. P. DE LAGARDE and J. BOLLIG, *Abhandlungen der Göttinger Gesellschaft*

We witness here the end of a Christianizing process. The combination of theological wisdom displayed through rhetoric and scholarship here held forth is not an invention of the eleventh century. It has echoes among the Alexandrian commentators on Aristotle's obscurity whom we have examined. Their approach gave a kind of mystical aura to the author as well as to the act of interpreting him, if not indeed to the interpreter himself. The same psychology extends into Byzantium. In the *Bibliotheca* Photius reviews the works of a number of Neoplatonic writers. His deep appreciation of their scholarly method¹ introduces us to a lasting pattern of Byzantine intellectual life. It is Photius who made scholarship an even more vital and positive force in Byzantium. In so doing he was but welcoming habits which late antiquity had endorsed, but with the all-important difference that they were supplied now with a Christian base. The religious thrust of Byzantine literature, set long ago, was received by the ninth century through the filter of iconoclasm, itself affected by earlier mystical modes. What the ninth century added was a more elitist, professional outlook. The Byzantine intelligentsia who follow are generally more conscious of being students, in a professional sense, than those who precede the ninth century. Scholarship too has its inner sancta, its curtains and mystic rites, its own summons to the obscure.

So it comes about that the same set of circumstances which calls forth the noble vision of Mauropus and Siceliotes might also evoke and perpetuate cabalistic stereotypes in which allusiveness for its own sake, apart from its Christian base, justified by the authority of Hermogenes and expressed regularly in the currency of Neoplatonism, often might become the order of the day. Art enjoyed relatively greater freedom in developing special forms to meet its needs. Literature, on the other hand, continued to draw its major sustenance from the classical modes of the language. It often rose and met the challenge, producing much of value and beauty, but it could also become mired in its own past. The wholesale application of the term «Attic» to an indiscriminate variety of classical authors during this middle period² may represent in part a misguided

der Wissenschaften 28 (1882) 115. I give here essentially BECK's analysis, *Kallilogia*, 95-96.

1. See codd. 181 and 242 on Damascius, *passim*.

2. On this phenomenon see G. BÖHLIG, *Untersuchungen zum rhetorischen Sprachgebrauch der Byzantiner*, Berlin 1956, 3 ff.

attempt to accommodate the universalizing character of the Christian ideas of logos, which had little in common with classical literary history. The stylistic confusion which resulted threatened to overwhelm the claims of clarity, and the scholiasts often warn against it. In the final analysis, however, the ideal succeeded in maintaining and asserting itself. On the practical level, Byzantium presumed to approach it through the manipulation of those functions of Hermogenes' rhetoric which seemed suited to the purpose. Hence it is to him that we must once again turn in order to grasp it at close hand.

CHAPTER FIVE

ΣΕΜΝΟΤΗΣ AND ΠΕΡΙΒΟΛΗ

The first two general headings in the *De Ideis* are Clarity and Loftiness or Grandeur. In accordance with the principle of arrangement in the treatise the one is a counterpoise to the other.¹ According to Hermogenes, among the six subdivisions of Grandeur two, Dignity and Amplitude, stand apart. In the rhetorical system of Pseudo-Aristides the same two ideals are described as sharing all things in common.²

1. See pp. 35ff. Siceliotes offers a subtle but significant change in the interpretation of Hermogenes' account. Hermogenes speaks of the *excess* of Clarity as requiring the counter of Grandeur. Siceliotes generalizes and adds the element of exclusiveness. Clarity befits the common crowd, Dignity the exalted (ἀνεστηκόσι, 6.205.15 W). σεμνότης belongs to the intellectual elite (τοῖς συνετοῖς, 6.205.9 W). In this way obscurity might easily become the special preserve of a class from which the multitude is kept at a distance.

2. *De Ideis* 242,7: τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν σεμνότης ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ περιβολή, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι συμπλέκονται; PSEUDO-ARISTIDES, 35.16: ἡ σεμνότης καὶ ἡ περιβολή κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ πάντα. DEMETRIUS remark, 204, made in connection with meter, also suggests a connection between the two principles: μεγαλοπρεπὲς γὰρ πᾶν μῆκος. As will appear from the analysis in the following pages, περιβολή produces long sentences. DEMETRIUS, 5, points to an intrinsic connection between elevation in language and the size of cola and notes that the hexameter, the longest of the metres of poetry, is called heroic because its length is suitable for heroes: σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ κώλου συνεξήρται καὶ ὁ λόγος. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐξάμετρον ἡρώδων τε ὀνομάζεται ὑπὸ τοῦ μήκους καὶ πρέπον ἦρωσιν. Cf. also 39; 44; 72; and note that περιβολή makes extensive use of various connectives such as μέν-δέ (see p. 137, *infra*), which he says, 59, make for dignity. Historically speaking, περιβολή is an outgrowth of the same psychology which throughout all Greek criticism put a premium on the periodic sentence as a mark of high style (σεμνότης) aiming at a full structured circuit of meaning (σύνθεσις περιηγμένη, DEMETRIUS, 30). Cf. DEMETRIUS, 45: μεγαλοπρεπὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ περι-αγωγῆς τῇ συνθέσει λέγειν.

The common ground is evident also in the view of the author of the scholia in Vat. Gr. 107, who regards ἀφέλεια as the opposite of both σεμνότης and περιβολή. *Commentarium Codicis Vaticani Gr. 107 in Hermogenis περὶ στάσεων et περὶ εὐρέσεως cum scholiis minoribus in omnia praeter Praeexercitamenta opera. Acta Seminarii*

Dignity is one of the oldest of rhetorical standards. Aristotle notices a contrast with clarity because it makes use of metaphorical or poetic language.¹ It comes to be one of the most celebrated of rhetorical virtues. Dionysius of Halicarnassus sees it as one of the achievements of the Thucydidean style; a large section of Demetrius' treatise is devoted to the related concepts of grandeur (μέγεθος) and magnificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια); it is extensively analyzed on two occasions by Pseudo-Aristides; in the form of sublimity it is the subject of the most celebrated of the ancient tracts on literary criticism, the *Περὶ Ὑψους* of 'Longinus'; and it is recognized early as a key element of the Platonic style and repeatedly so noted by the Neoplatonists.² Not only is σεμνότης one of Hermogenes' Forms; the

Philologici II Universitatis Ioanneo-Casimirianae Leopoliensis, fasc. 5-7 ed. G. KOWALSKI, Lvov 1939, 106.4. Cf. also 'LONGINUS', Sect. 11.

The Seguerianus helps fill in the background. We are informed that to the standard three virtues of διήγησις (σαφήνεια, συντομία, πιθανότης) others made additions: 370.4: εἰσι δὲ οἱ πρὸς ταύταις ταῖς τρισι καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ προσήκειαν ἥτοι ἐπιείκειαν ἀρετὰς ἔρασαν διηγήσεως. Cf. also NICOLAUS, 14.4, and note 3, p. 94. The list is basically Stoic. See VOLKMANN, 158. These same values appear in Hermogenes under different rubrics, except for ἐπιείκεια, which survives intact as one of the Forms. The first three of the additions present themselves as the Forms of σεμνότης (note that μεγαλοπρέπεια requires νοήματα σεμνά, Seg. 369.25), περιβολή, and κάλλος (on this trinitarian scheme of rhetorical value in Byzantium see p. 153). Demetrius knows the relation between μεγαλοπρέπεια and σεμνότης, a connection already made by ARISTOTLE, *Rhet.* A 9. 29, 1367b1. So also does DIONYSIUS, who joins to them καλλιρρημοσύνη (*De Thuc.* 360.8: ὕψος λέγω καὶ καλλιρρημοσύνην καὶ σεμνολογίαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν; see note 2, *infra*). A full Latin discussion of διήγησις (*narratio*) appears in QUINTILIAN, 4.2.31-4.3.17, and follows similar lines. Hence is it clear that the origin of much of Hermogenes' system is rooted in the rhetorical discussions of διήγησις. See A. SCHÄFER, *De rhetorum praeceptis quae ad narrationem spectant*, Diss. Freiburg 1920.

1. *Poet.* 22.11, 1458a21 ff.; *Rhet.* Γ 2.1, 1404b1 ff. In Γ 3.3-4, 1406b3 ff. Aristotle notes that excessive, that is to say, inappropriate (ἀπρεπείς) metaphors used for the sake of dignity result in obscurity. In Hermogenes the opposite of Dignity is Simplicity, 242.19.

2. DIONYSIUS, *De Thuc.* 360.8, quoted note 2, *supra*; DEMETRIUS, 8; 36-84; and *passim*; PSEUDO-ARISTIDES, 2.3-16.5; 94.14-96.2. In the Byzantine world of learning polymathy is justified as being μεγαλοπρεπής: PLETHO, 6.590.2 W: τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς τῆς πολυμαθίας ἐστὶ. On the Neoplatonists see WALSDORFF, 91 ff. Plato's dignified style enjoyed the added sanction of being the prose equivalent of Homer. See *Ἐκ τῶν Λογίων* 214.27: ὁ πρῶτος ἄριστος πρὸς τὴν πεζὴν λέξιν τὸν Ὀμηρικὸν ὄγκον μετενεγκὼν Πλάτων ἐστίν. ὄγκος is often synonymous with dignity, though it can sometimes have a pejorative meaning, e.g., DIONYS., *Demosth.* 306.19; 'LONGINUS', 109.22. See note in ROBERTS' edition of DEMETRIUS, p. 294; HAGEDORN, 44-46.

In his tract *Περὶ συνθήκης τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν*, 5.598.14 W, Psellus regards με-

σεμνὸς λόγος is one of the tropes listed in the fourth book of the *De Inventione*. Here a great deal is held out for it: τὸ σεμνόν is in fact what λόγος is all about.¹ The great appeal of the concept in pagan antiquity derives in large measure from the sense of solemnity which informs the aristocratic impulse of all ancient literature, both prose and poetry. We have seen in Chapter Two the role which it played in the creation of Christian literary genres; but it also possessed other values which could attract the Christian world.

Amplitude Hermogenes regards as the most characteristic feature of the Demosthenic style.² More space is devoted to it than to any other topic in the *De Ideis*. Partly through his endorsement and partly because it responded to certain trends in Byzantine thought it becomes a central stylistic value in mediaeval Greek literature. Its importance cannot be exaggerated. It overshadows Force, Hermogenes' pinnacle of style, and in fact comes to stand for what was meant by style itself or even the very function of λόγος, the definition of formal language and how it worked or should work. Dignity and Amplitude show some common features and also reinforce each other. As two key pillars in the structure of Byzantine rhetoric they therefore merit special attention. We may begin by reconstructing Hermogenes' definition.

I. Dignity.³

A. Sentences.

1. Discussion concerning the gods as gods;⁴ that is, not

γαλοπρέπεια, βάρος, ὄγκος, σεμνολογία, μέγεθος, ἀξίωμα, καὶ τὰ τοιοῦτοις ὅμοια as expressions of τὸ καλόν, which together with ἡδονή he considers to be the aim of discourse. Elsewhere, 3.687-703 W, he follows Hermogenes' outline.

1. 200.15-16: σεμνόν δέ, εἰ τί πού ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τί ἄλλο μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἢ λόγος. Cf. λόγιος = μεγαλοπρεπής, DEMETRIUS, 48; see E. ORTH, *Logios*, Kaiserresch 1926. Cf. SICELIOTES, 6.205.10 W, who asks: τοῖς συνετοῖς: τί δὲ τοῖς λόγοις σεμνότερον. Dignity is a rhetorical figure also in an anonymous Christian tract, *Περὶ Σχημάτων* 117.27, which essentially follows the *De Inventione*. PSEUDO-ARISTIDES, 14.11, specifically notes that dignity uses tropical speech: ὅταν τροπικαῖς ἀντὶ ἰδίων ταῖς λέξεσι χρῆσθῃ. Cf. DEMETRIUS, 99: μεγαλεῖόν δέ τί ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀλληγορία. Let us also recall that the majestic or sublime is one of the most frequently recognized qualities of Byzantine art. Consult the index to MICHELIS (see Bibliography); also MATHEW, 16.

2. 221.7-9: μᾶ τιμι τῶν προειρημένων πλεονάσας ἰδέα καὶ αὐτὸς --- λέγω τῇ περιβολῇ; also 278.5-7.

3. 242.21-254.21. On σεμνότης and περιβολή in the Renaissance see PATTERSON, 51-53; 69-74.

4. 242.22: αἱ περὶ θεῶν ὥς θεῶν.

Homeric descriptions of their activities, for these are simply anthropomorphic accounts and have more to do with Pleasantness, but rather what one should call theology in the broad sense. Orators are least given to this particular type of Sentence.

2. Discussion of divine matters.¹ These, on the other hand, may be found in Demosthenes and other orators. The nature of the seasons, the circuit of the universe, the stirrings of earth and sea, lightning, and other natural phenomena are examples. Such discussions should include a treatment of the causes (αἰτίαι). The same topics discussed without reference to cause may properly be classed as both πολιτικά² and σεμνά.

3. Matters basically divine but having to do with the human condition, such as the immortality of the soul, the nature of justice and temperance, the definition of life, and the question what is nature and what convention.³ The discussion must be kept general. If one were to describe the temperance or intemperance of a specific person, that is to say, if both genus and species are mentioned, we are in the realm of the πολιτικός and περιβεβλημένος λόγος.

4. Significant human events, such as the battles of Marathon and Plataea.⁴

1. 243.22: αἱ περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὡς ὄντων πραγμάτων. Cf. DEMETRIUS, 75: ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν πράγμασι τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές, ἂν μεγάλη καὶ διαπρεπὴς πεζομαχία ἢ ναυμαχία, ἢ περὶ οὐρανοῦ ἢ περὶ γῆς λόγος; cf. also 'LONGINUS', Sect. 35.

2. See note 4, p. 131.

3. 245.4: περὶ πραγμάτων ἃ δὴ φύσει μὲν ἐστὶ θεῖα, τὸ πλεῖστον δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις θεωρεῖται. νόμος - φύσις, 245.8.

4. According to the Scholia Minora the first of these four types of Sentence is the province of philosophers, the other three of orators, 7.955 W. Cf. also the gloss, p. 961: φύσει σεμνῶν: τῶν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀρμοττουσῶν λέγω τῶν θεῶν. The scholiast goes on to explain that the first is not much developed in Hermogenes' analysis. The second type, if the cause is included, also becomes the business of philosophers; if not, it falls to the orators. The distinction between philosophers and orators is not in Hermogenes. One may perhaps observe that Christian society in effect made its orators, that is to say, its preachers, into philosophers or theologians, at least in theory.

The feeling that a high style depends not merely on linguistic and grammatical considerations but on the subject matter as well, that is, that there are subjects in and of themselves σεμνά (or ἀφελῆ, ἠθικά, ἀληθῆ, etc.), Hermogenes shares with 'LONGINUS' (Sects. 9,35), who similarly discusses the treatment of cosmic subjects and remarks on man's inclination to regard certain topics as in themselves sublime. See RUSSELL, xlv.

B. Modes.

1. Direct assertions.¹ These lend authority to discourse and help us feel confident that the speaker knows his subject. They must be thoroughgoing.² All elements which express doubt (e.g., whether—or) should be excluded. Such a phrase as Demosthenes' "whoever they were, heroes or gods,"³ is certainly dignified, but because of the element of doubt has more of a "political" character and aims rather at persuasion.⁴

2. Thoroughgoing allegorical modes.⁵ There is, however, also a type of allegory the themes of which are not dignified but rather the opposite, mean and ordinary.⁶

3. Mystical and ritual effects achieved through the use of emphases.⁷ When we have knowledge of something but cannot express its essence, this technique provides grandeur and dignity

1. 246.10: αἱ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν καὶ χωρὶς ἐνδοιασμοῦ ἐξ ἀρηγήσεως λεγόμεναι.

2. διαρκοῦς, 246.13. By the term we are to understand Modes that have Dignity as their prime function, realized to the full. Cf. ANON., *In De Ideis* 7.961.6 W: μέχρι τέλους; *Scholia Minora*, 7. p. 961 W: τῆς διαρκοῦς τῆς καθαρᾶς καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν καὶ μὴ συμπλεκομένης ἐτέρας, ἀλλ' ἀρκούσης πρὸς τὸν λόγον. Similarly, ὅτε διαρκοῦσιν, 246.17, is glossed as ὅτε πληροῖεν τὸν λόγον. In SICELIOTES, 6.221.24 W, διαρκοῦς ἀλληγορίαι are those which instead of intimating their meaning hide it completely and show another. See note 5, *infra*.

3. *Against Aristocrates* 70: οἷτινές ποτ' ἦσαν, εἴθ' ἥρωες εἴτε θεοί.

4. 246.15: πλεόν ἔχει τοῦ πολιτικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ. Running throughout the whole of the section on Dignity are references to the special category of the πολιτικός λόγος, which Hermogenes treats at length toward the end of the *De Ideis*, 380.12 ff. It is for him the mixture of all the Forms, including Force. Though Dignity is included, the purposes of the two do not always coincide. The πολιτικός λόγος is rooted in politics and reflects a view of Demosthenes primarily as a courtroom orator, whereas Dignity is based on a broader conception. The conflict is evidence of the dual personality of the *De Ideis* itself, which for historical reasons continued to promote the practical virtues of courtroom oratory as seen in Demosthenes at the same time that it abstracted from them a roster of more general standards. On Hermogenes' πολιτικός λόγος the best analysis is by MARYDA, 46-47. See p. 130.

5. 242.17: αἱ ἀλληγορικαὶ μέθοδοι ὅταν διαρκοῦσιν. See note 2, *supra*.

6. The text does not elaborate, but SICELIOTES, 6.222.6 W, gives as examples the beetle passage in ARISTOPHANES' *Peace* 100 ff. and the account of the origin of sexuality developed by Aristophanes in PLATO's *Symposium* 189d ff. The burden of Siceliot's remarks is that such passages do not qualify because the intent is comic: 6.221.31 W. ἐκείναι μὲν γὰρ γελῶντων, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται τῶν θαυμαζόντων. See p. 195.

7. 246.23: τὸ δι' ἐμφάσεων μυστικῶς τι καὶ τελεστικῶς ἐν ταῖς σεμναῖς τῶν ἐννοιῶν ὑποσημαίνειν.

to discourse. The Platonic phrases τὸ ὄντως ὄν and ἀγαθὸς ᾗν (said of the Creator) are illustrations.¹

C. Diction.

1. In general, sounds which require the distension of the mouth, especially alpha and omega, and particularly in final syllables.

2. The o-sound in words culminating in long syllables, e.g., Ὀρόντης. Also, long vowels and diphthongs, particularly in final syllables, except for αι. The iota should be avoided.

3. Tropical expressions. These must be used with caution and moderation. There are degrees of excess: first, ruggedness; second, harshness; beyond even this, they become coarse and cheap,² as sometimes in Pindar and the tragic poets. There are no such examples in Demosthenes; indeed, the πολιτικὸς λόγος does not admit them.

4. Participles, pronouns, and nouns abstracted from verbs. These are "onomastic" words. Verbs should be used least of all. Thucydides' description of the revolution at Coreyra is a good illustration of their omission.³

D. Figures.

1. The same as under Purity:⁴ essentially ὀρθότης, that is, direct constructions using the nominative.⁵ These make for clarity. When, on the other hand, we use a genitive absolute, a second phrase is required to resolve the thought grammatically. Then we are in Amplitude, which in this respect at least is the opposite of Purity and Dignity.

2. Judgments,⁶ e.g., Demosthenes' "with right and noble

1. *Timaeus* 29e.

2. 248.16-25: τραχύνουσι --- σκληρότερον --- παχύτερον καὶ σχεδὸν εὐτελέστερον.

3. 249.12: ἔτι δὲ σεμνὴ λέξις ἣ τε ὀνομαστικὴ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὀνόματα. ὀνομαστικὴν δὲ λέγω τὴν τε ἀπὸ τῶν ῥημάτων εἰς ὀνόματα πεποιημένην καὶ τὴν διὰ μετοχῶν τε καὶ ἀντωνυμιῶν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὡς ἐλάχιστα γὰρ ἐν σεμνότητι δεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς ῥήμασι. THUCYDIDES, 3.82: τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλουσιν δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, κτλ. On «onomastic» words see pp. 147, 157.

4. 229.19 ff.

5. 250.6: σχήματα δὲ σεμνά, ἅπερ καὶ καθαρὰ, ἣ ὀρθότης λέγω καὶ εἰ τι τοιοῦτότροπον.

6. ἐπικρίσεις, 250.8. The figure is a close relative of ἐπιφώνημα, which is described in *De Inventione*, 196.11, as λόγος ἐξωθεν ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι παρ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενος;

resolve."¹ We detract from Dignity once we include phrases which express reservation, e.g., ὡς εἴποι. These make the style ἡθικόν rather than σεμνόν.

3. References to one's personal opinion, as for example, μοι δοκεῖ.² Apostrophes and hypostrophes³ should be avoided.

E. Cola.

The same as under Purity,⁴ that is, short cola forming complete thoughts by themselves. Periodic constructions and long cola are to be avoided, though the latter are sometimes possible depending on circumstances. Aphoristic expressions are particularly recommended.⁵

F. Composition.

1. Sequences which are not stunted for the sake of the congruence of vowels.⁶

2. Dactyls, anapaests, paeonics, and occasionally iambics and spondees. Epitrites contribute to the dignified style. Trochaic and ionic⁷ meters do not.

G. Cadence.

The cola must end in a suitable metrical foot, as defined under Composition. The ending must be acatalectic in order to avoid a

cf. also 198.16: τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πράγματος εἰς τὸ ἡμέτερον μεταφέρειν. Consult ERNESTI s.o.

1. *De Corona* 97: ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς βουλευόμενοι.

2. 250.19: τὸ εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ἀναφέρειν τι τῶν ῥητισσομένων ἀξιομαστικὸν καὶ σεμνόν.

3. Hypostrophe is the resumption of a theme after a parenthetical interruption; also called ἐπεμβολή, 7.978.26 W. Hyperbaton is a form of it. See PLANUDES, 5.490. 14 W. SICELIOTES gives a long account, 6.234.26-236.19 W, and later, 278.4, calls it μεσολάβησις τις κώλου ὑφ' ἑτέρου. The commentators agree that apostrophe deals with people and hypostrophe with things. Cf. also GREGORY OF CORINTH, 7.1262. 22 W.

4. 232.3 ff.

5. E.g., *Phaedrus* 245c: ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος (251.16).

6. 251.21: συνθῆκαί γε μὴν σεμναὶ αἱ τῆς μὲν συγκρούσεως ἕνεκα τῶν φωνηέντων μὴ μικρολογούμεναι.

7. Siceliotas says ionic rhythms are womanish and mincing, like the Ionians who invented them, whereas Dignity is stately and masculine: 6.241.13 W: καθάπερ καὶ οἱ ἐφευρόντες αὐτοὺς Ἴωνες βλακώδεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὡς ἂν τις εἴπη γύνιδες· ἣ δὲ σεμνότης ἀνδρική καὶ μεγαλοπρεπής. Similarly SYRIANUS, 2.2.3; ANON., 7.984.5 W.

trochaic pattern. Cadence should not be jerky but should have a stately movement, which it will achieve if 1) the cola end in nouns or adjectives of not less than three syllables; and 2) if there is a preponderance of long syllables, so that the ending is a double spondee or any of the epitrites except the fourth (i.e., $\cup - - -$, $- \cup - -$, $- - \cup -$, but not $- - - \cup$). An especially dignified effect is achieved if the vowel in the last or penultimate syllable is one of those which distend the mouth, such as alpha or omega, as stated in the rules governing Diction.

H. Rhythm.

Rhythm is made up of and attends upon Composition and Cadence.¹ One should maintain the metrical patterns proper to a particular Form unbroken throughout, not only in the body of a sentence but at the end of the individual cola.²

II. Amplitude.³

A. Sentences.

1. The addition of generic references to the mention of specific persons or events, i.e., genus to species, unlimited to limited, whole to part.⁴

1. 218.22: συνθέσεις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτων συνιστάμενον ὁ ῥυθμός· ἢ γὰρ ποῖα σύνθεσις τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν καὶ τὸ ὧδε πῶς ἀναπαύσθαι τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ μὴ ὧδε ποιεῖ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλὰ μὴ τοιόνδε εἶναι τὸν ῥυθμόν; 219.18: τὸν δὲ περὶ ῥυθμοῦ τι λέγοντα καὶ συνθήκης ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ στοιχείων διαλαβεῖν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τῆς ἀναπαύσεως ὁ ῥυθμός --- ὁ δὲ ῥυθμός ὥσπερ εἰδός τι ἐπακολουθεῖ τῇ τε συνθήκῃ τῇ ποίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἀναπαύσει ἄλλο τι ὃν παρὰ ταῦτα.

2. 254.10: εἰδέναι μέντοι χρή, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ δι' ὧν ἐξ ἐπιτρίτων ἢ δακτύλων ἢ τινων τοιούτων ὁ λόγος συντεθείη, αἱ δὲ ἀναπαύσεις μὴ καταλήγοιεν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἔχειν τοὺς οἰκείους πόδας τῇ σεμνότητι, οἱ ῥυθμοὶ οὐκέτι γίνονται σεμνοί, κτλ. Consult BECKER, 23-27, who points out that Hermogenes attaches great importance to the beginnings and endings of cola. *Syllaba anceps* seems to be ruled out.

So PROCLUS says, *In rem publ.* 1. 63.16 ff., that one of the chief faults of poets is τὸ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμούς μὴ ποιεῖν οἰκείους τοῖς εἰδεσι τῆς ζωῆς ἀμμουναί--- δεῖν γὰρ ἐπεσθαι τῷ μὲν λόγῳ τὴν ἀρμονίαν τῇ δὲ ἀρμονίᾳ τὸν ῥυθμόν (based on the discussion regarding ῥυθμός and ἀρμονία in PLATO, *Laws* 667a ff.). Cf. also the definition, 67.6 ff.: ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ ποιητικὴ κατ' αὐτὸν ἕξις μιμητικὴ διὰ τε μύθων καὶ λόγων μετὰ ἀρμονιῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν διατιθέναι δυναμένων τὰς τῶν ἀκούοντων ψυχὰς.

3. 277.21-296.3.

4. 278.13: ὅταν ᾗτοι ἐξωθέν τι προσλαμβάνῃς τούτῳ περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος οἷον γένος εἶδει --- ἢ ἀόριστον ὀρισμένῳ --- ἢ ὅλον μέρος.

a. Listing the sum and its subdivisions, e.g., Demosthenes' "There are two two things of great moment, one ---, the other ---." ¹

2. Reference not simply to things themselves but also to their attendant circumstances. These include place, time, cause, manner, person, judgment of the person, and the like.² One should in general introduce similar or opposite phenomena and mention things which are less or more than or equal to the matter at hand.³ Many such items are not to be regarded as mere premisses (προσλήψεις) but from a logical point of view, possessing a logical connection with the subject at hand as integral parts of enthymemes or proofs (πίστεις).

3. Reference not to the simple event alone but also to what would have happened if ---.

B. Modes.

Inversion of the narrative order, putting second things first.⁴ The "first things" have then to be inserted (ἐπεμβάλλειν) in the form of parenthetical remarks and subordinate statements of various sorts, or else added at the end (ἐπισυνάπτειν).⁵ Passing judgment on an action, e.g., Demosthenes' "shamefully, O Athenians, and unworthily of you,"⁶ is also recommended. These are all forms of amplification (αὔξεις). They supply not only Ampli-

1. De Corona 3.

2. 281.3: ὅταν μὴ ψιλά λέγει τὰ πράγματα μὴδὲ καθ' ἑαυτά, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τῶν παρακολουθούντων, οἷον τόπου, χρόνου, αἰτίας, τρόπου, προσώπου, καὶ ἔτι γνώμης τῆς τοῦ προσώπου πάντων τε ἀπλῶς τῶν τοιούτων. Examples of each are given, based on DEMOSTHENES, *Against Meidias* 13. γνώμη gives the author's explanation of the motives of the principals, e.g., διὰ φιλοτιμίαν. The list makes up the so-called περιστατικά, on which see p. 87.

3. These tactics have the effect of «amplifying» (αὔξεις: 281.15, 20, 24) the matter at hand. αὔξεις is the older term, now clearly subsumed under περιβολή. See note 9, p. 140; also W. PLÖBST, *Die Auzesis*, Diss. Munich 1911.

4. 282.15: τὸ ἀναστρέφειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ δεύτερα πρῶτα ποιεῖν. The two examples cited from DEMOSTHENES, *De Fals. Legat.* 17, 158, both contain instances of the attributive use of the article (τῆς πρεσβείας ταύτης τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρκους; ἐν τῷ πανδοκίῳ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ Διοσκορείου). Though not vital to the definition, they may have been chosen because the expansiveness of the construction is in keeping with the general purposes of Amplitude.

5. ἐπισυνάπτειν in this meaning of «linking» also in DIONYS., *De Comp. Verb.* 127.9, 11.

6. 283.10: αἰσχρῶς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀναξίως ὑμῶν (*De Fals. Legat.* 158).

tude but Conciseness and Sincerity to one's style. The recital of proofs and arguments for a given statement before the statement itself is also recommended.¹

C. Diction.

Amplitude has no Diction proper to itself, unless we include synonyms and techniques of repetition, e.g., Demosthenes' "What shall we ask or say?" or "lord and master,"² since these have the effect of amplifying a statement. However, such examples may perhaps be more properly classed under Modes, since they are largely structural in nature. They entail the use of *ἐπιμονή*, "dwelling on a point."

D. Figures.

σχήματα περιβλητικά all involve more than one clause. There are several types:

1. Enumeration.³

2. Suppositions, i.e., if-clauses, particularly if presented in the scheme, *εἰ μὲν* —, *εἰ δέ*. The second if-clause may be either stated or suppressed.⁴ The effect is to produce a range of possibilities.

3. Genitive absolute.⁵

1. 283.17: τὸ τὰς κατασκευὰς τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τὰς πίστεις τὰς τε τούτων ἀνέξεις πρώτας τιθέναι τῶν προτάσεων αὐτῶν. Cf. 'LONGINUS', 126.10: αὔξησιν, ὅταν δεχομένων τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἀγόνων κατὰ περιόδους ἀρχὰς τε πολλὰς καὶ ἀναπαύλας ἕτερα ἑτέροις ἐπεισκυκλούμενα μεγέθη συνεχῶς ἐπιδείχεται κατ' ἐπίβασιν. τοῦτο δὲ εἴτε διὰ τοπηγορίαν εἴτε δεινῶσιν ἢ πραγμάτων ἢ κατασκευῶν εἴτε ἐπίρρῳσιν εἴτε οἰκονομίαν ἔργων ἢ παθῶν (μυρία γὰρ ἰδέαι τῶν ἀνέξεων, κτλ.)

2. 285.1-5: τί ἐροῦμεν καὶ τί φήσομεν (*De Chers.* 37); δεσπότης καὶ κύριος (*De Synt.* 81).

3. ἀπαρίθμησις, 287.6.

4. 287.25: τὰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν σχήματα. Cf. ERNESTI's definition: *mentio rei quae neque facta est neque iam est sed fingitur a rhetore, si hoc vel illud fiat aut consequatur*. Hermogenes quotes DEMOSTHENES, *De Fals. Legat.* 42: εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἦν ἤδη τὰ πράγματα, Αἰσχίνῃ, ὥστε μὴδ' αἰσθανομένοις τοῖς Θηβαίοις πλεονεῖν εἶναι μὴδὲν, τί οὐ γέγονεν; εἰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ προαισθῆσθαι κεκώλυται, τίς ὁ ἐκλάλησας;

5. 288.13: οἱ πλαγιασμοί. The genitive absolute is the only example given, so that it is difficult to know whether Hermogenes intends *πλαγιασμοί* to mean participial constructions in other cases also, as it does, for example, in PSEUDO-ARISTIDES, 34.3 ff. ANON., *Περὶ Σχημάτων* 127.13 Sp III, seems rather to agree with Hermogenes. Cf. also HERMOG. 229.1, 19 ff. Further examples in ZUCKER, 24.

4. The rapid sequence of a number of simple clauses having some loose causal connection explained at the start.¹

5. Expansions,² i.e., various forms of correlation, such as *οὕτως* - *ὥστε* and *ὅσος* - *τόσος*.

6. Divisions,³ e.g., *ἂ μὲν* - - - *ἂ δέ*. They must be of sufficient length to be classified as Amplitude. If they are too long, as, for example, when one such set is included within another, we have a ripe (*μεστός*) style; if too short, a concise (*γοργός*) style.

7. Negative followed by positive expressions, as in Demosthenes' "not as one who would make traffic of your interests, not as one who had any confidence in Philip, but as one of the parts that was to keep an eye on the rest."⁴ Sometimes the positive is not stated but left to be inferred.

1. 290.13: τὸ ἐπιτρέχον καλούμενον σχῆμα ἐκ τοῦ παρασυναπτικοῦ. The example given, 290.14, is DEMOSTHENES, *De Fals. Legat.* 154: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐκκλησία μὲν οὐκέτ' ἦν ὑπόλοιπος οὐδεμία διὰ τὸ προκατακερῆσθαι, οὗτοι δ' οὐκ ἀπῆσαν ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ διέτριβον, γράφω ψήφισμα βουλευῶν, τὴν βουλὴν ποιήσαντες τοῦ δήμου κυρίαν, ἀπιέναι τοὺς πρέσβεις τὴν ταχίστην, τὸν δὲ στρατηγὸν Πρόξενον κομίζεω αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοὺς τόπους ἐν οἷς ἂν ὄντα Φίλιππον πυνθάνηται, γράφας ὥστερ νῦν λέγω τοῖς ῥήμασιν οὕτως ἀντικρυς. The precise definition of the figure occasions difficulty to the commentators. The best explanation is ANON., *In De Ideis* 7.1030.1 ff.: ἐπιτρέχον ἐστὶ σχῆμα τὸ δι' ἐνὸς κώλου ἀπαρτίζον ἐννοίαν καὶ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνειν εἰς ἑτέραν καὶ αὐτὴν δι' ἐνὸς κώλου πληρουμένην, καὶ μεταπηδῶν εὐθὺς εἰς ἄλλην ὁμοίως--- περισυναπτικὸν (*sic*) δὲ ἐκεῖνο τὸ εὐθὺς ἐπάγον τῇ προτάσει τὴν ἀπόδοσιν, ὡς τοῦτο· πρότασις μὲν, τὸ ἐπειδὴ ἐκκλησία μὲν οὐκέτ' ἦν ὑπόλοιπος οὐδεμία, ἀπόδοσις δὲ διὰ τὸ προκατακερῆσθαι. The scholiast goes on to distinguish among τὸ ἐπιτρέχον, ἐπιτροχασμός, συναθροισμός, and ἐπιμονή. Cf. also SYRIANUS, 1.60.8 (=PLANODES, 5.509.13 W): ἐπιτρέχον μὲν καλεῖται τὸ σχῆμα διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐννοίας ἔχειν ὥστερ ἐν δρόμῳ ἡρτημένας ἀλλήλων· ἐκ τοῦ παρασυναπτικοῦ δέ, ἐπειδὴ εὐθὺς τῇ πρώτῃ προτάσει συνῆπται ἡ αἰτία. Both Syrianus and the Anonymus cite Ulpian, a lost third-century A.D. commentator on Demosthenes, who preferred the term κατ' ἐπιδρομήν. See VOLKMANN, 463, note 1, who calls attention to the confused tradition.

2. 290.17: ὑποστάσεις. SYRIANUS, 1.60.25 (=ANON., *In De Ideis* 7.1030.28 W): ὑποστάσεις καλοῦνται τὰ σχήματα τὰ οἰοῦναι ὑποστῆσαι καὶ δεῖξαι τὰ πράγματα δυνάμενα. A full account appears in PSEUDO-ARISTIDES, 27.22 ff. Cf. also 'Εκ τῶν Λογγίων 215.28: ὑπόστασιν καλοῦσι τὸ ἔμφασιν ἔχον καὶ πάθους τινὸς ἐνδεικτικόν. The effect is to encompass the full range of a Sentence by comparing or contrasting it with another. ὑπόστασις defines by placing within a wider context.

3. 290.21: μερισμοί.

4. 293.16: τὸ κατὰ ἄρσιν καὶ θέσιν, e.g., DEMOSTHENES, *De Fals. Legat.* 12: οὐχ ὡς τῶν ἀποδωσομένων τὰ ὑμέτερα οὐδ' ὡς τῶν πεπιστευκότων τῷ Φιλίππῳ ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν φυλαζόντων τοὺς ἄλλους. SYRIANUS, 1.62.15: τὸ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν σημαίνει.

8. Correlative clauses involving negatives,¹ e.g., οὐ μόνον - ἀλλὰ καί.

9. Clauses within clauses, e.g., Demosthenes' "For if, when we came ---,"²

10. Parenthetical additions, e.g., Demosthenes' "he—which is true—appears worthless."³ Such devices add a kind of tension to the narrative. They have both Conciseness and Amplitude, qualities in some ways opposite. The shorter they are, the more γοργά; the longer, the more περιβλητικά.

E. Cola, Composition, Cadence, Rhythm.

These have no special form; all are admissible.

Such in outline is Hermogenes' rehearsal of the habits of Dignity and Amplitude. Let us now put them in historical setting.

Clarity and Grandeur, placed first and second in the *De Ideis*, stand in general contrast. On the other hand, their subdivisions, Purity and Amplitude, are often direct opposites.⁴ As we have seen, the Sentences of Purity must avoid profound or complicated subjects and deal instead with topics of common understanding.⁵ The Modes should give only the bare statement of the facts with nothing added, such as genus to species or whole to part, and no mention of attendant circumstances,⁶ since such techniques belong rather to Amplitude. The Diction must be common (κοινή), not tropical.⁷ As for Figures, Purity, unlike Amplitude,

1. 294.1: τὸ ἐξ ἀναιρέσεως συμπλεκτικόν.

2. 294.7: τὸ κατὰ συστροφὴν λεγόμενον σχῆμα. *First Olynth.* 8: εἰ γὰρ οὐδ' ἤκομεν—.

3. 294.11: ἐπεμβολή. *Second Olynth.* 5: ἐκεῖνον—ὅπερ καὶ ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχει—φαῦλον φαίνεσθαι.

4. 278.11: ὅτι δὲ ἐναντίον αὐτῇ [sc. περιβολῇ] ἡ καθαρότης ἐν τῷ σαφηνείας εἴρηται. Cf. also 226.19; 227.26; 230.9; with the understanding, 295.22, that it is not thorough-going (μὴ κατὰ πάντα). It cannot be stressed too often that Hermogenes proceeds on the principle of flexibility. His observations are on the whole designed to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, despite his strong views, and he himself is always quick to record exceptions and qualifications to his general remarks. I have not troubled to include many such items since my purpose is not to describe his work *in toto* but only to concentrate on certain threads of thought running through it.

5. See p. 81.

6. 227.21 ff.: φιλὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα—μὴδὲν ἔξωθεν συνεφέλκεται οἷον ἢ γένος εἶδει προσλαβὼν ἢ ὅλον μέρει ἢ ἀόριστον ὀρισμένῳ, κτλ. The language is identical with the description of Amplitude, 281.3 ff.

7. 229.9; τετραμμένη. Cf. 229.15-17.

makes use not of πλαγιασμός, but its opposite, ὀρθότης.¹ This makes for simplicity, since the genitive absolute obviously requires an additional clause for its grammatical resolution. The "circuit of thought"² becomes longer; hence less clear. Sentences composed according to these principles will not only lack Amplitude and Grandeur; they will be clearer in the process.³

The other subdivision of Clarity is Limpidity. Some of its techniques it shares with Amplitude; in others it stands opposite. Under Sentences, for example, the reference to the genus of a species may help to provide a context, thus making matters clearer, while in the case of Modes Limpidity, unlike Amplitude, prefers the natural order of narration, putting first things first.⁴

Hermogenes gives much attention to μεστότης, the full or ripe style. It is defined as an excess of Amplitude, a prime example being the insertion of one μέν-δέ correlation within another.⁵ He does not condemn its use but stresses the importance of speaking clearly and unconfusedly if one chooses to avail oneself of it.⁶ περιπτώς is

1. 229.19.

2. 230.16: περιγραφή.

3. 231.11.

4. 279.10; 237.21.

5. 291.13: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεστότης οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ περιβολή πλεονάσασα ἐν αὐτῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν τις λέγοι περιβολή περιβεβλημένη; similarly, 293.6 ff.

6. 293.11: τὸ σαφῶς καὶ μὴ συγκεχυμένως εἰπεῖν; also 226.19; 227.26. Hermogenes says that Antiphon, the author of the fifth-century B.C. tract entitled *Ἀλήθεια*, uses Amplitude without Limpidity, with the result that his style is confused and unclear (401.18). Critias, on the other hand, combines the two; hence is σαφής (402.3). The charge of obscurity is also laid against Andocides (403.6). Thucydides is too τραχὺς and σκληρός; hence ἀσαφής (410.3,9), a verdict which agrees in general with that of Dionysius.

PSEUDO-ARISTIDES similarly warns against obscurity if περιβολή is misused: 22.13: ἐὰν μὴ σὺν τινι μέτρῳ γένηται, δεινὴν ἀσάφειαν ἐργάζεται. So too STEPHANUS, a twelfth-century commentator on ARISTOTLE'S *Rhetoric*, which he interprets on the basis of Hermogenes, says excessive περιβολή produces obscurity (CAG 21 ed. H. RABE, 1896, 181.29). In the ninth century Photius charges Eunomius with trying to conceal his ignorance and impiety by using excessively long periods in order to give the impression of δεινότης through the techniques of ἀσάφεια (cod. 138, 98a5-11). The connection of δεινότης, Hermogenes' ideal of style, with ἀσάφεια shows the process by which obscurity becomes a positive virtue in the tenth and later centuries. See SICELIOTES, 6.457.32 W; ANON., *In De Ideis* 7.951.28 W; STEPHANUS, CAG 21, 181.19; et al; and pp. 12, 88-92. Elsewhere, Photius praises Basil of Seleucia for overcoming the basic obscurity of tropical language through the use of short

a synonym,¹ as we can see in the *Bibliotheca* of Photius, who, applying the yardstick of Hermogenes in his critical notices, feels that an excess of Amplitude, that is, περιττολογία, takes away from clarity.² By the twelfth century, however, a more extreme position in criticism emerges. For Eustathius περιττολογία is in effect synonymous not with μεστότης but with περιβολή.³ The opposite for him is ἀπλότης.⁴

Though περιβολή as a rhetorical term does not precede Hermogenes and Pseudo-Aristides,⁵ the principles it represents can be traced as far back as Aristotle, who in a passage in the *Poetics* groups together such notions as μέγεθος, μεγαλοπρέπεια, αὔξησης, ὄγκος, μεταφορά, and περιττόν.⁶ Most of these come subsequently to be received under Dignity and Amplitude. For Hermogenes μέγεθος and ὄγκος are synonymous. They are produced by Dignity.⁷ According to Demetrius, dignity (σεμνότης) has much in common with μεγαλοπρέπεια.⁸ αὔξησης, used frequently by Hermogenes, signifies the function or effect of Amplitude.⁹ As for μεταφορά, let

periods and of emphasis (cod. 168, 161a21 ff.), and approves the way Himerius has avoided obscurity by combining Amplitude and Conciseness (cod. 165, 107b33-35). Siceliotis, using the image of Plato's horses and charioteer (*Phaedrus* 246a ff., 253c ff.), says that Clarity through Limpidity puts a rein on the wildly rampaging horse of Amplitude (6.204.15 W). In the unusual formulation in ANON., *In De Ideis* 7.77. 20 W, σεμνόν, ὃ ἐναντίον ἀσάφεια, the author is thinking of Hermogenes' dictum that declarative statements admitting no hesitation or doubt are a Mode of Dignity (246.10; see p. 131); thus, those that do he chooses to call obscure.

1. 279.27; 286.22.

2. See cod. 40, 8a43-b2, on Philostorgius; cod. 78, 54b39, on Malchus; cod. 160, 102b23 ff., on Choricus; cod. 164, 107b8-12, on Galen; cod. 177, 122a30-40, on Theodore of Antioch; cod. 192, 156b30 ff., on Maximus Confessor; cod. 214 173a41-b2, on Hierocles; et al. περισσολογία is a fault for QUINTILIAN, 8.6.61.

3. 43.31 (on *Iliad* 1.156); 90.3 (on *Odyssey* 15.17).

4. 377.35 (on *Iliad* 4.285 ff.).

5. This is the only other contemporary treatment, 20.1-35.18. For the background see HAGEDORN, 43 ff.

6. 22.8, 1459b23 ff.

7. 242.3.

8. Sects. 36-49.

9. 280.19; 281.18,20; 283.9; 284.1; 285.11. See note 3, p. 135. On the extensive ancient interest in this category (= Latin *amplificatio*) consult VOLKMANN, 449ff., and the Indices to CAPLAN and LAUSBERG. αὔξησης in oratory appears particularly in the peroration, where through the use of *loci communes* the intention is to gather up the force of the speech as a whole and summarize its points. αὔξησης has its origin in epideictic. See BUCHHEIT, 15 ff. One of its techniques is σύγκρισις,

us recall that allegorical modes are regarded in the *De Ideis* as a feature of Dignity.¹ Furthermore, Demetrius tells us that the diction required to produce gravity (ὄγκος) must be περιττός, ἐξηλλαγμένος, and, ἀσυνήθης, "fulsome, elaborate, and out of the ordinary,"² and by equating ordinary or current speech with clarity so much as implies that such diction moves in the direction of obscurity.

We can see how some of these lines of thought develop in the centuries after Hermogenes once we turn to the fifth-century Alexandrian Neoplatonist, Ammonius. In his commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* Ammonius distinguishes two "relations" (σχέσεις) of discourse, one to the audience, the other to the subject matter. The second, which deals with truth and falsehood, is the business of philosophy. The first divides into poetics and rhetoric. These must seek to avoid common expressions and to choose those conducive to dignity, which they should use in harmonious blend, all in due season, so as to charm and persuade the reader. The object is to achieve σαφήνεια, γλυκύτης, and the other *ιδέαι*, along with μακρολογία and βραχυλογία.³

«comparison,» which becomes a progymnasma in its own right. The connection with Amplitude represents the fullest expansion of αὔξησης beyond its limited courtroom purpose. The development is evident from CICERO's observation (*Orator* 126) that αὔξησης transfers the subject to the realm of universals. 'LONGINUS' also knows the relationship: 127.5-16: αὔξησης ἐστὶ λόγος μέγεθος περιτιθεὶς τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις --- κεῖται --- ἢ δ' αὔξησης ἐν τῷ πλήθει --- μετὰ ποσότητος καὶ περιουσίας τινὸς ὀρίσεται --- ἐστὶν --- συμπλήρωσις ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐμφορομένων τοῖς πράγμασι μορίων καὶ τόπων ἰσχυροποιούσα τῇ ἐπιμονῇ τὸ κατεσκευασμένον. See pp. 57, 76, 135, 159.

1. 246.16 ff. On the relation of Amplitude to metaphor see p. 57.

2. Sect. 77. See HAGEDORN, 45, who compares ARISTOTLE, *Rhetoric* Γ 2.2, 1404b8: τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνότεραν [sc. λέξιν], and adduces further parallels in 'Longinus'.

3. CAG 4.5 ed. A. BUSSE, 1897, 66.5 ff.: διττῆς γὰρ οὐσης τῆς τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως, καθὰ διώρισεν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος, τῆς τε πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροαμένους, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πείσαι προτίθεται τοὺς ἀκροαμένους, περὶ μὲν τὴν σχέσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καταγίνονται ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ, διόπερ ἔργον αὐταῖς ἐκλέγεσθαι τε τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδημευμένα καὶ ταῦτα ἐναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐπομένων, οἷον σαφήνειας γλυκύτητος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ιδεῶν ἐτι τε μακρολογίας καὶ βραχυλογίας, κατὰ καιρὸν πάντων παραλαμβάνομένων, ἥσαι τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ ἐκπλήξαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν πειθῶν χειρωθέντα ἔχειν. τῆς δὲ γε πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος προηγουμένως ἐπιμελήσεται τὸ τε ψεῦδος διελέγχων καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύς, κτλ. As HAGEDORN remarks, 44 note 1, it is very uncertain that this theory, at least in its present form, belongs to Theophrastus as Ammonius says. It does, however, suggest a Peripatetic milieu.

σεμνότης is not classed here as one of the Forms in Hermogenes' sense. Much more is reserved for it: it seems the ideal of discourse in general. Nor need the use of ἰδέα reflect Hermogenes. As a rhetorical term ἰδέα can be traced back to the fourth century B.C. It continues in use, appearing as a general description of style as late as Phoebeammon.¹ Similarly, σαφήνεια and γλυκύτης belong to a wider repertoire of stylistic values.

With μακρολογία and βραχυλογία we can, on the other hand, associate Hermogenes' Amplitude and Conciseness. The usual meaning of μακρολογία is pejorative, "wordiness," though Dionysius recognizes it as a valid Demosthenic habit for certain occasions.² The notion of τὸ μακρόν in style appears already in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and shows features in common with περιβολή. It is in the peroration particularly that we should practice its opposite, βραχυλογία. That is, the review of all the facts in their context must be a summary review, which is to say, σύντομος.³ Hence the two styles are interdependent. Their effectiveness in an oration comes about as a result of this relationship. This association is, then, the historical source for Hermogenes' alliance of Amplitude and Conciseness.

Far more common than βραχυλογία as a term of criticism is its synonym, συντομία. It is known to Byzantium mainly through the progymnasmata, which list it together with σαφήνεια, πιθανότης, and sometimes ὁ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑλληνισμός as a virtue of Narrative.⁴ Pseudo-Aristides

1. *Prol. Syll.*, 387.21. So also in 4.29 Ammonius uses ἰδέα to refer to prose style in general.

2. *Dem.* 251.8 ff. Cf. QUINTILIAN, 8.3.53: *vitanda etiam μακρολογία, id est, longior quam oportet sermo*. For DEMETRIUS, 7, it is the garrulity of old men. HAGEDORN, 45.

3. 52.10 ff.: *μηκύνειν δὲ τοὺς λόγους βουλόμενον δεῖ μερίζειν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ μέρει τὰ ἐνόντα οἶα τε ἐστὶ τὴν φύσιν διδάσκειν, καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ ἰδέα καὶ κοινῇ καὶ τὰς προφάσεις αὐτῶν ἐκδιηγέσθαι. ἂν δὲ καὶ ἐτι μακρότερον ἐβελήσωμεν τὸν λόγον ποιεῖν, δεῖ πολλοὺς ὀνόμασι περὶ ἑκάστου χρῆσθαι. χρῆ δὲ καὶ παρὰ μέρος ἑκάστον τοῦ λόγου παλλιλογεῖν (defined, 50.8, as σύντομος ἀνάμνησις) καὶ τὴν παλλιλογίαν σύντομον ποιεῖσθαι, ἐν δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ λόγου ταῦτα, περὶ ὧν καθ' ἑν ἑκάστον εἴρηκας, ἀθρόα συντιθέναι καὶ περὶ ὧν τῶν πραγμάτων λέγειν. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν τὸν τρόπον μήκος ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι. The next paragraph deals with the opposite, βραχυλογία. The combination of a rich style in union with Tacitean pungency is both recommended by 'Longinus' and is a feature of the treatise itself. See RUSSELL, xl, who traces it to the admiration of Plato's looser richness alongside the *graves sententiae* of the rhetorical schools, affected by Stoic interest in the epigrammatic. Byzantine writing adopts both modes, finding theoretical support in the interrelation of περιβολή and γοργότης. μακρολογία and βραχυλογία are the same pair in another form.*

4. See p. 94. See VOLKMAN, 153 ff. Stobaeus has a chapter on βραχυλογία, by which he understands simply laconic speech.

connects the two in his section περὶ βραχύτητος καὶ συντομίας,¹ as does also Trypho.² συντομία is cited by Gregory of Nazianzus as a standard for letter-writing, while Philostratus makes recommendations for counterbalancing the βραχυλογία of excessively short letters.³ Eustathius calls the rhetorical device of emphasis a σχῆμα τῆς συντομίας, by which he probably means that it achieves its effect by implication rather than explicit statement.⁴ For Trypho βραχύτης signifies phraseology which implies more than it says, as in the case of Delphic maxims. Thus βραχυλογία can have religious associations.

A Neo-Pythagorean adage has it that knowledge of God makes man βραχυλόγος, and another that inexperience of God produces garrulity.⁵ Similarly, Clement of Alexandria, by way of justifying the use of symbols in speaking of the divine, tells us that βραχυλογία contributes to piety and "right theology" and is a mark of wisdom.⁶ Such remarks help explain the psychology behind the use of aphoristic language in religion and also give us an insight into the Byzantine penchant for proverbial sayings, quotations from pagan or Christian authors, and the varied compilations in the form of lexica or *catenae* produced in all ages. The fullest Christian development of the concept is perhaps nowhere better seen than in the assertion of Maximus the Confessor that the word of God is not garrulous or garrulity but singular.⁷

1. 53.8-20.

2. *Περὶ Τρόπων*, 202.7.

3. GREGORY, in his letter, (cited *supra*, p. 50) on the virtues of epistolary style, PG 37, 105B; PHILOSTRATUS, 2.258.18 KAYSER. See also B. LAOURDAS, «Παρατηρήσεις ἐπὶ τοῦ χαρακτήρος τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τοῦ Φωτίου,» *Ἑπετηρίς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* 21 (1951) 74-109, who reviews the ideals of Byzantine epistolography up to the ninth century.

4. 49.23 (on *Iliad* 5,504). See p. 186.

5. ἄνθρωπον θεοῦ γνῶσις βραχυλόγον ποιεῖ (Sentent. 430, *Seati Pythagorici Sententiae* ed. A. ELTER, Programm Bonn 1891); πολλοὺς λόγους περὶ θεοῦ ἀπειρία ποιεῖ (Sentent. 431 ELTER); quoted by CASEL, 68, together with parallel Greek proverbs.

6. *Stromat.* 5.9.56.2: χρησιμώτατον ἄρα τὸ τῆς συμβολικῆς ἐρμηνείας εἰς πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀρθὴν θεολογίαν συνεργεῖν καὶ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν συνέσεως καὶ πρὸς βραχυλογίας ἄσκησιν καὶ σοφίας ἐνδειξιν. Clement's source, as with much of the *Stromateis*, may be Neo-Pythagorean.

7. *Cap. Theol.* II, PG 90, 1133C: πᾶς τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος οὔτε πολύλογος οὔτε πολυλογία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ εἷς. More vital in its theological influence is the notion that the Symbols of the Faith are the abridged Word containing the meaning of all the Scriptures. LOSSKY, 16 note 1, quotes ST. JOHN CASSIANUS, *De Incarn.* 6.3, *Patr. Lat.* 50, 149A: *Hoc est brevium verbum quod fecit Dominus--- fidem scilicet duplicis Testa-*

Thus βραχυλογία, issuing from its ancient confines, influenced mediaeval rhetorical theory in important ways. Through συντομία it gained entrance into theology, while the system of Hermogenes absorbed and recast it in the form of Conciseness. μακρολογία, on the other hand, is effectively eliminated as a term of criticism in its own right, though here again elements of it are transformed and presented in Hermogenes as parts of Amplitude. The importance of the quotation from Ammonius lies in the fact that it recalls parts of the tradition behind Hermogenes at the same time that it is colored by an acquaintance with his formulations.

Neoplatonic interest in the concept of dignity was arrived at pre-eminently through an analysis of Plato's style. Proclus, as we have seen, knew Hermogenes well and we may suppose that he found in him a reflection of some of his own attitudes. With Proclus the philosophical presuppositions which in Hermogenes have sometimes to be read between the lines become more explicit. Proclus in effect joins rhetoric and metaphysics and in so doing ennobles rhetorical values, supplying them with a religious base. In a passage which uses the terminology of Hermogenes he describes the style of the *Republic* as lofty (ὕψηλός), synonymous for him with σεμνός.¹ He comes to this description from noticing that the *Republic* deals with ultimate problems, which, as Hermogenes points out, form the basic Sentences of Dignity.

Not only Dignity but Amplitude as well must have struck a responsive chord in the Neoplatonic mind. Proclus' use in the same passage of the terms προσήκουσα and ἤρμοσεν returns us once again to that popular current of Greek thought, the conception of appropriateness or harmony.² The terminology was to prove especially useful in supplying the

menti sui in pauca colligens, et sensum omnium Scripturarum in brevia concludens, said of the Symbol of Antioch. The *breviatum verbum* alludes to *Romans* 9: 27-28 (< *Isaiah* 10: 22): 'Ἡσαίας δὲ κράζει ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ, ἐὰν ἦ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ ὡς ἡ ἄμμος τῆς θαλάσσης, τὸ ὑπόλειμμα σωθήσεται· λόγον γὰρ συντελὼν καὶ συντέμνων ποιήσει Κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.

1. *In rem publ.* 2.7.23 ff.: ὁ δὲ χαρακτήρ τοῦ λόγου λίαν ἐστὶν ὑψηλός--- ἡ δὲ ἰδέα τοῦ παντός λόγου σεμνότης ἐστὶν προσήκουσα καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι--- τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ἰδεῶν τὸ μέγεθος ἤρμοσεν τῷ λόγῳ· τὸ γὰρ σεμνὸν ὑπὸ τὸ μέγεθος ἐστίν. A fuller review of Hermogenes' criteria appears in PROCLUS, *In Tim.* 3.300.10 ff.

2. On τὸ πρέπον see pp. 41, 97, 153. For its connection with dignity cf. 'SYRIANUS' term (*Hermias. In Plat. Phaedr. Scholia* ed. P. COUVREUR, Paris 1901, 10.16): σεμνοπρεπέστερον; 'LONGINUS', 127.23: ἐν ὅγκῳ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεί σεμνότητι. In the *Refutation*, one of the progymnasmata, ἀσάφεια and τὸ ἀπρεπές are brought together as part of the list of charges which should be laid against an opponent

Neoplatonic vocabulary for such questions as the relation of universal to particular and later, in the iconoclastic controversy, of image to prototype. Reinforcement was provided by the commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*—"relation" being one of the categories—and from another quarter by the constant Christian demand for correspondence of word and deed.

Within rhetoric itself the reference might often be, as in Proclus and others, to the habit of the Platonic dialogues of carefully adjusting the style to the ἦθος of the speaker and the moment at hand.¹ Our texts make much of the need for correspondence of the λέξις or λόγος with τὰ ὑποκείμενα. Both persons and things (πρόσωπα and πράγματα) are regularly understood, but the greater attention is given to πρόσωπα.² In Aristotle's old formulation the ὑποκείμενον stood for an independent sensible object. Neoplatonism rejected such a definition and held out for the primacy of the λόγος. It is in this light that the use of the term in rhetorical contexts can be understood. The language leans in the direction of connecting the ὑποκείμενον with the soul and its expression through the λόγος.

Other themes frequently aired in contemporary philosophical texts and recurring also in the rhetorical prolegomena are the relation of γένος to εἶδος, the meaning of ἄτομον, and similar problems. It would be gratuitous to catalogue the many discussions of these topics. What is noteworthy from our point of view is their influence upon rhetorical theory. A common

in the courtroom. Cf. THEON, 76.19; APHTHONIUS, 10.16; NICOLAUS, 30.3; [HERMOGENES], 11.8: ἐκ τοῦ ἀσαφούς, ἐκ τοῦ ἀπειθάνου, ἐκ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου, ἐκ τοῦ ἀνακαλοῦθου,--- ἐκ τοῦ ἀπρεπούς, ἐκ τοῦ ἀσυμφόρου. For Dionysius τὸ πρέπον is κρατίστη ἀπασῶν ἀρετῇ καὶ τελειότητι, *Lys.* 16.17.

1. See pp. 31 ff., 41 ff. Note that ἦθος is for Hermogenes a synonym of ἐπιείκεια, one of the Forms (345.6, 24; et al.). ἐπιείκεια carries the notion of seemliness and thus has common ground with τὸ πρέπον.

2. Proclus, e.g., speaks of Socrates adjusting his words to the person whom he is addressing: *In Alc.* 28.10: τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις οἰκείως. 'Longinus' makes much of the principle of correspondence in describing the operation of λέξις, 150.4 ff. Cf. also *Τέχνη Πητορική* 187.3 ff. ARISTOTLE, *Rhetoric* I' 7.1, 1408a10 ff.: τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἡ λέξις ἐὰν ἦ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἡθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασι ἀνάλογον. Historically speaking, the Byzantine position on the question of correlation of person and style is, like so much else in Byzantine thought, a mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian theory. For Aristotle such adjustment was intended primarily for the courtroom, as a means of attaining credibility (τὸ πιθανόν), not truth. The Christians came to see «truth» in this very accommodation to circumstance, in a world where both persons and things were God's creation. Thus they combined the Platonic imitation of true reality with Aristotle's circumstantial reality.

definition of the rhetorical *ιδέα* runs as follows: ποιότης λόγου ἀρμόδιος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις καὶ πράγμασι κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ λέξιν καὶ τῆς ὅλης ἀρμονίας τὴν διαπλοκὴν, "a quality of discourse in keeping with the persons and things under discussion, in respect to thought, diction, and over-all texture of composition." The definition appears first in Syrianus, though he is presumably drawing from an older source, and is repeated in Siceliotus. ¹ Syrianus, however, is discussing the εἶδη, by which he understands the traditional distinction into dicanic, panegyric, and symbouleutic types of discourse. ² In Siceliotus this identification is significantly omitted. He simply reports that rhetoric is essentially a genus and includes many species. His text speaks at many points of the

1. SYRIANUS, 1.2.16; SICELIOTES, *Prol. Syll.*, 418.5. A number of Byzantine definitions of rhetoric survive. See P. RICHTER, «Byzantinischer Kommentar zu Hermogenes», *Byzantion* 3 (1926) 153-304, especially 154 ff.; O. SCHISSEL, «Lollianos aus Ephesos», *Philologus* 82 (1927) 181-201; G. KOWALSKI, *De Arte Rhetorica I. Acta Seminarii Philologici Universitatis Ioanneo-Casimirianae Leopoliensis* II, fasc. 3-4, 1937, 56-87. Cf. the variant in Ambr. 523, fol. 146^r, quoted by RABE, *Prol. Syll.*, 418: ῥητορικὴ ἰδέα ἐστὶ ποιότης λόγου κατὰλληλος τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεων κατὰ τὴν ἐπισυμβαίνουσαν περιστάσιν ἐν ὁρθότητι χρήσεως δι' ἐννοιῶν καὶ μεθόδων σχημάτων τε καὶ λέξεων καὶ κώλων συνθήκης τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως τὸ ἐαυτῆς γινώρισμα παρεχόμενη. Psellus' definition of the function of rhetoric is worth quoting (transl. E.R.A. SEWTER, *The Chronographia of Psellus*, London 1952, 194): «The function of rhetoric is not merely to deceive by persuasive argument, or to deck itself out with ambiguous sentiments: it is an exact science. On the one hand, it expresses philosophic ideas; on the other, by means of its flowery imagery, it beautifies them. The listener is equally charmed by both. Rhetoric teaches a man to think clearly, undisturbed by the associations of words; to classify, to analyze, to make one's meaning plain without undue fuss. Its peculiar excellence lies in its freedom from confusion, its clarity, the way it suits itself to time and circumstance, even when a man uses simple diction, without recourse to periods or long sentences.» Greek text (*Chronographia* ed. SATHAS, 177.16-25): ἡ ἐκείνης [sc. ῥητορικῆς] ἀφώρισται δύναμις, οὐδὲ τῷ πιθανῷ μόνῳ ψεύδει καὶ τῷ πρὸς τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀμφιρρεπεῖ ἐγκαλλωπίζεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀκριβοῦς ἀπτεται μούσης, καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἐννοίας φιλοσοφεῖ, ἀνθεὶ δὲ τῇ καλλιπερίᾳ τῶν λέξεων καὶ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διχόθεν ἐαυτῆς ἐξαρτᾷ, διαρθροῖ τε τὰ νοήματα, μὴ συγχέουσα ταῖς ἐπιπλοκαῖς, ἀλλὰ μερίζουσα τε καὶ διαιροῦσα καὶ ἡρέμα πῶς ἐπανάγουσα, τό τε δεινὸν αὐτῆς, οὐ συγκεχυμένον, οὐδ' ἀσαφές, ἀλλ' ἀρμόζον τοῖς καιροῖς καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ ἀφελῶς εἴποι τις, καὶ μήτε περιόδοις μήτε πνεύμασι χρῆσθαιτο.

2. 1.2.19-1.3.3: ἰδέας δὲ εἶδος διαφέρει ὥσπερ γένος εἶδους καὶ ὅλον μέρους· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶδος περιληπτικὸν ἐστὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν, αἱ δὲ ἰδέαι ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀνάγονται. ἀδύνατον γὰρ δικανικὸν ἢ συμβουλευτικὸν ἢ πανηγυρικὸν εἶδος λόγου συστήναι χωρὶς πλείονων ἰδεῶν μίξεως. Other similar analyses: *Prol. Syll.*, 234.15 ff.; 299.12 ff.; 320.2 ff. Cf. HERMOGENES, 218.1 ff.

ὑποκείμενα πράγματα and πρόσωπα; yet his examples are all of the latter. ¹ One might almost say the species of the genus rhetoric is in effect humanity at large which practices it and about whose members it speaks. Clearly, he is thinking in personal terms, or, as rhetorical theory would put it, in terms of ἦθος or ἡθοποιεῖα. One might perhaps add that the popularity of Byzantine epistolography can be explained by the same rationale insofar as letter-writing gives voice to the varied character of human beings and their individual experiences.

This sense of a wide world, large with possibilities, partakes of the same psychology as Hermogenes' Amplitude. It is, however, a world which in order to be understood at all requires an overlying structure, loose yet organic, which will contain but not confine its essential variety. By catering to the need for context and relevance, which it expressed grammatically through a whole range of techniques of modification and subordination, Amplitude offered a way of coming to grips with the vividly luxuriating world of late antiquity and Byzantium. Its habits might also be used to ratify and perpetuate confusion, but at the same time it opened vistas of meaning to the Byzantine mind.

The vistas reach out ultimately to God. Both Dignity and Amplitude have a strong ontological or theological base, the one in asserting that dignity of style is attained by talking about the gods, the other through its interest in relating whole to part and limited to unlimited. We may recall that for the Diction of Dignity the *De Ideis* recommends the use of ὀνόματα, that is, "nouns abstracted from verbs, pronouns, participles, and the like." Verbs should be used as little as possible. These "onomastic" terms have as their main function the definition of the divine, which is the main business, or Sentence, of Dignity. ² One should note that a premium is put on the dynamic aspect. The theory asks not simply for nominal essences existing in their own right as the objects of knowledge and the explanation of the world, but as abstracted from the πράξεις of verbs. ³ As for Amplitude, the effect of the complex sentences, the

1. Cf. *Prol. Syll.*, 418.19; 419.2, 6-12, 15, 23; 420.1.

2. 242.22 ff.

3. MAXIMUS PLANODES, 5.488.7 W, uses philosophical language when he says the interest is in οὐσία (i.e., nouns), not ἐνέργεια (i.e., verbs), though like Hermogenes he is careful to insist on the verbal base. It is not amiss to note that the later Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle's logic adopt, as A. Lloyd points out, «a more formal, autonomous, or nominalist» stance: *CHLGP*, 320; see also his «Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic», *Phronesis* 1 (1955-1956), 58-72, 146-160. See pp. 132, 157.

habits of enumeration, and the other formulae that it employs is to suggest the relation of the units to one another and to an overriding whole. They organize the theological subject matter of Dignity. Dignity and Amplitude are, as it were, the two dimensions of inclusiveness: in the one case the thrust is vertical, man and God; in the other, horizontal.¹ The aim, however, is not the creation of a monolithic conceptual mass nor even a movement in this direction. The world is rather the sum of inter-relationships given in terms of interacting nominalist patterns, a flexible adumbration of quantities and qualities, of modalities of existence at once reserved and committed. Such a philosophy tends to put a premium on both policy and practice. As such it can be the stuff of diplomacy, and we must not forget that those who learned these rhetorical principles regularly passed into the imperial service, where the success of their endeavors can be measured in the delicate balance of friend and foe which they helped maintain within the scheme of Byzantium's ecumenical vision.

The cosmic harmony which lies at the root of such ideas is reflected in Hermogenes' principle of "mixture" (μῖξις), which, as we have seen, is a keystone in his system.² Interestingly enough, his fullest discussion of it appears in his chapter on Amplitude.³ Here the mixture involves not the other Categories but the subject matter, the ἔννοια itself. In other words, it operates precisely in the ontological realm. It is here that the Forms reinforce one another, possessing a natural kinship, so that the λόγος is fulfilled in the happy blend of contrasting relationships.⁴ The critic Phoebammon, commenting on the principles governing the *De Ideis*, remarks on the impossibility of representing the whole as a whole except in symbolic terms. The λόγος, we learn, is like the human body: one knows the elements of its make-up but one cannot adequately describe their composition (μῖξις). So too the artist can teach us how to use pigments but not how to produce a picture.⁵ Here again we can see the

[1. One is reminded of St. Paul's description of the pleroma as including breadth, length, height, and depth: *Ephes.* 3: 18: ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἐρριζωμένοι καὶ θεμελιωμένοι ἵνα ἐξισχύσητε καταλαβέσθαι σὺν πᾶσι τοῖς ἁγίοις τί τὸ πλάτος καὶ μήκος καὶ ὕψος καὶ βάθος, γινῶναι τε τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῆς γνώσεως ἀγάπην τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα πληρωθῆτε εἰς πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ θεοῦ.

2. See pp. 15-16.

3. 279.9 ff.

4. 279.21: πέφυκε δύνασθαι συνυπάρχειν--- τότε μᾶλλον θαυμαστός ὁ λόγος γίνεται, ὅταν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἰδεῶν εὖ κεκραμένους περαίνηται.

5. *Prol. Syll.*, 382.10 ff.

intrinsic connection between Dignity and Amplitude. The tropical language which Dignity perforce adopts to describe the divine serves equally to represent the universals with which Amplitude is also concerned.

Beck's recent analysis of the function of rhetoric within Byzantine society observes similar forces at work.¹ Behind the constant Byzantine preoccupation with tropes he sees operating the principle of metonymy. Its effect is to place individual objects or events within a species and this in turn under a genus so as to establish a system of logical relationships. In this way the individual participates in the fulness of the whole. Metonymy works through a process of metaphor so as to attain a scheme of correspondences issuing finally in the metaphor of all existence itself, the *analogia entis*. Metaphor provided not only comparison but transcendence in a line which raised events from the secular to the divine. Beck sees the Byzantine conception of the Emperor as the highpoint in this structure. His kingdom is the last on earth before the Pantocrator himself assumes the governance of the world. In this view nothing in nature or history can be discarded; everything contributes to a single interrelated whole. The Old Testament joins the New; the events of Greek and Roman history which the chroniclers recite are part of the here and now; history and the present, oecumene and Empire are one, in an irrefragible unity which it is the role of rhetoric to express. One need not stress how perfectly in conception and technique Amplitude accommodated this grand design.

The groundwork for the accommodation had been laid already in the early Christian period, when the Fathers adopted the term περιβολή to describe Christ's taking on of flesh.² In the assumption of human form the divine Logos exalts to its fulness the logos of man, establishing a context of universality within which the act of rhetoric is justified as an essential and transcendent human experience, and guiding the writer's

1. Beck *Kallilogia*, 93, 99 ff. I paraphrase in this paragraph Beck's attractive German text. He makes no mention of περιβολή since his sketch is done in broader strokes, but much of what he has to say clearly supplements the present approach.

2. CHRYSOSTOM, *Hom. in Math.* 44.3, PG 57, 467: οὐ τύπῳ ἀλλὰ σχέσει καὶ οἰκονομίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐγγύτερος ἡμῖν γινόμενος διὰ τῆς κατὰ σάρκα περιβολῆς; et al. Cf. EUSEBIUS, *Demonstr. Evangel.* 6.22 HEIKEI: αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον ἦξεν --- οὐκ ἀφανῶς--- οὐδ' ἄνευ τινος σωματικῆς περιβολῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ νεφέλης κούφης ὄχούμενον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πάχους ἐλαφροῦ, and note Origen's concept of the λόγος περιεκτικός, *Contra Celsum* 5.39: τὸν δεῦτερον θεὸν οὐκ ἄλλο τι λέγομεν ἢ τὴν περιεκτικὴν πασῶν ἀρετῶν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν περιεκτικὸν παντὸς --- λόγου --- λόγον.

hand in the practical task of composition. The περιβολή of the rhetoricians could not but have profited from this theological doctrine. The details of its influence are less immediately apparent in the scholia, where the frames of reference adopted by the Neoplatonists continued pagan, but in any reconstruction of the forces acting upon the underlying presuppositions of Byzantine Christian rhetoric it must unquestionably take pride of place.

Dignity and Amplitude must move together,¹ for the fullest context in which the particular could be understood and find justification is the divine. The Christians had their own solution to the question of the relation of generic to particular in the fact of the Incarnation, which combined the two aspects in the figure of Christ. The Neoplatonists had theirs in the theory of an all-embracing cosmic unity sublimated in the conception of the One. Rhetoric supplied both ideologies by proposing a literary habit which could stand as the concrete expression of their philosophical ideals. In a sense Amplitude aims of course at the impossible, at the realization of a cosmic ideal through an imperfect literary mold. Yet, though impossible, the attempt forms part of human purpose, and we may regard it as an effort to develop what may be called a metaphysics of literature which will act in concert with the rest of the religious life of the Middle Ages. Further, the well-known predilection of Byzantine mysticism for antinomial expression is guided by the same impulse toward inclusiveness. We may note Gregory of Nyssa's λαμπρὸς γνόφος to describe the "bright darkness" of God,² St. Basil's "comprehension of the divine

1. Cf. the two dimensions in the description of Christ by CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, *Comm. in Hebr.* p. 365.2 PUSEY: τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ δι' ἡμᾶς ἑαυτὸν κενώσαντος--- τῆς δόξης τὸ ὕψος τοῦ καθέντος ἑαυτὸν δι' ἡμᾶς εἰς ταπεινώσιν. Much of this kind of vocabulary appears in connection with the doctrine of Christ's «abasement» (κένωσις). Consult LAMPE s.v.

2. *Vita Moysis*, PG 44, 377A: ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἡ ἀληθὴς ζήτησις τοῦ ζητουμένου, τὸ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ἰδεῖν, ἐν τῷ μὴ ἰδεῖν· ὅτι ὑπέρκειται πάσης εἰδήσεως τὸ ζητούμενον, οἷόν τινα γνόφῳ τῇ ἀκαταληψίᾳ πανταχόθεν διειλημμένον. διό φησι καὶ ὁ ὑψηλὸς Ἰωάννης, ὁ ἐν τῷ λαμπρῷ γνόφῳ τούτῳ γενόμενος, κτλ. (cf. *John* 1:18: θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πώποτε; 1:10: ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν καὶ ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω). Cf. also GREGORY, *Hom. I in Cant.*, PG 44, 773B: ὁ γνόφος τῆς ἀσφαλείας ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν ὁ θεός (*Exodus* 20:21: Μωυσῆς ἐσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν γνόφον οὗ ἦν ὁ θεός). See p. 170 Cf. Ps. DIONYS., *De Myst. Theol.*, PG 3, 997A: τὸν ὑπέρφωτον τῆς κρυφιομύστου σιγῆς γνόφον ἐν τῷ σκοτεινοτάτῳ τὸ ὑπερφανεστάτον ὑπερλάμποντα (part of chap. 1, which is entitled Τίς ὁ θεὸς γνόφος).

lies in the perception of its incomprehensibility,"¹ and Maximus the Confessor's desire to create a synthesis in Christian terms from such polarities as spirit and matter and universal and particular.² Similarly, περιβολή is the term Isidore of Pelusium chooses in order to describe the unity of Old Testament prophecy with New Testament fulfillment.³

Though Dignity and Amplitude provide access to the divine, we must at the same time recognize the inadequacy of both before the vastness of God. The Forms, though historically derived from them, are not Platonic Ideas in the sense of perfect stylistic essences, but rather the means by which we approach our divinity and in our imperfect way express it. In the process it is not only God's but our own dignity and amplitude as His creatures to which we give voice. The most important particular to be fitted into the universal scheme is of course man himself.

1. *Epist.* 234.2, PG 32, 869C: εἰδησις τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἢ αἰσθησις τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀκαταληψίας.

2. Cf. *Cap. Theol.* I, PG 90, 1120A. See note 2, p. 107 and p. 170.

3. Book 4, Letter 203, PG 78, 1289B: κεράσας τοῖς παροῦσι τὴν τῶν μελλόντων γνώσιν οὕτω τὴν προφητείαν ἐσέμνυνεν ὥπως καὶ οἱ τότε ἀκροώμενοι ἀπολαύσωσι τινος ὥφελείας καὶ οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς περιβολῆς τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ ἀκριβὲς γνοῖεν. So too Maximus will use περιβολή to describe how man under the inspiration of Christ can encompass the truth of the world: *Amb. Lib.*, PG 91, 1321B: τῇ περιβολῇ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἀληθῶν λόγων δίκην σπαργάνων περισφίξεας ἀδιάχυτον παντελῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι. Synesius in a homily on the Easter Vigil speaks of the night brighter than any day: *Hom.* 2, PG 66, 1564A: νύξ ἱερὰ, φῶς ἐνεγκούσα--- ὅσον οὐδεὶς ἡμέραν ἔλαμψεν ἥλιος. CHRYSOSTOM's five homilies, *De Incomprehensibili Dei Natura*, PG 48, 698-748, often display antinomial thought. The habit has good Biblical support in such phrases as *Luke* 14:11: «Whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased,» and *Matthew* 16:25: «Whosoever will save his life shall lose it.»

The expansive psychology which Amplitude in general represents has an interesting extension in exegesis. In his treatise regarding the obscurity of prophetic language Chrysostom points out that it is not the difficulties of Scripture but the ignorance of the faithful with which we have to contend. The function of the exegete is to deck out his remarks with a wealth of «parables, examples, explanations, and periods» so that the weak and ignorant might have a wide selection from which to choose, just as a sick man's table must be varied to permit him to select one dish and forego another: *De Prophet. Obscur.* 1, PG 56, 165: καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστούντων οὐκ ἀναγκάσιον σύντομον καὶ ἐσχεδιασμένην παραθεῖναι τράπεζαν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ παρασκευάσαι τὰ σίτια διάφορα, ἵνα ἂν τοῦτο ὁ κάμνων μὴ βουληθῇ μεταλαβεῖν, τὸ ἕτερον λάβῃ--- καὶ τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τῶν βρωμάτων τὴν δυσκολίαν νικῶμεν, καὶ τῷ πολυτρόπῳ τῆς τραπέζης τὸ δυσάρεστον τῆς γνώμης θεραπεύσωμεν· οὕτω πολλάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς πνευματικῆς ἐστιάσεως χρὴ ποιεῖν. ὅταν ἀσθενεῖς ᾖμεν, πολὺν παρασκευάσασθαι χρὴ τὸν λόγον καὶ ποικίλον, παραβολὰς καὶ παραδείγματα ἔχοντα, κατασκευὰς καὶ περιόδους καὶ ἕτερα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ἵνα ἐκ πάντων ῥαδίᾳ γένηται ἡμῖν τῶν συμφερόντων ἡ αἵρεσις. See p. 115.

In his prolegomena Siceliotes seeks to relate each of the Forms to specific moral virtues. Thus, he connects καθαρότης, which must here be translated "cleanliness," with σωφροσύνη; it reminds him of a chaste wife.¹ Amplitude excites him more and he gives it an eloquent designation. It is φιλόθεός τε καὶ ἐλευθέριος: the sovereign and noble spirit of man working in concert with his love of God.² The two together circumscribe the sum of human purpose. In another passage he waxes ecstatic in his description of Amplitude and its ways. Discourse, he tells us, need not move only in a straight line, nor be lax and reckless, since human affairs are not necessarily so either. Rather, it may dance hither and thither and wheel about, moving in pace with events themselves and leaping from one to another like a star athlete who aims to contain his opponent from all sides. Discourse which does not act in this way is like a wild beast which either avoids its prey or ranges indiscriminately in pursuit of it over the whole of the plain, without the knowledge—which the fox alone has—of when to circle and when to press for the kill.³ Amplitude for Siceliotes has become a symbol of life itself, full and glorious in its cunning.

The attention paid to Dignity and Amplitude by the Byzantines was as great as it was because these conceptions reflect two of the most celebrated characteristics of Byzantine life and thought. It is no accident, for example, that the eighth-century patriarch of Constantinople, Germanus, chooses to incorporate these two Forms extensively in his sermons.⁴ We have basically to do with a correspondence between rhetori-

1. *Prolog. Syll.*, 899.27-30: σωφροσύνην μὲν διαλάμπουσιν διὰ τοῦ εἰκασμοῦ ταῖς καθαραῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ὥσπερ ἀγνὴν σύζυγον γνῶντας ἀντὶ τὴν καθαρότητα.

2. *Prolog. Syll.*, 400.7.

3. 6.206.30 W: ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐσχάτῃ ἢ περιβολῇ, ὅτι μὴ κατ' εὐθείαν μόνον ὁ λόγος κινεῖται, οὐδὲ ἀνειμένος καὶ λελυμένος, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ πάντα τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλ' ὥδε κάκεισε χορεύει πρὸς τὰ πράγματα μεταβαλλόμενος καὶ παραβαλλόμενος, καὶ ἀπὸ ἑλλοῦ εἰς ἄλλο μεταπηδῶν, ὥσπερ τρισαριστέος πάντοθεν συνέχων τὸν ἀντιβαίνοντα, καὶ ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἴσος ἐστὶ θηρίῳ ὡς ἐπὶ πολλοῦ τοῦ πεδίου τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἢ φεύγοντι τινὰς ἢ διώκοντι, καμπὰς καὶ διακυκλήσεις καὶ περικοπὰς καὶ ἐπιτάσεις, αἷς ἢ ἀλώπηξ μόνῃ ποιεῖ τῶν πάντων, οὐκ ἔχοντι, κτλ. For similar sentiments in 'Longinus' see p. 76. Discourse as a wild beast also in DEMETRIUS, 8.

4. See J. LIST, *Studien zur Homiletik. Germanus I. von Konstantinopel und seiner Zeit. Texte und Forschungen zur byzantinisch-neugriechischen Philologie* No. 29, Athens 1939, *passim*, especially 86-88. For discourse as a dance cf. also NICEPHORUS CHYMNUS, *Epistle* 1, pp. 1-2 ed. J. F. BOISSONADE, *Anecdota Nova*, Paris 1844: ἐσπούδασται δ' ἐν πᾶσιν ἐμοὶ μετ' εὐκρινείας καὶ καθαρότητος, καὶ ἥθους καὶ κάλλους, καὶ σχηματισμὸς πυκνός, & καὶ ἔμφυχον ποιεῖ τὸν λόγον, ἀναπαυόμενον ὡς δεῖ καὶ κινούμενον,

cal and social or cultural ideals and practices. That such a partnership did in fact exist and guide the Byzantine mind seems undeniable. Rhetoric was not simply part of one's schooling, to be acquired and soon forgotten. It continued throughout the life of the Byzantine state to inform not merely the literary efforts but also the outlook and attitudes of the class from whose ranks steadily came both the cultural leaders and the learned ministers of the Byzantine court. The sense of decorum which underlies Byzantine religious art as well as the traditions of private and public life has its rhetorical counterpart in the same standard, τὸ σεμνόν.¹ This gave Byzantine literature its moral dimension. As for Amplitude, it functioned as a logical construct, aiming at the creation of a full noetic structure, oecumenical, as it were, in its scope. As such it found a responsive audience among both theologians and philosophers who, with their interest both in Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's logic, came in late antiquity to examine Hermogenes' works.²

A third category was, however, needed in order to complete the scheme. The aesthetic force of discourse Hermogenes reserves under a special heading. For him Beauty is a Form in its own right. Aesthetic considerations are little in evidence in his chapter on Amplitude, which has practically nothing to do with the effect of style on the ear. Rhythm, for example, is not a special feature. Now Beauty is a kind of symmetry or felicitous concord of all the Forms or elements of them with one another (συμμετρία, εὐαρμοστία). Propriety (τὸ πρέπον) is the guiding power

καὶ μετὰ χάριτος πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν συστρεφόμενον, καὶ οἷον ὀραλλόμενον καὶ χορεύοντα μεθ' ἡδονῆς, κτλ.

1. Brilliance, one of the Forms, is a complement to it. Hermogenes recognizes two types of Brilliance, one related to Pleasantness, Simplicity, Elegance, and Beauty, and the other to Grandeur. He is much more interested in the second and says that Brilliance makes a greater contribution to Grandeur than any of the other Forms. Dignity requires Brilliance to keep it from being too severe: 264.8-20: τῶν γὰρ ποιουσῶν τὸ μέγεθος τε καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῷ λόγῳ ἰδεῶν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἐστὶν ἡ λαμπρότης;—δεῖ τῷ σεμνῷ—προσεῖναι τι πάντως καὶ φαιδρότητας, ἵνα μὴ πάντῃ αὐστηρὸς ᾖ. φαιδρότητας δὲ οὐ τῆς ἐν ὀρασίμῳ, ἢ δὴ γλυκύτητος τε καὶ ἀφελείας ἐστίν, οὐδὲ τῆς κατ' ἐπιμέλειαν συνθήκης κάλλος ἐχούσης τι—οὐκ οὖν ταύτης δεῖ τῆς φαιδρότητας—ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀξιοματυχίας—ταύτην δὲ ποιεῖ ἡ λαμπρότης, περὶ ἧς ῥητέον. See HAGEDORN, 41,50.

2. Cf. ORIGEN's phrase, *Contra Celsum* 3.39: περιβολὴ λόγων καὶ λέξεων σύνθεσις καὶ μετὰ διαιρέσεων καὶ τεχνολογίας ἐλληνικῆς ἀκολουθία. In the context of his methodology περιβολὴ λόγων is the compass of logical and dialectical proof acting through and in conjunction with the rhetorical scheme of language to effect the definition of a proposition.

and the result a kind of κόσμος.¹ Hermogenes cites Plato's *Phaedrus* to the effect that discourse ought to be a living organism with a body of its own and a head and feet, both torso and extremities adapted to one another and to the whole.² Beauty works not through Sentences, as Amplitude does, but through Diction, Cola, Cadence, and Rhythm. These are precisely the areas where Amplitude has little or no special competence. Hence Beauty acts as a kind of supplement to it.³

This is the basic trinitarian scheme on which Byzantine criticism was later to draw. In Christian hands, however, the formula goes beyond the traditional limits of rhetorical action. Stylistic considerations hardly exist isolated from literary value. The antithesis between rhetorical and literary criticism has no real force in Byzantium. The old distinction between λόγος and λέξις⁴ dissolves. The Byzantine λόγος is the product not only of style but of the whole complex creative power of the soul of man. Better put, it is both at once. In this way style becomes not something external but an expression of man as a spiritual entity in and of the world. The germ of such an outlook is already evident in the *De Ideis*,

1. 296.19; 207.5, 11, 26. For the role of Beauty in Renaissance literature see PATTERSON, 58ff., 123ff.

2. 297.10. *Phaedrus* 264c: δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον συνεστάναι σώμα τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα. Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Poetics* 23.1, 1459a17: ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τέλος ἵνα ὥσπερ ζῶον ἐν ὅλῳ ποιῇ τὴν οἰκίαν ἡδονήν. The conception of discourse as a coherent organism is very frequent in ancient criticism: ARISTOTLE, *Rhetoric* I 14.8, 1415b8; *Rhet. ad Alex.* 59.7; 67; 26. 83.14; *Ad Herenn.* 4.58; CIC., *De Orat.* 2.325; *Orator* 126; 'LONGINUS', 168.13; et al. See AVENARIUS, 109 ff., who points to GORGAS, Fr. 82. B.11, as the origin of the view of the ἐν καὶ σύμμετρον with reference to the products of the visual arts. The theme is frequent also in the rhetorical scholia: SYRIANUS, 1.85.1; ANON., *In De Ideis* 7.964.18 W; ANON., *In De Stat., Prol. Syll.*, 320.14; (MARCELLINI), *In De Stat., Prol. Syll.*, 264.20 (from a source used also by ELIAS, *CAG* 18.1, 155.27-156.7, quoted by RABE); 281.25; DOXAPATRES, *In De Invent., Prol. Syll.*, 363.18; et al. See pp. 28, 172, 179.

3. Beauty and Amplitude can also share certain techniques. Cf. 305.13: οἱ κατὰ συζυγίαν μερισμοὶ διὰ τῆς ἰσοκαλίας, ὥς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς περιβολῆς ἐδείκνυμεν (cf. 291.22); 305.24: ἐπεμβολή: τί δὲ ἐργάζεται ἐπεμβολή, εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τῷ περὶ περιβολῆς (cf. 292.6); 306.23 ff. repeats the preference for longer cola under certain conditions and asks that they have an intrinsic causal connection and relationship with one another that makes for a conceptual unity when we use a number of them within a sentence: 307.8 ff.: κοσμεῖ τὰ ἐξ ἐπιπλοκῆς βραχείας [*sc. κῶλα*] ὅταν δι' ἀλλήλων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐπεμβολῆς λέγηται πεπλεγμένα, τῆς ὅλης διανοίας μὴ καθ' ἑκάστον αὐτῶν πληρουμένης, δι' ὅλων δὲ ὡς μῦθος, κτλ.

4. PLATO, *Rep.* 392c.

where the Forms are not merely linguistic gauges but existential attitudes, ways of grasping reality through rhetoric. Withal, the constant Byzantine impulse toward synthesis is once more in evidence here. Expressed through the universalism which lies at the heart of Hermogenes' conception of Amplitude it helped fashion a Byzantine view which saw in literature a reflection of the feeling that man lived in a world not only intelligible but magnificent (σεμνός) and beautiful (καλός) as well,¹ through being related to God.

Anyone reading Hermogenes' account cannot fail to entertain the impression that Amplitude constitutes much of what is fundamental and characteristic of the Greek language itself. His description is a crystallization of some of its most distinctive features, especially in sentence structure. Its appeal to the learned of all periods derives no doubt in good measure from this fact.

The call to reproduce grammatically the "natural" coherence of events marks in reality a quest for a supernatural organic bond, for a way to give voice to the ineffable. A letter of Psellus, to which we have previously made reference in another connection,² well illustrates the point. The letter is basically an attempt to answer the charge of obscurity that his correspondent had levelled against him. In language reminiscent of Ammonius and his school he speaks of the mysteries of philosophy and its concealment behind curtains. Aristotle abjured figurative language, we are told, and chose rather to employ obscurity in order to restrict theological knowledge to the elect. Psellus prides himself on having combined philosophy and rhetoric, which he claims had for a long time been kept apart. He has drawn back the curtain somewhat, he admits, but not fully. After all, seers do not interpret their prophecies nor the heavenly bodies tell us the measure of their spheres. Why do you suppose the moon is circular? "So that the unifying principle of the whole might remain irresolvable and untrodden by the multitude." The rhetoric he was accused of using is not, he says, the kind meant to cater to the mass,

1. Basically the same group appears in 'LONGINUS', Sect. 35.3, where it is held that the three things supreme in life are τὸ περιττὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ καλόν. Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Rhetoric* A 9.39, 1368a22 ff., who speaks of epideictic oratory as involving αὐξησις, μέγεθος, and κάλλος. Cf. also *Rhet.* B 18.4, 1391b30 ff. and 19.26-27, 1393a9 ff. Photius adopts a partially related scheme of value. *Homily* 17, a key document for the Byzantine definition of art, speaks of a religious picture as expressing τὸ νοητὸν τῆς ἀληθείας κάλλος (171.26 LAOURDAS).

2. See pp. 85, 103, 117. *Letter* 174, *Μεσ. Βιβλ.*, vol. 5, ed. SATHAS, 441-443.

but the kind that manages to convey through its periods, its multiform figures and the compass of its logical proofs, the variegated unity of its message.¹ The letter is a remarkable *tour de force*. Extremely allusive in character, it ranges sensitively and imperceptibly across both philosophy and rhetoric. Its subtle shifts of meaning and its word plays are designed as a practical demonstration of the type of rhetoric which the letter itself holds out as an ideal.² Thus rhetoric is given a quasi-religious and metaphysical rationale within the context of Neoplatonic sidereal thought. Indeed, Psellus seems to be saying, human discourse as shaped by rhetorical form is itself a reflection of that rationale.

Psellus' remarks form part of the contemporary interest in the relation between philosophy and rhetoric. His pupil, John Italus, also discussed the nature of a ῥητορικὴ φιλοσοφοῦσα.³ Anna Comnena's judgment introduces us to an ethical side light. She charges Italus with knowing philosophy but not rhetoric. Hence his style lacked harmony and charm. It was, she complains, like his character, niggardly and without περιβολή.⁴

By the eleventh century Amplitude had come to stand not for one particular kind of style or even for one of the most important, but for style or even the λόγος itself. A suggestion of its special position had come as early as the third century in Philostratus and Cyril of Alexandria.⁵

1. 'Αριστοτέλης--- τῶν σχημάτων ἀφέντος προύστησατο τὴν ἀσάφειαν.--- ἔστι--- καὶ φιλοσοφίας ῥητορικὴ καὶ ῥητορεία φιλόσοφος--- οὐδὲ οἱ μάντιες τοὺς χρησμούς ἐρμηνεύουσιν, οὐδὲ τὸ μέτρον τῶν σφαιρῶν οἱ φωστῆρες' οὐχ ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἰθέριον σῶμα κύκλος ἐστὶ, τί δηλοῦντος τοῦ σχήματος; ἵνα μὲν ὁ τοῦ παντός λόγος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνεκφοίτητος.--- ἡ λεγόμενη περίοδος, καὶ τὸ πολυειδὲς τῶν σχημάτων, καὶ τὸ κυκλικὸν τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος. For the symbol of a circle applied to a rhetorical period see *Τέχνη Ῥητορικὴ* 193.28 ff.: αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ περίοδος κέκληται ἐκ μεταφορᾶς ἥτοι τῶν ἀγώνων τῆς περιόδου, οἱ τῷ ἐκινουμένῳ χρόνῳ ἐπιτελούμενοι τὸ ἴσον ἀεὶ ἀφαστᾶσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν χορευόντων περὶ τοὺς βωμούς καὶ τὴν περίμετρον τοῦ βωμοῦ καὶ τὸν κύκλον περιλαμβανόντων ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ σημεῖον καθισταμένων, ἕως ἂν πληρώσαντες τύχῃσι τοῦ κύκλου τὴν χορείαν.

2. It is impossible to do justice to these nuances in an English translation. Throughout the letter there is a pun on σχῆμα in the sense of 1) a rhetorical figure and 2) the form of the heavenly bodies. Similarly, ἀνεκφοίτητος appears in its common meaning of «untrodden» as well as in its technical Neoplatonic sense (e.g., PROCLUS, *In Tim.* 1.12.14), «without emanation.»

3. *Ioannis Itali Opera* edd. G. CERETELI and N. KETSCHAKMAZJE, Tiflis 1966, 40.

4. *Hist.* 5.8.6.22-27 LEIB: περὶ τε τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐχώλεσε τέχνην καὶ τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ νέκταρος οὐκ ἐγεύσατο' οὐδ' ἐκείθεν ὁ λόγος τούτῳ ἐφήρμοστο καὶ εἰς κάλλος ἐπέξεστο. ἔθεν τοι καὶ τοῦ χαρακτήρος εἶχε στρυφνῶς καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀνεμπεριβόλως. καὶ συνενεύκει ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ τὰς ὁφρὺς καὶ διόλου ἀπέπνει δριμύτητος.

5. PHILOSTRATUS, 2.19.32 (on Isocrates): ἐπεμελήθη δὲ καὶ περιβολῆς καὶ ῥυθμοῦ

In the ninth it is an important element in Photius' repertoire of stylistic virtues. He sees its operation in St. Paul.¹ However, it is still only one in a list of rhetorical values to which the patriarch subscribes. Psellus, on the other hand, will frequently use the phrase περιβολὴ τῆς γλώσσης to designate what amounts to the writing of good Greek.² No doubt the non-rhetorical meanings, "embrace" and "enclosure" (it comes to refer to the precincts of a church), facilitated its aggrandizement. One may wonder, too, whether the encyclopaedic psychology of the age of Constantine Porphyrogenitus and the general expansionist spirit of these middle centuries also played a role. However, another trend might also make itself felt. The invitation to long sentences, interrupted by secondary thoughts; the inversion of the natural sequence of one's thoughts; the lack of a specific rhythmical pattern—for rhythm can be an aid against obscurity—all these factors, given the proper impetus, could enervate and confuse when what was intended was variety and vigor. Hence we should not be surprised when in late Byzantium Amplitude becomes more complex, its sentences longer and its vocabulary often richer, as the weight of classicism overwhelms it and the frontiers of the Empire shrink and contract. Ideals sometimes loom larger in proportion as they recede from our grasp.³

καὶ συνθήκης καὶ κρότου; 2.24.28 (on Nicetas of Smyrna): τὸ δικανικὸν σοφιστικὴν τινι περιβολῇ ἐκόσμησε; 2.53.3: περιβολὴ καὶ τέχνη. Cyril knows its connection with obscurity, *Comm. in Joann.* 2.5, PG 73,328C: τὸ σύμπαν αὐτοῖς ἀνακαλύπτει μυστήριον, καὶ τὴν αἰνιγματώδη τῶν λόγων ἀποστήσας περιβολὴν ἐναργεστάτην τοῦ σημεινομένου παρίστησι τὴν διάνοιαν. Athanasius also is aware of its charm, *Ep. ad Episc. Aegypt. et Liby.* 20, PG 25, 585A: μήποτε τῇ περιβολῇ τῶν γραμμάτων ἀπάτη τις γένηται, as is ORIGEN, *Contra Celsum* 4.2: ἴσως γὰρ εἰ κάλλος καὶ περιβολὴν φράσεως ὡς τὰ παρ' Ἑλλήσι θαυμάζόμενα εἶχεν ἡ Γραφή.

1. Along with μεσότης: PG 101, 572D; also on *II Cor.* 7:7-9 in K. STAAB, *Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche*, Münster 1933, 593.5, and on *Ephes.* 2:1, 614.22.

2. *Mez. Bisl.*, vol. 5, 481; *M. Pselli Scripta Minora*, vol. 1 ed. E. KURTZ, 77. 18; 101.17; 361.11; *Chronographia* ed. SATHAS, 169.35; 181.18.

3. It would be useful to have statistics on the relative proportion of nouns and adjectives to verbs in the authors of the middle and late periods. I may here simply record a general impression that the proportion changes to the detriment of verbs. The historical development of the Greek verb from its simple form to one compounded with a preposition represents an attempt to compensate for the steady draining of meaning from the simple form. At the same time, prepositions add an element of posture which contributes to the «onomastic» dimension and detracts from the purely energizing force of the verb itself. See pp. 132, 147.

The pattern becomes clear once we consult the lexica. περιβολή can signify "dress" or "cover," a meaning related to the symbol of the screen or curtain which veils the divine. It is instructive that the imagery used to define the word passes from that of simple ornamentation to luxuriance. The *Suda* glosses περιβολή with just one word, ὁ πλοῦτος, "wealth," and in a separate entry describes it as a "ceremonial procession of words,"¹ while Thomas Magister's fourteenth-century *Ecloge* says περιβάλλω is περιπλέκομαι, "entangle" or "entwine." His entry makes much of the symbolism of dress and he calls περιβολή itself the "variegated and involuted style."² Here we may leave it and turn to a related rhetorical term.

1. τῶν λόγων πομπείας τε καὶ περιβολῆς. That is to say, the Byzantine lexica regularly have two entries, one for the general and one for the rhetorical meaning. The scholiast in Vat. Gr. 107 (ed. KOWALSKI; see note 2, p. 127) glosses περιβολή in *De Invent.* 107.10 as δύναμις.

2. τὸ ἐστραμμένως καὶ ποικίλως χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐρμηνείᾳ καὶ τοῖς σχήμασι. The notion of inclusiveness comes through in the lexica of Photius and Hesychius, where περιβάλλειν = περιλαμβάνειν.

CHAPTER SIX

EMPHASIS AS A RHETORICAL CONCEPT

When Hermogenes recommends the use of "emphasis" as one of the Modes for achieving Dignity¹ he does not bother to define the term, no doubt on the assumption that his readers were familiar with it. Indeed, it was a well-known rhetorical classification. The most succinct contemporary analysis is by Quintilian, who distinguishes two kinds: "One means more than it says, the other means something it does not say." Quintilian also remarks that in some of its forms emphasis is close to *amplificatio*.² The same connection is drawn by Trypho, whose definition follows his discussion of hyperbole. He regards emphasis as the use of suggestion designed to heighten the effect of a statement. Homer's phrase, for example, "we descended into the horse," suggests (ἐμφαίνει) the size of the horse.³ Now Latin *amplificatio* equals Greek ἀξήσις, a term appearing

1. 246.23-25: τὸ δι' ἐμφάσεως μυστικῶς τε καὶ τελεστικῶς ἐν ταῖς σεμναῖς τῶν ἐννοιῶν ὑποσημαίνειν μεθόδου σεμνῆς. The derivation is from ἐμφαίνω. The adjective is properly ἐμφατικός, but there is a constant and revealing confusion in authors and their copiers with ἐμφαντικός (ἐμφαντίζομαι), based on the similarity of meaning between exposition and expressiveness. RUTHERFORD, 264-266, gives a number of examples. The same confusion exists between ἀπόφασις and ἀπόφανσις. See ZUCKER, 6, note 1. H. SCHMIDT, *Synonymik der griechischen Sprache*, vol. 3, Leipzig 1879, 414, defines ἐμφασις as «das bei einer Gelegenheit oder an einem Orte stattfindende Erscheinen eines Dinges.» H. LAUSBERG, *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik*², Munich 1963, 75, considers the standard meaning in the modern Western languages to be a development through the spoken forms of literature, such as oratory and drama.

2. 8.3.83: *vicina praedictae sed amplior virtus est ἐμφασις, altiore praebens intellectum quam quem verba per se ipsa declarant. Eius duae sunt species, altera, quae plus significat quam dicit, altera, quae etiam id quod non dicit.* The «related virtue than which emphasis is fuller» is βραχυλογία, discussed in his previous section, 82. Related to *amplificatio*, 8.4.26. The fullest treatment of emphasis (*significatio*) in the Latin tradition is *Ad Herennium* 4.67 ff.

3. *Περὶ Τρόπων* 199.15: λέξις δι' ὑπονοίας ἀξήνουσα τὸ δηλούμενον. *Odyssey* 11. 523: αὐτὰρ ὅτ' εἰς ἵππον καταβαίνομεν, δν κάμ' Ἐπειός, also quoted by QUINTILIAN,

in Hermogenes and Pseudo-Aristides under περιβολή, to which it is said to contribute.¹ Thus, theory recognized a fundamental relation between emphasis and περιβολή, two concepts which were later to reinforce one another in a special way in Byzantine rhetoric.

Pseudo-Aristides also devotes a section to emphasis.² As is his habit, the discussion is arranged under three headings: 1) γνώμη (= Hermogenes' ἔννοια), 2) σχῆμα, and 3) ἀπαγγελία i.e., λέξις. The author notes that emphasis has much in common with σφοδρότης and τραχύτης. Emphasis under the first heading is achieved by a simple paratactic sequence of a number of clauses and by passing judgment on a person or event.³ Under the second heading it employs demonstratives, direct questions, and successive negative statements.⁴ Under the third it shows the same features as σφοδρότης and τραχύτης.⁵

For Tiberius, writing in the third Christian century, emphasis similarly involves the principle of suggestion. It consists in "not stating the thing itself but implying it through reference to other things."⁶ Tiberius

8.3.84, and EUSTATHIUS, the twelfth-century Homeric critic, 432.39. Eustathius' definition is the same as Trypho's both here and 49.23 (on *Iliad* 5.504). Strictly speaking, emphasis is a trope, not a figure.

1. See pp. 76, 140.

2. 46.19-48.17.

3. 47.4: ὅταν συνεχῇ τὰ πράγματα λέγῃς καὶ ἐπάλληλα; 47.15: τὸ ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τοῖς ποιότησιν. The two examples here given are θέαμα δεινὸν and νόσημα δεινὸν καὶ χαλεπὸν, from DEMOSTHENES, *De Fals. Legat.* 65,259. On ποιότης as a rhetorical term consult ERNESTI, s.v. E. LEMOINE's study (see Bibliography) analyzes a special use of the Greek article in some Biblical passages, based on a distinction between two kinds of statement, one involving moral judgment of persons or events, the other, which he calls emphasis, presenting a simple exposition of facts (hence related to διήγησις, narrative).

4. 47.22: ὅταν τις δεικτικοῖς χρῆται; 48.4: ἐρωτήσεις. The rhetorical designation for the third is ἀναιρέσεις, 48.13. ANON., *Περὶ Σχημάτων* 125.14, gives as an example οὐ λίθοις ἐτείχεσα τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲ πλίνθοις, ἀλλὰ---, and also the construction, οὐ μόνον--- ἀλλὰ καὶ, 130.11 ff. The same examples in ANON., *Περὶ Σχημάτων* ὡς Ἑρμογένους ἐμνημόνευσεν ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Εὐρέσεως καὶ Ἰδεῶν βιβλίοις σύντομῳ*, 3.708.10; 709.10 W.

5. τραχύτης is not separately treated in Pseudo-Aristides. The relevant section under σφοδρότης recommends hyperbole and «everything which dramatizes» (πάντα ἃ ἐξαιρεῖ), 45.23, 46.7, as, for example, saying «jumped out» instead of «went out.»

6. *Περὶ Σχημάτων* 65.27-66.5: ὅταν μὴ αὐτὸ τις λέγῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀλλὰ δι' ἑτέρων ἐμφαίνει. We are given two illustrations, the first being DEMOSTHENES, *First Olynthiac* 12. The sentence, «What is to prevent him from going where he wishes?» «suggests» that the person referred to will be able to invade Athens since no one wishes to prevent him. In the second example, DEMOSTHENES, *Against Stephanus* 84, re-

is one of a long list of writers whose works, commonly entitled *Περὶ Σχημάτων* or *Περὶ Τρόπων*, have the aim of categorizing and defining, along with illustrations from classical authors, the variety of recognized tropical modes of speech. The entries in these lists vary somewhat, but the tradition is largely self-contained and shows a common strain of definition. Emphasis may be treated independently, in a list which includes metaphor and allegory,¹ as in Tiberius, or it may appear as a technical term under the heading of metaphor.² The standard definition of metaphor in these texts describes it as a transference from a literal to a non-literal statement "for the sake of emphasis or the establishment of a resemblance." Four types of transfer are normally listed: 1) from animate things (ἐμψυχα) to animate; 2) from animate to inanimate (ἄψυχα); 3) from inanimate to inanimate; and 4) from inanimate to animate. Trypho cites *Iliad* 5.661, αἰχμὴ δὲ διέσσυτο μαιμώσασα, "the spear rushed eagerly." Since μαιμώσασα applies to human beings but is used for the inanimate spear, the metaphor is κατ' ἐμφασιν; if it were applied to another ἐμψυχον, the metaphor would be καθ' ὁμοίωσιν.³ As for allegory, Tiberius again provides a

ference to a brother by the same mother but perhaps not the same father is ■ way of insinuating adultery. The section on emphasis is followed by the definition of another rhetorical device, the ἀντιταίμενον, which Tiberius says resembles it. The illustration here is DEMOSTHENES, *Against Meidias* 63. By listing a number of actions which Iphicrates did not do, the orator achieves his purpose of suggesting Meidias as their real author.

1. E.g., TIBERIUS, 65.27; ANON., *Περὶ Σχημάτων* 144.27; TRYPHO, 199.14.

2. TRYPHO, 192.1; ANON., *Περὶ Τρόπων* 208.1; PSEUDO-GREGORY OF CORINTH, *Περὶ Τρόπων* 216.11; ANON., *Περὶ Τρόπων* 228.8; COCONDRIUS, *Περὶ Τρόπων* 232.16; CHOROBOSCUS, *Περὶ Τρόπων Ποιητικῶν*, 245.17; et al. Note that both emphasis and allegory are Modes of Dignity in HERMOGENES, 246.17. Gregory is the author of a commentary on Hermogenes' *Περὶ Μεθόδου Δεινότητος* (7.1088-1352 W) but probably not of the *Περὶ Τρόπων* (3.761-778 W; 215-226 Sp) generally cited as his. This is earlier. See MÜLLER in RE-PW s.v.; WENDEL, RE-PW s.v. Trypho, col. 739.38-63; T. GERBER, *Quae in commentariis a Gregorio Corinthio in Hermogene scriptis commentariorum vestigia deprehendi possint*, Diss. Keil 1891.

3. TRYPHO, 191.23: μεταφορά ἐστὶ λέξις μεταφερομένη ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ κύριον ἐμφάσεως ἢ ὁμοιώσεως ἕνεκα, ἐμφάσεως μὲν, ὅλον αἰχμὴ, κτλ.; also ANON., 208.2; PSEUDO-GREGORY, 216.10; COCONDRIUS, 232.15. Pseudo-Gregory has a fifth classification, ἀπὸ πράξεως ἐπὶ πράξιν (217.1), which applies specifically to verbs and excludes nouns and adjectives. The Byzantine scholia on the grammarian, Dionysius Thrax, give many of the same definitions as those in the writers on tropes. On metaphor and allegory, e.g., cf. *Grammatici Graeci* I² ed. HILGARD, 13.29; 458.21; 457.22; et al., and notice 456.16: τοῦ γὰρ ῥήτορος ἀρετὴ ἢ σαφήνεια, οἱ δὲ τρόποι ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσαφὲς παράγουσι. The *De Inventione*, 199.9 ff., in its chapter, *Περὶ τροπῆς*, expresses

fair sample of the current definition when he describes it as a transference from the literal meaning and connects it closely with metaphor.¹

In addition to his specific recommendation for the use of emphasis in achieving Dignity, Hermogenes employs the term frequently in other contexts. He will remark on two kinds of Amplitude, one φανερά, the other κατ' ἔμφασιν,² and will say that, though περιβολή has no Diction proper to itself the use of certain other stylistic devices create such an "effect"; hence produce a feeling of Amplitude. A passage may "give the impression" of being vigorous and concise (γοργός) at the same time that it has an underlying Amplitude. The two Forms are in fact mutually effective.³ A defendant in a courtroom should "show himself" virtuous and reasonable (ἐπεικής); he must strive for the natural or artless (ἀφελής) effect.⁴ Two of the Forms, Beauty and Ethos, one the moral, the other the aesthetic component of discourse, achieve their effect through emphasis. The two are described in similar terms as providing an over-all coloring which affects the body of the logos. The coloring is both internal and external, and alike integral to the narrative, not just a superfluous accretion.⁵

dissatisfaction with the standard definition of metaphor: the definition based on ἔμφυχα / ἄψυχα in use by the γραμματικοί is too limiting; rhetoric is not concerned with such matters; the term τροπή is better than μεταφορά because it can apply to all transfers of meaning. Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Poet.* 21.7, 1457b6 ff.: μεταφορά δ' ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἄλλοτριού ἐπιφορά ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ γένος, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. These distinctions are noted by QUINTILIAN, 8.6.9 ff., who also says that excessive metaphor obscures and defines allegory and enigma as continuous metaphor (14): *obscurat et taedio complet, continuus vero in allegorias et aenigmata exit.*

1. 70.3: ἀλληγορία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅταν τῶν κυρίων τι ἐρμηνεύη τις ἐν μεταφοραῖς τὸ κύριον σημαίνειν δυναμένης. Cf. TRYPHO, 193.9: ἀλληγορία ἐστὶ λόγος ἕτερον μὲν τι κυρίως δηλών, ἕτερον δὲ ἔννοιαν παριστάνων καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον. The subject of Byzantine allegory has so far received no systematic treatment. ἀλληγορία is a recognized genre. See, e.g., the Homeric *Allegories* of TZETZES and PSELLUS (ed. J. BOISSONADE *Tzetzæ Allegoriæ Iliadis, accedunt Pselli Allegoriæ*, Paris 1851; TZETZES' *Χρονικὴ Βιβλος* ed. H. HUNGER' *Johannes Tzetzes, Allegorien aus der Verschronik*, *Jahrbuch der österreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft* 4 (1955) 13-51). See also HUNGER's useful summary of Byzantine allegory in general in the same periodical, 3 (1954) 35-54; J.C. JOOSEN and J.H. WASZINK, s.v. *Allegorese* in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*. See note 3, p. 194.

2. 288.4; 291.4,6.

3. 316.22,23; 318.1,10,16,20. See p. 142.

4. 346.20.

5. 320.25: λέγω γὰρ ἦθος νῦν οὐχ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δι' ὅλου τοῦ λόγου ἀναγκαιῶς ἔχον ἐμφανέσθαι καθάπερ σώματος χρῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐγκαταμίγνυσθαι πεφυκὸς παν-

Hermogenes throughout stresses the element of naturalness, and we may note that Sincerity, a subdivision of Ethos, is described as ἐνδιάθετος and ἔμφυχος, a natural utterance from within the soul, having as its subject matter items naturally (φύσει) agreed upon or "giving this impression."¹

Clearly, emphasis plays a large role in Hermogenes' thinking. We might reasonably regard it as a kind of shading or tone imparted to one's speech, or as a technique for evoking the vital force of language itself. His frequent combination, φύσις/ἐμφασις, does not imply mutual exclusion. A careful reading will show that what is envisioned rather is mutual support. On this reckoning emphasis might almost be style itself, without which the intrinsic content of language is ineffectual and incomplete. Hermogenes looks to a synthesis; yet there can be no denying that the theory carried also a hidden danger, for under certain conditions one might pass from the artful to the artificial, from suggestion to innuendo, or even come to exalt style for its own sake.

In reality, however, emphasis aimed at something higher. There is a curious dualism in the term itself, the ἐμ- implying inherence, while -φάσις (φαίνω) describes extrinsic effect. Thus the word carries within it a paradox. Let us not forget that in Hermogenes we are witnessing the decisive step in the process of the Platonization of rhetoric. The problem now was to find a means whereby the phenomenal human logos partici-

ταχοῦ; 297.4: δεῖ δὴ πούθεν, εἰ μέλλει καλὸς ἔσεσθαι, ἐν τε ποικίλος ἐν τε μονοειδὴς ἦ, συμμετρίαν ἔχειν τούτων, ὅ ἐστιν εὐαρμοσίαν, καὶ τινα ἐπανθεῖν αὐτῷ οἷον εὐχροίαν, τὴν ἐμφανισμένην διόλου μίαν τοῦ ἥθους ποιότητα, ἣν δὴ καὶ φύσει τινὲς χρῶμα λόγου ὀνομάζουσι. Cf. also 382.15; 384.11. *Color* in Latin: CIC., *De Orat.* 3.199; *Brutus* 36; et al. The notion of congruence or τὸ πρέπον runs through these remarks. Ethos requires that the words suit the personalities being treated: a general's speech must use language appropriate to the military, 321.7 ff. The historical background to the various meanings which the term ἦθος carried in Hermogenes' time are well described, though with a heavy bias in favor of the classical norms, by RUTHERFORD, 138-156. See also the special study by SÜSS (see Bibliography). Parallel sentiments appear in the progymnasmata. JOHN OF SARDES calls πιθανότης an ἐμφασις ἀληθείας, 23.5, and DOXAPATRES, following GEOMETRES, describes it as λέξις ἀνεπιτήδευτος καὶ τὸ αὐτοσχέδιον ἐμφανίον, 2.234.26 W (<ANON. SEG., 396.16), which provides δόξαν τῆς ἀκριβείας καὶ φαντασίαν τῆς ἀληθείας ὡς ἀπερίσκεπτος καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μιμουμένη, 2.236.3 W. Cf. JOHN OF SARDES, 24.5. Some of the qualities of the old πιθανότης appear under Ethos and Sincerity. Cf., e.g., HERMOG., 321.19 ff.; DOXAPATRES, 2.237.15 ff.; JOHN OF SARDES, 23.21 ff. See pp. 32, 153-54, 189.

1. 367.17-20: ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ὁμολογουμένων πραγμάτων ἡ ἀποδεδειγμένων ἡ ἐμφασὶν γε τοῦ ὁμολογῆσθαι ἡ ἀποδεδείχθαι ἐχόντων καὶ ποιεῖ ἅμα τῷ ἐνδιαθέτω πλέον τὸ ἦθος διὰ τὴν ἐμφασιν. Cf. 352.16. On the φύσις aspect see 296.22; 297.8; 321.3; et al. See p. 16.

pated in the real or divine logos, that is, in the rhetorical Form. Emphasis is the term by which such a relationship might be described. Such a concept could provide theoretical foundation for a religious literature, which, unlike its secular partner, starts from a given, the ideal truth of God's presence, and uses rhetoric to voice that truth and that presence in all its variety and force within us. The concept is serviceable also for what might be called the rhetoric of Byzantine art, to describe the concentrated divine power resident in a religious image.

The term had already by the early imperial age acquired a wide range of associations. It touched on the philosophy of language itself and assisted in a special understanding of such problems as the relation between the nominal and the real, the meaning of symbol, and what precisely was meant by metaphor and allegory. It was to make, as we shall see, an important contribution to the question of the relation between image and prototype, whether in word or picture, as part of the Byzantine theory of images in the age of iconoclasm.

Inasmuch as tropical speech of all kinds, of which allegory is but one, contains an element of the obscure, there is an *a priori* connection between emphasis and obscurity. This association is commonly understood in Byzantine texts under the rubrics of Hermogenes. Already with him emphasis has religious overtones. It is one of the Modes of Dignity, to be achieved "mystically and ritually."¹ Hence it comes to be regarded as a force in Christian literature. Photius calls attention to St. Paul's use of emphasis as a means for mystically revealing the hidden truths of Christianity.² His words remind us of the observation of Clement of Alexandria that the truth of God is revealed through "enigmas, symbols, allegories, and metaphors."³ Photius' standard applies indiscriminately to

1. 246.23: *μυστικῶς καὶ τελεστικῶς*.

2. PG 101, 586A: *μυστικῶς ἐξ ἁλῶ καὶ τελεστικῶς ἀνακαλύπτων τὴν τῶν κεκρυμένων ἀλήθειαν*.

3. *Stromat.* 4.4.21.4: *πάντες οἱ θεολογήσαντες-- τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν αἰνίγμασι καὶ συμβόλοις ἀλληγορίαις τε αὖ καὶ μεταφοραῖς παραδεδώκασι*. That these questions were discussed in non-religious contexts as well issues from the comments of PSEUDO-PLUTARCH, *Vita Homeri* 92. Though the author is speaking immediately of poetry and its ways, the remarks are of general application. We must not be surprised, he says, to see the meaning given through myths and symbols. This is the ancient habit, so that the learned may uncover the truth, charmed by the music of the words, and the ignorant may not reject what they do not understand. That which is conveyed by suggestion is somehow admired; that which is spoken openly is considered mean. Cf. HERMOC., 241.8: *παράκειται γὰρ τῷ σφόδρα σαφεῖ τὸ εὐτελὲς καὶ ταπεινόν*; DEMETRIUS, 100-101.

pagan and Christian authors. In the *Bibliotheca* he commends Himerius for using words not only in their literal meaning but also "emphatically," without reduction in the clarity of the narrative.¹ Basil of Seleucia is cited for avoiding obscurity through a proper combination of Amplitude and Conciseness. With him the judicious use of emphasis overcomes the basic obscurity of tropical expression.² Malchus' novel phraseology lends emphasis and dignity to his style.³ Lucian's *Dialogues of the Dead* are admirable for their easy, direct, and emphatic language.⁴ Arrian's linguistic novelty, though not necessarily a desideratum, is rather an instance of figurative style properly used, and its excellence depends on the close correspondence, through emphasis, with the subject matter. This, together with the proper ordering of one's material, is true clarity, intrinsic, not accidental.⁵ A similar observation is made of Basil of Caesarea: his *Ascetica* show an originality of language coupled with a correct use of emphasis. That is to say, the figures of speech are congruous to the subject at hand.⁶ Noticeable throughout these critical judgments is the stress which Photius places on the notion of correspondence. We have here a special application of the notion of *οὐκείωσις* or *τὸ πρέπον* which we have seen play a large role in earlier thought.⁷ What is particularly significant, however, is that the yardstick is closely associated in his mind with emphasis. Indeed, emphasis appears to be its visible or concrete expression. Finally, we must not presume a sharp Photian contrast between emphasis and obscurity. What the patriarch seeks to avoid is rather the excesses of tropical expression. His purpose is to find a means whereby the full force of the tropical mode, which Aristotle had intimated at once clarifies and obscures,⁸ might be achieved. Emphasis is the means to that end.

Obscurity and emphasis are paired also in Psellus, who compares the allegorical logos to a religious rite (*τελετή*) and speaks of it as a kind

1. Cod. 165, 107b30-42.

2. Cod. 168, 116a18-23.

3. Cod. 68, 54b39-41.

4. Cod. 128, 96a39-b1.

5. Cod. 92, 73a8-13.

6. The section, cod. 191, 153b38-154a28, is an extended discussion of emphasis and related matters. Photius is aware throughout that such techniques, unless applied with caution, run counter to the desired clarity and simplicity.

7. Cf. 116a33: *τῆς τροπῆς δὲ ἡ κατ' ἐμφασιν καὶ οὐκείωσιν μεταχείρισις*.

8. See pp. 63 ff.

of curtain behind which one enters the inner sanctum with its pure light.¹ The beginning of Tzetzes' *Χρονική Βίβλος*, an allegorical work, declares that allegory is an Egyptian invention that passed to Greece with the help of Cadmus. The Egyptian purpose was to keep talk about the gods away from profane ears through the use of symbolic or obscure language.² Such patterns of thought affect the handbooks as well. An anonymous treatise, *Περὶ Σχημάτων*, provides an interesting illustration of how such texts might be Christianized. The heading of one of its sections is not a simple, "Concerning emphasis," but *Περὶ σχήματος τοῦ δι' ἐμφάσεως μυστικῶς λεγομένου*.³ The two quotations from Plato's *Timaeus* are lifted from Hermogenes' treatment of emphasis.⁴ To these are added a number of religious commandments, one that we should say or do nothing profane upon entering a temple; another that we should remove our shoes before sacrifice, and a third that we should not disbelieve anything marvelous about God.⁵ The author has passed far beyond the standard rhetorical definition of emphasis and sees its operation as well in symbolic ritual acts of worship.⁶

1. *Εἰς Τάνταλον*, p. 347 BOISSONADE. The Tantalus allegory appears also in IAMBlichus, *Vita Pythag.* 245: αὐτὸν [sc. Pythagoras] δὲ συνεπικρύπτεσθαι πολὺ τῶν λεγομένων, ὥπως οἱ μὲν καθαρῶς παιδευόμενοι σαφῶς αὐτῶν μεταλαμβάνωσι, οἱ δ', ὥσπερ Ὀμηρὸς φησι τὸν Τάνταλον, λυπῶνται παρόντων αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων μηδὲν ἀπολαύοντες. See p. 103.

2. P. 18.1 ff. HUNGER (see note 1, p. 162). CASEL, 63, quotes CLEMENT, *Stromat.* 4.27-31: διὰ τοῦτο τοὶ καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἰδρύνονται, ὡς αἰνιγματῶδους τοῦ περὶ θεοῦ λόγου καὶ ἀσαφοῦς ὄντος (~ PLUTARCH, *De Is. et Osir.* 9.354C); also, 4.41: ὅθεν καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι οὐ τοῖς ἐπιτυχουσι τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀντιθέμενα μυστήρια οὐδὲ μὴν βεβήλοις τὴν τῶν θεῶν εἰδῆσιν ἐξέφερον--- ὁμοία γοῦν τοῖς Ἑβραίοις κατὰ γε τὴν ἐπικρυψιν καὶ τὰ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων αἰνίγματα.

3. The immediately preceding section, 144.13 ff., deals with the ἀλληγορικὸν σχῆμα, while the section following is entitled περὶ τοῦ ἀπαρκαλύπτως εἰσάγεσθαι τὴν τραχύτητα σχήματος. The treatise is discussed by J. BRZOSKA, *RE-PW*, vol. 1, col. 2831.

4. 247.3 ff. *Timaeus* 28c, 29e.

5. The entry is worth quoting in full: 144.29-145.9: ὡς παρὰ Πλάτωνι, ὡς ὅταν λέγῃ, τὸ ὄντως ὄν καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἦν, καὶ ἀναπτύξας ἔφη, τότε τι εὐρεῖν τε καὶ εὐρύνειν εἰς πάντας λέγειν ἀδύνατον, καὶ οἷον τὸ Πυθαγορικόν, εἰς ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν προσκνήσαι μηδὲν ἄλλο μεταξὺ βιωτικῶν μῆτε λέγει μῆτε πράττει. καὶ πάλιν, ἀντιπρόθετος θῆκε καὶ προσκίνει κοσμίως καὶ μετρίως καὶ μὴ ὑπερσχῶν τῆς ἐν τῇ γῇ τάξεως--- σχεδὸν ὅμοιον τὸ λῦσον τὸ ὑπόδημα ἐκ τῶν ποδῶν σου· ὁ γὰρ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἔστηκας γῆ ἀγία ἐστὶ (*Exodus* 3:5). πάλιν, περὶ θεοῦ μηδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπίσκει μηδὲ περὶ θεῶν δογμάτων.

6. At the root of this transference lies the very wide range of meaning which Patristic literature assigns to the term λόγος. It can be applied to all expressions of

Rhetoric associated allegory not only with emphasis but with αἰνίγμα, "riddle." Quintilian can say, "When allegory is too obscure we call it a riddle."¹ Demetrius notices that allegorical language has a kind of impressiveness and dignity about it. It is a sort of shroud, reminiscent of darkness, and suited to the Mysteries. He warns against its excess lest it become a riddle.² On the Christian side, Clement of Alexandria cites the Delphic maxims as examples of the way in which the meaning of things great is conveyed by a small number of words. To him such wisdom, hard to grasp, attests the infinite treasure of God.³ The fourth and fifth book of the *Stromateis* treat at length the question of religious obscurity. As is his wont, Clement draws from a vast array of pagan and Christian sources in order to establish his thesis that knowledge of the divine (his text has strong Gnostic associations) has throughout history been limited to the initiates of a philosophical or ecclesiastical order, and that a process of concealment and revelation has been an element of the religious experience of Egyptians, Hebrews, Orphics, Pythagoreans, Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, Epicureans, and others. One of his key Christian witnesses is the passage on the prophecy of tongues in St. Paul's *First Epistle to the Corinthians*.⁴ He also cites a lost work of Dionysius Thrax, a grammarian of the second century B.C., entitled *Περὶ τῆς ἐμφάσεως*.⁵ In it Dionysius

revealed Christian truth, whether words properly so-called or the dumb language of iconography and ritual gesture. See LOSSKY, 16. This transference, however, does not prevent the author from adopting the older meaning as well, for which he reserves a special section, 119.14-27, entitled Παράδειγμα τοῦ τρίτου [sc. ἐσχηματισμένου λόγου] ἥτοι τοῦ κατ' ἐμφασιν. Here emphasis is essentially a pun. The double meaning of συνουσία, "cohabitation," permits one to use the word while at the same time maintaining decorum (he has spoken shortly before, 117.27, of the σεμνὸς λόγος) and making one's point. See p. 189.

1. 8.6.52.

2. 100-102: ὥσπερ συγκαλύμματα τοῦ λόγου τῇ ἀλληγορίᾳ κέχρηται· διὸ καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἐν ἀλληγορίαις λέγεται--- εἴκοι δὲ ἡ ἀλληγορία τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῇ νυκτὶ φυλάττεσθαι μέντοι καπὶ ταύτης τὸ συνεχές, ὡς μὴ αἰνίγμα ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν γένηται. On this feeling see also pp. 69, 164. Cf. CLEMENT, *Stromat.* 5.9.56.5: ὅσα διὰ τινος παρακαλύμματος ὑποφαίνεται μεῖζονά τε καὶ σεμνοτέρην δεικνύει τὴν ἀλήθειαν καθάπερ τὰ μὲν ὥρια διαφαίνοντα τοῦ ὕδατος αἱ μορφαὶ δὲ διὰ τῶν παρακαλυμμάτων συνεμφάσεις τινὰς αὐταῖς προσχαριζόμενων.

3. *Stromat.* 4.4.22: τὰ ἀποφθέγματα ὀλίγαις λέξεσι μεῖζονος πράγματος δῆλωση ἐμφαίνει; 4.4.23.2: θησαυροὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πλοῦτος ἀνεκλιπῆς ἡ δυσθῆρατος σοφία ἐστὶ.

4. 12:4 ff.

5. 5.8.45.4. See M. SCHMIDT, "Dionys der Thraker," *Philologus* 7 (1852) 360-382. Dionysius Thrax is well known to the Byzantines, but Doxapatres' reference to his definition of rhetoric, *Procl. Syll.*, 106.24, is no doubt a slip for Dionysius of

distinguished two kinds of symbol, word and deed. By the latter he meant specific actions performed as part of a religious rite; by the former, the deeper meaning behind maxims such as those at Delphi. Clement similarly puts both under one rubric, pointing out that the symbolic mode is useful for many things, including *θεολογία* and *εὐσέβεια*, and is a mark of intelligence and wisdom.¹ Plutarch, his contemporary, also speaks of the religion of the Egyptians as a "philosophy veiled in myths and in words containing reflections and adumbrations of the truth, as they themselves intimate beyond question by appropriately placing sphinxes before their shrines to indicate that their religious teaching has in it an enigmatical sort of wisdom."²

Thus there had arisen already in the Hellenistic age a discussion regarding the nature of emphasis which was not confined to rhetoric alone, but contributed to the analysis of the process by which one grasped religious truth. Philo, who occupies a central position in the history of allegorical interpretation, had observed that the exegesis of religious books among an ascetical sect of his time took place covertly through allegory: "The whole law book seems to resemble a living creature with the literal ordinances for its body and for its soul the invisible mind laid up in its wording. It is in this mind that the rational soul begins to contemplate the things akin to itself and, looking through the words as through a mirror, beholds the marvellous beauties of the concepts, unfolds and removes the symbolic coverings, and brings forth the thoughts and sets them bare to the light of day for those who need but a little reminding to enable them to discern the inward and hidden through the outward and visible."³

Halicarnassus, to whom the words are regularly assigned. See *Prolog. Syll.*, 30.9; 7.15.5 W; 3.611.3 W (which last says simply Dionysius).

1. 5.8.46.1: *χρησιμώτατον ἄρα τὸ τῆς συμβολικῆς ἐρμηνείας εἶδος εἰς πολλά, καὶ πρὸς ὁρθὴν θεολογίαν συνεργεῖν καὶ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν συνέσεως καὶ πρὸς βραχυλογίας ἀσκήσιν καὶ σοφίας ἐνδείξιν.*

2. *De Is. et Osir.* 354C: *τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρυμμένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις ἀμυδρὰς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διαφάσεις ἔχουσιν, ὥστε ἀμέλει καὶ παραδηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἐπιεικῶς ἰστάντες, ὡς αἰνιγματώδη σοφίαν τῆς θεολογίας αὐτῶν ἐχούσης.* So also *De Defectu Orac.* 417C: *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μυστικῶν, ἐν οἷς τὰς μεγίστας ἐμφάσεις καὶ διαφάσεις λαβεῖν ἔστι τῆς περὶ δαιμόνων ἀληθείας.* Both Clement and Plutarch draw from Neo-Pythagorean sources. See CASEL, 63 ff., 72 ff.

3. *In Vita Contempl.* 78: *αἱ δὲ ἐξηγήσεις τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων γίνονται δι' ὑπονοῶν ἐν ἀλληγορίαις ἅπανα γὰρ ἡ νομοθεσία δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις εὐκέναι ζῆλον καὶ σῶμα ἔχον τὰς ῥητὰς διατάξεις, ψυχὴν δὲ τὸν ἐναποκείμενον ταῖς λέξεσι ἀόρατον νοῦν, ἐν ᾧ*

An explanation similar to that in Clement is adopted by Iamblichus to describe Pythagorean mysticism. Iamblichus calls attention to Pythagoras' oracular remarks. In their brevity they contain a rich variety of meaning and may be compared to Nature, who through seeds small in bulk but innumerable and hard to interpret reveals herself to us.¹ Thus

ἤρξατο ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ διαφερόντως τὰ οἰκεῖα θεωρεῖν, ὥστε διὰ κατόπτρου τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξαίσιμα κἀλλη νοημάτων ἐμφαινόμενα κατιδοῦσα καὶ τὰ σύμβολα διαπτύξασα καὶ διακαλύψασα, γυμνὰ δὲ εἰς φῶς προαγαγούσα τὰ ἐνθύμια τοῖς δυναμένοις ἐκ μικρᾶς ὑπομνήσεως τὰ ἀφανῆ διὰ τῶν φανερῶν θεωρεῖν. F. H. COLSON'S Loeb translation.

1. *Vita Pythag.* 118.5: *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ κομιδῆς βραχυτάτων φωνῶν καὶ πολυσχιδῆς ἔμφασις συμβολικῶς τρόπῳ τοῖς γνωρίμοις ἀποφοιβάσκειν, ὥστε διὰ πυθοχρήστων τινῶν λογίων ἢ μικρῶν τοῖς ὄγκοις σπερμάτων ὁ Πύθιος τε καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις πλήρη ἀνήνυται καὶ δυσεπινόητα ἐννοιῶν καὶ ἀποτελεσμάτων ὑποφαίνουσι.* Cf. also 75.19 ff., where Pythagoras' symbolism is cited as particularly suitable to philosophical and metaphysical truths: *ἀναγκαιότατος δὲ παρ' αὐτῷ τρόπος διδασκαλίας ὑπῆρχε καὶ ὁ διὰ τῶν συμβόλων. ὁ γὰρ χαρακτήρ οὗτος καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήσι μὲν σχεδὸν ἅπασι ἄτε παλαιότερος ὢν ἐσπουδάζετο, ἐξαίρετως δὲ παρ' Αἰγυπτίους ποικιλώτατα ἐπρεσβεύετο, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ Πυθαγόρῳ μεγάλῃ σπουδῇ ἐτύγγανεν, εἰ τις διαθρόσσειε σοφῶς τὰς τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν συμβόλων ἐμφάσεις καὶ ἀπορρήτους ἐννοίας, ὅσας ὁρθότητος καὶ ἀληθείας μετέχουσι ἀποκαλυφθεῖσαι καὶ τοῦ αἰνιγματώδους ἐλευθερωθεῖσαι τύπου, προοικειωθεῖσαι δὲ κατὰ ἀπλὴν καὶ ἀποκλινὴν παράδοσιν ταῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων τούτων μεγαλοφυΐαις καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπίνοιαν θεωρεῖσαι.* The *Vita* as a whole makes much of the mystical elements in Pythagoras' life and mode of teaching. Cf. 24.12 ff.; 48.16 ff.; 52.5 ff.; 53.14 ff.; 119.19 ff.; 157.16 ff.; 171.14 ff.; 176.10 ff. The theme is very common in Greek literature. See E. ZELLER, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. 1, Leipzig 1923, 400, notes 2-4. Cf. also STOBÆUS, *Flor.* 5.72: *οὐδὲν ἔστιν οὕτω τῆς Πυθαγορικῆς φιλοσοφίας ἴδιον ὡς τὸ συμβολικόν, οἷον ἐν τελετῇ μεμειγμένον φωνῇ καὶ σιωπῇ διδασκαλίας γένος, ὥστε μὴ λέγειν ἀείσω ξυνοῖσι, θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι* (on this phrase see p. 107), *ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν ἔχει φῶς καὶ χαρακτῆρα τοῖς συνήθεσι τὸ φραζόμενον, τυφλὸν καὶ ἄσημον εἶναι τοῖς ἀπείροις, ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἀναξ ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον, οὕτω τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν συμβόλων καὶ τὸ φράζεσθαι δοκοῦν κρυπτόμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ κρύπτεσθαι νοούμενον.* See p. 107.

For some Christian equivalents to the conception of religious silence and its role in helping us comprehend the divine wisdom see IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH, *Ad Ephes.* 15.2, PG 5, 657A: *ὁ λόγον Ἰησοῦ κεκτημένος ἀληθῶς δύναται καὶ τῆς ἡσυχίας αὐτοῦ ἀκοῦειν.* ST. BASIL, *De Spiritu Sancto* 66, PG 32, 189A ff., speaks of preserving the solemnity of the Christian mysteries with silence (*τῶν μυστηρίων τὸ σεμνὸν σιωπῇ διασώζεσθαι*), observes that Moses rightly limited the access to the Holy of Holies on the principle that what is common is despised (*ὑπὸ σοφίας τῷ μὲν πεπατημένῳ καὶ αὐτόθεν ληπτῷ πρόχειρον οὖσαν τὴν καταφρόνησιν, τῷ δὲ ἀνακεχωρηκῶτι καὶ σπανίῳ φυσικῶς πως παρεξυγμένον τὸ περισπούδαστον*), and remarks that the Apostles and the Fathers have acted from similar motives in keeping some of the tradition unwritten. This he calls *δόγμα* as opposed to *κῆρυγμα*: 189B: *τὸ μὲν γὰρ σιωπᾶται τὰ δὲ κηρύγματα δημοσιεύεται*, and adds that Scripture proceeds on the same basis: *σιωπῆς*

for him brachylogy and emphasis—for these are his terms for describing the symbolic force of Pythagoras' sayings—are justified as part of religious expression.

This steady current of thought regarding emphasis and the rhetorical habits and concepts related to it will vitally affect Byzantium. As it passes through the filter of late antiquity it is deeply colored by the religious distinctions and mystical temper of the age, both pagan and Christian, and emerges with renewed strength. The train of commentaries on Hermogenes and Aphthonius initiated by the scholars of the late Empire and, on our evidence, resuming from the ninth century onward, bespeaks an unceasing interest in these mystical modes as part of the continuity of the educational process even in the period following Justinian, when our sources become scarce. Rhetoric during these centuries assisted in and affected the formulation of ever new problems. Of these the most crucial was the theological issue of the relation of image to prototype raised by the age of iconoclasm.

The dualistic cast of mind which lies at the base of the concept of emphasis is woven into the very fabric of Byzantine thought. The literary practice so characteristic of the whole of Byzantium, the imitation of the ancients (μίμησις ἀρχαίων), is psychologically rooted in the Platonic gap between the copy and what is copied. Further, the individual Byzantine himself, reminded by his Church that the goal of life was to liken himself to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ), is guided by the same psychology. Deeply ingrained habits of antinomial and paradoxical expression, to which we have already alluded,¹ as well as the use of typology for interpreting the

δὲ εἶδος καὶ ἡ ἀσάφεια ἢ κέχρηται ἡ Γραφή, δυσθεώρητον κατασκευάζουσα τῶν δογμάτων τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων λυσιτελεῖς. For GREGORY OF NYSSA God is honored by silence: *C. Eunom.*, 2.105, 1.257.22 JAEGER, (PG 45, 945c): σιγῇ τιμᾶσθαι. Cf. Ps.-DIONYS., *Myst. Theol.* 1, PG 3,997B: κρυφιομόστου σιγῆς; MAX. CONF., *Amb.*, PG 91, 1409B: κρυφιογνώστου σοφίας; *Cap. Theol.* 2, PG 90, 1160A: ἡ τῆς σοφίας κατὰ νοῦν κρυφίτης; and *Amb.*, PG 91, 1380B: τοὺς ἐν πνεύματι φυσικοὺς λόγους σιωπῇ κηρύττοντας τὸν παναίτιον Λόγον. A favorite antinomy in MAXIMUS is the «melodious silence» of God: *Myst.*, PG 91, 672C: τὴν ἐν ἀδύτοις πολυμήνητον τῆς ἀφανοῦς καὶ ἀγνώστου μεγαλοφωνίας σιγὴν τῆς θεότητος; *Opusc. Theol.*, PG 91, 229A: πολυφωνοτάτω σιγῇ. The appeal of silence to the religious mind lies partly in the fact that its very undifferentiation makes it a good symbol for expressing not only the mystery but the simplicity and oneness of the divine. Cf. MAX. CONF., *Myst.*, PG 91, 696D: ἑνωσις πρὸς τὸ ἐν τῆς θείας ἀπλότητος κρύφιον. For a Western view see J. MAZZEO, «St. Augustine's Rhetoric of Silence,» *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962) 175-196. In the Gnostic system of Valentinian Σιγή is the primal spouse of the universe.

1. See pp. 150-151.

Old Testament in relation to the New, are also witness to it. Rhetoric not only reacted to these dualistic impulses; it also supplied them.¹ In this way rhetoric gave neat expression to the profound paradox in the mediæval mind: at once the yearning for an apocalyptic identification through means of language with the divine logos, and a recognition of the nobility, yet insufficiency, of its human counterpart. In Byzantium pragmatism and mysticism often march hand in hand. Emphasis provided the means, within this religious society, of transcending the imperfection of language by relating its operation to its divine equivalent. The assumption of two planes of existence practically requires the creation of a locale where the two might meet. Emphasis describes the process of contact as well as its result on the plane visible to man. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle had listed what he regarded as the three components of effective discourse: metaphor, antithesis, and actuality.² Emphasis works in precisely these ways. It would almost seem as if the Hellenistic rhetorical tradition evolved the concept in response to Aristotle's requirement.³

In this way man, the creature of God, brings home to himself God's distant presence. Such a conception could not fail to draw sustenance from the central doctrine of Christianity itself. It is in the Incarnation that the human and divine realities meet across the eternity of time and space, that the Logos of God, the archetype of man's rational existence, and the logos of man are joined. The doctrine found support also in the Byzantine view of the liturgy as a sacred drama which re-enacts the life of Christ through the words of the service and the pictures in the church where it is performed. The living universe becomes the function of a living God in Whose name man celebrates his life.

Through emphasis these attitudes find reflection also in the theory of art. A recent critic has pointed to a characteristic Byzantine view that an image "could be the representation of the visible or the invisible, a

1. Note the bilateral symmetry in Hermogenes' division of the Forms into two groups, the rough and the smooth, and his call for their interaction so as to achieve an over-all unity of contrasting relationships, as, e.g., Amplitude versus Purity and Conciseness. Cf. 278.11; 279.14 ff.; 283.14; 294.14; et al. See p. 16, *supra*. In the progymnasmata, Refutation is followed by Confirmation, Encomium by Censure, and Θέσις invites antithesis. Cf., e.g., APHTHONIUS, 10-16; 21-31; 42.6.

2. μεταφορά, ἀντίθεσις, ἐνέργεια, I 10.6, 1410b35.

3. The term does not seem to precede Aristotle, but it is the Stoics who, given their allegorical interests, appear especially to have taken it up. Consult LIDDELL-SCOTT-JONES. BABRIUS, 116.15 CRUSIUS, uses it to refer to the moral of a fable.

shadow of the visible or a materialization of the invisible. In the latter case its meaning might only become clear to the initiate."¹ We have noted in a previous chapter that literary is appended to artistic theory in the texts of the iconoclastic period and the theme developed of the image as a word or a logos.² *Ut pictura poesis*: the literary artist is likewise engaged in giving expression to the life of the cosmos. Rhetorical theorists of all periods are much taken with the Platonic notion of discourse as an organism,³ and we may adopt for literature as well the conception of the artist as ζωγράφος,⁴ proclaiming through his art the life of the world at a moment in time.

Contributing to this habit of thought was the association which rhetoric had drawn between εμφασις and ἐνάργεια, "vividness." Quintilian regards vividness as a heightening of clarity (σαφήνεια).⁵ In other authors it is an element of persuasiveness (πιθανότης)⁶ and is described as contributing to πάθος.⁷ Vividness profits from the support of συντομία, which

1. MATHEW, 97.

2. See pp. 120 ff. MATHEW, 124.

3. See pp. 25, 154, 199.

4. The terms ζωγράφος, ζωγραφέω, etc., are used in Patristic texts not only in the literal use of painting but in a variety of symbolic connotations, including representation in words and in imagination. Consult LAMPE, s.v. ISIDORE OF PELUSIUM, for example, *Epistle* 1403, PG 78, 408B, compares the painter's task to the search for union with God. Cf. NICEPHORUS, *Antirrh.* 2, PG 100, 365A: ὁ ζωγράφος λόγος. MATHEW, 76-77, points out that φύσις in Byzantine Greek means something more than «nature»: «It meant Nature as a source of operation, a nature considered precisely in relation to its appropriate function.» This feeling ties in well with the stress on τὸ πρέπον (see pp. 41, 97, 153) and explains also the Byzantine fascination with mathematics, in the symbols of which one could see the formal structure of the world. Eurhythm and due proportion, designations often used in speaking of Byzantine art, also come into play here. See MICHELIS, 51-54; 171-174; 272; MATHEW, 1; 58. Cf. ST. JOHN DAM., *Orat. 3 De Imag.*, PG 94, 1361A: λογογράφοι καὶ ζωγράφοι; THEOD. STUD., *Refut. Poem. Iconom.*, PG 99, 445C: λογογραφείσθαι καὶ ζωγραφείσθαι; NICEPH., *Antirrh.* 3, PG 380C: λογογράφοι καὶ ζωγράφοι; also 381C ff. See pp. 120 ff. for additional references.

5. 8.3.61. Cf. THEON, 71.31: σαφὴ καὶ ἐναργῆ.

6. ANON. SEG., 369.13: συνεργεῖ δὲ πρὸς πειθῶ καὶ ἡ ἐνάργεια. ἔστι δὲ ἐνάργεια λόγος ὅπ' ὅσιν ἄγων τὸ δηλούμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ πειθῶ καὶ λέξις ἀνεπιτήδευτος καὶ τὸ αὐτοσχέδιον ἐμφαίνουσα. The Latin terms are *illustratio*, *evidentia*, *demonstratio*, *repraesentatio*. See CAPLAN, 405, note c; VOLKMANN, 158 ff., 276; KROLL, *RE-PW* Suppl. 7, coll. 1411 ff.

7. 'LONGINUS', 131.15: ὥς δ' ἑτερόν τι ἢ ῥητορικὴ φαντασία βούλεται καὶ ἑτερον ἢ παρὰ ποιηταῖς, οὐκ ἂν λάθοι σε, οὐδ' ὅτι τῆς μὲν ἐν ποιήσει τέλος ἐστὶν ἐκπληξίς, τῆς δ'

concentrates narrative so as to achieve a sense of immediacy and force.¹ Traditionally, the term ἐνάργεια had been used in contexts which drew a connection between literature and the visual arts and sought to encourage a writer to adopt a style which would make his words come alive before the mind's eye. Thus, Aristotle describes metaphor as putting things "before the eyes,"² while Plutarch elaborates upon Simonides' pronouncement that painting is silent poetry and poetry speaking painting,³ and Lucian stresses the obligation of the historian to produce a narrative in which the reader "sees" what is being said.⁴ The vision which ἐνάργεια evokes Lucian describes in terms of a mirror which reflects without distortion. The writing of history is properly a mimesis of truth, and mimesis, as Demetrius points out, has an element of vividness in it.⁵

ἐν λόγοις ἐνάργεια, ἀμφοτέρω δ' ὁμοῦς τότε ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ τὸ συγκεκινημένον. Kayser's suggested change, τό τε (παθητικόν), has been adopted by some editors. As RUSSELL, 122, points out, there can be no doubt of the sense, though the precise word to be supplied before ἐπιζητοῦσι is uncertain.

1. ANON. SEG., 370.9: περὶ μέντοι συντομίας Ἀριστοτέλης ἐφίστησιν (*Rhet.* 1416b35 ff.): εἰ γὰρ ἔστι, φησὶν, ἡ συντομία συμμετρία τῆς μήτε παραλειπούσης τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων μήτε πλεοναζούσης, ἀρετὴ γενήσεται; DIONYS., *Dem.* 205.13: τῆς σαφήνειας καὶ τῆς συντομίας καὶ τοῦ πιθανοῦ χωρίου ἀποφαίνουσιν οἱ τεχνογράφοι τὴν διήγησιν. DEMETRIUS, 208-220, in discussing ἐνάργεια says language must be concise in order to achieve it, but must take care to include all necessary details. See VOLKMANN, 153. The way to produce these effects in one's narrative is to include and give due weight to the circumstances accompanying events (τὰ περιστατικά, παρεπόμενα, or παρακολουθοῦντα). Cf. *Ad Herenn.* 4.68; *Rhet. ad Alex.* Sect. 30. AVENARIUS, 105, calls attention to Lucian's stress on wholeness as a historiographical ideal.

2. πρὸς ὁμιλίαν, *Rhet.* Γ 10.7, 1411a26, 28, 35 and 1411b5; Γ 11.1, 1411b23-24; et al. There is throughout this section of the *Rhetoric* a connection established among hearing, sight, and intellect (ἀκοή, ὄψις, διάνοια). For a Christian extension cf. GREG. NYSS., *C. Eunom.*, PG 45, 981A: ὅλον δι' ὅλου τὸ θεῖον ὁρασις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκοή καὶ γνῶσις.

3. *De Gloria Athen.* 346F: ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποιῆσιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποιῆσιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν (frs. 29-31 BERGK); also *Quaest. Conv.* 748A. The objective, says Plutarch, is to make the reader a spectator of events, as Thucydides does (347A: θεατὴν ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν). Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Poet.* 14.2, 1453b3 ff., who says a dramatic plot should be so constructed that one can feel fear and pity from hearing the incidents even without seeing the play. See SÜSS, 175-182, who points to an origin for such a theory in Gorgias and fifth-century conceptions of drama.

4. *De Histor. Conscrib.* 51: ὁρᾶν τὰ λεγόμενα. For other texts on this theme see AVENARIUS, 105 ff., 131 ff. Cf. PS.-DIONYS. HAL., 372.12: γραφικὰς ὅψεις, like wise with reference to historiography.

5. DEMETRIUS, 219: πᾶσα μίμησις ἐναργὲς τι ἔχει. That the function of historiography is μιμεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν is stated by DIONYS., *Thuc.* 402.3. AVENARIUS,

Because vivid narrative implies an actualization of events, a revealing palaeographical confusion occurs in Greek manuscripts between *ἐνάργεια* and *ἐνέργεια*. The association is already in Aristotle, according to whom metaphor achieves its vivid effect by describing things "in active state" (*ἐνεργούντα*).¹ It makes its way into historiographical theory with Polybius, who, in comparing the historian, Timaeus, to bad painters, introduces us to the connection between emphasis and *ἐνέργεια*/*ἐνάργεια*: "In their case the outlines are sometimes preserved but we miss that vividness and animation of the real figures which the graphic art is especially capable of rendering."² This vocabulary continued to prove useful. Centuries later Plotinus adopts it for his philosophical purposes and speaks of the intellectual reason as an actualized presence resident in the soul.³

138, traces the idea back to the Peripatetic Duris. On Thucydides' *ἐνάργεια* in describing what he actually saw see H. PRATER, *Wahrheit und Kunst. Geschichtsschreibung und Plagiat im klassischen Altertum*, Leipzig 1911, 114 ff. The end result of vivid narrative is «ethical» and «divine» speech. Dionysius credits Lysias with the achievement: *Lys.* 22.21: τὸ μὴδὲν ἄψυχον ὑποτίθεσθαι πρόσωπον μὴδὲ ἀνηθοποίητον. P sellus marks it in Gregory of Nazianzus (ed. A. MAYER, «Psellos' Rede über den rhetorischen Charakter des Gregor von Nazianz», *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 20 (1911) 58, line 365): οὐδαμοῦ ἀνηθοποίητος ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ ἐναργῆς καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ὁμοιος. See ZUCKER, 15. Cf. APSINES, 317.9-11: κινεῖ δὲ ἔλεον ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐνάργεια ἢ τῶν ἀτυχούντων καὶ ἡθοποιῶν καὶ χαρακτηρισμὸς ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν γινόμενος.

1. *Rhet.* Γ 11.2, 1411b24: λέγω δὴ πρὸς ὁμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργούσα σημαίνει. Note the use of the term throughout this section of the treatise. The apparatus to Roemer's Teubner edition shows that the confusion has infected the manuscripts of the *Rhetoric* themselves. With Trypho *ἐνέργεια* has even become a trope: 199.22: ἐνέργεια ἔστι φράσις ὅπ' ὅψιν ἄγουσα τὸ νοούμενον --- ἔχουσα δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ αἱ τοῦ Ὀμήρου παραβολαί. Rutherford gives a number of interesting texts from various scholiasts which show how the similarity of feeling underlying the two terms occasioned the lack of discrimination, 266-268. The relation between the two terms is known also to the Renaissance. See PATTERSON, 131ff.

2. 12.25h.3: καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ἢ μὲν ἐκτὸς ἐνίοτε γραμμὴ σφίζεται, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐμφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας (ἐναργείας: some MSS. and editions) τῶν ἀληθινῶν ζῶων ἄπεισιν, ὅπερ ἴδιον ὑπάρχει τῆς ζωγραφικῆς τέχνης. The passage goes on to speak repeatedly of the need for *ἐμφασις*, i.e., vividness. Cf. DEMETRIUS, 216, praising Ctesias for his natural and vivid effect: ἡθικῶς καὶ ἐναργῶς --- ἐμφήνας.

3. *Ennead* 4.3.18.10: εἰ τις λογισμὸν λαμβάνει τὴν ἐκ νοῦ ἀεὶ γινομένην καὶ οὖσαν ἐν αὐταῖς διάθεσιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἐστῶσαν καὶ οἷον ἐμφασιν οὖσαν. A few lines before, the theory is illustrated by comparison with the visual arts. Elsewhere, 1.3.5.2, Plotinus describes intellect as giving clear principles (*ἐναργεῖς ἀρχαί*) to any soul which can receive them. See *Plotin. Über Ewigkeit und Zeit (Enneade III, 7)* ed. W. BEIERWALTES, Frankfurt 1967, 59. BEIERWALTES, 196, notes that *ἐμφανής* is standard Greek

Among the later Neoplatonists one writer who makes use of the term emphasis as part of his philosophical apparatus is Proclus. In his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* he speaks of the *ἐμφασις* τοῦ ὄντος by way of distinguishing the realm of being from that of becoming, and in discussing the process of participation in the world of the Platonic Ideas he calls the visible world an *εἰκὼν* of the intelligible, and then proceeds to a finer distinction "made by others" whereby *μέθεξις* can apply only to the physical forms. When it comes to the soul the relation is best expressed as *ἐμφασις*, and that of the mind as *ὁμοίωσις*.¹ Soul, Proclus says, contains in itself both unity and division. It is both monad and number, one and many, continuous and discrete. In its unity it possesses an "image (*εἰκὼν*) and emphasis" of the One, in its division and plurality an image and emphasis of the divine numbers.²

terminology for the epiphany of deities. See L. WENIGER, «Theophanien. Altgriechische Götteradvente», *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 22 (1923/4) 16-57. In reference to images cf. THEODORE STUDITE, *Antirrhet.* 1, PG 99, 340D: εἰ ὕσση ἀκοῆς τὴν δι' ὅψεως ἐνάργειαν ὁμολογεῖς. The Areopagite says that the priestly orders present in the form of material symbols the working of God corresponding to the harmonious order and distinction of the activity of the divine: *De Eccles. Hier.* 5.1, PG 3, 509A: ἐναργῶς ὑποδεικνύσα τὰς θεαρχικὰς ἐνεργείας.

1. 1.243.24 DIEHL: ὡς ὅταν γε τῷ γιγνομένῳ προσγένηται τοῦ ὄντος ἐμφασις δύναται μένειν ὅπως οὖν γιγνόμενον; 1.434.22: τὸ ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι τὴν ποιήσαντα εἰκόνα τοῦ νοητοῦ τὸν ὁρατὸν κόσμον. οἱ δὲ διαιροῦντές φασιν ὅτι τῶν μὲν φυσικῶν εἰδῶν μετέχει τὸ ἀσθητὸν ὡς τυπούμενον, τῶν δὲ ψυχικῶν ἐμφάσεις ὑποδέχεται, τοῦ δὲ νοητοῦ ὁμοίωσις --- (line 27) ἔτι ζῶον μὲν ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν ὡς εἰκὼν τούτου τοῦ νοητοῦ ζῴου. A similar distinction between *ἐμφασις* and *μέθεξις* as regards the harmony of the soul in 2.295.2 ff.: τριχῶς τὴν ἁρμονίαν νοητέον, ἢ τὴν αὐτοαρμονίαν ἢ τὸ πρῶτως ἡρμοσμένον καὶ καθ' ὅλον ἑαυτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν, ἢ τὸ δευτέρως ἡρμοσμένον καὶ πᾶν μετέχον ἁρμονίας, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀποδοτέον τῷ νῷ τὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν δὲ τῷ σώματι. τριχῶς δὲ καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν, τὸν μὲν πρωτοῦργον τὸν δὲ κατὰ μέθεξιν τὸν δὲ κατ' ἐμφασιν.

2. 2.238.12: κατὰ μὲν τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἐπιστήμας διήρηται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ τε συνεχὲς καὶ τὸ διωρισμένον καὶ ἀντίκειται πρὸς ἀλλήλα τρόπον τινά, καὶ οὔτε τὸ διωρισμένον συνεχὲς εἶναι δυνατόν οὔτε τὸ συνεχὲς διωρισμένον. ἔτι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμφοτέρω συντρέχει, καὶ ἡ ἑνωσις καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις: καὶ γὰρ μονάς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ εἰς λόγος καὶ πλῆθος, ἐν τε καὶ πολλὰ, καὶ ὡς μὲν ὅλον οὖσα συνεχὲς ἐστὶν, ὡς δὲ ἀριθμὸς διηρημένη κατὰ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ λόγους, καὶ διὰ μὲν τῆς συνεχείας ὁμοιούμενη πρὸς τὴν ἑνωσιν τῶν νοητῶν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πλῆθους πρὸς τὴν διάκρισιν καὶ ἔτι τούτων ἀνωτέρω κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἑνωσιν εἰκόνα καὶ ἐμφασιν ἔχουσα τοῦ ἑνός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θείων ἀριθμῶν. The passage, a mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian theory, rests on the distinction between the continuous and the discrete in *Categories* 6, 4b20 ff.

Elsewhere, the assessment of Plato's style is combined with an analysis of its function as a teaching method. Plato's lofty and dignified language is suited both to the Muses and to wordly concerns, for the universe and individual souls are dig-

Proclus' remarks might do double duty, both as metaphysics and as a philosophy of discourse. Siceliotes, in describing the operation of Hermogenes' Forms, uses language strikingly similar. A god, as it were, he tells us, infuses into the organism of our words a soul which through its virtues keeps the image and likeness of the archetypal first principle, not in the sense of the particular stylistic ideals represented by a Lysias or Isocrates, but of an all-embracing Form in itself, in accordance with which we each "ensoul" our words and from which issue the corresponding expressions that reflect our personal characteristics. Just as our rational or intellectual soul in its essential logos is one and undivided but discrete in terms of our individual temperaments, so the rhetorical Forms are hypostases, so to speak, of an essence which we call soul and as such shape the logos of its virtues. Its parts are the Sentences, Modes, and the like, of Hermogenes, guided by our rational powers. Literary creativity is a process whereby the writer reflects through divine inspiration the substance and form (ιδέα καὶ φράσις) of the universe.¹ Christian literature,

nified subjects. Plato's manner of teaching is to use images when it comes to the physical world. Truth shown through numbers, i.e., mathematics, is truth shown through images and the habit of imagery is proper to souls and to all cosmic things: *In rem publ.* 2.7.28 KROLL: ὁ δὲ χαρακτήρ τοῦ λόγου λίαν ἐστὶ ὑψηλός, πρέπων καὶ ταῖς Μούσαις ταῖς χρησιμώδουσιν τὴν λύσιν καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν κοσμοῖς οὖσιν --- ἢ δ' ἰδέα τοῦ παντός λόγου σεμνότης ἐστὶν προσήκουσα καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν (σεμνὰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ παντός καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν) --- ὁ δὲ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας εἰκονικὸς διὰ τὰ πράγματα: τὸ γὰρ ἀπὸ ἀριθμῶν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπ' εἰκόνων ἐστὶ διδάσκειν· οἰκεῖον δὲ ψυχῶν καὶ τοῖς κοσμοῖς πᾶσιν τὸ εἰκονικόν. See p. 39. WALSDORFF, 108 ff. In another passage, *In rem publ.* 2.247.9, Proclus speaks of the Platonic style as ἔμφρασις σεμνότητος.

1. *Prol. Syll.*, 398.2-399.27: ἥ [sc. ῥητορικῆς] καθάπερ κόρης ἐναποθέτου κάλλους ὑπερφυῶς καὶ λογικῶς Ἑρμογένους ἐπλασε τὸ σῶμα ---; ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ χρειαῖ ψυχῆς ἀρεταῖς ἀστραπτοῦσης εἰς ἐναργεστέραν κίνησιν τῆς ζωοπλαστίας καὶ ζώωσιν, ἐμπνέει τῷ ὁργάνῳ καθάπερ τις θεὸς καὶ ταύτην, ὃς ἐπρεπεῖν εἶναι τοιούτων δημιουργός, τὴν εἰκόνα σφίζουσιν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τῆς ἀρχετύπου προτύπουσάσας, οὐχ ὡς ἂν τις κατεσπουδασμένος ὑπόθοιτο τὰς μερικὰς ἰδέας, αἷς οἱ κατ' αἰσθησὶν λόγοι χαρακτηρίζονται, Λυσιακοὶ τινες ἢ Ἰσοκρατικοὶ καὶ ὅσοι καθ' ἑκάστον, ἀλλὰ τὴν τούτων περιεκτικὴν καὶ συνεκτικὴν καὶ τοῦ παντός καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἰδέαν καὶ φράσιν, καθ' ἣν ἑκάστος τῶν ἐκκρίτων ψυχῶν τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον καὶ τῶν ὁμοιοειδῶν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ χαρακτηριστικοῖς ὑπεξίσταται. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡμῶν ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ τε καὶ νοερά κατὰ μὲν τὸν οὐσιώδη λόγον μία τίς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδιάφορος, κατὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν καθ' ἑκάστον γνώμας καὶ κράσεις διαπεφόρηται, οὕτω κἀνανταῦθα· ταύτης γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐσίας τινὸς ὑποστάσεις αἱ νῦν ἰδέαι καλούμεναι διαμορφοῦσι τὸν τῶν ἀρετῶν λόγον ὡς πρὸς ψυχὴν σφίζουσαι μέρη μὲν ἔχουσιν τὰ ῥητορικὰ εἶδη δυνάμεις τε γνωστικὰς ἀντὶ μὲν νοὸς τὰς ἐννοίας ταῖς αὐτῆς παρέχουσιν ἀρεταῖς, ἀντὶ δὲ δόξης τὴν μέθοδον παραδειγματικοῖς αἰτίοις ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδικοῖς ἢ ποιητικοῖς ἢ τελικοῖς καὶ ὡς τὸ γεγραμμένον ζῶον τοῦ ὄντος, ἀντὶ φαντα-

Siceliotes seems to be saying, insofar as it is Christian, can claim itself the spokesman for the singular truth of the Christian message, but a message conveyed through the infinitude of human resource. The literary artist in a truly Christian society takes justification not only from the religious themes which he describes, "emphatic" though they be of God's revelation, but also from the inspiration of the writer as His creature, who in the expression of his talent declares his divine gift. Siceliotes' description is a remarkable synthesis of Christian theology, Aristotelian logic, and Platonic idealism applied to the measure of Hermogenes' rhetorical philosophy. In order to understand it more fully we need to compare it against its pagan equivalent in Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Republic*.¹

The commentary is cast in the form of a series of essays that deal with various questions raised by a reading of Plato's work. The remarks in which we are interested describe the process of literary creation. They are part of a larger discussion of the creative art and its relation to Plato's Ideas,² and they help point up the Neoplatonic roots of the Byzantine view. Though throughout the reference is to the ποιητῆς and ποιητικῆ, it is clear that Proclus is thinking not of poetry in the narrow sense as against prose, but of the over-all λόγος of the universereflected generally in intellectual discourse.

He begins by asserting that as imitator (μιμητής) a poet has as his object not pleasure, though pleasure may accrue, but the good, as is the case with all activity performed in accordance with virtue. Poetry is a kind of preliminary to the political life.³ Hence it is the statesman who must define the activity of the poet as he does of the general, the doctor, and the orator. Positing throughout two realms of being, universal and particular, Proclus asks who is the universal poet and what is his relation to the universal statesman or father above him. The universal general

σίας τὰς συνθήκας, σχήματα δὲ καὶ ῥυθμούς ἀντ' αἰσθήσεως· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ταῖς ζωτικαῖς παρεκκλίνονται, βάσεις, κῶλα καὶ λέξεις, τὸ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων ἐνέργημα — πᾶσαν τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐρμηνείαν — ὡς εὐλογίαν τινα ῥυθμίζοντα καὶ ἰσάζοντα καὶ τοῖς συμπίπτουσι δι' ἀνάγκην ἐπισυμβαίνουσιν μαχόμενα οἰνεῖ τινες ἀρεταὶ τοῖς ἐκ δυσκρασίας ἢ κακοηθείας ἐγγιγνομένοις πάθεσιν. The passage then proceeds to connect the moral virtues with Hermogenes' Forms, e.g., σωφροσύνη with καθαρότης. See p. 152.

1. 1.67.10-69.19.

2. The title of the essay runs, 1.42.1-2, Περὶ ποιητικῆς καὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὴν εἰδῶν καὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ἀρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ τὰ Πλάτωνι δοκοῦντα.

3. 1.67.26: πρόδρομον εἶδος τῆς πολιτικῆς ζωῆς.

together with the father superintends the cosmic war and sees to it that the stronger prevails over the weaker, but in such a way that the latter is not destroyed but contributes to the Whole, which is made up of opposites. The universal doctor promotes the physical strength of the Whole, while the universal orator "through the intellective faculty of discourse persuades the ensemble to live in the way that the nous of the statesman who is in the Whole wills."¹ The cosmic poet creates the visible forms of good as imitations of the invisible and the objects of nature as imitations of the objects of nous. He shall secure the hegemony of virtue and the defeat of vice in the Whole, shall arrange its movements in due order, and shall from all its elements form a single living harmony and a single rhythm. ■ This figure is Apollo, the poet of rhythmical and harmonious imitations, and truly an educator god. He looks to the nous of the universal statesman, Zeus, and is his associate in the disposition of the universe in its swift or slow cadences and shorter or longer circuits.² The general is Ares, the doctor Asclepius, the persuader Hermes, by whose agency the gods harangue one another, while Zeus in turn harangues them all, "manipulating the Hermes within himself."⁴ The universal poet "sets in motion the Sirens' song, releasing one sound, one note, as the myth of the tenth book of the *Republic* says (617b5) and, as the *Timaeus* says (36c2), sets in motion the cycles of the divine souls which duly issue in rhythmic movements."⁵ Poetry, proceeding harmonious

1. 1.68.18: ὁ δὲ τοῖς νοεοῖς λόγοις πείθων ταῦτα ζῆν αὐτὸν βούλεται ὁ πολιτικός ἐν τῷ παντὶ νοῦς. FESTUGIERE, 1. 84, translates: "par ses discours intellectifs, persuadant cet ensemble de vivre comme le veut l'Intellect Politique qui est dans le Tout."

2. 1.68.16: μιμήματα ποιῶν τὰ ἐμφανῆ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ καλῶν καλὰ, τῶν κατὰ νοῦν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀρμονίαις χρώμενος, δι' ὧν ἀρετὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ παρέχεται κρατοῦσαν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν· καὶ ῥυθμίζων τὰς κινήσεις, ὥστε κατὰ λόγον κινεῖσθαι, καὶ μίαν ἐκ πάντων ζῶσαν ἀποτελῶν ἀρμονίαν καὶ ἓνα ῥυθμόν.

3. 1.68.21: τοῦτον ἐγὼ τὸν ποιητὴν οὐκ ἄλλον εἶναι φαίην ἢ τὸν τοῦ μεγάλου πολιτικοῦ μέγαν συνεργόν καὶ παιδευτικόν ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόν, εἰς τὸν ἐκείνου βλέποντα νοῦν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολιτικός ἐστίν ὁ μέγας ὑμνούμενος Ζεὺς, παρ' ᾧ καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι φησιν τὴν πολιτικὴν (cf. PLATO, *Laws* 624a)· ὁ δὲ τοῦτω μὲν συνεργὸς τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ πάσης τάξεως ἐν τε ὀξεύαις καὶ βαρεύαις κινήσει καὶ ἐν βραχυπορωτέραις ἢ μακροπορωτέραις περιόδους οὐκ ἄλλος ἐστίν ἢ ὁ Ἀπόλλων, ποιητὴς ὧν μιμημάτων ἑναρμονίων καὶ ἐνρhythμων.

4. 1.69.4: Ἑρμῆς, δι' ὃν καὶ δημηγοροῦσιν ἄλλοι θεοὶ κατ' ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς πάντας ὁ Ζεὺς τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ προχειρίσας Ἑρμῆν.

5. 1.69.9: ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς ὅστις ἐστὶ δῆλον· κινεῖ δὲ τὰς Σειρήνας ἄδειν μίαν φωνὴν λείσας ἓνα τόνον ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ λέγει τῆς Πολιτείας μῦθος (617b)· κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ὁ Τιμαίος (36c) τοὺς τῶν θείων ψυχῶν κύκλους ἐν λόγῳ προφερομένους ἐνρhythμους κινήσεις. The phrase ἐν λόγῳ προφερομένους equally well refers to rational utterance. Kroll sug-

and rhythmical from within the soul of man, Proclus considers to be the function of Apollo, and he concludes, "Looking to him let the poets of this earth hymn the gods and hymn good men both in myths and without them; or else let them know that if 'versed' in other things they sin against both poetry and Apollo."¹

The passage forms an extended metaphor which, in assigning material properties to the operation of words, deliberately selects a vocabulary relating to both physics and rhetoric.² Like the parts of the universe, words move rhythmically and harmoniously, the logoi which quicken and give concrete rhetorical shape to the thoughts of the universal Nous. They have a life of their own at the same time that they instance the intelligence of the universal statesman. In this view man-made words are not external signs designating a concept or mere instruments of communication. They have a content which can be intelligibly defined and is an expression of the articulated discourse of the universe itself. As "emphatic" imitations of a moral and spiritual other-worldly reality they show themselves invested with the fulness of divine power. The world of literature is a living organism³ which, issuing from the soul of man, has its being in God.

gests in his apparatus and Festugière adopts περιφερομένους ("qui tournent avec mesure selon des mouvements bien rythmés," FESTUGIERE, 1. 85). This gives weight to the physical rather than to the rhetorical side (see note 2, *infra*) of Proclus' *double entendre*, although DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *De Comp. Verb.* 110.11, already can use the adjective περιφερής with reference to the rounded periodic style.

1. 1.69.14: πάντα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχῶν ἀρξάμενα ποιήματά ἐστιν Ἀπόλλωνος ἑναρμόνια καὶ ἔρρυθμα· καὶ εἰς τοῦτον βλέπων ὁ τῆδε ποιητὴς ὑμνεῖται μὲν θεοῦς, ὑμνεῖται δὲ ἀγαθούς ἄνδρας ἐν τε μύθοις καὶ ἄνευ μύθων, ἢ περὶ ἄλλα στρεφόμενος γινωσκέτω καὶ ποιητικῆς ἀμαρτῶν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος.

2. κινήσεις throughout applies not only to the bodies of the universe and to the soul but to the movements of speech: 1.68.20,28; 69.10,14; so too στρεφόμενος, 69.18. The phrase τὸν κοσμικὸν πόλεμον συνδιακοσμών, 68.8, is chosen for its aesthetic content, as is also the adjective κοσμικός here, in 68.16 and 69.3. κατὰ λόγον κινεῖσθαι, 68.20, is both verbal expression and purposeful movement. ὀξεύαις καὶ βαρεύαις κινήσεις, 68.28, puns on grave and acute accents and quicker and slower runs of syllables in composition (ἀρμονία).

3. 68.20: μίαν ἐκ πάντων ζῶσαν ἀρμονίαν. On this conception in rhetoric see pp. 28, 154, 172. A similar idealization of the literary process appears in another Neoplatonic tract (WESTERINK, *Anon.*, 13.12 ff.): καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ θεῖον μιμούμενος --- ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνόν τινα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δημιουργηθέντων ἀφανῆ ἐποίησεν, οἷά εἰσι τὰ ἀσώματα πάντα, ἄγγελοι καὶ ψυχαὶ καὶ νοῖ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τινὰ δὲ ὑποπίπτοντα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αἰσθή-

Implicit in both Proclus' and Siceliotes' analysis is the notion of relationship and the hope for a harmonization of the elements in that relationship, whether they be God and man, words and what they stand for, universals and particulars.¹ The result of such a perfect correlation might be described not only as emphasis but as εἰκών. This dualistic habit of thought posed the constant danger of worshipping appearance for appearance's sake, as the iconoclasts had good cause to fear in the case of religious images, but at least the theory did not so specify. At the least, the idea of correlation was central to the concept of emphasis: its opposite, ἀπέμφασις, means "contradiction" or "incongruity." The theological use appears in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, who adopts the term to describe the imperfect correspondence of metaphors to their objects in the expression of divine truths. In Photius heathen idols, unlike Christian εἰκόνες, are "apemphatic" for they have no connection with any divine source of being.²

σει καὶ φανερά τυγχάνοντα, οἷά εἰσιν τὰ οὐράνια σώματα καὶ τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς τινὰ μὲν ἐγγράφως παραδέδωκεν, τινὰ δὲ ἀγράφως καὶ μὴ ὑποκείμενον τῇ αἰσθησει δίχην τῶν ἀσωμάτων, οἷά εἰσι τὰ ἐν συνουσίαις εἰρημένα αὐτῷ: «This is another point in which Plato strove to imitate the Godhead ---. For just as God has made some parts of his creation invisible, namely all incorporeal beings, angels, souls, intelligences, etc., others, however, subject to perception and visible, such as for example the heavenly bodies and the world of coming-to-be and passing-away, so Plato too has handed on some of his ideas in writing and some by word of mouth, like incorporeal entities, imperceptible to the sense, namely what he said in his lectures.» Cf. also the tradition of referring to the students of Socrates and Pythagoras as the «living books» of their masters (ἐμψυχα συγγράμματα, 13.19), along with the parallels in Olympiodorus, David, and Elias given in Westerink's note).

That the symbolism of the iconostasis in the Byzantine church has «emphatic» associations is clear from G. VAN DER LEEUW's remarks (*Sacred and Profane Beauty. The Holy in Art*, London 1963, 173): «This screen of images completely hides the altar space behind it, thereby setting it apart as a genuine *adyton*, an unapproachable shrine where, in secret, the mystery is performed. For the iconostasis cannot be pushed aside. --- Thus the screen is not a barrier in the sense of a wall. It is, rather, a living creature, and indicates the presence within the church of a divine world. --- The unification of images into a unity is the gate through which this world is bound to the other. The people, who have the world of the saints represented to them in the church, participate in it and know that they are transferred into the divine world.»

1. Note that Amplitude provides an emphasis of all-inclusiveness, HERMOG., 318.13-17: γένη γὰρ εἶδεν καὶ ὅλα μέρεσι καὶ ἀόριστα ὀρισμένους καὶ ἕτερα ἅτα περιβλητικά προσλαμβάνων περὶ ἐκάστου ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντος ὑπόστασιν ἐμφαίνει, παραδηλῶν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς καὶ μεταβάσεις ποιούμενος ἀπὸ πραγμάτων ἐπὶ ἕτερα πράγματα. See p. 134.

2. *De Celest. Hier.*, PG 3, 137B: ἀπεμφαίνουσαι --- τὰς εἰκονογραφίας; 141B: τὰς

Emphasis, then, shows a strong connection with εἰκών. Gregory of Nyssa regards the soul, turned to face the expectation of the good, as a mirror in which the images and presentments of virtue (εἰκόνες τε καὶ ἐμφάσεις) given by God impress themselves on its purity.¹ This conception should be seen in the light of Gregory's understanding of man as a microcosm who answers to the harmony found in the universe of God, Who created him. As Quasten points out, "Gregory uses the term 'image' as the comprehensive expression for man's entire endowment of divine gifts, his original state of perfection. --- It consists not only in the νοῦς and αὐτεξούσιον, but also in his virtue, the ἀρετή."²

Nor does Proclus' phrase εἰκὼν καὶ ἐμφασις³ imply any crucial distinction between the two. One explains the efficacy of the other. Such texts prefigure the development in the succeeding centuries, when the two terms begin to be used literally instead of figuratively to describe religious images and their operation. In the process the passive symbol of the mirror gives way before a sense of a dynamic divine force operating

ἀπεμφαίνουσας ἀνομοιότητας. Cf. also MAX. CONF., *Quaest. ad Thalass.*, PG 90, 372A, in a passage influenced by Ps. - DIONYS. See L. THÜNBERG, *Microcosm and Mediator*, Lund 1965, 276, note 2. PHOTIUS, *Amphil.* 111, PG 101, 656D.

Greek also knows a συνέμφασις, in use particularly among the Stoics, in the sense of the added implications of a definition beyond the stated words, so as to bring out the full participation with one another of the objects compared. Cf. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, *Adv. Math.* 7. 233-241. In a religious context, CLEMENT, *Stromat.* 5.9. 56.5 (quoted note 2, p. 167).

The frequent occurrence of ἐμφαίνω in the simple meaning of «show» or «illustrate» in texts of all periods is not at issue and has been ignored.

1. *Vita Moysis*, PG 44, 340A: ἀντιπρόσωπον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν, οἷόν τι κάτοπτρον, πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τῶν ἀγαθῶν στήσας, ὡς τῆς προδεικνυμένης αὐτῷ θεοῦ ἀρετῆς τὰς εἰκόνες τε καὶ τὰς ἐμφάσεις τῷ καθαρῷ τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς ἐντυπώσασθαι.

2. In *Psalmos* 1, PG 44, 441CD. J. QUASTEN, *Patrology. The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature From the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon*, vol. 3, Utrecht 1960, 292.

3. In *Tim.* 2.238.23 (quoted note 2, p. 175). Elsewhere (*Proclus Diadochus. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato* ed. L. G. WESTERINK, Amsterdam 1954, 49.5), the fulness of the divine causes to emanate unto the soul an εἰδωλικήν τινα ἐμφασιν of itself; cf. also 69.5 ff.; 318.3; 320.10. The combination appears also in SIMPLICIUS' sixth-century commentary on the *Categories* (CAG 8 ed. C. KALBFLEISCH 1907, 222.16), where it refers to secondary quality (ποιότης) as distinct from substance (οὐσία): quality is an ἐμφασις εἶδους and εἰκὼν τοῦ προτέρου λόγου. Simplicius uses ἐμφαίνω frequently. He is known to draw heavily on Iamblichus' lost commentary on the *Categories*, which may be the source here. The term is comparatively rare in the other extant commentaries.

in the image. A point of transition may be seen in St. John of Damascus' description of images of nature "darkly uncovering to us the divine emphases," and his compliment to a friend, whom he calls "a spotless mirror of God and His emphases."¹

The early Fathers of the Church had stressed the value of pictures as instruments of moral and doctrinal instruction.² The essential innovation of the post-Justinianic period, as Kitzinger points out, "is that attempts were made to justify images --- on the strength of a transcendental relationship to their prototypes. They began to be thought of in terms of an extension, or repetition on a lower level, of the act of the Creation of Man (the image of God) or of the Incarnation of the Logos (the image of the Father). Thus they came to be securely anchored in the metaphysical stratum and acquired a definite place and function in the divine order of the universe, a permanent and absolute status; --- more intimately linked to its prototype, the image became a vehicle of the latter's supernatural powers. For the divine acts of creation which served as 'precedents' for endowing the artist's work with a transcendental status also entailed the concept of a flow of substance or energy emanating from the prototypes and received by the image."³ Emphasis comes to describe both these relationships, in the one case the pedagogical function of images as the "books of the illiterate,"⁴ their effect moving from the image to the beholder and based essentially on what they "showed" him, in the other the presentation simultaneously of the divine source of their message in terms of its active power.

The conceptualization of this mystical force passed to the age of iconoclasm assisted by Neoplatonic thought. This is suggested not only by the mystical terminology of Proclus but by the Christian mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius, which in part depends on him. *ἐμφαίνω* is the regular

1. *Orat. 1 De Imag.*, PG 94, 1241B (= *Orat. 3 De Imag.*, PG 94, 1341B): ὁρώμεν γὰρ εἰκόνας ἐν τοῖς κτίσμασι μνηύουσας ἡμῖν ἀμυδρῶς τὰς θείας ἐμφάσεις (Cf. Ps. - Dionys., *De Eccles. Hier.* 5.2, PG 3, 501B: ἀμυδραῖς τῶν ἀληθῶν εἰκόσι; *De Divin. Nomin.* 4.1, PG 3, 695B; 5.7, 821B); *De Hymn. Trisag.*, PG 95, 21B: θεοῦ καὶ τῶν θείων ἐμφάσεων ἀκηλίδωτον ἔσποπτρον; *Orat. 1 De Imag.*, PG 94, 1260B: εἰκόνας ἐμφανεῖς τῶν ἀπορρήτων καὶ ὑπερφῶν θαυμάτων (Ps. - Dionys., *Epistle* 9, PG 3, 1108C); et al.

2. E. KITZINGER, «On Some Icons of the VII Century,» in *Late Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of Albert Mathias Friend, Jr.*, Princeton 1955, 142.

3. Ibid. See also his «The Cult of Images Before Iconoclasm,» *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* No. 8, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, 136, 142.

4. ST. JOHN DAM., *Orat. 1 De Imag.*, PG 94, 1247C: βίβλοι τῶν ἀγραμμάτων; also 1293; NICEPHORUS, *Antirrhet. 3*, PG 100, 380D; et al.

word in Pseudo-Dionysius for the symbolic actions of the priest or the function of a ritual act or object, and its juxtaposition with *εἰκόν* is frequent.¹ Among the iconodules St. John of Damascus and Theodore Studite are particularly given to quotations from him.² In Maximus the Confessor the terminology is extended to Holy Writ, which effects its message κατ' ἀμυδράν τινα τῶν ἀληθῶν ἐμφασιν, "through a dark emphasis of divine truths," proceeding "through shadow and image and truth," while the saints are said to reach God through their "natural emphasis with the divine."³

This connection between emphasis and the pregnant forms of religious obscurity comes forth most cogently in the Areopagite. He will speak of the supersubstantiality of Christ which, from being hidden, reveals itself to us in human form. Christ is "hidden even after his manifestation, or, to speak in terms more in keeping with the divine, even in his manifestation," and his mystery both when spoken remains ineffable and when thought remains unknown.⁴

1. *De Divin. Nomin.* 4.4, PG 3, 697C: ἡ τῆς θείας ἀγαθότητος ἐμφανῆς εἰκὼν (of the sun); 700B: κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τῆς ἐμφανοῦς εἰκόνης λόγον (likewise); *Epistle* 10, 1118A: ἀληθῶς ἐμφανεῖς εἰκόνες εἰσι τὰ ὁρατὰ τῶν ἀοράτων; *De Celest. Hier.*, 328A; 332A; 336C; *De Eccles. Hier.*, 444C; 473C; 476D; et al.

2. See the lists compiled by E. J. MARTIN, *A History of the Iconoclastic Controversy*, London 1930, 148, 198.

3. *Amb.*, PG 91, 1253C: σικᾷ γὰρ καὶ εἰκόνι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς ὅλον τῆς σωτηρίας σοφῆς ὁικονομήθη μυστήριον. σικᾷ γὰρ εἶχεν ὁ νόμος, ὡς φησιν ὁ θεὸς Ἀπόστολος, τῶν μελλόντων ἀναθῶν, οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν πραγμάτων (*Hebr.* 10:1) δι' ἧς τοὺς κατὰ νόμον οἰκειῶς ἑαυτοῖς κατ' ἀμυδράν τινα τῶν ἀληθῶν ἐμφασιν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Εὐαγγελίου παραδοχὴν ὁ λόγος ἐπαιδαγωγῶν. On the saints: *Amb.*, PG 91, 1113C: διὰ τῶν ἐνουςῶν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα φυσικῶν ἐμφάσεων. Cf. also *Quaest. ad Thalass.*, PG 90, 332B, which speaks of the Logos vouchsafing to the nous of man emphases of the divine commensurate with man's knowledge of visible things: ὁ Λόγος δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ἀναγόμενον διὰ τῆς τῶν ὄντων εὐσεβῶς θεωρίας καθίστησι νοῦν, χορηγῶν αὐτῷ συμμετρου κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν ὁρατῶν τὰς νοητὰς τῶν θείων ἐμφάσεις; also 613B; *Mystag.*, PG 91, 669B; and note the description of angels and the soul as εἰκὼν καὶ φανέρωσις of God, *Mystag.*, PG 91, 701C (Ps. - Dionys., *De Divin. Nomin.* 4.22, PG 3, 724B).

4. *Epistle* 3, PG 3, 1069B: τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κρυφίου τὸν ὑπερούσιον εἰς τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐμφάνειαν ἀνθρωπικῶς οὐσιωθέντα προεληλυθέναι, κρύφιος δέ ἐστι καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἔκφανσιν, ἥ, ἵνα τὸ θεϊότερον εἶπω, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκφάνσει --- μυστήριον καὶ λεγόμενον ἄρρητον μένει καὶ νοούμενον ἄγνωστον; cf. also *Epistle* 9, PG 3, 1104B. The term *ἐκφανσις* and related forms are best explained with reference to the act of revelation or its result as it affects us. It has the same associations as *ἐμφασις*, often appears in the same contexts, and is occasionally palaeographically confused with it. *ἐμφασις* should be the wider term and *ἐκφανσις* its function, but the distinction is not steadily maintained.

Such formulae extend into the iconoclastic period. Nicephorus, the ninth-century patriarch of Constantinople, depicts the correspondence between image and prototype as emphasis both in its sensible and its noetic impact upon the beholder.¹ Theodore Studite compares the effect of the image of Christ to the action of the sun in bringing to light what existed in shadowy darkness, and declares that he who reverences the image reverences him whom the image "reveals" (ἐμφαίνει).² An image, he says, is an ἐμφασίς τῆς αὐτοψίας, the supercharged visual point wherein

Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of the dual inheritance of theology as entwining the expressible and the inexpressible, the one mystical and symbolic, the other manifest, philosophic, and apodeictic: *Epistle* 9, PG 3, 1105D: διττὴν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν θεολόγων παράδοσιν, τὴν μὲν ἀπόρητον καὶ μυστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐμφανῆ καὶ γνωριμωτέραν τὴν μὲν συμβολικὴν καὶ τελεστικὴν, τὴν δὲ φιλόσοφον καὶ ἀποδεικτικὴν, καὶ συμπλέκεται τῷ ῥητῷ τὸ ἔρρητον. The common symbol of the παραπέτασμα or προκάλυμμα is also well known to the Areopagite: *De Eccles. Hier.* 4.2, PG 3, 476B; *Epistle* 9, PG 3, 1108AB; et al. Cf. STOBÆUS, who is quoting a Pythagorean source, vol. 3.151.8-9 HENSE: τὸ φράζεσθαι δοκοῦν κρυπτόμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ κρύπτεσθαι νοούμενον; and note Psellus' reference to ARISTOTLE's *Organon* as «covered with the shadow of truth»: τῇ τῆς ἀληθείας κεκαλυμμένην σκιᾷ, *Μεσ. Βιβλ.*, vol. 5, 500 SATHAS. In the *Vita Stephani*, a hagiographical text of the early ninth century concerned with image-worship, emphasis is at the same time a key and a riddle: PG 100, 1113B: ἡ εἰκονικὴ ἀνατύπωσις ὡς σφραγίδας τὰς περιγραφὰς ἀναδεικνύουσα καὶ τὰς ἐμφάσεις ὡς κλεῖδας διὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν τὰ νοητὰ προσαίνειτται. Useful lists of such terminology within the tradition of Byzantine mysticism are provided by W. VÖLKER, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, Wiesbaden 1965, 273 ff. See p. 103.

1. *Refutatio et Eversio*, Paris. Gr. 1250, fol. 182^v, 25 ff. (quoted by P. ALEXANDER, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople*, Oxford 1958, 201-2, note 1): σχέσις αὐτῇ [sc. εἰκόνι] πρὸς δὲ λέγεται πρόσεστι καὶ δι' ἐαυτῆς ἐμφανίζει τὸ ἀρχέτυπον καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ παρέχεται; fol. 223^v, 20 ff.: ὁπνίκα οἱ ψευδieroὶ τὰς τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως Χριστοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ εἰκόνας ψευδανύμους ἀποκαλεῖν τολμῶεν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδὴ ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ δηλωτικά καὶ τὰς ἐμφάσεις ἀλλήλων κέκτηται, αὐτὸν τὸν Χριστὸν ψευδῆ --- τυγχάνειν αὐτοὺς ἀποφαίνεσθαι. As regards discourse cf. NICEPHORUS, *Antirrhet.* 3, PG 100, 485A: αἱ ἱερὰ εἰκόνας εἰς τῶν λόγων τῶν συγγεγραφότων; 380C: οἱ λόγοι αὐτοὶ εἰκόνας εἰς τῶν πραγμάτων; et al.

2. *Antirrhet.* 3, PG 99, 483B: ὥσπερ ἡ σκιά τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου βολίδι μᾶλλον εἰς τοῦφανὲς πρόεισιν οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰκὼν τὴνικαῦτα τοῖς πᾶσι φανερὰ γίνεται, ὁπότεν διατυποῦσα ἐαυτὴν ταῖς ὕλαις ἐμφανίζεται (such solar symbolism is very frequent in the Areopagite: *De Eccles. Hier.*, PG 3, 516A; *De Divin. Nomin.*, 693B, 697C, 700BC, 824BC); *De Cultu Sac. Imag.*, PG 99, 501: ὁ προσκυνῶν τὴν εἰκόνα προσεκύνῃσιν τὸν ὄντα ἐμφαίνει ἡ εἰκὼν; *Epistle* 114, PG 99, 1503A: τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι ἐφαίνεται (cf. Ps. - DIONYS., *De Divin. Nomin.*, PG 3, 697C; *De Eccles. Hier.*, PG 3, 428A). The failure of the iconoclasts to appreciate the difference between Christ and the Cross is not only «apemphatic» but impious: οὐ μόνον ἀπεμφαίνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσεβές, *Refut. Poem. Iconom.*, PG 99, 457A.

we meet Christ's person.¹ Photius speaks of the tradition of the Church uncovering "all her wordly role in the form of holy images which with symbolic fitness supply to us the pure and untainted emphases of their prototypes,"² and a sermon of Leo the Wise from the end of the ninth century which describes an image of Christ in a newly built church speaks of the intention of the craftsman to provide a μυστηριώδης ἐμφασίς of divine glory in the portrayal.³

We need not press the fact that this, the language of theology, shares common ground with that of rhetoric. It is fair to say that ἐμφασίς was to rhetoric what εἰκὼν was to theology, or even what ἐμφασίς and εἰκὼν were to theology. One should not seek an initial impulse in either discipline except insofar as rhetoric preceded theology in the curriculum. The deeper stimulus, however, lay in the metaphysical and mystical aura with which late antiquity, both pagan and Christian, endowed much of its cultural inheritance. Rhetorical functions such as allegory and emphasis take a new lease on life beyond their old Hellenistic formulations. Rhetoric could now assist Christology in its quest for the proper conveyance through the images of art and literature of the relation between the two natures of Christ. Guided by rhetorical principles and philosophical method⁴ words, like the productions of art, become nodal points in the

1. *Epistle* 36, PG 99, 1220A; cf. 1288C, 1612C. On the philosophical question of universal and particular as applied to Christology by Theodore see E. MARTIN, *A History of the Iconoclastic Controversy*, London 1980, 189. J. HUSSEY and T. HART remark, *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, vol. 4.2, Cambridge 1966, 187, that St. John of Damascus and Theodore «worked out a sacramental theology --- and established the sacred artist in a priest-like position as a dispenser of the means of grace.» Authors and their works would seem to be invested with a similar sanctity at this time.

2. *Amphil.* 111, PG 101, 653D: ὅλον δὲ τὸ ἔργον ἐαυτῆς δεικνύσα καὶ ἀποφαίνουσα καθαρὰς ἡμῖν καὶ ἀκιδήλως ἐν τοῖς σεπτοῖς εἰκονίσμασι τὰς τῶν πρωτοτύπων ἐμφάσεις ἱεροπρεπῶς καὶ ἱεροτύπως παρέχεται; cf. also 952A.

3. *Homil.* 34 ed. AGACIUS, Athens 1868, 275.

4. P. ALEXANDER, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople*, Oxford 1958, 191-213, has remarked in detail on the adoption of Aristotelian terminology, much of it from the *Categories*, into the arguments of the iconodules during the second iconoclastic period in the late eighth and early ninth centuries and has found traces of scholastic thought even for the earlier period. He posits the existence of philosophical handbooks, at least for the ninth century, from which such knowledge might have come. A source in rhetoric is also likely. Our scholia show similar terminology, much of which they derive, as we have seen, from their late antique sources. The continuing traditions of rhetorical instruction would have kept such material in the

span of the cosmos, foci in which is caught up man's vision of the supra-sensible intelligible universe.¹ As pictorial art required the hint of the invisible so rhetoric through emphasis allowed for the suggestion of the inexpressible.

The concept made possible the transformation of the logos of the rhetoricians and philosophers into the truly *ἱερός λόγος* of the Christian age. But the logos now was not only of the mind but of the heart as well, for emphasis worked by summoning religious emotion (*πάθος*).² Assuredly, it is in this light that we must appreciate the Areopagite's many descriptions of the effect produced by the candles, the incense, the colorful priestly vestments, the song, and the other parts of the church service. The somber drama of a Byzantine litany defined at once the presence of Godhead and the ordered passion by which one felt its power.

The entry in the *Suda* sums up well what the term meant to the Byzantines. To the lexicographer emphasis is three things: first, *προσποίησης*, "allusion" or "illusion"; second, *ἐννόησις*, the cognitive process, or its result, by which we relate to the ideal world;³ finally, *μέγεθος*, "magnitude."⁴ The twelfth-century critic, Eustathius, is, to be sure, thinking only in grammatical terms when he calls emphasis a *σχῆμα τῆς συντομίας*, "a figure of conciseness,"⁵ but his phrase well expresses what the author of the

educational consciousness during the seventh and eighth centuries and probably added to it as well. Yet despite the interaction between the scholiasts and Aristotle Syrianus is the only sure instance of an author writing on both Hermogenes and the *Categories*. His commentary on the latter is lost but is mentioned by SIMPLICIUS, *In Cat.* 3.9; et al. and ELIAS, *In Cat.* 218.32. The extant commentary on Hermogenes is not particularly given to Aristotelian vocabulary. The assumption that there exist MSS. of Simplicius on Hermogenes (K. PRAECHTER, *RE-PW*, s.v. Simplicius, col. 205.12 ff.) rests on a questionable notice in J. FABRICIUS, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, vol. 5, Hamburg 1796, 770.

1. On this topic see A. GRABAR, «La représentation de l'intelligible dans l'art byzantin du moyen âge», *Actes du VIIe congrès international d'études byzantines*, vol. 2, Paris 1951, 127-143.

2. The connection between emphasis and *πάθος* is standard rhetorical theory. See, e.g., *Ἐκ τῶν Λογικῶν*, 215.28: ὑπόστασιν καλοῦσι τὸ ἐμφασιν ἔχον καὶ πάθους τινὸς ἐνδεικτικόν.

3. So too other lexicographers, e.g., HESYCHIUS; *Etymologicum Magnum*; *Anecdota Graeca* ed. L. BACHMANN, Leipzig 1828. The lexicographical tradition has a wholly separate entry for *ἐμφαίνω* in its ordinary meaning, *σημαίνω*.

4. Cf. HERMOG., 247.2: διὰ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης (i.e., emphasis) μέγεθός τι καὶ σεμνότητά ἐννοίας.

5. 49.23 (on *Iliad* 5.504). See p. 143.

Suda must have had in mind: not simply the old oratorical tactic of amplification through intensity, but the human impulse to understand and illustrate in the face of an abbreviated existence the majesty of the divine.

Historically speaking, emphasis responded to the strong sense of polarity which manifests itself in major areas of Byzantine life. We need only think of the sharpened feeling of conflict engendered by the iconoclastic struggle and, withal, of the rival claims of Christianity and classical culture which affect the Byzantine spirit in all ages. Along with these strong contrasts there runs a current which envisages a larger harmony rooted, as it were, on middle ground, not by way of compromise but as a focus of energies. Professor Hunger has recently in a full-length study developed the theme of Byzantium as a "middle kingdom" and has remarked on the double meaning of *ἐνθεος βασιλεία*, which not only signifies hegemony in God but, since *ἐνθεος* also means "seer" or "prophet," calls attention as well to His secret working in the Emperor and his rule.¹ Noticeable is the extensive use which Byzantine vocabulary makes of compounds beginning with *ἐν-*. Terms such as *νόμος ἐμψυχος*, an appellation of the Emperor,² *ἐμφιλόσοφος*, *ἐμπερής*, *ἐμφυτος*, and others abound in our texts in a variety of contexts.³ Clearly, *ἐμφασις* should be included in the list, central as it was to the Byzantine definition of the rhetorical art.

We have been considering emphasis on the rarefied level of abstract thought. We have next to ask how it was applied and justified in rhetorical practice as taught in the schools. Our information comes from the scholiasts on Hermogenes. Of those who treat the subject Siceliotes pro-

1. H. HUNGER, *Reich der neueren Mitte*, Graz 1965, 65 ff. Hence the host of compounds beginning with *θεο-* as imperial epithets: *θεοφιλής*, *θεόσπετος*, *θεοπρόβλητος*, et al. In rhetoric, BECK, *Kallilogia*, 98-99, cites Aphthonius: «Für Aphthonios liegen Anaskeue und Kataskeue nicht da, wo es keinen Zweifel mehr gibt, wo Wissenschaft vorhanden ist, sondern in der Mitte, in jener Mittellage, welche die menschliche Situation schlechthin darstellt. Und es ist die höchste Kunst dieses Teiles der Rhetorik, die Vielseitigkeit und Fragwürdigkeit unserer Existenz zu durchleuchten. Nur in Anwendung von Anaskeue und Kataskeue ist unsere Kontingenz, unsere Zufälligkeit sichtbar zu machen.» APHTHONIUS, 10.11: ἀνασκευαστέον δὲ τὰ μήτε λίαν σαφὴ μήτε ἀδύνατα παντελῶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα μέσην ἔχει τὴν τάξιν. Cf. also SICELIOTES, *Prol. Syll.*, 394.7.

2. HUNGER, op. cit., 105. On the theological side, H. MERKI, *Ὁμοιωσις θεῷ. von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa*, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1952, *passim*.

3. A partial list in H. HUNGER, «Johannes Tzetzes, Allegorien aus der Verschronik, Kommentierte Ausgabe», *Jahrbuch der österreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft* 4 (1955) 49. Cf. also φιλένσοφος.

vides the fullest and most interesting discussion. In him we have an outstanding representative of that well-known breed, the Byzantine intellectual. A scholar of catholic learning, writing in a style all his own, he has hardly been noticed, partly because he is lost among a long, arid list of commentators and partly because he has traditionally been confused with John Doxapatres. Siceliotes is a Christian author in the full sense. The materials he has received through his education in philosophy, grammar, and rhetoric are presented to us transformed by his Christian outlook. It is not merely that he has added illustrations from Christian literature; his whole conception of the function of rhetoric is guided by Christian inspiration. He represents within the history of Byzantine rhetoric a pinnacle in the process of fusion by which the religious values developed in the preceding centuries are used to give new life and new meaning to the received body of practical secular knowledge. The testimonia in Rabe's edition of the prolegomena¹ establish that much of what Siceliotes has there to say derives from fifth/sixth century sources, particularly within Alexandrian Neoplatonism. However, his remarks are cast in a different frame and presented in such a way as to show that he has thought through the implications of traditional statements. Similarly, received definitions are given in strikingly different contexts and sufficiently varied so that we feel that we are confronting new insights into old problems.

Siceliotes tends to think of emphasis in terms of obscurity. The occasion for his remarks is Hermogenes' treatment of Limpidity, where two acceptable forms of obscurity are recognized, one being emphasis and the other τὰ ἐσχηματισμένα τῶν ζητημάτων, "figured topics."² This particular rhetorical technique was popular in early imperial rhetoric. Pseudo-Dionysius, Quintilian, Demetrius, and Apsines treat it at length.³ We need not delve into the complex and subtle refinements and the varieties of classification which they and their Byzantine successors developed.

1. *Proleg. Syll.*, 393.13-420.3.

2. 240.25-241.5.

3. PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS edd. USENER-RADERMACHER, as part of the Teubner edition of Dionysius' works, 295-358; QUINTILIAN, Book 9 *passim*, especially 2.65 (*controversiae figuratae*); DEMETRIUS, 287-298 (see p. 71); APSINES, 330-339. The composition is indiscriminately called ζήτημα, λόγος, or πρόβλημα. Extensive discussion in VOLKMANN, 112 ff., and special analysis by J. PENNDORF, «De sermone figurato quaestio rhetorica» in *Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie* 22 (1902) 167-194.

Suffice it to say that an ἐσχηματισμένον ζήτημα is a composition contrived in such a way that the words are capable of more than one interpretation. Because of its very nature it belongs to the category of invention. Indeed, it was known to the Byzantines mainly through the chapter in the *De Inventione*, which recognizes three types: ἐναντίον, πλάγιον, and κατ' ἔμφασιν.¹ In the first we secure a meaning opposite to the literal statement of the words; in the second, we introduce a second meaning beyond the literal. We use the third when we are prevented, possibly out of embarrassment, from speaking openly.² Phrases which in themselves carry a double meaning will be useful,³ as will also a careful arrangement of words.⁴ Decorum must always be observed. The text at this point adds an interesting little conceit: by punning on εὐσχημόνως/σχῆμα it in effect relates stylistic beauty to figurative language. Inasmuch as emphasis is a category of such language and itself a form of the obscure,⁵ we may say that obscurity is supplied with an aesthetic value.

The section in Siceliotes with which we are concerned, in which both emphasis and figured topics are analyzed and illustrated,⁶ shows

1. The chapter, 204.16-210.18, is part of Book 4 on σχήματα λόγου and is entitled Περὶ ἐσχηματισμένων προβλημάτων. *De Ideis*, 366.13, recognizes a further category, a form of Sternness, which involves the use of irony. A variation of this classification appears in the Planudean scholia, 5.228.27 W, where πλάγιον=ἔμφασις, the other two entries being κατὰ τὸ μείζον and κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον. The opposite of ἐσχηματισμένον is ἀπ' εὐθείας (SOPATER, *In De Ideis* 5.44.25 W). Cf. also MARCELLINUS, *In De Statibus* 4.103.10-104.3 W. The source for part of the chapter in *De Inventione* is Apsines. See Rabe's apparatus in his edition of Hermogenes and, on the relation between the two texts, his p. vii.

2. As in describing sexual episodes, 208.18 ff. The illustrations in the shortly preceding section, 200.14-202.2, on the σχῆμα of the σεμνὸς λόγος are again sexual: we should avoid vulgarity by a careful choice of words, e.g., ἔγνω με in the sense of carnal knowledge, as in MENANDER (fr. 558, 3. p. 170 KOCK), or by describing only the before and after of sexual encounters, as in HOMER, *Od.* 11. 245, 254. See note 6, p. 166 and 2, p. 196.

3. PENNDORF, *op. cit.*, 189, calls attention to the fact that the *De Inventione* recommends such choices whereas QUINTILIAN, 9.2.69, disapproves: *ne sint manifestae. non erunt autem si non ex verbis dubiis et quasi duplicibus petentur.*

4. E.g., 210.11, if a son wishes to accuse his father of adultery with his wife without saying so, he might construct such a sentence as «Grabbing the adulterer, I shouted, 'Father!'» I leave it to others to comment on the utility of such exercises.

5. 209.5. On Beauty and Ethos giving color to one's speech through emphasis see pp. 162-63 and cf. DEMETRIUS, 287: ἀληθινὸν δὲ σχῆμα ἐστὶ λόγου μετὰ δυοῖν τοῦτον λεγόμενον, εὐπρεπείας καὶ ἀσφαλείας.

6. 6.196.23-203.21 W. As noted above, p. 188, the remarks are occasioned by

the breadth of his interests and training. We find references to Gregory of Nazianzus, Galen, Plato, Lycophron, Heraclitus, Apsines, Aeschines, Libanius, Isaiah, Simonides, Homer, the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and the Epicureans. The order is Siceliotes' own. The ease with which he passes among this array of Christian, Hebraic, and pagan Greek authors, the last from a wide selection of genres, is witness to his sense of the unity of culture. His frequent use of philosophical terms, such as οὐσία, ὑποκειμένον, συμβεβηκός and ἀληθής/ψευδής λόγος shows an elaborate interest in analyzing, as part of the school instruction of the day, the varied ramifications of obscurity. He tells us as much, reminding his readers that they have already learned how to avoid obscurity in the training provided by the progymnasmata, that is to say, in the early stage of the curriculum, and that they have been instructed in the techniques of emphasis, which, as they know, is a form of obscurity, though not a fault of style. His comments leave no doubt that the subject was in his time a staple of Byzantine education.

Hermogenes' treatment of Limpidity. The observations on the figured topics largely derive from the section on them in the *De Inventione*. Of the other three scholiasts on the *De Ideis*, SYRIANUS' account, 1.36.9-37.10, is content to list illustrations without discussion: one of emphasis, four of griphoi (see note 1, p. 193), and three of figured topics. Of these last, one is a quotation from SOPHOCLES, *Oed. R.* 928, γυνή δὲ μήτηρ ἦδε τῶν κείνου τέκνων, where the language deliberately emphasizes the conjugal relationship between Oedipus and Jocasta. The other two Syrianus says are quoted by Apsines, but what seems to be involved is a different recension of the *De Inventione*, to which Apsines' name was attached. See RABE, *Hermogenes*, vii.

The equivalent remarks in the Anonymus fall into two parts, the first practically a *verbatim* reproduction of Syrianus (7.949.14-950.12 W = SYRIANUS, 1.36.9-37.10). The second, 950.13-952.3, expounds on the nature of obscurity, which is recognized as a virtue, but a virtue more closely tied to emphasis and figured topics than in Siceliotes. See p. 88, *supra*. Noticeable is the phrase, 950.19, ἐν τοῖς ἐσχηματισμένοις δνόμασι καὶ ζητήμασι. The first member clearly equals emphasis, which regularly works through δνόματα. The ANONYMUS, *In De Inventione* 7.854.12-858.13 W, by the same author, shares material in common with this section.

Planudes, the shortest version of all, echoes the Anonymus. It falls into the same two parts, though much abbreviated: 5.479.14-480.6 and 480.7-17 W. The first, i.e., the Syrianus tradition, limits itself to two illustrations, one of emphasis and the other of a figured topic. The only new notice is to the effect that we may find the discussion of the figured topics in the *De Inventione*. Planudes seems to have done his homework. Most of the second section is identical with the text of the Anonymus (hence Walz prints the lines only once and at ANON., 7.951.31 W, for the text refers the reader to Planudes). The remainder uses the same language in a shortened version.

He informs us that confusion and obscurity result when, like Galen, we do not take care to repeat a word or phrase at the end of an involved structure of thought so as to help the reader resume the thread of argument; and again, when we clothe our lofty thoughts in long and subtle cola without the aid of recapitulation.¹ One can be obscure in thought² or in expression or in both. The Platonic phrase τὸ ὄν,³ in its attempt to describe the realm of being, is an example of the former. In the second instance obscurity arises from the failure to distinguish between essential and accidental predicates, as in the case of Lycophron's word-coinages and Heraclitus. Whoever strives for Purity will avoid these tactics and others like them, which, as we have learned from the progymnasmata, contribute to this worst of the faults of style.⁴

1. 6.197.9-13 W: εἰ γὰρ περιβάλλει τις, ὥσπερ ὁ Γαληνός, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιλαμβάνει, συγγεῖ καὶ ἀσάφειαν ποιεῖ· καὶ πάλιν, εἰ ἔχει τις ὑψηλὰ νοήματα καὶ χρῆται κώλοις σχοινοτενέσι καὶ πνευματικοῖς μὴ ἀναλαμβάνων, καὶ οὗτος ἀσάφης. On the need for recapitulation in connection with Amplitude cf. HERMOG., 287.9 ff.; in connection with σεμνότης (SICELIOTES' ὑψηλὰ νοήματα), 250.26 ff. Galen's verbosity is criticized by PHOTIUS, *Bibliotheca* cod. 164, 107b4-16. On his popularity with the Neoplatonists see J. IHLBERG, 'Über die Schriftstellerei des Klaudios Galenos,' *Rheinisches Museum* 52 (1897) 617, 620.

2. ἔννοια is here substituted for the more standard πράγματα versus λέξεις. See also note 1, p. 113.

3. From HERMOGENES' (247.3) quotation of *Timaeus* 29e.

4. 6.197.19-29 W: κατὰ δὲ λέξιν, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου, τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. καθ' ὑποκειμένου γὰρ λέγει τὰς καθόλου οὐσίας· ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ τὰ συμβεβηκτότα· ἐὰν δὲ μίξῃ τις κατὰ τὴν συνθήκην, ἀσάφως ἔρεῖ καὶ αὐτός, ὥς ὁ Λυκόφρων ταῖς ὀνοματοποιταῖς, καὶ φιλοσόφων Ἡράκλειτος· ἐκφεύγειν δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα τὸν καθαρότητος ἐπιμελόμενον, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς προγυμνάσμασι μεμαθήκαμεν, ὥς κακίαν λόγου τὴν ἐσχάτην ποιῶντα· οὐ μὴν πᾶσα κακὸν ἀσάφεια, οὐ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἐμφάσεις, ἃς ἐν ταῖς εὐρέσεσι τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων προβλημάτων μεμαθήκαμεν. The distinction is from ARISTOTLE'S *Categorias* 2, 1a20-21: τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔστιν: «But as for things that are meant, you can predicate some of a subject, but they are never present in one. You can predicate 'man', for example, of this or that man as the subject, but man is not found in a subject. By 'in', 'present', 'found in a subject', I do not mean present or found as its parts are contained in a whole; I mean that it cannot exist apart from the subject referred to.» H.P. Cook's Loeb translation. Cf. also *Cat.* 5, 1b11 ff., and Cook's note b, p. 18.

Since obscurity does not appear as a topic in the standard Byzantine collections of progymnasmata such as those of Aphthonius, [Hermogenes], Nicolaus, and Theon, we may infer that Siceliotes' reference here is to the general forms of instruction in grammar and rhetoric which accompanied exercises in composition. ἀσάφεια is a type of Refutation, e.g., in [HERMOG.], 11.8, but is not in question here since what

Libanius' composition, *On the Garrulous Wife*, Siceliotes continues, is an example of a figured topic.¹ Some of the "clay" rhetoricians and philosophers of our day, he says,² claim that the *Farewell Address* by Gregory of Nazianzus is also of this type,³ but they are mistaken. "Figured" language is not subject to any proof: it can easily be called into question since it relies on the symbol alone and not on our total understanding. Gregory's works, however, cannot be recast, not even by an angel from heaven, where figured language does not exist. Siceliotes then passes in review a number of instances of the use of emphasis, marking them as excellent examples of the proper kind of obscurity, which is not obscurity at all. Throughout, his defense of Gregory rests partly on a standard weapon of the Christian apologist that his opponents are too literal; through not being Christian enough themselves, they fail to see that Gre-

is there involved is the use of the term itself as part of the make-up of this particular progymnasma.

LYCOPHRON'S *Alexandra*, of uncertain Hellenistic date, attempts not only to be difficult to understand but to lead the reader deliberately astray. K. ZIEGLER in *RE-PW* points out that it represents a complete replacement of the *κρυπία* by the *τροπική λέξις* and gives some interesting statistics: of the 3,000 words (1,474 verses), 1,350 are *poetica, rariora, or audaciora*, 578 are *ἀπαξ λεγ.*, and 117 *πρῶτα λεγ.* The syntax shows all kinds of maneuver designed for obscurity, though the basic structure of the sentences is clear. The poem was very widely known in the Byzantine period, as the rich manuscript tradition, the varied scholia, the commentaries by Theon and the brothers Tzetzes, and many references, attest. For its *Nachleben* consult ZIEGLER's article. Cf. *Suda*: τὴν καλουμένην Ἀλεξάνδραν τὸ σκοτεινὸν ποίημα. The rhetorical texts show that Lycophron was a school text, since he often appears in lists together with other authors. Doxapatres cites him as an example of the *κομπηρὰ λέξις* but *νοῦς ταπεινός* (*Prol. Syll.*, 79.27 = ANON., "Ἐκθεσις Ῥητορικῆς, 3.729.16 W) and censures his excesses (2.240.25 W). RHACENDYTES likes the *ἀφέλεια* of his Letters (3.521.26 W) and commends his occasional felicity of expression (τὰ εὐφραδέστερα, 3.562.14 W).

1. 6.494-544 FÖRSTER. On the popularity of this piece in the Byzantine schools see FÖRSTER, 494.

2. 6.198.8 W: οἱ πῆλιν οἱ ῥήτορες καὶ σοφοὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς. The notice is valuable in recording the state of learning in the first half of the eleventh century and in calling attention to a range of opinion in the interpretation of the Christian classics. The argument seems to be between those who would celebrate Gregory for his use of classical modes and those who, like Siceliotes, see his virtue rather in the perfection of these modes under Christian inspiration.

3. *Oratio* 42, PG 36, 457-492, a much admired piece in Byzantium. SICELIOTES considers it so well known that he refers to it simply as ὁ συντακτῆριος, 6.176.29; 198.9 W; and often. On the genre see *Περὶ Ἐπιδεικτικῶν* 430.9-434.9 Sp.

gory does not simply use the device in question but ennobles it for religious ends. Siceliotes seems to be thinking of a kind of ideal language dealing not with imperfect symbols but with perfect, Platonic, as it were, realities.

The γρῖφος is a close relative of the ἀνιγμᾶ. ¹ Thus, Siceliotes regards it as a type of emphasis. His further remark that it is an example of "the approved rhetorical ἰδέα which we call ἀσάφεια" ² is especially revealing. The use of such features in one's composition — and let us note that behind it lies the Byzantine penchant for pithy sayings, apophthegms, proverbs, antinomial expressions, and other kinds of epigrammatic style, which are common features of later Greek literature and appear interspersed in practically all its genres — is now reinforced with a new theoretical justification. An author is now in effect practicing obscurity not only

1. On the difference between the two see POLLUX, 6.109 BETHE: ἀνιγμᾶ καὶ γρῖφος· τὸ μὲν παιδιὰν εἶχεν, ὁ δὲ γρῖφος καὶ σπουδὴν, but the distinction is not maintained in the literature. Cf. also *Scholia Aristidis* 3.509 DINDORF: ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀνιγμᾶ ὁμολογεῖ τις ἀγνοεῖν, τὸν δὲ γρῖφον ἀγνοεῖ δοκῶν ἐπιστασθαι. Definitions of ἀνιγμᾶ in ARISTOTLE, *Poet.*, 22.4-6, 1458a26 ff.; *Rhet.* B 21.8, 1394b34; Γ 2.12, 1405b1 ff. Aristotle's student, CLEARCHUS, wrote a *Περὶ γρῖφων* (richly excerpted by ATHENAEUS, chaps. 69-89), which gave a classification scheme. A different scheme appears in TRYPHO, 193.13 ff. For some remarks on the Byzantine riddle see W. SCHULZ, *RE-PW* s.v. Rätsel, col. 106.7 ff. LYCOPHRON'S *Alexandra* is basically an extended γρῖφος.

Siceliotes cites a number of γρῖφοι in this section, three of which show a common tradition. They are quoted by ATHENAEUS within a few lines of one another (452b, 456e), and are briefly discussed by SYRIANUS, 1.36.13 ff., and by the ANONYMUS, 7.949.18 W. The first is quoted by ARISTOTLE, *Rhet.* Γ 2.12, 1405b1: εἶδον ἐγὼ πύρι χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα. It has been assigned to Cleobulina, an authoress of riddles (fr. 1 BERGK) and has its origin probably in the Aesop tradition. See W. SCHULZ, *RE-PW* s.v. Rätsel, col. 95.23 ff. Cf. also the anonymous twelfth-century commentary on the *Rhetoric*, CAG 21, 170.6 ff. RABE. The line is quoted *ad nauseam* by Greek rhetoricians of all periods. A second quotation is from SIMONIDES (fr. 173 BERGK): φημι τὸν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα φέρειν τέττιγος ἀεθλον / τῷ Πανοπητιάδῃ μετὰ δεῖπνον δώσειν ἐπ' ἡώ. Siceliotes confesses he has spent many years pondering Simonides' meaning, but is still not sure that he understands him. At any rate, if others disagree with his interpretation, he is willing to learn (6.201.16 W). The lines are also discussed by EUSTATHIUS, 315.13 ff. (on *Iliad* 23.664 ff.) and many others. The third is an anonymous fragment: πέντε ἄνδρες δέκα ναυσὶ κατέδραμον εἰς ἓνα χῶρον, / ἐν δὲ λίθοις ἐμάχοντο, λίθον δ' οὐκ ἦν ἀνελεῖσθαι. / διψεῖ δ' ἐξώλλοντο, ὕδωρ δ' ὑπερεῖχε γενείου.

2. 6.199.29-31 W: καὶ μὴν καὶ οἱ γρῖφοι σοφοὶ ὄντες τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τῆς ἀσαφείας εἰσι τῆς ἐπαινουμένης καὶ τῶν ἐμφάσεων; cf. SYRIANUS, 1.36.10: πολλὸ μὲν παρὰ τῷ ῥήτορι τὸ κατ' ἐμφασιν σχῆμα --- εὐκε δὲ τοῖς ἐμφάσει καὶ τὰ ἀνιγμᾶτα καλούμενα ἦτοι γρῖφοι (= ANON., *In De Ideis* 7.949.14 W = PLANODES, 5.480.1 W). See pp. 12, 91.

as a positive force but as a desideratum. It is now held up as a Form of rhetoric, the equal presumably of Hermogenes' other Forms.

In the course of his discussion of griphoi Siceliotes refines his definition of obscurity. One type depends on syntax and subject matter, the other on homonyms.¹ Once again he is applying the language of logic to matters traditionally rhetorical. His analysis brings him to consider the nature of true and false statements and the syllogistic techniques which facilitate a distinction. The passage, based on Aristotle's logical works,² reads like a primer in which basic terms are defined and illustrated. This kind of multiple analysis of a single passage in Hermogenes issues partly from Siceliotes' own fertile brain, but also suggests that he is using more than one source, or at least a single source of plural origin, and has not troubled to fit his materials into a unified scheme. He is content to reproduce the clipped style of older scholiasts and to add his own, similarly abbreviated, remarks. This staccato formula does not permit him to develop the implications of his juxtapositions, but what is especially noticeable is the ease with which he passes back and forth between logic and rhetoric. For him the two traditions support one another. He clearly reflects the kind of cooperation which the Neoplatonic commentators on Hermogenes had adopted, in part from older Stoic strata, and which his own Christian genius has in some measure inherited and reformed.

The subject of emphasis is taken up once again, later in the text, this time in conjunction with Hermogenes' observation that allegorical Modes produce Dignity. Siceliotes gives a definition of allegory, one of the clearest and most compact in a long series.³ Attention is called to two

1. 6.201.29-31 W: οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὡς εἶπον, ἐκ τῆς συντάξεως καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἔχουσι τὸ ἀσαφές· ἐκείνοι δὲ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας. Siceliotes is here essentially conflating the stylistic obscurity decried in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with the «logical» obscurity noted in the *Topica*. The phrase, 6.202.7, οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα, must be a slip.

2. Beside the *Topica* the earliest source on the question is Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*, which was commented upon by a long list of Byzantine authors, including Syrianus, Stephanus, Philoponus, Psellus, and John Italus. The mention of Galen a few lines before, himself the author of a commentary, now lost, on the *De Interpretatione*, (see Christ-Schmid-Stählin, 837, note 3), may suggest that Siceliotes is following the same source as Stephanus (*In De Int.*, CAG 18.3, Hayduck 1885, 12.1), who also cites the physician on this problem.

3. 6.221.10-13 W: ἀλληγορία ἐστὶ λόγος δι' ἑτέρας ἐννοίας ἑτέραν ἀνιπτόμενος, with the important addition, ὅταν αὐτάρκης ἐστὶ καὶ σφίγγει τρανῶς τὸ κρυπτόμενον. For other definitions, in addition to the entries in the Byzantine lexica, see Choeroboscus,

types. In the one, the words suggest an alternate meaning; in the other, the allegory is thoroughgoing and conceals its intent. Some allegories are of the lowly kind, as when Aristophanes in the *Peace* describes the ascent to heaven on a beetle and in Plato's *Symposium* comically explains the origin of the sexes.¹ Siceliotes is proceeding on the basis of the usual division between *πρᾶγμα* and *λέξις*. So far he has dealt with the first. He then takes up *ἐμφαντικαὶ λέξεις*.² Allegory can be called emphasis. The reverse, however, does not obtain: emphasis is not allegory.³ Particular attention is given to allegory involving lofty or religious themes. Antiphrasis,⁴ punctuation,⁵ metalepsis,⁶ and aposiopesis⁷ all lend emphasis

244.13; Cocondrius, 234.26; Pseudo-Gregory of Corinth, 215.21; Tiberius-70.3 (see note 1, p. 162); Trypho, 193.8; John of Sardes, 10.5; Anonymi: 2.3.26 W; *Prol. Syll.*, p. xlii, 41.15, 63.12; 207.18 Sp.

1. 6.221.1-11 W = almost verbatim Syrianus, 1.38.9-21. *Peace* 100 ff.; *Sympo.* 189c ff. See, note 6, p. 131.

2. 6.222.12 W.

3. 6.222.19-21 W: αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀλληγορίαι καὶ ἐμφάσεις λέγονται· νοῦν γὰρ ἔχουσι πολλόν· αἱ δὲ ἐμφάσεις οὐκ ἀλληγορίαι.

4. Antiphrasis is one of the tropes and is regularly described together with emphasis in the handbooks. See Anon., 212.6 Sp; Choeroboscus, 251.4; Cocondrius, 233.10; Pseudo-Gregory of Corinth, 222.19; Trypho, 204.3. Tiberius' equivalent, 66.6, is ἀντικείμενον. Antiphrasis in these accounts is variously defined as the use of expressions opposite or parallel to what is meant. Euphemism and irony are two forms of it, both regarded by Siceliotes, 6.222.18, and the handbooks as «ethical» in content. Siceliotes shares with the Anon. and with Choeroboscus the illustration of the blind man who «sees much.»

5. «As we have seen,» he says, 6.222.28 W, ἐν ταῖς εὐρέσεσι. The reference is to *De Inventione* 210.11, which has the same example as here (quoted note 4, p. 189).

6. Trypho, 195.10, defines this as λέξις ἐκ συνωνυμίας τὸ ὁμώνυμον δηλοῦσα; similarly, Anon., 209.1 Sp; Choeroboscus, 247.18; Cocondrius, 239.9; Pseudo-Gregory of Corinth, 217.20. Consult Ernesti, s.v. Basically, metalepsis is the use of metaphorical equivalents, as, e.g., «Ἡφαίστος for πῦρ» (Quintilian, 8.6.37). Siceliotes' entry has to do with metalepsis as a trope; he is not concerned with it as a form of stasis, as described in *De Statibus* 79.17-82. 3.

7. *Ad Herenn.* 4.67; Alexander, 22.6; Anonymi: 142.9, 178.3 Sp., 3.711.13 W; Demetrius, 103, 264; Herodian, 95.10; Phorbammion, 50.10; Pseudo-Aristides, 19.3; Quintilian, 9.2.54; Tiberius, 66.25; Zonaeus, 163.5. The definitions vary extensively, depending on various types. Alexander calls it a λόγος ἐπιτείνων τὸ παρασιωπώμενον ἢ παραλείπων τὸ γνωσκόμενον ἢ σιωπῶν τὸ αἰσχρόν. To Siceliotes, 6.223.17 W, the Christian symbol of the bridal chamber (νυμφών) to stand for the awesome βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν is an example of aposiopesis, and he makes much in general of silence as a means of avoiding blasphemy. See p. 69.

to discourse. The section as a whole¹ well illustrates his habit of replacing pagan by Christian examples. Thus, a passage from *Genesis* and another from *Luke* take the place of citations from Homer and Menander.²

Siceliotes' commentary is not only of importance for the history of rhetoric but also exemplifies certain trends in Byzantine scholarship. His Christian illustrations are brought in abruptly, often merely noted, without discussion. This allusiveness of content bespeaks the polymath; to it is added an allusiveness of style which expresses itself often in complex sentences, an unusual order of words, and a rare vocabulary.³ He feels at home in the "grammatical" side of rhetoric: the kind of analysis represented by such writers as Trypho and Tiberius he knows thoroughly and uses regularly, at the same time adding distinctions and examples of his own. His philosophical knowledge, on the other hand, is not profound; it is better described as basic, though correct and apposite. Yet both traditions are leavened by a Christian metaphysics of the logos which derives from his reading of the Church Fathers. Syrianus was a philosopher to whom rhetoric served, as it were, as a department of philosophical knowledge, broadly conceived. Siceliotes is a rhetorician applying theology and philosophy to a rhetorical text.

The habit of combining philosophy and rhetoric which Psellus claims to have received from his teacher, Mauropus, is therefore not special to Mauropus but a more general phenomenon appearing also in Siceliotes, whose work marks the increasing attention which the early eleventh century was giving to both bodies of knowledge.⁴ This effort is to blossom in the pages of Psellus himself, who, at home in both traditions, applies his energies to the more difficult task of integration.

The esteem in which Siceliotes came to be held is shown by the references in a thirteenth-century manuscript to "the most philosophical and rhetorical Siceliotes" and "the marvellous and most learned Siceliotes."⁵ He is not the first to explain a Christian text in terms of Hermo-

1. 6.221.10-224.11 W.

2. 6.222.14,31 W: *Genesis* 4:1: ἔγνω ὁ Ἀδὰμ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ Εὐάν; *Luke* 2:21: ἀνῆγον τὸ παιδίον Ἰησοῦν τοῦ περιτεμεῖν αὐτόν — καὶ ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦς. See note 2, p. 189.

3. This is also RABE's judgment, *Prolog. Syll.*, cxiii: sermo floribus conspersus, sententiis implicatis helluans, scriptorum locis ornatus non tam citatis quam obscure adumbratis difficultates affert haud mediocres.

4. On the scholarship of the period see J. HUSSEY, *Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire 867-1185*, Oxford 1937, chap. 2.

5. Fol. 161v, Vat. Gr. 105, quoted by RABE, *Prolog. Syll.*, cxiv: ὁ φιλοσοφώτατος

genes — witness Photius' comments on St. Paul¹ — and he has been anticipated by Geometres and Arethas in claiming the "right" kind of obscurity for the Fathers. Clearly, a considerable scholarly effort was being expended on the analysis of Christian literature. Dry though he and his fellow scholiasts are, one often senses in them a keen solicitude regarding the larger significance of the rules which they urge on their students. As more scholia from the middle Byzantine centuries come to be edited, we shall see other minds at work and be better able to assess Siceliotes' contribution in relation to them. However, there can be no question that he is a major figure among the Byzantine intelligentsia of the first half of the eleventh century and that he occupies a leading position in the history of rhetorical criticism.

That emphasis was in the eleventh century a subject of considerable interest we infer from Psellus, who tells us that the learned Emperor, Michael VII (1071-1078), used to discuss its meaning with his scholarly friends.² It is Psellus, too, who gives us a succinct statement of its religious import: through words we receive emphases of things divine.³ Elsewhere, in speaking of the epistolary style, he remarks on the "emphasis of harmony" which it ideally requires.⁴ This is standard phraseology, that is, emphasis plus a qualifying noun, such as appears in texts of all periods. We can read in his statement the familiar demand for correspondence of ethos and words, of character brought out by means of language that achieves its purpose and effect in the ideal formulation of a particu-

καὶ ῥητορικώτατος Σικελιώτης; ὁ θαυμαστός καὶ πολὺς τὴν σοφίαν Σικελιώτης. Siceliotes himself praises Hermogenes in the same language. See p. 10.

1. See B. WYSS, «Photios über den Stil des Paulus», *Museum Helveticum* 12 (1955) 236-251. See p. 25.

2. *Chronographia* 261.5 SATHAS: μετὰ ῥητόρων εἰπεῖν τι περὶ ζεύγματος καὶ ἐμφάσεως. The Emperor was also interested in allegory and its interpretation: ἡ τῆς ἀλληγορίας μεταβολή, 260.29.

3. *Μεσ. Βιβλ.*, vol. 5, 532 SATHAS: οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑψηλοτέρων μόνον φωνῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συνήθων καὶ ταπεινότερων ἐμφάσεως ἐστὶν ὅτε τῶν θείων δεχόμεθα. The sentence introduces an essay in defense of the use of a vernacular term. Note, *ibid.*, συμβολικῶς παραδέξασθαι καὶ κατ' ἐμφαντικὴν διερμηνεῦσαι δύναμιν; and cf. λέγω ἐμφαίνων, «I speak symbolically», *Michaelis Pselli de Gregorii Theologi Charactere Iudicium. Accedit eiusdem de Ioannis Chrysostomi Charactere Iudicium Ineditum* ed. P. LEVY, Diss. Leipzig, 1912, 48.25.

4. *Epistle* 11, *Μεσ. Βιβλ.*, vol. 5, 243 SATHAS: ὁ ἐπιστολιμαῖος [*sc.* χαρακτήρ] τὴν ἐνδιάθετον μορφήν ἀποτυπώται τοῦ γράφοντος, and provides an ἀρμονίας ἐμμελοῦς ἐμφασιν.

lar genre, down even to the consonance of its measures and syllables.¹ The ideal, in short, is not only in how man writes but in his whole intellectual and spiritual comportment. All of these are caught up in the act of discourse and lead him to realize his vital force as a human being. There is in the concept of emphasis something of the Oriental sense of "face," a life-style marked by a conviction of man's bond with the cosmos, a bond which must not be broken and cannot without arresting the throb of existence itself. But why a circumlocution at all? Why not say simply "harmony"? The answer lies ultimately perhaps in the Byzantine fascination with symbol and the profound feeling for the amphiboly of life.

In his commentary on the *De Ideis* the fourteenth-century philosopher, Pletho, is content to follow its grouping of the various kinds of obscure writing. However, while Hermogenes, along with aenigmata and figured topics speaks of emphasis, Pletho says instead "mimetic forms of composition."² Here perhaps is one of the most telling definitions of all. Emphasis is a kind of mimesis. Indeed, in Byzantine hands it becomes the final mimesis, the mimesis of God, a sacred utterance of the truth of His word and world.

In the course of the mediaeval period the West placed more and more weight on allegory, a practice which in the East received comparatively much less attention, at least after the fifth century. Greek rhetorical theorists tend to repeat the old Hellenistic definitions or else to describe allegory under the aspect of concepts more familiar to them, such as emphasis. The Eastern substitute is a special brand of mysticism. The two have much in common, but they are not the same. Allegory tended to rely on equations within the human experience; emphasis seeks to pass imperceptibly between the physical and the metaphysical. Byzantium had no deep need for allegory because she was more alive to the symbolic function of the spoken and written word in its own right.

1. The height of achievement in this quarter as far as the Byzantines were concerned is the life and works of the Church Fathers. Cf. PSELUS' estimate of John Chrysostom (96.1-7 in LEVY's edition, cited note 3, p. 197): καταντᾷ δὲ πρὸς ἡθος ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ καὶ πᾶν αἰχμαλωτίζει νόημα πρὸς διόρθωσιν τῆς τῶν ἀκροαζομένων ψυχῆς. ἀλληγορεῖν δὲ βούλεται μὲν, οἰκονομεῖ δὲ τὸν λόγον ταῖς ἀκροαῖς καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀνοίξας τοῦ στόματος, ὅσον ἐμφανῆσαι τοῖς ἐλλογιμωτέροις, ὅτι τοῦ βήματός ἐστι καὶ τῶν ἀδύτων ἐν-τός, τὸ πλεῖον αὐτῷ μέρος ἡθολογίαν τίθησι καὶ ἀρετῶν ἐξέτασιν καὶ ἀκρίβειαν.

2. 6.587.6 W: τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων καὶ αἰνιγματωδῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν κατὰ μίμησιν γεγραμμένων, ἀσαφογράφων τινῶν, κτλ. Cf. HERMOG., 240.25 ff; PLUTARCH, *Quaest. Conviv.* 9.747D: πρὸς τὰς ἐμφάσεις καὶ τὰς μιμήσεις καὶ ὀνοματοποιίας χρώνται καὶ μεταφοραῖς. See p. 95.

In turn, the religious perspective from which such figures as Pythagoras, Heracleitus, Plato, Aristotle, and their followers viewed their philosophical pursuits supplied the required ancient models. Christian thought found new use for these attitudes. Byzantium was a theocentric state, the earthly representation of the heavenly kingdom. If, as the theorists claimed, literature was an organism, the life of the logos in such a commonwealth was properly the religious life. Hermogenes' contribution had been to suggest a way of idealizing the very praxis of literature. And just as the liturgy does not commemorate but re-enacts the life of Christ, so too now not only the homilist and hymnographer, or the exegete inspired to appreciate the pronouncements of Scripture, but the sacred act and art of discourse itself evoke in words God's living presence in His mysterious majesty. Byzantium provides a historical application of Plato's insight in prescribing a carefully ordered moral and religious literature for the ideal state.¹

1. *Rep.* 377b ff.; Book 3, *passim*; 607a ff.

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